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LETTERS, LECTURES, AND REVIEWS,

INCLUDING

THE PHRONTISTERION,

OR, OXFORD IN THE 19TH CENTURY.

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BY THE VERY REV.

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LONDON:
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PREFACE.

THE present volume contains the minor philosophical works of the late Dean Mansel, nearly all his reviews,* together with two articles hitherto unpublished, viz. the Lecture on Utility as the Ground of Moral Obligation, and the fragment on Berkeley's Philosophy, the completion of which was prevented by the decease of the author. The Phrontisterion has been added at the request of several friends. After some hesitation it was resolved to reprint this exquisite parody exactly as its author left it, rather than run the risk of spoiling its effect by explaining allusions which will be easily understood by all who are capable of enjoying such a droll combination of wit and learning. The matter enclosed in brackets is new, and has been derived from the Author's own MS. notes, from which also a few verbal alterations in the original text have been made.

The Editor's task has been confined solely to the correction of the press, and the addition of an occasional reference.

OXFORD, *February* 7, 1873.

* The article on Mr. Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, which originally appeared in the 'Contemporary Review,' has been reprinted in a separate form under the title of 'The Philosophy of the Conditioned; comprising some Remarks on Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and on Mr. J. S. Mill's Examination of that Philosophy.' Alexander Strahan. London, 1866. 8vo.

CONTENTS.

1850.

PAGE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 3

1851.

RECENT EXTENSIONS OF FORMAL LOGIC 39

1853.

THE LIMITS OF DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE CONSIDERED 79

1854.

MAN'S CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY. AN EXAMINATION OF MR. MAURICE'S THEORY OF A FIXED STATE OUT OF TIME 111

1855.

PSYCHOLOGY THE TEST OF MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY .. 127

1856.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 157

1859.

MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 189

1863.

PAGE

SENSATION NOVELS 215

MODERN SPIRITUALISM 255

1864.

FREETHINKING—ITS HISTORY AND TENDENCIES 293

1866.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 339

ON UTILITY AS A GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION 363

1871.

ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. A FRAGMENT 381

SCENES FROM AN UNFINISHED DRAMA, ENTITLED 'PHRONTISTERION, OR, OXFORD IN THE 19TH CENTURY' 392

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE FULL TITLES OF THE PAMPHLETS REPRINTED IN THIS VOLUME.

The Limits of Demonstrative Science considered, in a Letter to the Rev. William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, Cambridge; Author of the History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. By the Rev. Henry Longueville Mansel, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of St. John's College, Oxford; Author of Prolegomena Logica. Oxford: William Graham; Whittaker & Co., Ave Maria Lane, London. 1853. 8vo.

Man's Conception of Eternity. An Examination of Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time; in a Letter to the Rev. L. J. Bernays, M.A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. By the Rev. H. L. Mansel, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of St. John's College, Oxford. London: John Henry Parker, 377, Strand, and Broad Street, Oxford. 1854. 8vo.

Psychology the Test of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. An Inaugural Lecture delivered in Magdalen College, October 23, 1855. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B.D., Reader in Moral and and Metaphysical Philosophy, Magdalen College; Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College.

"La psychologie n'est assurément pas toute la philosophie, mais elle en est le fondement."—COUSIN.

Oxford: William Graham, High Street; Whittaker & Co., London. 1855. 8vo.

A Lecture on the Philosophy of Kant, delivered at Magdalen College, May 20, 1856. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B.D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Magdalen College; Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College. Oxford, and 377, Strand, London: John Henry and James Parker. 1856. 8vo.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

CONTENTS.

The Marriage of Hermes and Philologia as described by Marcianus Capella.

Change in the Method of Philosophy.

The Mediæval *Trivium*, Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric.

The Organon of Aristotle.

Results of the first and last Classification of the Facts of Consciousness.

Relations of Language and Thought.

Two Methods of treating Grammar.

Tooke's Diversions of Purley.

Sir J. Stoddart's Treatise.

The Unit of Thought is a Judgment: the Unit of Speech is a Proposition.

Definition of Grammar.

Principal Parts of Speech: the Noun and the Verb.

The ῥῆμα of Aristotle.

Moods and Tenses.

Secondary Parts of Speech: the Adjective and Participle.

The Object of Universal Grammar.

Subordinate Parts of Speech: the Preposition, Conjunction, Adverb.

The Interjection not a Part of Speech.

Merits of Sir J. Stoddart's Work.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.*

At the marriage festivities of Mercury and Philology, as reported by Marcianus Capella, there appeared, among other guests, an elderly lady of a mild and pleasing aspect, whose dress and accoutrements seemed to mark her as a professor of medicine or a calculator of nativities.† She bore in her hand, among other somewhat unusual specimens of female ornament, a certain bitter drug, of a scarlet colour, composed of the growth of the cane and of thongs of goatskin, the virtues of which are described in terms which might lead the reader to suspect an anticipation of certain modern tooth-powders. It "purified the gums, and imparted a pleasing fragrance to the breath."‡ The fair stranger, however, put an end to all doubt as to her country and profession, by announcing herself as Egyptian by birth, Athenian by adoption, and called by the latter people Grammatica, from her office of delineating alphabetical characters.

Reader, herein is mystery. Hermes, the bridegroom of the fable, is none other than the Trismegistus of the Neo-Platonists and of Mr. Shandy, "the greatest king, the greatest lawgiver, the greatest philosopher, and the greatest priest—and engineer." Metaphor apart, Hermes is the heaven-born Reason, and his mortal bride Philologia represents the whole cycle of human learning.

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* This review of 'The Philosophy of Language,' Part I., Universal Grammar,' by Sir John Stoddart, Knt., LL.D. (Second Edition, London, 1849), appeared in the 'North British Review,' vol. xiv., No. 27, Nov. 1850. Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2., p. iii. [Ed.]

† Lib. iii. 228. "Quum deorum nonnulli Iatricen, alii Genethliacen, diversis rerum operibus æstimarent."

‡ Lib. iii. 224. "Tunc etiam quoddam medicamen acerrimum, quod ex ferulæ flore caprigenique tergoris resectione confecerat, rubri admodum coloris, exprompsit, quod monebat fauci-bus admovendum, cum indocta rusticitate vexatæ, fœtidos ructus vitiosi oris exhalant." Capella seems to have regarded grammatical solecisms in the same light as Beatrice did abuses of language of another kind. "Foul words is but foul wind, and foul wind is but foul breath, and foul breath is noisome." The medicine, as our junior readers will probably testify, retains its virtues to the present day. Sooth to say, if our schoolboy recollections prove not treacherous, the modern prescription does not say, *faucibus admovendum.*

If some Capella of the nineteenth century were to write a new matrimonial allegory, the customs of modern society would demand considerable alteration in the details of the description. Instead of Apollo to extol the personal and mental graces of the bride, and a senate of gods to decree her apotheosis, and Juno Pronuba to bless the marriage, there would be stipulations concerning fortune, and a lawyer to draw up the necessary instruments, and the careful father of the maiden to demand of the ardent lover whether he, Mercury, god of thieves, had the means of procuring an honest living, and what settlements he could afford to make on the object of his affections. And by a happy coincidence, rarely found in the history of allegories, the fiction, thus modified, would not inadequately represent a corresponding change in the method of philosophy.

When Kant contrasted the sure and steady progress of the mathematical and physical sciences with the contradiction and uncertainty which prevailed in metaphysics, he perceived that the former owed this advantage chiefly to their having abandoned the method of inquiry which was still pursued in the latter. All knowledge becomes sure and permanent only when the subject governs, instead of being governed by, the object. While man remains the passive slave of the world without, he feels his way blindfold, and stumbles at every step. It is only when he becomes the judge and master of nature, subjecting all phenomena to the immutable laws of his own mind, that he advances with open eye and firm tread on the broad highway of science. Upon the nature and laws of the human mind depends all the certainty of human knowledge.* Let Hermes, then, ere he aspire to the hand of Philology, examine carefully into the resources of his estate and the validity of his title-deeds.

But though every department of human knowledge is ultimately dependent on Psychology, the connection is most immediate and apparent in the three branches which formed the mediæval *Trivium*—grammar, logic, and rhetoric. All these are concerned in different ways, not with the employment of the mind in some one special province, but with the laws and manner of its operation in many. The mind of man has been

* [Cf. Hume, 'Treatise of Human Nature,' p. 7.]

aptly compared by Aristotle to the hand,* and the comparison will hold good to illustrate the present distinction. For, as it is one thing to employ the hand well in any special work of art, and another to understand the law and manner of its working in all;—as it is one thing to be an expert carpenter, or a skilful engraver, or a neat-handed Phillis in dressing of meats, and another to know how the same member acts as the organ of the sense of touch, as the recorder of the thoughts of the philosopher, as the agent of the energetic purpose of the pugilist; so it is one thing to employ the mind acutely and successfully in the researches of geometry or optics or astronomy, and another to investigate the principles of performing and communicating the several operations of sense, reason, and will.

On this account, these three sciences (for such in truth they are) have sometimes been described as faculties or instrumental arts; and a work of Aristotle's, usually considered as an exposition of logic alone, but which is, in fact, a collection of separate treatises more or less related to the whole *Trivium*,† has been emphatically designated by the name of *The Instrument*. In truth, these kindred branches of knowledge should rather have been called sciences of the instrument. The faculties and operations of the mind are, in different ways, the legitimate province of all three, and it is this last alone which directly performs the office of an instrument to the material sciences.‡

"The analysis of facts in psychology," says M. Cousin, "belongs almost exclusively to modern times; the ancients confined themselves chiefly to transcendental metaphysics."§ In this remark the great Eclectic has hardly done justice to a philosopher who, notwithstanding his encroachments on the domain of physiology, unquestionably laid the foundations of the inductive science of mind, and whose classification of the facts of consciousness coincides remarkably with M. Cousin's own. Both acknowledge three distinct and co-ordinate classes,

* 'De Anima,' iii., 8; 'Problem,' xxx. 5.

† The 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione' have most connection with Grammar; the 'Analytics' with Logic; the 'Topics' and 'Sophistic Refutations' with Rhetoric.

‡ See Biese, 'Die Philosophie des Aristoteles,' vol. i., p. 45.

§ 'Fragments Philosophiques;' 'Esquisses de Philosophie Morale,' par Dugald Stewart.

those of sensation, reason, and activity.* Two of these have been strangely neglected by modern philosophers. The critical philosophy suppresses the active element. M. Cousin's predecessors in France, from Condillac to De Tracy, derive the whole material † of our knowledge from the senses only; and even the reflection of Locke, as explained by himself, is not sufficiently independent of sensation to exonerate that philosopher from the same charge. Thus have two out of three of the soul's powers been ignored by her hierophants. Melampus, we doubt not, did good service to Argos when he *devaccinated* the daughters of Prœtus; but the doctor's fee cost the monarch two-thirds of his kingdom. The father of modern psychology was bred a physician likewise, and in that capacity has removed many a hallucination of distempered fancy; but, while destroying the El Dorados of the mind, he has sadly curtailed her substantial dominions.

Sensation, Reason, Will. Such is the result of the first and last classification of the facts of consciousness.‡ Analysis has still much to perform in the subdivision and arrangement of the several members of these three great classes; but in the recognition of the claims of each as a separate and independent source of knowledge, there is every reason to trust that the foundations are securely laid for the still imperfect science of inductive psychology. And whilst, in accordance with the same classification, the laws of the operations of the reason are

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* Νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ, καὶ τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει. Arist. 'De Anima,' ii. 2. "J'ai classé tous les phénomènes de la conscience en trois classes, lesquelles se rattachent à trois grandes facultés élémentaires, qui, dans leurs combinaisons, comprennent et expliquent toutes les autres: ces facultés sont la sensibilité, l'activité, la raison." Cousin, 'Fragments Philosophiques;' Préface de la 2me édition. Aristotle's admission of the unconscious nutritive faculty has been justly censured by his translator, M. St. Hilaire; but as regards the true facts of consciousness, his classification coincides with Cousin's, and is far more nearly perfect than that of many modern philosophers. The reader who wishes fully to appreciate Aristotle's merits in mental science, may consult Sir W. Hamilton's edition of Reid's Works, Notes D, D*, D**. We trust the illustrious editor will ere long be enabled to complete this noble monument to the father of Scottish psychology.

† [Individualize your concepts, in the whole of this school, means sensationalize them. But has not the will (and the religious element) a body of *presentations* (Anschauungen neglected by Kant) which may be objects of thought? and will not the admission of such elements extend the province of the imaginative faculty likewise?]

‡ [Should not a *religious element* be added? What may be made in a philosophy of religion of the psychological fact, that man is a *worshipping being?*]

assigned as the province of logic, and those of the movement of the will as that of rhetoric (while in sensation the mind is rather the passive recipient* than the active operator), universal grammar claims a wider field, in the whole relation of thought to language—of the several phenomena of consciousness to the instrument by which they are both represented to ourselves and communicated to our fellows.

Thus far (no great distance, indeed) we advance without serious impediment; but the very mention of thought and language throws us at once into the region of controversy. Is thought the parent of speech, or speech of thought? or are they twin brethren, inseparable though distinct, or the successive offspring of one progenitor? And, in the latter case, does chronological precedence convey also pre-eminence in rank? or, like the sons of Isaac, is the elder brother the servant of the younger? Nay further, is thinking itself but an unspoken language, or is the connection between thought and its symbol accidental only and arbitrary? Can we change our symbols at will, or dispense with them altogether? Is the clothing of our minds, as of our bodies, the result of fall and corruption? and can we return to the state of primitive excellence, and behold our thoughts face to face divested of their conventional habiliments?† Or is orthodoxy to be found in the tenets of that sect who maintain that man, in mind as well as in body, is but a micro-coat, and that what the world calls improperly suits of clothes, are, in reality, the most refined species of beings?

All these opinions have had their champions, and some of them of no mean note. To take only two extremes, we have, on the one side, the precept of Locke, that "the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being wholly laid aside, is the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge;"‡ and, on the other side, Condillac maintains that

* [Properly, the *organism* is passive, the mind active in *attention*. Cf. Hamilton on Reid, p. 80. Morell, 'Philos. of Religion,' p. 7.]

† Compare the curious hypothesis of Condillac, who holds that the mind became dependent on the senses in consequence of the fall of Adam. It would almost seem as if the author had some presentiment of the ulterior development of his doctrine in the hands of the Ideologists, and had introduced instinctively this *Deus ex machina* by way of recoil from the consequences of his own principles.

‡ [A doctrine inadmissible in Locke, who believed in abstract ideas, though in one sense true in Berkeley, who held

science is but a well-made language, and Horne Tooke assures us that the business of the mind extends no further than to receive impressions, and that what are called its operations are merely the operations of language. The truth, we suspect, lies between the two. To identify the operations of thought and language is to confound the material refractions of the eye with the mental sensation of sight: to expect to carry on a process of thought unaided by verbal or other symbols, is to put out our eyes that we may see the clearer. To perceive by organs, to think by symbols, may be imperfections in mankind as compared with a higher order of beings; but they are imperfections inseparable from our condition on earth, which we must bear with us while soul and body are united. Yet there have not been wanting speculators, who have sought, not to improve and strengthen their instruments, but to dispense with them altogether; as the gouty patient, in a moment of irritation, curses the good limb that has borne him through many a journey, and devoutly wishes, for the prevention of his torments, that man had been created a natural *cul-de-jatte*.

That language is not thought, is evident from the fact that the same conception may be represented by different words. That language (verbal or other) is inseparable from thought, is rendered morally certain by the impossibility under which we all labour of forming universal notions without the aid of voluntary symbols. The instant we advance beyond the perception of that which is present *now* and *here*, our knowledge can be only representative; as soon as we rise above the individual object, our representative sign must be arbitrary.* The phantasms of imagination may have more or less resemblance to the objects of sense; but they bear that resemblance solely by virtue of being, like those objects themselves, individual. I may recall to mind, with more or less vividness, the features of an absent friend, as I may paint his portrait with more or less accuracy; but the likeness in neither case ceases to be the individual representation of an individual man. But my *conception*† of man in general can attain universality only by

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all ideas to be individual. Cf. 'Princ. of Human Knowledge,' xxi–xxiii.]

* [Duval-Jouve, 'Traité de Logique,' p. 203.] Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, 14 *sqq.* and 65. [Ed.]

† Here we must take the liberty to dissent from Sir John Stoddart; not indeed from his principles, but from his

surrendering resemblance; it becomes the representative of all mankind only because it has no special likeness to any one man.*

As a matter of necessity, men must think by symbols; as a matter of fact, they do think by language;—that is, they employ a corresponding system of symbols as the media of thought and of its communication. We might waste much fruitless speculation on the precise nature of the connection between these two,—between the articulations of speech without and the εὐφήμου στόμα φροντίδος within. The word of thought we feel to be in some sort an echo of the word of speech, yet the one is an articulate sound, wholly material, and the other a modification of mind, wholly spiritual.† But the truth is, that in this, as in every other case where mind and matter come in contact, we dogmatize at the point where ignorance begins, like the babbling hound, giving tongue when the scent is lost. Witness the vulgar idea of a ghost, as a visible vapour with human features,—a substance every whit as material as Daniel Lambert or a Smithfield prize ox. Witness the representative theory of perception, with its whole apparatus of bodily effluxions and sensible species, and a host of other corporeo-spiritual go-betweens; as if these were stages of transition from matter to

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phraseology. "Conception," he says, "which is derived from *con* and *capio*, expresses the action by which I *take up together* a portion of our sensations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity." That the etymology of the word allows of its being thus applied to the perception of individual compounds, we do not deny; but it has already been appropriated to express a still more important distinction—that of the act by which we comprehend by means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the *perception* of a present, and the *imagination* of an absent, *individual*. German philosophers have adopted a similar distinction between "Begriff" and "Anschauung;" the latter of which is applied both to the percepts of sense and to the phantasms of the imagination. The operation which Sir John Stoddart in the above passage calls *conception*, Kant, in the first edition of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' distinguishes by the name of *apprehension*, and regards it as the work of the imaginative faculty. In the subsequent editions he calls it *conjunction* (Verbindung), and attributes it to the understanding. The latter view justifies Sir John's use of the term conception—at least in the eyes of those who admit (which we are by no means inclined to do) the whole of the Kantian theory of perception. [Cf. Herbart, 'Werke,' vol. i., pp. 71, 259, 308.]

* "On peut le dire dans un certain sens, il n'est point de véritable idée sans *signe volontaire*." [Cf. Duval-Jouve, 'Logique,' p. 9.] Such are the words of Maine de Biran, an author who will scarcely be suspected of conceding too much to sensationalism or materialism. [Cf. Hamilton on Reid, p. 291. Berkeley, 'Princ. of Human Knowledge,' §§. ix., x., xi., xii.; Hume, 'Of Human Nature,' bk. i., part i., § 7.]

† [Cf. Damiron, 'Psychologie,' vol. ii., p. 185.]

mind, as if body became soul by being rarefied, or soul became body by being informed. That mind does become cognizant of matter, is a truth which our every-day consciousness attests; how it does so we know not; the fact remains ultimate and inexplicable—a mystery.* We can examine separately the phenomena of each, as we can investigate the structure of the earth, or the architecture of the heavens: we seek the boundary-line of their junction, as the child chases the horizon, only to discover that it flies as we pursue it.†

There are two methods by which grammar may be treated as a science; methods corresponding to the two extremes between which all philosophy oscillates, sensationalism and idealism, the relation of object to subject viewed from the one or the other side. The one takes its departure from the external phenomena of existing languages, the other from the internal testimony of our own consciousness. The one employs the researches of comparative philology to ascertain the history of languages in their origin and progress from the parent stem; the other, reasoning from the facts and laws of the human mind, inquires how language must have arisen, as the instrument of thought and its communication. And here, as in all other branches of philosophy, the merits of each method must ultimately be tested by the comparison of their results; the errors arising from the exclusive pursuit of either will be eliminated, and the truths common to both confirmed, by their combination. But for this we are not yet ripe. Comparative grammar is but of yesterday, and psychology, though of elder birth and maturer growth, has not yet been fully investigated or applied to the solution of the problems of language. Both must be suffered to advance to completeness, and even to run

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* The nature of the mystery is well stated by Royer-Collard—"Le mystère consiste en ce que la raison ne découvre aucune connexion nécessaire entre les impressions faites sur nos organes et la connaissance des objets extérieurs qui suit ces impressions, c'est-à-dire entre la matière et le mouvement d'une part, et la pensée de l'autre. Les philosophes ont voulu percer ce mystère, et ils ont cherché pour cela des analogies dans les lois du monde physique."

† In no case is this more strongly exemplified than in some of the speculations on the first paradox of vision. Why do we see upright with an inverted image on the retina? To answer the question fully, we ought to know the exact relation between the material focus of reflected rays and the mental sensation of sight. The former can be produced by glass or crystal, but even a French ideologist would shrink from the absurdity of a lens that can see.

into extravagance, before the merits or the faults of either can be brought to the test of a discriminating eclecticism. For the present we need only observe that the tendency of the former school is to give too much weight to chronological antecedence, that of the latter to attend too exclusively to logical priority. A notion or judgment is logically prior to another, when its existence or truth is necessarily implied as a condition of that of the latter; but in the order of time, the dependent and consequent fact may be the earlier known by us.*

Tooke's 'Diversions of Purley' may in one point of view be regarded as a premature attempt to reconcile the two methods by the application of a hasty and partial philology to a crude and one-sided theory of mind. Viewed with reference to psychology alone, the author undoubtedly belongs, where he is usually placed, to the ultra-sensational school. Viewed with reference to grammar, he is not without a sprinkling of abortive eclecticism. And by a strange perversity of fortune, while he confounded the form of speech with the matter, and endeavoured to merge the philosophy of language in its history, he has been more successful on the formal than on the material side of grammar, in his philosophical principle than in his etymological details. His main position, that the noun and the verb are the only necessary parts of speech, if not absolutely true, requires but slight modification to become so. But that historically there ever was a time when the language of mankind consisted of these parts only, is a theory which, however plausibly supported by his Anglo-Saxon and Gothic etymologies, has been anything but confirmed by a more extensive examination of the Indo-Teutonic languages. But on this question it would as yet be premature to pronounce judgment. We must leave the philologer and the metaphysician to pursue their separate paths, confident that the time will come when the conclusions of each, with redundancies lopped and deficiencies supplied, may be combined into one harmonious whole. Meanwhile the writer on universal grammar will best fulfil his task by taking for his guide the precept of Leibnitz,

* The distinction is as old as Aristotle. Some valuable remarks on its importance may be found in M. Cousin's critique of Locke, 'Cours de Philosophie,' Leçon xvii. Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 64.

"Il est vrai que celui qui écriroit une Grammaire Universelle feroit bien de passer de l'essence des langues à leur existence, et de comparer les grammaires de plusieurs langues. Cependant, dans la science même, séparée de son histoire ou existence, il n'importe point si les peuples se sont conformés ou non à ce que la raison ordonne." *

The above remarks will also in a great measure be applicable to another metaphysico-grammatical theory. That there ever was a period in the history of man, as Reid conjectures,† when every single word represented a sentence, when the noun and the verb themselves held the same place which their several syllables hold now, as fractional and imperfect in speech as they still are in thought; this is an hypothesis which we may reasonably hesitate to admit. But logically the position is true. The sentence, we may go farther, the enunciative sentence, is the unit of speech, as the judgment is of thought; and it behoves us to remember, that the verbal analysis of the thoughts we utter, like the chemical decomposition of the air we breathe, exhibits only the forced and unnatural dissolution of parts whose vital force and efficacy exists only in combination.

The treatise of Sir John Stoddart is a valuable contribution to the science of grammar from the psychological point of view. The author commences with the recognition of two most important but often neglected principles; (1.) That the philosophy, as distinct from the history, of language must be based on a knowledge of the faculties of the mind; and (2.) That the distinction between the several parts of speech is intelligible only in their relation to the sentence as a whole. With the greater part of the contents of the work we cordially agree; and with this opinion of its general value, and indeed in consequence of it, we venture, for the sake of further accuracy, to point out, in no invidious spirit, a few points on which we are compelled to differ from the learned author.

Of the threefold division of the facts of consciousness, which Sir John Stoddart agrees with us in adopting, we have spoken already. We have now to speak of the subordinate classification

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* 'Nouv. Essais,' l. 3, c. 5, § 8.

† Correspondence with James Gregory, Letter XI. See p. 71 of Sir W. Hamilton's edition.

of the operations of reason alone, with respect to which he gives the ordinary logical division into simple apprehension, judgment, and discourse. Here we must notice, if not an error, at least an omission of some consequence. Sir John, while he partially adopts in practice, has neglected to state in theory, what we believe to be the cardinal point of grammar and of logic. It should be remarked, (1.) that judgment is not confined to the province of thought strictly so called; (2.) that, whether within or without that province, it is logically as well as chronologically prior to the corresponding apprehension, using the latter term also in its widest extent. Logically, apprehension cannot exist without judgment. Every perception, nay, every imagination and conception, is accompanied by a conviction of the existence of its object, either within or without the mind; and the possibility of consciousness itself depends upon the mutual relation of subject and object. And in the order of time, the complete analysis of the development of mind assures us that its earliest operations, whether relating to itself or to the world without, appear in the form of singular judgments, combining an attribute with a subject.* It is not till reflection comes in and decomposes the complex whole into its constituent elements, that we learn to estimate the value of the fractional parts of the unit of consciousness. For this purpose, language is our instrument. It is of course difficult to speculate on the possible results of a supposition which never has been, and never will be realised; but we believe that if man had been denied the gift of speech, judgment would have been the sole operation of his mind. It is true that he would not have known it as judgment, being conscious of no other operation from which to distinguish it. The complex nature of each perception and volition would have remained undetected, from want of the instrument by which it is analysed; as the combination of rays in the light of the sun is not suspected by those who have never witnessed its refraction.

The service performed by language† in the analysis of our

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* For a farther explanation of most of what is here advanced, the reader is referred to M. Cousin's 'Cours de Philosophie,' especially to the four concluding lectures. † Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 17. [Ed.]

intuitions, and its consequent necessity for the formation, and not merely for the communication of thought, holds a conspicuous position in the philosophy of Condillac; and it is probably this association which has caused the whole theory to be regarded as a consequence of ultra-sensational views of the origin of knowledge. But it would not be difficult to show that the sensational philosophy is pre-eminently that which could most easily dispense with the necessity for introducing language at all. Ideas, says Condillac, are but transformed sensations; and his disciple, Destutt de Tracy, has carried the doctrine to its climax in the aphorism *penser c'est sentir*. But who imagines language to be indispensable to sensation? Or who does not see that the introduction of such an instrument for the purpose of transforming sensations implies the existence of a mental power which mere sensation can never confer? It is only on the supposition that the concept is something totally distinct from, and unlike all the products of the senses, that the representative symbol becomes necessary. As for the crowning extravagance of Horne Tooke, who assures us that what are called the operations of mind are merely operations of language, we have only to ask, what makes language operate? He might as reasonably have maintained that a coat is not the work of the tailor, but of his needle. But it is the perpetual error of the sensational school to confound the indispensable condition of a thing with the thing itself. Thought is not sensation, though the exercise of the senses is a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the understanding. Science is not a well-constructed language, as the skill of the painter is not identical with the excellence of his brush or colours; yet we may still acknowledge that the power of the artist could neither have been acquired nor exhibited had these useful instruments been withheld.*

From these data it may be seen with what limitations we ought to accept the definition of knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.† It is true of knowledge strictly so called;‡ of truth conveyed from man to

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* Cf. Damiron, 'Psychologie,' vol. ii., pp. 188, 192; 'Logique,' p. 234.

† Ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν.—Arist. 'Eth. Nic.' vi. 3.

‡ [Cf. Duval-Jouve, 'Logique,' p. 21.]

man, conveyed piecemeal in the words of the teacher, and put together in the mind of the learner. It is not true of those judgments, whether of the world without or of the world within, which we gain without the intervention of language. An instance will explain our meaning. Having seen a white swan, I am told of the existence of black ones. Here I put together my distinct notions of swan and black, and perceive their possible agreement. But in seeing the white swan I did nothing of the kind. I did not form independent ideas, first of swan, then of white, then of their agreement; they were presented in combination, and the mental effort was made to separate them. From sensation let us pass to reason. When Descartes * discovered his famous *Cogito, ergo sum,* assuredly he did not arrive at that knowledge by perceiving the agreement of the idea I, with those of thought and existence successively.† Primarily, then, apprehension is the analysis of judgment; secondarily, judgment may be the synthesis of apprehensions.‡

As the unit of thought is a judgment, so the unit of speech is a proposition. When we consider language, not as caught up unconsciously by the imitative animal from the dictation of mother or nurse, but as consciously evoked by the creative man, as the exponent of the secrets of his mind, we are tempted to believe that the earliest expression of consciousness would naturally correspond to its earliest operation. But whatever disturbing causes may affect the chronological formation of language, the logical priority of the proposition remains unshaken. We mean, that it alone is fully significant, and that the power and distinctive character of every subordinate portion of speech is derived from its relation to this one. Grammarians have too often overlooked the important principle, that the significance of the several parts of speech depends entirely on their functions in combination, as members of an organized

* Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 74. [Ed.]

† On this point we have the testimony of Descartes himself: "Cum itaque quis advertit se cogitare, atque inde sequi se existere, quamvis forte nunquam antea quæsiverit quid sit cogitatio nec quid existentia, non potest tamen non utramque satis nosse, ut sibi in hac parte satisfaciat."—'Responsio ad sextas objectiones.' See an article in M. Cousin's 'Fragments Philosophiques,' "sur le vrai sens du *Cogito, ergo sum.*"

‡ [Cf. Herbart, 'Werke,' vol. v., p. 60; Reid, 'Intellect. Powers,' iv., 3, p. 376, ed. Hamilton.]

whole. Horne Tooke and his disciples have wasted much good ridicule on a doctrine held by philosophers and grammarians from Aristotle to Harris, viz., that words insignificant when separate may have significance in connection; and an able writer has not scrupled to declare, that "it is a maxim without which science could not be applied to the subject of language, that the same word has always the same radical import, in whatever different situations it may be placed." * And yet the very conception of a part or membe implies that the performance of its duties depends on its connection with the whole. Where is the sight of the eye or the feeling of the hand, except so long as they are in the body and of the body? † May we not speak of an acid and an alkali as substances ineffervescent in themselves, but having effervescence in combination? And in this respect, language misunderstood has been injurious to sound philosophy, inasmuch as, by separating the several members of the body of speech, men have been led to fancy that they have an absolute and not a relative, an integral and not a fractional value.

Among many merits of Sir John Stoddart's treatise, one of the greatest is the manner in which he has apprehended and carried out the above principle. His definition of grammar—*the science of the relations which the constituent parts of speech bear to each other in significant combination*—is peculiarly happy,‡ and the following passages may be selected from several others in which the same principle is made the basis of accurate and philosophical teaching:—

"It is proper to observe, with Vossius, that the grammatical character of a word is not necessarily attached to its sound, but to the function which it performs in a sentence. Particular languages indeed may appropriate certain forms to certain parts of speech, and therefore in the dictionaries of such languages we find words marked as substantives, adjectives, adverbs, &c.; as, in Latin, *dominus* is a substantive, *flebilis* an adjective, *prudenter* an adverb; and these words cannot be used otherwise in that language; but this is matter of particular grammar, and not of universal."—P. 53.

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* 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' art. 'Grammar.'

† Ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος. Arist. 'De Anima,' ii. 1.

‡ Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 289. [Ed.]

"To suppose that the prepositions necessary to any language could be enumerated *a priori* would certainly be absurd. It has been said that the Greeks had eighteen prepositions, the Latins forty-nine, and the French (according to different authors) thirty-two, forty-eight, and seventy-five. It is certainly possible to ascertain what words *have been* used as prepositions in a dead language, but in a living language it is quite impracticable to determine how many *should be* so used; for every day may enhance their number, by new combinations of thought and expression. A preposition is not like a piece of money stamped to pass for a certain sum, and which cannot change its denomination or value. It is a word to which a transient function is assigned, and which, as soon as it has discharged that office, becomes available again for its former purposes, as a noun, verb, or other part of speech."—P. 174.

We cannot, however, assent to the whole of Sir John Stoddart's chapter on *sentences*. The distinction between the enunciative and the passionate sentence we regard as untenable in philosophical grammar. Every sentence is complete only when it expresses a truth or falsehood; every truth and falsehood implies a proposition.* Of this, all other sentences must be regarded as abbreviations. We grant that the statement of passion in an assertory form becomes tame and spiritless; but much of this is the result of association, and the whole is out of the province of scientific analysis. It is natural for passion to vent itself in curt and abrupt form, as it is natural for the orator to suppress many of the necessary premises of his argument; but it does not follow that the sentence is grammatically complete, or the reasoning logically valid, without the addition of the omitted members. To speak of a perfect sentence without assertion, is an error of the same kind in grammar as it would be in logic to define the enthymeme as a formal consequence from a single premise.

By adopting the proposition as the unit of speech, we shall be enabled to answer satisfactorily one or two of the cavils of that somewhat pugnacious dogmatist, Horne Tooke. For instance, he maintains, in opposition to Harris's account of the verb, that it "does not denote any time, neither does it imply any assertion. No single word can." The objection vanishes

* [Cf. Damiron, 'Psychologie,' vol. ii., p. 173.]

as soon as the verb and the noun are regarded as fractional parts of the proposition. The remaining part of his criticism has already been fully answered by Sir John Stoddart. (P. 104)

The first analysis of the proposition gives us the two principal parts of speech, the noun as subject, and the verb as predicate.* And here we may take occasion to notice an error, which, originating with the Greek commentators on Aristotle, has caused much confusion to subsequent grammarians and logicians. Ammonius, commenting on *De Interpretatione*, chap. 1, supposes that Aristotle includes under the name of *verb*, an adjective in the predicate of a proposition, *i.e.*, the mere expression of an attribute without assertion; and this has led Harris to speak of the "verb in its most comprehensive signification, as including not only verbs properly so called, but also participles and adjectives." But the explanation is erroneous. The ῥῆμα of Aristotle has one uniform signification, that of a combination of attribute and assertion,—the predicate and copula united. This is equally the case, whether the combination is expressed in one word, as "runs," or in two, as "is running," "is white." The number of words is merely an accident of language, which gave rise to the scholastic distinction between propositions *secundi adjacentis*, in which the copula and predicate are united, and propositions *tertii adjacentis*, in which they are separate. Much error has been introduced into logical and grammatical treatises from overlooking the simple fact, that Aristotle reduces the latter class to the former, while subsequent writers have analysed the former into the latter. In such propositions as "snow is white," the Aristotelian ῥῆμα is the complex expression "is white," whether expressed thus, or in one word, as in Horace's "prata canis *albicant* pruinis." In the passage misunderstood by Ammonius, the word λευκόν is, by a common idiom, put for λευκόν ἐστι.

Sir John Stoddart has avoided this rock, but he has split upon another in interpreting a cognate passage in the Poetics.

"He (Aristotle) defines the σύνδεσμος, 'a word not significant, which is fitted to make of several significant words one significant

* Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 292. [Ed.]

word' (or rather sentence). And further on he says, 'not every sentence consists of ῥήματα and nouns; but it is possible that there may be a sentence without a ῥῆμα;' as an instance of which (it seems) he refers to 'the definition of man.' The passage is rather obscure, but it would seem from the context that he means this:—If we say, 'man is an animal,' the sentence is perfect, but there is no ῥῆμα in it; for the word 'is' serves merely as a connective to make of two nouns, 'man' and 'animal,' one significant sentence; but in itself it signifies neither substance nor attribute, neither does it mark time, and for these reasons it is not to be deemed a ῥῆμα."—P. 119.

That there is no verb in the sentence "man is an animal," is an interpretation for which Aristotle would hardly have thanked his commentator. The verb, however, is not the simple copula, but the copula with the predicate, "is an animal." The sentence without a verb alluded to by the Stagirite is his own well known definition of man, ζῶον πέζον δίπουν; which is a *sentence, i.e.*, a combination of more words than one, but not a *proposition*, as not containing a verb.*

We have thought it right to notice these misinterpretations, on account of the almost universal prevalence of the chief error; and because we believe that Aristotle's account of the verb, when rightly explained, is one of the most accurate within its own limits that has ever been given. It coincides in essentials with Sir John Stoddart's own, though Sir John does not seem to be aware of the coincidence. The following passage would be fully allowed by the Stagirite:—

"I consider as essential properties of the verb, its power,—

1*st*, To signify an *attribute* of some substance.

2*ndly*, To *connect* such attribute with its proper substance.

3*rdly*, To *assert*, directly or indirectly, the existence or non-existence of the connection.

"I consider as accidental properties, those which grammarians have commonly designated by some such terms as kind, voice, mood, tense, person, number, gender, &c."—P. 121.

Our limits will not permit us to follow the author through his ingenious deduction of the latter properties from the

* That this is the true explanation may be seen by comparing 'De Int.,' 5. 1, where Waitz's text and comment should be adopted. That every definition must be expressed in a λόγος, *i.e.*, in more words than one, is maintained in the 'Topics' (i. 5), where he excludes synonyms.

former. From the property of assertion he derives the mood; from that of connection, the tense; from that of attribute, the person, number, and gender. The most important of these are the moods and tenses. The former, as connected with assertion, may, we believe, be reduced to two, the indicative and the subjunctive, corresponding to two *manners* of assertion, the absolute and the relative, the independent and the dependent. Other distinctions, as of the imperative and optative moods, depend not so much on a difference in the *manner of asserting*, as on a difference in the *fact asserted*. The number of tenses has been almost as much a matter of controversy as that of moods. Sir John Stoddart appears to admit as many as fourteen. Harris's scheme acknowledges twelve. Both of these, we think, may be simplified by the following, for which we are principally indebted to the suggestions of Burnouf:*—

Primary Tenses.

Present—I write, or am writing—(simultaneously with another present).

Perfect—I have written—(time before present).

Future—I am about to write—(time after present).

Secondary Tenses—Past.

(Past simultaneous with another past.)

Imperfect—I was writing—(while you were reading).

(Past before another past.)

Pluperfect—I had written—(before I saw you).

(Past after another past.)

Aorist—I wrote—(after I heard the news).

Secondary Tenses—Future.

(Future simultaneous with another future.)

Future imperfect—I shall be writing—(while you will be [are] absent).

(Future before another future.)

Future perfect—I shall have written—(before you [will] go).

* 'Méthode pour étudier la langue Grecque,' § 255. See also Donaldson, 'New Cratylus,' p. 458.

(Future after another future.)
Future indefinite—I shall write—(after I [shall] have seen him).

The present is thus regarded as a boundary line between two tenses related to itself, the now past and the now future; the one representing an act which has lasted up to the present time; the other, an act which commences from it. The present itself is obviously incapable of any relation to other acts, except that of contemporaneousness. The tenses on the same side of the present are capable of a threefold relation of time to each other. Tenses on opposite sides are contradictory of each other, and incapable of combination.

The first analysis of the proposition has given us the two primary or categorematic parts of speech, the noun substantive (or personal pronoun) and the verb. The second analysis will furnish the secondary or syncategorematic parts, the adjective and the participle. The relation of adjective to substantive in language corresponds to that of attribute and subject in thought. In the objects of sense, perception informs us only of attributes, reason compels us to add the substratum.* The history, both of our individual minds and of the general progress of philosophy, alike testifies that the union of the two precedes their resolution; and it is natural to suppose (though we do not insist on the fact) that the concrete names of things existed in like manner before the adjective was thrown off by analysis. The distinction, however, of adjective and substantive will necessarily arise, as soon as the mind is able to distinguish between qualities and their subjects, *i.e.*, as soon as it has learned to compare together objects having conspicuous features of similarity and dissimilarity. Analogous to this is the resolution of the predicate of the proposition into the component elements of attribute and assertion, the participle and the copula.

The results of the above analysis may be exhibited as follows:—Our proposition, be it remembered, appears in its original logical form, that distinguished by the schoolmen as *secundi adjacentis*. We dissent altogether from a doctrine held by some logicians—"Verbum logicum præter copulam nullum est."†

* [Cf. Herbart, 'Werke,' vol. v., p. 135.]
† Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 72. [Ed.]

Primary or categorematic parts of speech	Subject,	Substantive.
		Pronoun.
	Predicate,	Verb.
Secondary or syncategorematic parts (parts of subject or predicate,)		Adjective.
		Participle.

The characteristic of a noun substantive, or of its substitute, the personal pronoun, is that it can be the subject of an assertion. But attribute may be asserted of attribute, as well as of substance; and this gives rise to the second class of substantives, those commonly known as abstract nouns. It matters not whether these are expressed by the same word as the adjective or not. We say "whiteness is a colour," or, "white is a colour." The word "white," in this case, is clearly a substantive, as it is an adjective in the complex expression "a white horse." The distinction does not depend on the combination of letters or sounds of which the word consists, but on its use in a proposition, as the whole subject or a portion only. In confirmation of the above remarks we are happy to be able to cite the authority of Sir John Stoddart, though the learned author arrives at his conclusion by a somewhat different process.

"The noun adjective is the name of a conception or thought, considered as a quality or attribute of another conception. In more popular language, it is a word added to a substantive to designate a quality which distinguishes it from some other substantive of the same class, as, a *red* house, *a lovely* lady, the *moneyed* interest, the *fiftieth* regiment; where red, lovely, moneyed, and fiftieth are all adjectives. In order fully to understand this definition, it will be proper to advert once more to the nature of a simple enunciative sentence or logical proposition. The subject, or that concerning which something is asserted, is always a noun substantive; the predicate may be a noun adjective.*

"The inferences to be drawn from this statement are several. In the first place, whenever the name of a conception is employed as the subject of a proposition, it is not an adjective. Thus, the conception expressed by the words 'good' and 'goodness' is the same; but if we predicate anything of this conception, if, for

* Du Marsais goes so far as to maintain that the substantive, when predicated of another, becomes an adjective, *e.g.*, *roi* in "Louis XV. est roi." The remark is worth the consideration of grammarians.

instance, we say 'goodness is amiable,' the word goodness must necessarily be a substantive. And this does not depend on the form of the word; for, if the idiom of our language allowed us to say 'good is amiable,' or 'the good is amiable,' the word 'good' would be as much a substantive as 'goodness.'

"Hence it follows that the distinction between a substantive and an adjective does not necessarily depend on any difference between the conceptions which they express, but between the different modes in which those conceptions are contemplated by the mind. If we contemplate goodness as a separate idea, if we assert anything of that idea, if we make it the subject of any proposition, then it is a substantive; but if we predicate it of anything else, if we consider it only as a quality of that thing, then it is an adjective."—P. 93.

It is scarcely necessary to add that we agree with Sir John Stoddart in regarding the infinitive mood as a noun substantive; and the same is also frequently the case in English with the participial form, as in the proposition "seeing is believing." We must also assent to Aristotle's exclusion of oblique cases from the class of substantives. The genitive, indeed, has much more affinity to the adjective, and the dative to the adverb.

Horne Tooke tells us that "the adjectives, *golden, brazen, silken,* uttered by themselves, convey to the hearer's mind and denote the same things as *gold, brass,* and *silk;*" and that "the substantive and adjective are frequently convertible without the smallest change of meaning; as we may say—a perverse nature, or, a natural perversity." The schoolboy who translated *equus marinus* "a horse marine," apparently held the same opinion.

Before proceeding to the subordinate parts of speech, it is incumbent on us to notice an adverse theory, which has sometimes been considered as undermining the whole foundation of psychological grammar. Philologers of eminence have assured us that the examination of existing tongues points to two original elements,—"1. Abstract nouns, denoting the simple attributes of things; and, 2. Pronouns, originally denoting the relations of place." This fact has been partially connected with a metaphysical theory essentially at variance with most of the current doctrines of universal grammar. One able writer has associated the former with our earliest perceptions, as being the names of simple notions; and another has connected the

latter with Kant's doctrine of space, as an intuition *a priori*, the necessary condition of sensibility.* On the other hand, psychology† maintains, (1.) That we do not give names to abstract attributes earlier than to concrete substances; (2.) That men possessing only the names of pronouns and abstract attributes‡ would be incapable of carrying on by their means any process of thought.§ Philology and psychology thus present us with two distinct and independent lines of reasoning. Full weight must be allowed to the legitimate results of each, if we would form anything like a tenable hypothesis of the formation of language, supposing it to be of human origin.

In comparing the two, we must again advert to the distinction between logical and chronological priority. Our simplest notions are not our earliest, and the conception of space, though logically prior, is in time posterior to that of body. Moreover, to connect the chronology of articulations with any order of thought, two additional assumptions are needed; (1.) That language was actually used as a means of communication at a time when it possessed the elementary sounds only; (2.) That these elements were then consciously limited to the same significations which they bear in a later development of the language. The number and order of our primitive articulations, except so far as they are influenced by the caprices of a teacher, will chiefly depend on the laws of our physical conformation; the signification of each sound depends on those of our mental constitution. Is there a pre-established harmony between these two, so that our earliest utterances must correspond to our earliest notions? Or, like the sophist who inquired how many grains of corn made a heap, may we ask how many articulations must accumulate before language becomes an instrument of thought? Among the treasures discovered by Pantagruel in the library of St. Victor, was a treatise entitled *Quæstio subtilissima, utrum Chimæra bombinans*

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* 'Quarterly Review,' vol. lvii., p. 89. Donaldson, 'New Cratylus,' p. 60.

† [Cf. Smith 'On the Formation of Language.' Stewart's 'Elements,' vol. iii., p. 20.]

‡ [On the necessity of the verb, see Smith 'On the Formation of Language,' p. 369.]

§ Hobbes is of opinion that abstract nouns must have been invented after propositions, and concrete nouns before. This, however, is pushing speculation a little too far. Chronologically we have no data for determining the question. Logically, the proposition is prior to concrete as well as to abstract nouns.

in vacuo possit comedere secundas intentiones. Of this knotty problem we beg to offer the following paraphrase for the consideration of grammarians. Whether an imaginary human being, ejaculating sounds void of logical connection, is capable of employing such utensils in the preparation and consumption of a feast of reason.*

But in truth the question must be argued on different grounds. The object of universal grammar is not to ascertain how words were formed in any given language or family of languages, but to determine the relations between speech and thought, both being supposed in a certain stage of maturity; to inquire, that is, whether certain distinctions do not naturally and necessarily arise in the growth of man's mind, and whether those distinctions do not naturally and necessarily find their expression in language. The controversy in this respect stands on precisely the same footing as that concerning innate ideas, and the value of the testimony of savages and infants as to their non-existence. And as the antagonism of the sensationalist and idealist schools has modified the extravagances of each without affecting the truths common to both; as the one party have been compelled to allow that the mind is not the passive tablet of the senses, and the other, that man is not actually furnished with ideas at the time of his birth; so in the present case, the metaphysical grammarian must abandon (what few probably have meant seriously to maintain) the

* The following remarks of Maine de Biran ('Nouvelles Considerations,' &c., p. 93), are well worthy of attention. "Pour que ces premiers signes donnés deviennent quelque chose pour l'individu qui s'en sert, il faut qu'il les institue lui-même une seconde fois par son activité propre, ou qu'il y attache un sens. Ceux qui pensent que l'homme n'eût pu jamais inventer le langage, si Dieu même ne le lui eût donné ou révélé, ne me semblent pas bien entendre la question de l'institution du langage; ils confondent sans cesse le fond avec les formes. Supposé que Dieu eût donné à l homme une langue toute faite ou un système parfait de signes articulés ou écrits propres à exprimer toutes ses idées; il s'agissait toujours pour l'homme d'attribuer à chaque signe sa valeur ou son sens propre, c'est-à-dire d'instituer véritablement ce signe avec une intention et dans un but conçu par l'être intelligent, de même que l'enfant institue les premiers signes quand il transforme les cris qui lui sont donnés par la nature en véritables signes de réclame.

"La difficulté du problème psychologique, qui consiste à déterminer les facultés qui ont dû concourir à l'institution du premier langage, subsiste donc la même, soit que les signes qui sont la forme et comme le matériel de ce langage aient été donnés ou révélés par la suprême intelligence, soit qu'ils aient été inventés par l homme ou suggérés par les idées ou les sentimens dont ils sont l'expression.'

hypothesis of a language purposely invented to express previously existing mental distinctions, while the philological grammarian must not suppose that his attributive and pronominal roots constitute the whole essentials of language, or that its functions could be actually discharged by the aid of these only.

Indeed, the relation of the parts of speech to the whole is altogether unaffected by the question whether language is of spontaneous growth or the invention of design. Thought and speech have grown together under common laws, whether consciously or unconsciously obeyed. When the architect distinguishes the several parts of a building, pointing out what is necessary for stability, what for comfort, and what is merely ornamental, it is no refutation to tell him that his columns were once unhewn rock, that his beams have passed through the several stages of seed and sapling and tree and timber. Here the combination is designed. But we may also describe the several offices of the eye, the foot, or the hand, though fully aware that there was a time in every man's life when he could not judge of distance by the eye, when he could not stand upright on his feet, and when he employed his hand for the sole purpose of sucking its extremities.

We must now turn to the subordinate parts of speech, distinguished by Harris as connectives. These differ from those above noticed in one important respect. Their functions may always be discharged, awkwardly indeed, but sufficiently, by the primary parts of the proposition. And there can be no question that the clumsy and unnatural appearance of the paraphrase is principally the result of habit, the feeling of deficiency which arises from renouncing a luxury to which we have all our lives been accustomed. Hence there is much truth in Tooke's ingenious simile: "I imagine that it is in some measure with the vehicle of our thoughts as with the vehicles for our bodies. The first carriage for men was no doubt invented to transport the bodies of those who, from infirmity or otherwise, could not move themselves. But should any one, desirous of understanding the purpose and meaning of all the parts of our modern elegant carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, viz., that they were necessary for conveyance, he would find himself wofully puzzled

to account for the wheels, the seats, the springs, the glasses, the lining, &c., not to mention the mere ornamental parts of gilding, varnish, &c."

His premises, however, do not warrant his conclusion. He is right in saying that the duties of the connectives may be adequately discharged by other means; he is wrong in logically identifying the connective with the word from which etymologically it is derived, instead of with the whole sentence to which that word is subordinate. The conjunction and preposition he reduces, sometimes to the noun, sometimes to the verb. But the noun and the verb themselves are fully significant only as the subject and predicate of a proposition; the introduction of a new noun or verb implies that of a new assertion. To take one of Tooke's own instances. He tells us that *from* means *beginning*, and that the sentence, "the lamp hangs *from* the ceiling," is equivalent to "the lamp hangs, *beginning* the ceiling." But here there is an ellipsis of an assertion, "the ceiling is the beginning." We grant that the functions of the connective may be discharged by nouns and verbs; not however by either separately, but by the two in combination. Every noun is virtually the subject, every verb virtually the predicate of an assertion; and in every sentence wherein more than one noun or verb occurs, whether in full or abbreviated form, there will be an ellipsis of so many distinct propositions.

There has been some dispute among grammarians as to the distinction of the two connectives from each other. The preposition is commonly said to connect words, the conjunction, sentences. Against this Tooke adduces such expressions as "two and two make four," "A B and B C and C A make a triangle." Here the conjunction, he says, does not unite sentences; we cannot say "two is four," or "A B makes a triangle."

Sir John Stoddart adopts the old distinction, with an ingenious defence against the objector.

"In the instances cited by Tooke, the word *and* serves merely *to distribute the whole into its parts*, all which bear relation to the verb: and it is observable that, though the verb be not twice expressed, yet it is expressed differently from what it would have been had there been only a single nominative. We say 'John *is* handsome,'

'Jane *is* handsome;' but we say 'John and Jane *are* a handsome couple.' In this particular the use of the conjunction differs from that of the preposition: it varies the assertion, and thus does in effect combine different sentences; for though A B does not *form* a triangle, yet A B *forms* one part of a triangle, and B C *forms* another part, and C A the remaining part; and these three parts are the whole. . . . . Since the first publication of the passages immediately preceding, I have been glad to see the view here taken confirmed by the authority of Dr. Latham, in one of his valuable grammatical works."—P. 200.

We have a high respect for the authority of Sir John Stoddart, as well as for that of Dr. Latham, but we cannot help thinking that there is a little special pleading in this defence. And even granting its validity in the instances above given, it does not apply to cases where the conjunction unites portions of the *predicate* instead of the *subject* of a proposition. If I assert that a gentleman of my acquaintance drinks brandy *and* water, he might not relish the imputation of imbibing separate potations of the neat spirit and the pure element. Stradling *versus* Stiles is a case in point. "Out of the kind love and respect that I bear unto my much honoured and good friend Mr. Matthew Stradling, gent., I do bequeath unto the said Matthew Stradling, gent., *all my black and white horses.* The testator had six black horses, six white horses, and six pied horses."

Horne Tooke, in allusion to his own trial, complained of having been made the miserable victim of two prepositions and a conjunction. In the present case, the whole point at issue turns upon the question whether the copulative *and* joins sentences or words. If the former, the plaintiff is entitled to the black horses, and also to the white, but not to the pied. If the latter, he has a right to the pied horses, but must forego his claim to the rest. And if the latter interpretation be adopted, must we say that *and* is a preposition and not a conjunction, or must we modify the definitions of these two parts of speech? To solve this dilemma, we transcribe Sir John Stoddart's definition of the preposition, with his comment:—

"*A preposition is a part of speech employed in a complex sentence, and serving to express the relation in which the conception named by a noun*

substantive stands to that named by another noun substantive, or asserted by a verb.

"In developing the above definition, I first observe that the sentence in which the preposition is employed must be a complex one. And this is evident; for, in addition to the assertion of a connection between a subject and its attribute (which together forms a simple sentence, as 'John walks,' or 'John is walking') the preposition expresses a conception of relation, which conception, if added to the attribute and assertion in the verb, forms another simple sentence. If I say 'John walks before Peter,' I, in effect, make two assertions, first, that John is walking, and, secondly, that the walking is before Peter. In the language of lawyers, I present two issues; for it may be admitted that John walks, and denied that the walking is *before* Peter. In like manner, if the conception of relation be added to one of two connected substantives, as 'Solomon was the son *of* David,' the sentence involves two assertions, viz. that Solomon stood in the relation of a son, and that that relation connected him with David; and the word expressing the connection is the preposition 'of.'"—P. 170.

These remarks are strictly applicable only when the preposition belongs to the *predicate* of an *affirmative* proposition; but not when it is in the predicate of a *negative*, or in the subject of either. Change the above assertion to "Rehoboam was not the son of David;" assuredly I have no intention of maintaining that he was not a son. Or if I say "a man of virtue is worthy of esteem," I assert nothing either of men in general or of any individual man, except on the hypothesis of his being virtuous.

In fact, the complex sentence is purely accidental. It is never *asserted* by the speaker, but in some cases may be *inferred*. Every logician knows that where we can affirm a species, we can also affirm its genus. Hence when the preposition limits the predicate in an affirmative assertion, the unlimited conception may be affirmed likewise. This is equally the case with an adjective as with a preposition. If I say "Socrates was a good man," I imply both that he was good, and that he was a man.

Adopting, as before, the proposition as the unit of speech, and agreeing with Harris and Sir John Stoddart, that prepositions and conjunctions are both connectives, we believe the distinction between them may be more accurately stated as

follows:—A preposition is a part of speech annexed to a noun or verb in a proposition, and serving to connect it with a noun or pronoun, by which it is limited as the subject or predicate of that proposition. The nature of the limitation, for the reason stated above, will best be seen in the subject of an affirmative and in the predicate of a negative proposition. "A man *with* money is well received in society." Here I limit my assertion to the fortunate person so endowed, saying nothing at all as to the reception of his poorer brethren. "The army did not march from Rome to Capua." Here I confine my denial to that particular route, leaving it an open question whether the army marched in any other direction or not. The preposition, as thus defined, bears some resemblance to the relative pronoun; but the word annexed by the preposition is always a noun or pronoun, while that introduced by the relative is a verb, either alone or in conjunction with other parts of speech. In such sentences, for example, as "withhold not good from them *to whom it is due*," the relative is introduced by the preposition, and the verb by the relative.

The conjunction on the other hand, whether uniting words or sentences, effects no limitation, either of a subject with reference to its predicate, or of a predicate with reference to its subject. If I say, "he drinks brandy *and* water," there is no limitation, except physically of the strength of the draught. I do not predicate a peculiar kind of brandy-drinking, consequently of less frequent occurrence than the genus to which it belongs. Whereas by the slight alteration of "brandy *mixed with* water," I imply a peculiar way of diluting the spirit, as distinguished from other methods of lenitive adulteration.

An apparent exception must be noticed when the conjunction and preposition are united in a single term. "A man of wisdom and virtue is an ornament to society." Here the addition, "and virtue," limits the subject in relation to the predicate asserted. But the limitation is really effected, not by the conjunction expressed, but by the preposition understood; "a man of wisdom and *of* virtue." So "a house without door *or* roof," is equivalent to "a house without a door *and without* a roof." The two prepositions have each an independent power

of limitation. That this is the case, may easily be seen by comparing expressions in which no preposition is implied:—"Man of wisdom and virtue," is a class subordinate to "man of wisdom;" "glass of brandy and water," is not a class subordinate to "glass of brandy."

From these considerations, we are inclined to define the conjunction as a part of speech serving to unite two propositions as parts of the same complex assertion, or two words as similar parts of the subject or predicate of one proposition. By *similar parts*, we mean that the words so united stand in similar relations to the term to which they belong. For example, (1.) as attributes, both qualifying a subject, "vir bonus et sapiens dignis ait esse paratus." (2.) As prepositions, both introducing limiting nouns, "without money and without price." (3.) As substantives, both forming parts of a collective subject, "two and three are five." Whereas with the preposition, the words united are not similar but opposed, the *limiting* and the *limited* notion.

Having been compelled to dissent from one or two of Sir John Stoddart's definitions, we are glad to make some amends by expressing our approbation of that of the adverb. His account of this part of speech is the most accurate with which we are acquainted; and accuracy is the more desirable, inasmuch as there is no subject concerning which so many vague and incorrect statements have been admitted. Tooke's sarcastic translation of Servius is well known. "*Omnis pars orationis*, every word; *quando desinit esse quod est*, when a grammarian knows not what to make of it, *migrat in adverbium*, he calls an adverb." Sir John Stoddart testifies to the same effect—

"Among the twenty-eight classes enumerated by Hickes, the twenty-seven by Manutius, the twenty-one by Charisius, and those of other writers, we find enough to justify the sarcasm of Tooke, and to explain, if not to justify, the grave designation of the Stoics, who called this part of speech *πανδέκτην*, because, as Charisius says, 'Omnia in se capit, quasi collata per satiram concessa sibi rerum varietate.'"—P. 226.

Sir John's own definition is excellent:—

"An adverb is a part of speech added to a perfect sentence, for the purpose of modifying primarily the conception expressed by a

verb, an adjective nominal or pronominal, or a participle; or, secondarily, that expressed by another adverb."

We regret that we have not space to follow the author through this chapter, in which, with much learning and acuteness, he traces the origin of some of the principal English adverbs, and shews the adverbial use of the several parts of speech; thus, in fact, justifying the expression of Servius, "*omnis pars orationis migrat in adverbium.*" The result shall be given in his own words:—

"Thus are the considerations exhausted, which arise out of the definition of an adverb, as above proposed. I have shown that an adverb is properly to be reckoned among the parts of speech; that it is a word added to a sentence perfect in the expression or mind of the speaker; and that it serves to modify an attribute—that is to say, primarily a verb or an adjective (taking the latter term in its widest sense), and secondarily another adverb. I have endeavoured to reduce these modifications systematically to certain classes (a task hitherto but little thought of), referring the modifications of verbs first to the corporeal relations of place and time, positive and relative, and then to the mental relations, propositional or argumentative; the former applying either to affirmation or negation, clear or doubtful, or else to interrogation and response; and the latter to the connection of propositions, particularly of the premises with the conclusion. The modifications of the adjective I have considered as affecting either their quantity or their quality. The positive quantity is either continuous or discrete; the relative admits of intension or remission; modifications of quality are also positive or relative, and the latter regard either similitude or degree. The secondary modifications (viz. those of adverbs by adverbs), follow the course of the primary: and I have here noticed certain classes of words, which, as affecting no modification of an attribute, are in my opinion improperly admitted into the class of adverbs. I have next considered the methods by which the expression of the modification of attributives is effected in language, viz. by an adverbial phrase, a compound word, or a single word, which constitutes the part of speech we call an adverb. And, lastly, I have shown by examples, that the words which may be employed to perform the function of adverbs, with or without inflection, are such as have been or may be employed to perform the function of any of the necessary parts of speech, viz. adjectives proper, participial, and pronominal, verbs (particularly as to the responsives *Yes* and *No*), and even nouns substantive."—P. 264.

It only remains to notice the interjection, which, notwithstanding an able defence by Sir John Stoddart, we are still inclined (with Horne Tooke and the Greek grammarians)* to exclude from the parts of speech. For this we have two principal reasons. *Firstly*, there is no *relation* between the interjection as part and the proposition as whole. We do not go so far as to affirm that "so far from giving pathos to the style, they have generally an effect that is disgusting or ridiculous;" † but we hold that, whether beauties or deformities, they are not parts of an organized whole. A mole or a dimple may, according to circumstances, improve or disfigure the countenance, but in neither case has it, like the ear or the eye, its place and duty as a member of the body. *Secondly*, the interjection, though expressive of emotion, does not express it in the way of speech. We do not adopt the irreverent language of Mr. Tooke, who classes it with "sneezing, coughing, groaning, shrieking, and every other involuntary convulsion with oral sound;" nor, on the other hand, do we assent to the sportive bard who attributes to a still more ignoble sound all the emotional power of the interjection,—

> "Let lovesick swains who plead their sighs
> A dust about emotions kick up;
> None from the breast sincerer rise,
> Or flow more warmly than a hiccup."

But we would draw a distinction between signs which are indicative only, and signs which are representative and can be substituted for the thing signified. The spoken word is a sign representative of a thought; the written word is a sign representative of the spoken. But the fall of the thermometer to 32° is indicative only of freezing, and the appearance of smoke rising from a chimney is indicative of the existence of a fire below. The head of the Marquis of Granby, suspended from a sign-post, is a sign representative of the features of the man; it is indicative only of entertainment to be had within. Accordingly, we can substitute the portrait for the person, and say "this is the marquis;" but to say "this is meat and drink," would suggest an explanation of King Richard's meal of

* [Cf. Bœthius, 'Int. ad Syllogismos,' p. 561, ed. Bas.]
† 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' art. 'Grammar.'

Saracen's head somewhat different from that usually adopted. Now the interjection is indicative of emotion, but not representative. The exclamation "oh!" may imply the existence of pain or astonishment in the utterer, but it is not, like the words "pain" and "astonishment," a sign representative of the feeling. Horne Tooke's somewhat hyperbolical metaphor, "the dominion of speech is erected upon the downfal of interjections," may be sobered into literal accuracy, if we say that the office of grammar is to determine the relations which the several parts of speech bear to the whole, as representative of corresponding relations in thought; and that therefore it does not notice such articulate sounds as are neither relative nor representative.

Before we conclude, we must express our thanks to the present proprietor of the 'Encyclopædia Metropolitana,' for this republication of the most valuable portions of a work which in its original form was, like Henry Wynd's 'Sampson,' "somewhat ponderous," and in spite of (we had almost said in consequence of) its philosophical arrangement, by no means convenient of reference. Some of the principal treatises have for some time past been before the public in a separate form. We have long wished to see others following in the same track, and none more so than the 'Universal Grammar' of Sir John Stoddart, which, notwithstanding a few differences on points of detail, we consider as on the whole the soundest and most philosophical treatise of the kind in the English language. The plan of our remarks has compelled us to leave unnoticed some of its merits. We have said nothing of the many interesting illustrations, which the author's extensive acquaintance with English literature, especially with our older writers, has enabled him to supply. Nor have we done justice to the excellent philosophical spirit which pervades the whole; a spirit, indeed, necessarily developed only as a subordinate feature, and which will hardly be appreciated by those who now open the book for the first time as a new publication. But in 1818, when the article first appeared in the Encyclopædia, the brilliant sophisms of the French Ideology had far greater influence in the philosophical world than at present. The Eclecticism of Cousin was then in its infancy; and Maine de Biran, the Fichte of France, had not yet accomplished his

revolt from the standard of Cabanis and de Tracy, and shewn that the union of physiology with mental science may contribute as much to a system of pure idealism, as to the sententious paradox, "les nerfs, voilà tout l'homme."* To Kant indeed, Sir John Stoddart, as might be expected in a friend of Coleridge, is in more than one instance indebted, and it is by no means one of his least merits that he should have appreciated and applied to a work of this character some of the most valuable speculations of the German philosopher, at a time when his writings, as his translator complains, were almost unknown in this country.

Neither Grammar nor Logic has as yet fully assumed its position as an offshoot of the science of mind; but to this desirable end the publication of works like the present will in no small degree contribute. And in the future history of the philosophy of language, the name of Sir John Stoddart will deserve honourable mention, as the author of one of the earliest and most energetic protests against the sensationalism and ultra-nominalism of Condillac and Horne Tooke; and as having laboured ably and successfully in his own province in accordance with the comprehensive maxim of one of the master-minds of the age, "la psychologie n'est assurément pas toute la philosophie, mais elle en est le fondement."

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* We speak of the publication, not of the formation of De Biran's opinions. They can hardly be considered as having been accessible to readers in general, till the publication in 1834 of his great posthumous work, "Nouvelles considérations sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme."

RECENT EXTENSIONS OF FORMAL LOGIC.

CONTENTS.

Parallel between Logic and Grammar.
Controversies as to the Nature and Province of Logic.
Aristotle the Father of Logic.
Contrast between pre-Kantian and post-Kantian Logicians.
The 'Formal Logic' of Professor De Morgan, and the 'New Analytic' of Sir W. Hamilton.
Conditions and Products of Thought.
Matter and Form of Thought.
Formal and Material Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning.
All Formal Thinking is governed by Laws which may be expressed in Analytical Judgments: All Material Thinking by Laws which may be expressed in Synthetical Judgments.
Analytical Judgments are not Futile.
De Morgan's 'Formal Logic:' his Confusion between Matter and Form: his account of the Copula: the *Numerically Definite Syllogism:* his Doctrine that "Every Negative Proposition is Affirmative, and every Affirmative Proposition is Negative."
Thomson's 'Laws of Thought.'
Baynes's Essay.
Sir W. Hamilton's 'New Analytic.'
Quantification of the Predicate.
Systems of Logical Notation.
Revival of the Study of Logic.

RECENT EXTENSIONS OF FORMAL LOGIC.*

LOGIC, in so far as it investigates the laws of the process performed, consciously or unconsciously, by all sound thinkers, has been aptly compared to grammar, which in like manner inquires into the principles of correct speech. The parallel might be carried further. There is an analogy in their perversions, as well as in their legitimate offices. Grammar, elevated into Gramarye,† has been regarded as enabling its fortunate possessor to penetrate into the mysteries of the unseen world; and Logic, burdened with the incubus of Realism, has been considered as affording an insight into the no less mysterious essences of things in general. Less fortunate, however, than its sister science, Logic has scarcely yet been able entirely to emancipate itself from its early bondage. No one now regards Lindley Murray as a wizard, or those fair disciples by whom he is chiefly studied as possessing more of the black art than is contained in the natural magic of a Lancashire witch. While Logic, though slowly and painfully working its way to its proper position, as

* This article appeared in the 'North British Review' for May, 1851, vol. xv., No. 29, and reviewed the following works:

1. 'Formal Logic; or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable.' By Augustus De Morgan, of Trinity College, Cambridge, Fellow of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, Secretary of the Royal Astronomical Society, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London. London, 1847.

2. 'On the Symbols of Logic, the Theory of the Syllogism, and, in particular, of the Copula, and the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to some Questions of Evidence.' From the Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. Vol. IX. Part I. By Augustus De Morgan, Sec. R.A.S., of Trinity College, Cambridge, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London. Cambridge, 1850.

3. 'An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought; A Treatise on Pure and Applied Logic.' By William Thomson, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford. London and Oxford, 1849.

4. 'An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms, being that which gained the Prize proposed by Sir Wm. Hamilton, in the year 1846, for the best Exposition of the New Doctrine propounded in his Lectures.' With an Historical Appendix. By Thomas Spencer Baynes, Translator of the Port-Royal Logic. Edinburgh and London, 1850. [ED.]

† See Bishop Percy's note to the ballad of 'King Estmere.'

the science of the laws of formal thinking, meets every now and then with a rude recall to material associations. The slave has broken prison, but the master has not yet relinquished his claim; and the fugitive still carries about him some links of his chain, by which ever and anon some emissary of his former tyrants seeks to drag him back to the burdens and the fleshpots of his servitude.

Perhaps there is no branch of human knowledge of which the history presents anomalies so strange and startling as that of Logic. From age to age it has blended itself with the matter of predominant interest, and its nature, its form, its province, have in each successive stage been perpetually the theme of doubt and controversy. At one time an instrument of philosophy, at another the handmaid of divinity, now a method of demonstration, and now an art of thinking, allying itself at different periods with physics, with metaphysics, with psychology, with theology, now formal, and now material, in this generation a science, in that an art, sometimes both, and sometimes neither, —it is scarcely to be wondered at that these Protean metamorphoses have caused at times its very basis to be questioned, and that adversaries should have occasionally applied to it the language of its founder on a very different subject, *χαμαιλέοντά τινα καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρύμενον.*

And yet, notwithstanding these various doctrines concerning the nature and province of Logic, its actual contents have at no time essentially varied. Scarcely any two logicians are in accordance as to what it is that they are expounding; scarcely any have in their exposition materially added to or taken from the original body of the system. Logic is not, like mathematics or physical science, the result of the united discoveries of successive generations. It is the offspring almost entirely of one master mind, to whose authority nearly every disputant has appealed, as decisive on his own side of the question. It is not like the river, which, springing at first from some obscure and insignificant source, receives in its progress the waters of tributary streams, acquiring, still under the same title, a wider channel and an ampler volume, till the name which the inland peasant associates with some petty rivulet is to the merchant the broad highway of commerce, and to the mariner a sea, bearing navies on its bosom. It is the work of one age and of one man,—a

Pallas, which sprang full grown and full armed from the head of her parent,—a monument which after generations have contented themselves with commenting on and elucidating, without adding to or diminishing from the original. Other gods have removed from their habitations; the fane of Terminus still stands on its pristine site; but its votaries are notwithstanding at variance as to its size and form, inquiring what parts are principal, what subordinate, what merely ornamental, what was the design of the architect, and how he has adhered to it in the execution.

As regards what Aristotle did, there is much truth in the remark of Kant,* that since the time of the Stagirite, Logic has neither advanced nor receded a step. As regards what Aristotle left undone, it is no less true that its whole subsequent history exhibits scarcely anything but the ebb and flow of unsettled opinion. The master left behind him a collection of writings; and to the substance of that collection his disciples have for the most part faithfully adhered: he left no definition of the science on which he wrote and no principle for determining its boundaries; and these accordingly have been matter of controversy ever since.

The above remarks apply only to the state of Logic from Aristotle to Kant. Its history since the latter period presents a singular and instructive contrast to its former fortunes. A few writers indeed have rigidly adhered to or even narrowed the Kantian limits, but the predominant feature of speculation has been an inverted attempt at expansion.† The general idea of the science becomes, with slight variety, tolerably fixed and definite; the province which that idea includes, varies almost from zero to infinity. In short, while the pre-Kantian logicians have laboured to accommodate the form to the matter, to comprehend under one general notion the heterogeneous mass of Aristotelian speculation, the post-Kantian logicians have striven to develop the matter from the form, starting from the idea of thought and its processes, to construct a science more or less comprehensive, according as the domain of *pure thinking* is extended or contracted. This revolution is a natural conse-

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* Cf. Hamilton on Reid, p. 928.—[Ed.]

† [*E.g.* Bouterwek, Bardili, Klein, Wagner, Hegel, Krause.]

quence of the Critical Philosophy. The understanding, being thereby limited to the field of possible experience, became confessedly finite in its capacity and objects. There remained, therefore, no alternative for the future metaphysician, but either to abandon altogether the philosophy of the infinite, or to assume, in opposition to Kant, the existence of a directly cognitive faculty of Reason,—a faculty independent of the acknowledged laws of finite thinking. It had been proved impossible to contract the object within the received grasp of the subject; there remained only the attempt to expand the subject to the compass of the object; an attempt which necessarily ended in the identification of the two. Both the method and the nomenclature became thus inverted, and metaphysic, reversing the complaint of Aristotle, assumes the name and garb of dialectic,* not unmixed with sophistry. Thought and Being become one and the same; the reasoning process is a continual creation of the universe; and Logic, the science of pure thinking, is at the same time a revelation of the whole mystery of existence.†

The ancient metaphysic is described by Hegel as finite thought striving after the infinite; the Understanding attempting to contemplate the objects of the Reason.‡ But his own system escapes the charge at the close only by an act of suicide at the outset. The ancient philosophy merely overtasked the untried power of thought. Its successor commences by giving the lie to consciousness, and denying the validity of the very laws by which itself, in common with all human thought, is in act regulated. Logic has thus realized the fabled death of its founder. Unable to fathom the ebb and flow of the Euripus of Being, it has ended by drowning itself in the current. Among the struggles preceding the grand euthanasia, there have not

* Metaph. III. 2. Οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταὐτὸν μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ (ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ διαλέγονται περὶ ἁπάντων) κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ὂν ἐστιν.

† "Bei der Exposition des reinen Begriffs," says Hegel, "ist angedeutet worden, dass derselbe der absolute, göttliche Begriff selbst ist, so dass jener logische Verlauf die unmittelbare Darstellung der Selbstbestimmung Gottes zum Seyn wäre." — 'Werke,' vol. v. p. 170. [Ed.] The mock thunder of Salmoneus was modesty itself to this. But our modern Salmoneus, while apparently raising man to an equality with his Maker, in fact only degrades the Deity to an identity with the general consciousness of mankind.

‡ Die blosse Verstandes-Ansicht der Vernunft-Gegenstände. — 'Encyclop,' § 27; 'Werke,' vi. p. 61. [Ed.]

been wanting speculations more akin to some of those which we propose to notice in this Article—speculations tending to identify logic, and through logic metaphysic, with mathematics.* There is not indeed much affinity between the details of Mr. De Morgan's system and that of Bardili; but in both we may trace the same error of regarding reasoning as a *computation*, giving a partial and perverted view of the process of thought and its expression by means of mathematical analogies and a mathematical notation, inverting the relation of whole and part, subordinating logic to algebra, and substituting the calculus of inference for the inference of calculation. Verily, in philosophy, as elsewhere, extremes meet. Who would have expected to see English mathematicians extending the hand of fellowship to Hobbes, or German metaphysicians repeating the maxim of Condillac, "calculer c'est raisonner, et raisonner c'est calculer?" †

But the Logic of modern Germany is a subject too vast and too important to be discussed within our present limits. We have alluded to it chiefly as furnishing an instructive comment on what we believe to be the fundamental defect in Kant's treatment of the science, the entire isolation of Logic from Psychology, the rejection, under the name of empirical, of all the special phenomena of consciousness, of all the actual characteristics of any determinate operation of thought.‡ To this subject we may possibly find another opportunity of recurring. Our present concern is with the position and prospects of Logic in our own country; with the striking fact of a considerable amount of revived interest in the study, and with the important question, how that interest may be best controlled and directed.

In this point of view, the works which we have placed at the head of this Article claim the attention of our readers. They are the representatives of two distinct, and in some respects antagonist systems, each professing to contribute a large addi-

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* *E. g.* Bardili and Wagner. Cf. Krug, 'Logik,' § 25, p. 75.

† 'Langue des Calculs,' l. i. ch. 16. It is unfortunate for the *computation* doctrine that the fundamental processes of arithmetic, under which, according to Hobbes, all ratiocination is comprehended, are not reasoning processes at all.

‡ Cf. Kant, 'Kritik d. rein. Vernunft,' p. 276; and Cousin, 'Sur Kant,' p. 180 *sqq.*; Fries', 'System d. Logik,' § 3, p. 22.

tion to the hitherto authorized contents of the science, and each claiming, as the basis of its extension, the principle of a more exact analysis of the *form* of Thought. The pretensions of either, if admitted, will necessitate a complete remodelling of the existing details of the science,—a step too important to be undertaken without a thorough sifting and testing of the grounds on which it is recommended. So important a crisis in the history of Logic demands on the part of a journal that professes to watch the chief contemporaneous evolutions of the mental and physical sciences some notice, which we shall endeavour to bestow upon it in the following pages.

The exposition of one of these systems is given in the *Formal Logic* of Professor De Morgan: the other has for some years been taught in the unpublished† lectures of Sir William Hamilton, and its essential features may be gathered from the publications of Mr. Thomson and Mr. Baynes. The characteristics of each may be given in the words of their respective authors. Mr. De Morgan, in his preface, calls the attention of his readers to the following points:—

"In the form of the proposition, the copula is made as abstract as the terms: or is considered as obeying only those conditions which are necessary to inference.

"Every name is treated in connection with its *contrary* or *contradictory* name; the distinction between these words not being made, and others supplied in consequence. Eight really separable forms of predication are thus obtained between any two names: the eight of the common system amounting only to six, when, as throughout my work, the two forms of a convertible proposition are considered as identical.

"The complex proposition is introduced, consisting in the co-existence of two simple ones. The theory of the syllogism of complex propositions is made to precede that of the simple or ordinary syllogism; which last is deduced from it.

"The theory of the numerical syllogism is investigated, in which, upon the hypothesis of numerical quantity in both terms of every proposition, a numerical inference is made.

"The old doctrine of modals is made to give place to the numerical theory of probability."

* Sir W. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic,' edited by the Rev. H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, were published in 1860. [Ed.]

Sir William Hamilton has issued a prospectus of his intended 'New Analytic of Logical Forms,' in which its most important features are described as follows:—

"In the *first* place, in the essay there will be shown, that the syllogism proceeds, not as has hitherto, virtually at least, been taught, in one, but in the *two* correlative and counter *wholes* (Metaphysical) of *Comprehension*, and (Logical) of *Extension*; the major premise in the one whole being the minor premise in the other, &c.

"In the *second* place, the self-evident truth,—that we can only rationally deal with what we already understand determines the simple logical postulate—*To state explicitly what is thought implicitly.* From the consistent application of this postulate, on which Logic ever insists, but which Logicians have never fairly obeyed, it follows:—that, logically, we ought to take into account the *quantity*, always understood in thought, but usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in its expression, not only of the *subject*, but also of the *predicate* of a judgment."

The doctrine of a *quantified predicate, and its influence on the forms of the syllogism*, may be selected as the most important feature in both systems, as well on its own account as on that of the controversy which has taken place concerning the authorship. Into that controversy we have no intention of entering; especially as we are convinced that the two systems are not only distinct from, but opposed to each other.* The opposition is clearly marked in Sir William Hamilton's own words.

"We have simply to consider, in their contrasts, the three following scheme of quantification.

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* One doctrine indeed is common to both systems,—that of the ultra-total quantification of the middle term; and in this there can be no question that neither author is indebted to the other. But Mr. De Morgan goes rather too far when he asserts that a person kept close to Aristotle's forms could not prove that some men must have both coats and waistcoats, if a majority have coats and a majority waistcoats. The proof would, indeed, be condemned by Aristotle's *rules*, but it may be admitted without violating his *principles*. For Aristotle does not, like many of his successors, regard the 2nd and 3rd figures as independent forms of reasoning, but considers their validity to be dependent on their reducibility to the first. Mr. De Morgan's syllogism is in the *third* figure, and may easily be brought to the Aristotelian type by a *reductio per impossibile*. It therefore stands on the same footing with a syllogism in Bokardo, as *imperfect* but *perfectible*. But we agree with Sir W. Hamilton in regarding this quantification as authentic, but of little use in practice, and cumbering the science with a superfluous mass of moods.

"The *first* scheme is that which logically confines all expressed quantity to the *subject*, presuming the *predicate* to be taken,—in *negative* propositions, always determinately in its *greatest* and *least* extension (universally and singularly),—in *affirmative* propositions, always indeterminately in *some part* of its extension (particularly).

"The *second* scheme is that which logically extends the expression of quantity to *both* the propositional terms, and allows the *predicate* to be of *any quantity* in propositions of *either quality*.

"The *third* scheme is that which logically admits *more expressed quantities* than a determinately least or greatest extension (quantity singular and universal), and an indeterminately partial extension (quantity particular)."

The second of these is Sir William Hamilton's; the third is Mr. De Morgan's. The latter is the more ambitious of the two, and makes more formidable inroads upon the established boundaries of Logic. It is incumbent, therefore, on those who take an interest in the progress of the science, to scrutinize narrowly its pretensions; and if, in endeavouring to fulfil this duty, we find it necessary to express our dissent from the principles of the acute and learned author, we trust that we shall not be considered as feeling anything but the highest respect for the ability which he has in many ways displayed, and which indeed renders the task of opposing him more obligatory, as well as more difficult. Mr. De Morgan's great eminence as a mathematician makes it necessary for every student of Logic to see that he does not mar its doctrines by spurious importations from his favourite science; while the acuteness and ingenuity of many of his logical details render still more imperative the duty of detecting the unsoundness, if any exists, of his principles. It has been said that, next to him who forms the taste of a country, the greatest genius is he who corrupts. If Mr. De Morgan should rank with posterity as one who corrupted Logic with mathematics, he need not be ashamed of his partners in the offence; for he will find among them Bacon, who corrupted it with physics, and Hegel, who corrupted it with metaphysics.

The main point at issue between us may be stated in a few words. Mr. De Morgan regards the processes of arithmetic and

algebra as exhibiting the pure form of reasoning, and, consequently, as belonging to the *Logica docens.* We consider all mathematical operations, so far as they contain reasonings at all, to be special applications of reasoning to a particular matter, and as such to belong to the *Logica utens.* His system, fully carried out, would make logic an application of mathematics: we hold mathematical, in the same manner as any other reasoning, to be an application of logic. Our difference is thus fundamental. We believe that there is no tenable principle of distinction between the matter and the form of thought which will not make the greater part of his "Formal Logic" material. But that the controversy may not become a dispute of words only, we will endeavour at the outset to lay down clearly our own view of the distinction in question—a step the more necessary, inasmuch as we are acquainted with no work on Logic in which the principle is clearly enunciated, though in most, as far as they are consistent with themselves, it is implied. If Mr. De Morgan dissent, as he probably will, from our principle, he must state his own, and the public (that portion of it at least which takes an interest in Logic) must decide between us.*

Thinking, the operation of the understanding, may be defined as the act of knowing or judging of things by means of concepts. In the extended sense in which psychology employs the term, every act of consciousness is a *judgment,* inasmuch as it contains an assertion of the existence of its object within or without the conscious mind. The *concept* forms the distinguishing feature of thought. Perception, like any other *immediate* act of consciousness, has two constituent elements—the perceiving subject and the object perceived, the hypothesis of a representative idea being rejected. Thought, as a *mediate* act of consciousness, requires at least three elements—the thinking subject, the

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* Though we have selected Mr. De Morgan as the principal offender, the principles here advanced are in many respects applicable to some other able works, which we have not space to notice in detail. To this class belong Boole's 'Mathematical Analysis of Logic,' Solly's 'Syllabus of Logic,' and a portion of the mathematical appendix to Drobisch's valuable 'Neue Darstellung der Logik.' All, we think, are guilty of one fundamental error: *They represent thought as a species of algebra, instead of regarding algebra as a species of thought.* [The same censure applies, in some degree, to Damiron's simplification of the syllogism, 'Logique,' p. 148.]

object about which he thinks, and the concept mediating between the two.*

Preliminary to every act of Thought is an act of Will, *attention*, in which the mind contemplates exclusively a certain number of the attributes given in an intuition to the neglect of the rest. By thought these attributes are regarded in their relation to objects. Of the three acts of thought commonly distinguished by logicians,—Conception, or simple Apprehension, regards a single collection of attributes as representing one or more objects; Judgment (in the more limited or logical sense of the term) regards two such collections as related to one or more common objects; Reasoning regards two judgments as so related, through a common concept and its objects, as to necessitate a third judgment in consequence.

In the product of every one of these operations we may distinguish between *matter* and *form*.† The former is all that is given out of the thinking act; the latter is all that is conveyed in and through the act itself. To conception are *given* attributes; to judgment are *given* concepts; to reasoning are *given* judgments. These constitute the *matter* of the respective products. By the act of conceiving, the attributes are *thought* as representing one or more objects; by the act of judging, the concepts are *thought* as related to one or more common objects; by the act of reasoning, the judgments are *thought* as necessitating another judgment in consequence. These three features constitute the *form* of the respective products. Hence we define the several products as follows:‡—

A concept is an attribute, or collection of attributes, (matter,) representing one or more objects, (form).

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* The reader of Kant will recognise in the following remarks much of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft.' But while acknowledging our great obligations to this philosopher, we think it necessary to state *in limine* that we have departed from his theory in two important particulars.—1. In regarding all consciousness, immediate as well as mediate, as a *judgment*; 2. In introducing the voluntary element of *attention*, an element neglected by the Kantian as well as by the sensational school, and only fully appreciated since the reaction against the latter, commencing with the lectures of Laromiguière. Nor do we observe Kant's distinction between Understanding and Reason in Logic; the former term we employ to denote the whole thinking faculty.

† [Cf. Hoffbauer, 'Logik,' § 11, § 142, 272.] 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 243 *sqq.* [Ed.]

‡ Cf. 'Prolegomena Logica,' ed. 2, p. 69. [Ed.]

A judgment is a combination of two concepts, (matter,) related to one or more common objects, (form).

A reasoning (syllogism) is a combination of two judgments, (matter), necessitating a third judgment as their consequence, (form).

The thinking process itself may also be distinguished as material or formal. It is *formal* when the matter *given* is sufficient for the completion of the product, without any other addition than what is communicated in the act of thought itself. It is *material* when the data are insufficient, and the mind has consequently to go out of the thinking act to obtain additional materials. If, for example, having *given* the attributes A, B, C, I can think those attributes as co-existing in an object, without appealing to experience to discover what objects actually possess them, this is *formal conceiving*. If, having *given* the concepts, P and Q, I can pronounce "P is Q" without a similar appeal, this is *formal judging*. If, having *given* the judgments, "W is X," "Y is Z," I can elicit a conclusion from them alone, this is *formal reasoning*. Experience is here used in a wide sense, for all accidental knowledge, all that is not part and parcel of the thinking act itself.

The condition of formal conceiving is that the attributes given must not contradict each other. There is no contradiction between the notions of a horse's body and a man's head. A centaur, therefore, is as *conceivable* as a horse or a man, whether such a creature exist in nature or not. But let us try to conceive a surface both black and white, or a figure contained by two straight lines; the attempt to individualize the attributes by applying them to an object shews their incompatibility. Hence the law of thought governing formal conceiving is, What is contradictory is inconceivable, what is not contradictory is conceivable.* Here we have the well-known principle of contradiction, the most general statement of which is, "nothing can be A and not A," or, "no object can be *thought* under contradictory attributes." But for material conceiving more than this is required. The senses must assure me of the existence of the objects, before I can think of horse or

* The latter criterion is allowed by Wolf, but is not strictly accurate; there are other inconceivables besides contradictories. [Cf. Hamilton on 'Reid,' p. 377.]

centaur as actually existing out of my imagination. This assurance is not the result of a law of thought, but of a fact of perception; hence, as a general rule, all imaginary objects are conceived as such formally; all real objects are conceived as such materially.

Formal judging is possible whenever one of the given concepts is contained in the other. If the concepts P and Q have no attributes in common, I cannot tell whether they co-exist in any object without an appeal to experience; but if Q contains the attributes O P, I can by a law of thought alone determine "all Q is P." The law in this case is the principle of identity, of which the most general statement is, "every A is A," or, "every concept is identical with itself." A negative judgment may in like manner be formed by means of the principle of contradiction, when the attributes in the two concepts are contradictory. Hence, as a general rule, all analytical judging is formal; all synthetical judging is material.

The wording of the above remarks has been adapted to categorical judgments; but hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are also sometimes analytical, and the result of a formal process. For example,—if having given the judgments, "A is B, C is D," I can form solely by a law of thought without experience the judgment "if A is B, C is D," the process is formal. This I can do when the concepts are *given* as standing in the relation of operating cause and resulting effect. Again, from the terms A, B, and C, if the two last are *given* as contradictory, I can form the analytical judgment, "A is either B or C, (not B)." In other cases I must ascertain the fact from experience. Here we have two additional laws of thought, the one—if a cause exist, its effect exists likewise;* the other,

* This, with its converse from the non-existence of the effect to the non-existence of the cause, may be called the principle of cause and effect, or of reason and consequence, but must not be confounded with the principle of sufficient reason, which is *synthetical*, and leads to material judgments. [Cf. Hegel, 'Werke,' vol. iv., p. 220 *sqq.* Damiron, 'Psychologie,' vol. ii., p. 222.] The two are distinguished by M. Royer-Collard, who adopts an illustration of Hume's: "*Point d'effet sans cause* est la même chose que *point de mari sans femme;* de ce qu'il n'y a point de *mari* sans *femme*, il ne suit pas qu'il n'y ait point d'*homme* qui ne soit *mari;* de même quand on dit, *point d'effet sans cause*, on ne dit pas que tout ce qui arrive soit un *effet* et soit produit par une *cause*." But this eminent philosopher, when he spoke thus disparagingly of identical judgments, did not anticipate the conclusion to which our present remarks are tending, viz., *that from the constitution of the human*

the principle of excluded middle, which, of two contradictory judgments, compels us to think one as true.

Formal reasoning is possible when the given propositions are connected by a middle term, under such conditions of quantity and quality that the mere act of thought necessarily elicits the conclusion. If any addition to the data is required, the consequence is material. Purely formal reasoning is dependent on the same laws as formal judgment—the law of identity governing the affirmative categorical syllogism, the law of contradiction the negative, the law of cause and effect the hypothetical, and the law of excluded middle the disjunctive. A single example must suffice. In a syllogism in Barbara we reason in this form,—"All A is [some] B, all C is [some] A;* therefore all C is [some] B." The law which determines the conclusion is, that whatever is identical with a portion of A is identical with a portion of that which is identical with all A. Here is again the principle of identity—"Every portion of a concept is identical with itself." The other forms of syllogism may easily be analysed in the same manner.

But whether the thinking process is formal or material, *i.e.*, whether the necessary data are given to the thinker, or have to be sought by him in addition to the act of thought, the resulting product possesses in every case a matter and a form, the former being given *to*, the latter being given *by*, the thinking act. We must necessarily be brief, and can therefore point out only one or two applications of the principle; but the latter being once clearly laid down, it will be easy to supply the rest.

We select then, as an important instance, the distinction of matter and form in a synthetical judgment gained from perception. I see an extended surface, which I am accustomed to call a table. I press my hand on it, and it resists; I judge in consequence "the table is hard." The judgment is material—for I could not have formed it merely from the concepts; but

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mind, every law of pure thinking must be an identical judgment. If this can be shewn psychologically, what has hitherto been considered as the reproach of logic becomes her glory.

* We have quantified the predicate, thus far anticipating our judgment of Sir William Hamilton's system. But in this we only express what every treatise on Logic tells us to understand, viz., that the predicate of an affirmative proposition is not distributed, *i.e.*, is *particular*.

I have now got an additional datum—the senses have informed me of the co-existence of the attributes. But this is not all that is needed for the judgment. The extended surface which I see is not identical with the hardness which I feel. The identity is in an imperceptible something, to which I am compelled to consider both as belonging. The visible and tangible qualities are by an act of thought attributed to one invisible and intangible subject. Here is a *form* of the judgment, expressed in language by the copula; the table *is* hard.*

I hold a piece of wax to the fire, and it begins to melt. My senses inform me only of two successive phenomena, the proximity of the fire, and the melting of the wax. That the one is the *cause* of the other, is an addition to the sensible data produced by the act of thought. The matter of the judgment is here given in the successive phenomena, "the fire is applied, the wax melts:" the form is given by the mind, which is compelled to assert a causal relation between them. This relation is expressed by the conjunction; "If the fire is applied, the wax melts." But this is not all. I see the wax in a liquid state; I remember that just now it was solid. Here, again, my senses only present to me two distinct phenomena. To pronounce that these belong to the same thing, that it is *the wax* which was solid and is liquid, I must believe in the continuous existence of the subject, notwithstanding the changes in its sensible appearance. This again is the result of an act of thought; and hence arises the disjunctive judgment. Its matter is given in the phenomena, "wax is solid, wax is liquid." Its form arises from the identification of the two, "the wax is solid *or* liquid." Thus we have three synthetical laws of mind, producing forms of material thinking. Qualities suppose a subject; changes suppose a cause; things continue to exist under changes of phenomena.†

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* Mr. De Morgan asserts that "historically speaking, the copula has been material to this day." We admit that logicians have often fallen into errors and inconsistencies in this respect. But the true logical copula we believe to be in all cases an assertion of identity or distinctness, and as such, a *form* of the judgment. Mr. De Morgan's spurious copulas, such as "gives," "brings," "makes," &c., all arise from the neglect of this principle. When I assert "A gives B," I mean that the attribute of giving B is found in the same subject with the attributes forming the concept A.

† Into the metaphysical discussions connected with these laws it would ex-

Hitherto we have treated of singular judgments only. A single instance must suffice to shew that the principle is applicable to common judgments also. I see a number of balls lying on a table; and I pronounce, "all those balls are white." I see another collection, and pronounce with the same readiness, "some of those balls are black." Here the senses present only individual objects. *This, this,* and *this* are within their province; they know nothing of *all* or *some.* It is by an act of thinking that the several individuals are regarded as constituting a whole, and a judgment pronounced concerning that whole or a portion of it.*

The above are only a few of the most obvious applications of the principle under discussion. Its general results may be briefly stated as follows:—All formal thinking is governed by laws which may be expressed in analytical judgments. All material thinking is governed by laws which may be expressed in synthetical judgments. The former are sufficient of themselves for an act of thought, operating only on that matter which is given, and which ultimately appears in the result. The latter are insufficient without calling in the aid of experience, thus requiring additional matter which does not appear in the result. The former are uniform in their operation, and can therefore completely guarantee the validity of the thought. The latter are modified in their operation by their combination with

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ceed our limits and our design to enter. For logical purposes it is sufficient that the common language and common thought of mankind universally acknowledge them.

* The fourth Kantian form of judgment, modality, has given rise to considerable dispute among logicians. The question of its admission or exclusion as a *form* depends, on the above principles, on a question of psychological fact. Do we in forming a necessary judgment decide that the object thought under the concept A *must be* identical with that thought under B, or that it *is* identical with what on other grounds we know must be B? In other words, is modality an affection of the copula, or of the predicate? We believe that a distinction of modals may be admitted on purely logical principles: whether it is worth admitting is another question. Thus, necessary judgments are such as by the laws of thought alone we are compelled to make; impossible, such as by the same laws we are forbidden to make; all others are contingent; all identical judgments are logically necessary; all contradictory judgments are logically impossible; all synthetical judgments are logically contingent. If my conception of man does not include the attribute of mortality, man may, as far as logic is concerned, be mortal or not. I must appeal to experience to decide whether the Struldbrugs of Luggnagg are realities or fictions. For aught I know *as a logician,* a triangle may have more or less than two right angles. Geometry must decide whether this is materially possible or not. But if any distinction be admitted, the modality must be *expressed* in the copula, not *understood.*

experience, and can therefore only partially guarantee the validity of one element of the thought. Hence the former may be described as *pure*, *adequate*, or *positive* laws of formal thinking; the latter may be described as *mixed*, *inadequate*, or *negative* laws of material thinking.

When, then, Logic is defined as the science of the laws of formal thinking, or as the science of the laws of thought as thought, (not as modified by experience), it follows that it can adequately determine the *conceivability* of an object, the truth of an *identical* or *analytical* judgment, the consequence of a *formal* reasoning. It cannot determine the *real existence* of an object, the truth of a *synthetical* judgment, the consequence of a *material* reasoning; for in these cases thought can only operate in conjunction with an act of perception or memory; and the laws of the former are no security for the trustworthiness of the latter. It is of course open to any innovator to attempt to extend the boundaries of the science; but he does so in the teeth of Kant's demonstration that a criterion of material truth is not only impossible, but self-contradictory. In attempting to enlarge the field of Logic, he only makes it impossible to assign to it any definite field whatever. If a single intruder is admitted from the province of material knowledge, no barrier can be devised which shall not with the same facility give access to all.

One more remark may close this part of our subject. In maintaining the whole of formal thinking to depend on identical, or to use the language of Kant, on analytical judgments, we must be prepared to meet the charge of "empty tautology," of "solemn trifling," and such like hard names, which have been unsparingly heaped by modern authorities upon this unfortunate class of judgments. The whole charge rests on a confusion between Laws of Thought and Laws of Things, between laws under which the subject must think, and laws under which the object must operate,—in short, between the positive and negative poles of speculative philosophy, the *ego* and the *non ego*. If (as Kant has clearly shewn) the understanding, in the strict meaning of the word, has a discursive power only, not an intuitive, and if, as he has also shewn, it is by intuition alone that synthetical judgments can be obtained, it follows that no judgment of this class can possibly rank as a pure law of thought.

Every new truth is the discovery of the special attributes of special things, and, as such, arises from the observation of differences: every general law of thinking must be indifferently applicable to all objects, and, as such, must be independent of differences. It is optional, and therefore contingent to every man, whether he shall think about this or that particular object; the laws therefore of any branch of material science are known to him only on condition of his adopting that line of study. But if all men have been thinking, some on this matter, some on that, but all *under one code of laws*, what marvel if, when their attention is called to those laws, they should recognise them as what they have all along unconsciously acknowledged? Herein lies at once the explanation and the justification of the supposed frivolities of logic. If its principles were synthetical, and therefore derived from intuition, it might rank with Optics or Astronomy, as a science of certain laws of material agents; or it might aspire to the character of a general Cosmology, to which these and other branches of physical study might be subordinate; but it could not pretend to exhibit the general laws which, independently of all special experience, the *thinking subject* must obey. Surely, in the name of common sense and common honesty, never was outcry more palpably absurd than that which finds fault with a science for accomplishing the very purpose which it professes to attempt, and for exhibiting the very features which, if its pretensions are well founded, and its method sound, it necessarily must exhibit.

It is true that the laws of formal thinking may become futile when they are employed as the sole agents for attaining material truth; but the fault lies not in the laws, but in their misapplication. It is the lot of the intellectual, no less than of the physical man, to derive his sustenance from without, his digestion from within; he cannot make the same organ both obsonatory and peristaltic. If he will not confine his understanding to its proper office of *concocting the matter given by intuition*, it is as natural and proper for him to fall into barren subtleties, as it is for him to perish of inanition, if he perversely employs his gastric juice in feeding on the coats of his own stomach.

The above considerations apply to the laws of thought in a logical point of view, in relation to the acts which they govern. But psychologically considered, in their relation to the mind

and its faculties, the examination of them furnishes us with an important special truth, the discovery, namely, to which we have before alluded, that the understanding in itself possesses no power of intuition.* If any one regards this discovery as trifling, he is refuted by the whole history of philosophy. It was by establishing this truth that Kant annihilated at a single blow all the fruitless speculations of the elder metaphysic: it is the influence of the same discovery which has determined the whole course of cognate speculations since that time, and has driven their authors to the candid and instructive confession that a knowledge of the absolute must be sought, not in accordance with, but in defiance of the laws of thought. It may be humiliating to know that man's powers are thus restricted; but the restriction is one which his Maker has thought fit to impose upon him, and, regret it as he may, he cannot escape from it. But so far is logic from being thereby convicted of frivolity, that it becomes the greatest possible safeguard against frivolous speculation, by showing clearly the nature of the pure laws of the understanding, and the exact limits within which they are operative.

"Tecum habita, et noris, quam sit tibi curta supellex."

Up to this point we have necessarily been somewhat prolix; but our principles being once stated, their application to the works before us will not be difficult. The title of Mr. De Morgan's book appears to us a complete misnomer. Under the name of *Formal Logic* he presents us with sundry perversions of the syllogistic form, designed to admit purely material reasonings. It does not seem as if the author had ever asked himself the preliminary question,—What constitutes the matter of thought, and what the form? His opening paragraph contains a clear and accurate statement of the nature and boundaries of logic, which his whole subsequent treatment seems expressly

* In denying a power of intuition to the pure understanding or logical faculty, we do not insist on the adoption of the Kantian division of the mental powers, nor do we assert that the whole *matter* of knowledge is derived from sensation. We mean only that the act of thought, as mediate and representative, must be rested on an immediate and presentative fact of consciousness. This important principle, as thus explained, is not more connected with Kant's pyschology than with Herbart's.

designed to refute. No logician will find fault with the following:—

"It (logic) has so far nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or presumptions from which an inference is derived; but simply takes care that the inference shall certainly be true if the premises be true. . . . Whether the premises be true or false, is not a question of logic, but of morals, philosophy, history, [may we not add mathematics?] or any other knowledge to which their subject-matter belongs: the question of logic is, does the conclusion certainly follow if the premises be true?"—*Formal Logic*, p. 1.

What, then, shall we say to the following?—

"Observing that every inference was frequently declared to be reducible to syllogism, with no exception unless in the case of mere transformation, as in the deduction of 'No X is Y' from 'No Y is X,' I gave a challenge in my work on formal logic to deduce syllogistically from 'every man is an animal' that 'every head of a man is the head of an animal.' From the total absence of attempt to answer this challenge, I conclude that no one has succeeded in whose way it has fallen."—*Transactions*, p. 9.

Now, either Mr. De Morgan regards this reasoning as material or as formal. If the former, what business has it in a work on formal logic? If the latter, we beg, in answer to his challenge, to propose the following reasoning, of precisely the same *form*:—A guinea-pig is an animal; therefore, the tail of a guinea-pig is the tail of an animal. But, says our logician, guinea-pigs have no tails. Who told him that? Is it logic or natural history? Is it the science of inference in general, or the knowledge to which the subject-matter belongs? We reply to Mr. De Morgan's challenge, by denying that the supposed inference is formally any reasoning at all. From the mere premise, "Every man is an animal," it does not follow that there is such a thing as a man's head in existence. We go out of the act of thought to obtain that information elsewhere. The consequence is therefore a special inference, *gained from our material knowledge of the thing thought about*, not a general inference *necessitated by the universal laws of thinking*.*

* The following passage from Wolf's German Logic will shew that this supposed inference has not been accidentally neglected, but intentionally and rightly repudiated by men who accepted the Aristotelian forms. We cite from the

A similar confusion appears in his account of the copula. He lays down, in a passage which our limits do not permit us to quote at length, the characteristics of the word *is*, which, existing in any proposed meaning of it, make that meaning satisfy the requirements of the logicians when they lay down the proposition A is B. For this doctrine we must refer the reader to his 'Formal Logic,' (p. 49.) We have only space for the ultimate result:—

"It should be noted that the copula 'gives' resembles 'is greater than,' and is an admissible copula in inferences with no conversion, provided that 'A gives B and B gives C,' implies 'A gives C.' The same may be said of the verbs to bring, to make, to lift, &c. And many of these verbs are, by the unseen operation of their having the effect of *is* in inference, often supplanted by the latter verb in phraseology. Thus we say 'murder *is* death to the perpetrator,' where the copula is *brings;* 'two and two *are* four,' the copula being 'have the value of,' &c. But this practice may lead to fallacies, as above shown: which must be avoided by attention to the class of verbs which communicate their action or state, such as make, give, bring, lift, draw, rule, hold, &c., &c. All these verbs are applied to denote the cause of the several actions: so, to give that which gives, or to bring that which brings, is to give or to bring. The boy who was said to rule the Greeks because he ruled his mother, who ruled Alcibiades, who ruled the Athenians, who ruled the Greeks, would have been correctly said so to do, if the matters of rule had been the same throughout."—*Formal Logic*, p. 268.

We presume Mr. De Morgan would not admit as valid reasoning the fallacy instanced by Hobbes,—"The hand touches the pen, the pen touches the paper; therefore the hand touches the paper." Still less would he allow us to reason, "Paris killed Achilles, Achilles killed Hector; therefore, Paris killed Hector." But how do these examples differ *in form* from "A

English translation published in 1770, which has been described by Sir W. Hamilton as one of the few tolerable versions we have of German philosophical works.

"We sometimes seem to draw a conclusion from a single premiss, which manner of reasoning is called *an immediate consequence*. As if I say, 'A triangle is a figure; therefore, whoever describes a triangle describes a figure.' Here it should seem as if I immediately drew one proposition from another. But it is evident that the one of these propositions alone cannot possibly lead me to the other. For that purpose it would be necessary the first should directly excite the second in my mind: but that is by no means the case."—P. 106.

gives B, B gives C; therefore, A gives C?" He will tell us that the verb "gives" communicates its action, the verbs "touch" and "kill" do not. But is this knowledge formal or material? Is it derived from the general laws of all thinking, or from a special knowledge of the nature of the actions denoted by the several verbs? If thinking about giving is a different *form* of thought from thinking about killing, there is an end of all general laws of reasoning. The nature of the object thought of must, in all cases, determine the inference. But his fundamental principle is erroneous. The copula, so far as it represents a form of thought, is not ambiguous. Its material misapplications are nothing to the purpose, unless one blunder authorizes another. When Mr. De Morgan speaks of the various meanings of *is*, as applied to names, ideas, and objects, he forgets that, in all actual thinking, name, idea, and object are combined. We think of an object, under a concept, which is represented by a sign. When I say "man is an animal," I can mean but one thing, the identity of one at least of the objects thought under each concept. Make the name or the concept itself an object of thought, and the supposed *is* of application or possession expresses a mere falsehood,—"the name man is the name animal." The copula always applies to the object of thought, in that application has but one meaning, and without an object there is no thinking at all.

But we must hasten on to the head and front of his offending, the *numerically definite syllogism;* as we believe that the question of the author's merits as a logician mainly turns on the legitimacy of this supposed addition to the Aristotelian forms.

"The ordinary universal propositions," says Mr. De Morgan, "are of a certain approach to definite character, both of them with respect to their subjects, and the negative one with respect to its predicate also. In X)Y [every X is Y], for example, what is known is as much known of any one X as of any other. Perfect definiteness would consist in a more exact degree of description and would require a higher degree of knowledge. But in this chapter I speak only of *numerical* definiteness, of the supposition that we know *how many* things we are talking about. We are well content to examine what we should do if we were two higher in the scale of creation, if by so doing we could to add something to our methods of inference in the which we have as yet attained.

"A numerically definite proposition is of this kind. Suppose the whole number of Xs and Ys to be known: say there are 100 Xs and 200 Ys in existence. Then an affirmative proposition of the sort in question is seen in '45 Xs (or more) are each of them one of 70 Ys:' and a negative proposition in '45 Xs (or more) are no one of them to be found among 70 Ys.' . . . .

"Taking X, Y, Z as the terms of the syllogism, ξ the number of Xs in existence, η the number of Ys, and ζ the number of Zs, and υ the number of instances in the universe, there are of course sixteen possible cases of knowledge, more or less, of these primary quantities, from all unknown to all known. Of these sixteen cases it will be requisite to consider two only. First, when the extent η of the middle term is known, and all the rest unknown; secondly, when all are known. The *algebraical* formulæ of the latter case will enable us to point out how the supposition of any less degree of knowledge would affect our power of inference.

"I propose the following notation. Let mXY denote either of the equivalent propositions, that m Xs are to be found among the Ys, or that m Ys are to be found among the Xs. Let mX: nY denote either of the equivalent propositions, that there are m Xs which are not any one among n Ys, or n Ys which are not any one among m Xs.

"Let η be known, and η only of the four, υ, ξ, η, ζ. . . . Let us first consider the premises mXY + nYZ. They tell us that among the η Ys we find m Xs and n Zs: accordingly, neither m nor n exceeds η. If m and n together fall short of η, nothing can be inferred: Y is extensive enough (that is, there are instances enough of Y) to hold the m Xs and the n Zs without any coincidence of an X with a Z. . . . But if m and n together exceed η, it is impossible that m Xs and n Zs can find place among η Ys except by putting either two Xs or two Zs, or an X and a Z, with *one* of the Ys. Now, as by the nature of the supposition, there cannot be two Xs, nor two Zs, to one Y, we must have the inference 1XZ as often as there are units in the excess of $m + n$ over η. That is,

$$m\text{XY} + n\text{YZ} = (m + n - \eta)\,\text{XZ}."$$

—*Formal Logic*, pp. 141, 143, 145.

For the benefit of those who are not familiar with algebra, will take a single numerical instance of the above theory, translate it into the ordinary notation. In so doing we do [illegible]tice to the author; for his general principle is obviously only if all its special applications are so. We will = 21, m = 18, n = 15. Mr. De Morgan then holds ing to be a formal syllogism:—

18 out of 21 Ys are Xs.
15 out of 21 Ys are Zs.
∴ 12 Zs are Xs.

Of course, no one denies a reasoning of this kind to be valid. The question is, is it valid in consequence of its form or of its matter? Is the conclusion such as I am by the laws of thought compelled to draw from the premises; or does it in any degree depend on the accidental circumstance of my possessing additional information not given in the premises? In the latter case the consequence is material, and the additional knowledge in question must be given as a new premise before it can become formal.

In examining whether any process is logical or not, we are at liberty to suppose in the logician any amount of ignorance out of the province of his own science. It signifies nothing whether the matters ignored are easy or difficult, common to nearly all men, or known only to a few; it is sufficient if they are not known *as parts of logic.* No man can make the above inference without the previous knowledge that $33 - 21 = 12$. Does he derive this knowledge from logic or from arithmetic? In the latter case the consequence is not formal but material. It is no answer to say that this knowledge is possessed by all civilized men. The question is, do they possess it *as logicians?* There is no middle course between relieving the logician, as such, from all material knowledge whatever, and compelling him to be conversant with all. Once concede that as a logician he is bound to know that two and two make four, and there is no art or science, knowledge or device, under the sun, a proficiency in which may not with equal justice be required of him.

It is evident, therefore, that Mr. De Morgan's whole case rests on his being able to shew that all propositions gained by addition or subtraction are laws of thought, known to men not specially as arithmeticians, but generally as thinkers. We do not say that he cannot maintain this, but we can adduce sufficient authority to make it incumbent on him to undertake the burden of proof, and not, as now, tacitly to assume a controvertible point. We have already stated our own belief that all laws of formal thinking are analytical judgments; whereas arithmetical propositions, since the days of Kant, have been

generally admitted to be synthetical.* We do not know Mr. De Morgan's opinion on this point, but we do not see how he is to escape from the following dilemma:—either he must maintain that synthetical judgments may be laws of formal thinking, in which case he is bound to prove against Kant that the understanding has a power of intuition; or he must hold that arithmetical judgments are analytical, in which case he must be prepared to refute Leibnitz's logical demonstration that two and two make four.† For it is equally fatal to his cause whether he concede to Kant, that arithmetical judgments are intuitive, or whether he concede to Leibnitz, that they are demonstrable by the old form of syllogism, not the basis of a new one.

We hold with Kant that arithmetical numbers, like geometrical figures, are the result of an intuition, and as such, furnish not forms of thought, but objects about which we think. The judgments of addition, as that two and two make four, are no more gained by a reasoning process than the knowledge that snow is white; but, once gained, they may, like any other judgments, form premises in a syllogism. The numerical reasoning given above is, as it stands, elliptical and material; it may be made formal by supplying a defective premise, thus:—

The difference between 33 and 21 is 12.

The number of Zs that are Xs is the difference between 33 and 21.

Therefore the number of Zs that are Xs is 12.

The minor premise in this syllogism is a combination of Mr. De Morgan's two, precisely as in the logical analysis of geometrical reasonings, the premise "A and C are equal to B," combines "A is equal to B, and B is equal to C." The major premise is an addition absolutely necessary to the conclusion, but derived not from logic, but from arithmetic. Without this addition, the reasoning must be regarded as material.

As we do not consider arithmetical processes to be formal reasonings, so we do not regard arithmetical data as pure forms

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* Hegel on this point differs from Kant, but his reasoning is anything but satisfactory.

† 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' Transc. Anal., b. i. Hauptst. 2. Abschn. i. § 17. Prolegomena, § 2, and Nouv. Essais, l. iv. ch. 7.

of the judgment. There is no law of mind which compels me, on seeing a number of balls on a table, to pronounce at once how many are black and how many white. I must proceed to the deliberate operation of counting. If two persons count and arrive at different results, I cannot decide between them by the laws of thought. I can only make them repeat the operation till the results coincide; and even then both may possibly be wrong. Now, is counting an appeal to facts as given in the intuition, or to a law of the mind in thinking? By every such law we are compelled to add something to the intuition, to think more than is given. But there is no law by which I am compelled to think of a number of balls as 70 rather than 69 or 71. The question is one of a more or less accurate examination of facts; and that examination must be completed before I begin to think of them under this notion of number or that. To refer to a law of the understanding to decide a matter belonging to intuition, is analogous to the celebrated problem, "given the latitude and longitude of a ship at sea, to find the name of the captain."

Mr. De Morgan's chief error arises from his having overlooked* the fact, that *the form of intuition becomes the matter of thought.* All formal judgments are necessary; but it by no means follows that all necessary judgments are formal. When Kant shewed that all mathematical judgments are synthetical, he shewed at the same time that they could not possibly be produced by the laws of thought alone. We may turn and analyse as we please the notions of 7 and 5; we cannot, by mere thinking, determine 12 to be their sum; as from the mere notion of two straight lines we cannot determine that they do not inclose a space. It is true that the intuitions which we call in aid for these judgments are dependent, not on the accidental presentations of this or that act of perception, but on the essential conditions of sensibility in general; and to this is owing the necessity of mathematical judgments, as thoughts, if not as truths; but it is nevertheless true that the constructed object of intuition is given *to*, not *by*, the judgment, and in accordance with laws distinct from those of general thinking.*

* Something of the same confusion may be observed in the language of a writer whose just and philosophical views of science in general make it the more necessary to notice his occasional inaccuracies, and whose authority

The above remarks are also applicable to another of Mr. De Morgan's innovations, the substitution of the numerical theory of probability in the place of the old modality. If all arithmetical and algebraical processes are extralogical, the theory of probabilities is of course excluded along with every other application of the calculus. Of the value of Mr. De Morgan's speculations, in a mathematical point of view, we are fully sensible; and had our task been to estimate his merits in that department, our judgment would have been very different from that which, relatively to logic, we find ourselves reluctantly compelled to give.

We have only space to notice one other feature of Mr. De Morgan's system, and that briefly. We allude to his treatment of every name "in connexion with its contrary or contradictory name." He commences by assuming that "every negative proposition is affirmative, and every affirmative proposition is negative."* From this principle we have already virtually expressed our dissent. We have endeavoured to shew that negation is not an affection of the predicate, but of the copula; that we do not pronounce in judgment on the identity of the objects thought under the concepts A, and not-B, but on the distinctness of those thought under A and B. Negation is thus not the offspring, as Mr. De Morgan holds, of an accidental variety of language, but of an essential difference in the form of thought. But the principle becomes still more questionable, if we admit, with Mr. De Morgan, that the copula may express other relations than those of identity and difference. What, for example, is the contradictory of "A gives B?" Is it "A gives not-B?" or "A does not give B?" In the former case, the two opposed propositions, as Aristotle has long ago observed,

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may possibly have had some influence in forming Mr. De Morgan's doctrine. Dr. Whewell applies the name of Formal Sciences to the pure mathematics, as having for their object the ideas of space, time, and number; and this, though in one sense correct as regards forms of the sensibility, is not so in that in which the same name is applicable to logic with relation to the forms of the understanding.

* Neither the principle nor the objection are new in logic. Sturm, in his 'Compendium Universalium seu Metaphysicæ Euclideæ,' proposed a theory of indefinite names in many respects resembling that of Mr. De Morgan. On this Leibnitz remarks;—"Cæterum Sturmianos illos modos arbitror non formæ sed materiæ ratione concludere, quia quod termini vel finiti vel infiniti sint non ad formam propositionis seu copulam aut signum pertinet, sed ad terminos."

are perfectly compatible with each other.* In the latter case, which of course is the true one, it must be admitted, either that "gives" is no copula, or that negation cannot be indifferently transferred from copula to predicate.† Nor are we better disposed to admit the author's applications of his principle. We observe the same confusion between the form of thought and the matter, between what we *must* know as logicians, and what we *may* know from other sources. For example:—

By the principle of excluded middle, we know that a concept may be affirmed or denied of any object whatever. But of this principle there are obviously three possible instances, none of which can be determined to be the true one without an appeal to our *material* knowledge. Either all A is B, or no A is B, or some A is B and some not. Mr. De Morgan assumes that we may *logically* lay down the third case as the true one.

"I always understand some one universe as being that in which all names used are wholly contained: and also (which it is very important to bear in mind) that no one name mentioned in a proposition fills this universe, or applies to everything in it. Nothing is more easy than to treat the supposition of a name being the universe as an extreme case."—'Formal Logic,' p. 55.

This extreme case, however, becomes positively inadmissible according to his subsequent doctrines. He tells us, for example, that the proposition all X is Y, contains, as a consequence, "some things are neither Xs nor Ys." This proposition, he says, "has never till now been introduced into logic;"‡—and for a very good reason, because it has no business there. Suppose his own extreme case, that either X or Y alone fills the universe, and there can obviously be nothing within that universe which is neither. The consequence is therefore material, based upon what we may happen to know of the extent of X and Y. Indeed, his whole theory of a material universe,

* Anal. Prior. i. 46. Mr. De Morgan, we presume, will say that, according to his characteristics of the copula (p. 50), whatever does not give B gives not-B. But, can any restriction be more arbitrary? And how are we to tell when the condition is fulfilled and when not.

† Since writing the above, we have seen Sir W. Hamilton's letter in the 'Athenæum' of August 24, 1850, in reply to Mr. De Morgan's Cambridge Paper. Our own remarks we leave as they were, referring to that letter the reader who wishes to see the contrasts between affirmation and negation clearly and fully stated.

‡ 'Formal Logic,' p. 62.

with its positive contraries, is extralogical.* It is not by logic that we learn that real and personal fill up the universe of property.

Before quitting this part of our subject, we will describe the principle of Mr. De Morgan's complex syllogism, as that part of his system which comes in some degree into rivalry with the quantified predicate of Sir W. Hamilton, which we are about to examine. When we say that the latter accomplishes all the ends attained by Mr. De Morgan, with a vast superiority in clearness and simplicity as well as in accuracy of thinking, we have said all that is necessary in the way of criticism. Mr. De Morgan refuses to quantify the predicate in a single affirmative proposition. Accordingly, the universal affirmative, all X is Y, may form part of two complex propositions, either "all X is Y, and all Y is X," or "all X is Y, and some Y is not X." Hence a syllogism in Barbara, which, in Sir W. Hamilton's system, would be expressed in the form, "all X is some Y, all Y is some Z, therefore all X is some Z," becomes in Mr. De Morgan's hands the following complex reasoning :—

All X is Y, and some Y is not X.

All Y is Z, and some Z is not Y.

Therefore all X is Z, and some Z is not X.

The reader who is desirous of further details must seek them in Mr. De Morgan's own work. Those who will take the trouble of comparing his fourth and fifth chapters with the system which we are about to describe, will, we are convinced, discover abundant grounds to justify our preference of the latter. We have followed Mr. De Morgan through a tedious journey, during which we have more than once had occasion to express our respect for his talents, and our regret at their perversion. We take leave of him in the words of an eminent logician and mathematician :—"Enimvero quæ confuse tantum cognoscuntur, ea sæpius confunduntur, ut adeo casus similes videantur quæ sunt dissimiles, et secundum ideam confusam qui agit, facile omittit quibus vel maxime fuerat opus. Atque ideo logica naturali instructus in applicatione sæpissime aberrat. Exemplo nobis sunt illi qui, in mathesi cum laude versati, methodum ma-

* As is shewn by Drobisch, 'Neue Darstellung der Logik,' § 30, and by Trendelenburg, 'Logische Untersuchungen,' c. ii., § 2.

thematicum extra eandem perperam applicant, etsi sibi rem acu tangere videantur." *

We must now turn to the rival system of Sir William Hamilton. In referring to the works of Mr. Thomson and Mr. Baynes as containing the principal features of this system, we by no means intend to describe either of these gentlemen as mere expositors of another's doctrine. Mr. Thomson's 'Outline of the Laws of Thought' is a work of much acuteness and originality; and it is due to the author to mention that the principle of a quantified predicate had been given in its most important application, that to the affirmative propositions and syllogisms, in the first edition, published in 1842, previously, we believe, to any communication of the author with Sir William Hamilton.† Mr. Baynes's essay, though principally compiled from Sir William's lectures, contains additional matter of interest to the more advanced students of Logic, in the curious and learned historical notices of the Appendix.‡ But, while acknowledging the merits of these works, we must express our regret at the delay in the publication of Sir William Hamilton's long promised 'New Analytic of Logical Forms.' We would remind him of Scott's censure of Coleridge for "throwing from him, as if in mere wantonness, those unfinished scraps of poetry, which, like the Torso of antiquity, defy the skill of his poetical brethren to complete them." Should any untoward circumstance ultimately deprive the philosophical world either of the New Analytic, or of the conclusion of the Supplementary Dissertations to Reid's works, it would be hard to name a loss more deeply to be regretted or more difficult to supply.

Of the two principal characteristics of Sir William Hamilton's

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* Wolf, 'Philosophia Rationalis,' Prolegomena, § 19.

† We much regret that the limits and design of the present Article prevent us from noticing more particularly some of the peculiar merits of Mr. Thomson's important work. Without committing ourselves to the whole of his details, we cordially approve of his general conception and treatment of his subject. It is only, we are convinced, as a system of truths valuable for their own sake, and not as a system of rules valuable for what they enable us to perform, that logic can ever be treated with any degree of accuracy or completeness.

‡ Mr. Baynes is also the author of an able translation of the 'Port-Royal Logic.' It is one of several original and translated philosophical works, lately published in Edinburgh, to which, from the specimens we have seen, we heartily wish success. Another of these works is an exceedingly well executed translation of the 'Discours de la Méthode' of Des Cartes, accompanied by an Introduction.

system, the quantification of the predicate is probably the most valuable accession to the science of logical forms which has been made since the days of Aristotle. The following passage from the Essay of Mr. Baynes exhibits at once the value of the principle and the reason of its general neglect in Logic:—

"Common language, as we have seen, seeks as its end to exhibit with *clearness the matter of thought*. Whatever does not contribute to this is thrown aside as worthless. Logic, on the other hand, seeks as its end *to exhibit with exactness the form of thought*. Whatever contributes to this is retained as of scientific value. All the elements which the analysis of the form of thought furnishes must be brought out to view and explicitly considered. Whatever does not belong to the form of thought must be cast aside as without the province of the science. We have seen that in thought the predicate notion of a proposition is always of a given quantity. This quantity is not expressed in common language; because, by a knowledge of, and reference to, the matter of thought, the omission is at once supplied. This procedure is, however, of course incompetent to logic. As a formal science, it knows nothing of the matter of thought; it makes no elisions; it can understand nothing; it can supply nothing; it can only recognise and deal scientifically with what is given formally. If, therefore, the predicate has always a certain quantity in thought (and we have shown it has), that quantity must be expressed before it can be logically taken into account, and its significance investigated. The recognition of the expressed quantity of the predicate is then as imperative in logic as the neglect of such recognition is convenient in common language; for it is plain that, unless all the elements furnished by analysis be received and considered in their relative influence and importance, the science cannot pretend to completeness. Logic, in common with all sciences, seeks perfection; but, as a formal science, it can only realise scientific perfection as it attains to formal exactness. The condition of its formal exactness is, that its analysis of the form of thought be exhaustive and complete. As soon as this is the case, synthesis may commence, and the science will emerge in its full beauty and true perfection."—Pp. 18-20.

The doctrine, indeed, is a necessary consequence of the principles which we have laid down above. If all actual thinking consists in the recognition of the relation between a concept and its object, it follows that, as a necessary condition of thought, the exact nature of that relation must be known. If all affirmative judgments assert the identity of one or more of the objects

thought under two concepts, it is indispensable to such assertion that we should know how far the identity extends. Common language and common logic both partially acknowledge the same principle. If I say "this is a rose," common language, by the use of the indefinite article, implies the existence of other roses besides the individual in question. If the logician asserts that affirmative propositions do not distribute the predicate, he must mean, if he means anything, that the predicate is actually thought as particular. The opponents of Sir William Hamilton are thus reduced to a dilemma: either they must maintain that the predicate cannot be thought as universal; in other words, that no two concepts can be co-extensive—a position false in fact, and, even if true, not recognisable by logic; or they must hold that we have no means of determining the quantity at all—in other words, that we are deficient in the *sine quâ non* of all actual thought. False thinking or no thinking are the sole alternatives.

Psychologically, as well as logically, we believe that Sir William Hamilton is right in maintaining "all A is all B" to be a single judgment, in opposition to Mr. De Morgan, who exhibits it in the complex form, "all A is B and all B is A;" thereby accepting the second horn of the above dilemma, since "all A is some B and all B is some A," would be a self-contradictory assertion.* On one or two difficulties which apparently lie on the surface of the system, it would be premature to pronounce judgment before the appearance of Sir William Hamilton's own work. Of this kind is an ingenious objection urged by Mr. De Morgan.† "Every falsehood," he says, "which can be enunciated as a truth should be deniable within the forms of the science;" whereas the denial of "all A is all B" is the dis-

* A curious inconsistency may be remarked in the theory of the complex proposition, when placed in antagonism to that of the quantified predicate. I cannot assert "all A is B and all B is A," without having thought of A and B as co-extensive, *i.e.*, without having made the judgment "all A is all B." If we know the quantity of the predicate we are of course entitled to state it. The complex proposition is only preferable on the supposition of our ignorance, a supposition which annihilates the complex proposition itself. If the assertion "all A is some B and all B is some A" be suicidal, is there more vitality in "all A is (I know not how much) B and all B is (I know not how much) A?" But the question, to be fully discussed, must be treated on psychological as well as logical grounds. Logic deals with the judgment as already formed; pyschology inquires what is the actual process of the mind in forming it.

† 'Transactions,' &c, p. 22.

junctive assertion, "some A is not B or some B is not A." The true contradictory we take to be "all A is not all B," which, like the original proposition, may be treated *collectively* or *distributively, i.e.*, as a singular or as an universal proposition. In the latter case it is compatible with one of three distinct assertions, "No A is B," "some A is not B," "some B is not A;" but the opponent does not commit himself to any one of the three. He denies only to the extent in which the original proposition was asserted, and no further: and hence, in proportion as the affirmation is *definite*, the negation will be *indefinite*. How far these indefinite statements, which are in fact judgments about the truth of another judgment, are entitled to a place in a logical system is a question which we leave to the consideration of Sir William Hamilton. We doubt not that this and similar questions will be satisfactorily disposed of in his work.

The value of Sir W. Hamilton's services to logical science in this part of his system it is scarcely possible to estimate too highly. It is, therefore, with considerable diffidence that we venture to suggest a difficulty in connection with his other characteristic doctrine, that of the double syllogism in extension and comprehension. The following passage from Mr. Thomson's 'Laws of Thought,' will at the same time furnish a concise account of the doctrine in question and exhibit the point in which we think its accuracy assailable:—

"Upon the examination of any judgment which appears to express a simple relation between two terms, we shall find it really complex, and capable of more than one interpretation. 'All stones are hard,' means in the first place that the mark, hardness, is found among the marks or attributes of all stones; and in this sense of the judgment, the predicate may be said to be contained in the subject, for a complete notion of stones contains the notion of hardness and something more. This is to read the judgment as to the intention (or comprehension) of its terms. Where it is a mere judgment of explanation, it will mean, 'the marks of the predicate are among *what I know to be* among the marks of the subject:' but where it is the expression of a new step in our investigation, of an accession of knowledge, it must mean, 'the marks of the predicate are among *what I now find* to be the marks of the subject.'

"Both subject and predicate, however, not only imply certain marks, but represent certain sets of objects. When we think of 'all stones,' we bring before us not only the set of marks—as

hardness, solidity, inorganic structure, and certain general forms—by which we know a thing to be what we call a stone, but also the class of things which have the marks, the stones themselves. And we might interpret the judgment, 'All stones are hard,' to mean that 'The class of stones is contained in the class of hard things.' This brings in only the extension of the two terms; according to which, in the example before us, the subject is said to be contained in the predicate. Every judgment may be interpreted from either point of view; and a right understanding of this doctrine is of great importance."—P. 189.

In this passage we do not think sufficient distinction is made between marks which are constitutive of a concept and marks which are characteristic of an object;—between attributes which are employed in the *definition* of a class-notion and attributes which may be used in a *description* of the individuals which the class contains. The doctrine is open to a different objection, according as the term comprehension is employed in the one or the other relation. In the former, which is the ordinary logical sense, and which seems to be that intended by Mr. Thomson, the attributes comprehended can only be predicated in analytical judgments, or, as they are called in the above passage, judgments of explanation. Mr. Thomson appears to meet this objection by holding that every new attribute is added, as soon as discovered, to the constitutive marks of the notion; in other words, that the progress of knowledge transforms synthetical judgments into analytical. But Geometry, and indeed every science in which definitions are genetic, is an exception to this rule. The attribute of having the square of the hypothenuse equal to the sum of the squares of the other sides, never forms part of the *notion* of a right angled triangle; nor does any advance of geometrical knowledge ever transform the 47th proposition of Euclid into an analytical judgment. If, then, the comprehension of a notion means the sum of the attributes forming its definition, judgments of this kind cannot be read in comprehension.*

We see but one mode of meeting this objection, viz., by assigning another meaning to the term comprehension, understanding thereby the sum of the attributes possessed by the

* [Cf. *contra* Hoffbauer, 'Logik,' 177.]

members of a class, whether forming part of the class-notion or not. But here we are met by an incongruity which the doctrine of quantification in both terms brings prominently into view. By that doctrine the copula of an affirmative proposition is regarded as expressing an *equation*, or, as we prefer to say, an *identification* of subject and predicate. The old theory of either term being *contained* in the other, as part in whole, whether by way of predication or of inhesion, is thereby abolished, and rightly so, for the material significance given in that theory to the copula tends to confound all distinction between the form and the matter of thought. But its abolition involves further changes. Under the old view, there is no inconsistency in regarding the related terms under opposite aspects. An attribute may be spoken of as inhering in a subject, or an individual as included under a notion, without any logical impropriety: the objections, if any, are solely metaphysical. But the laws of thought will not permit us to *identify* with each other these opposed notions. We can only identify attribute with attribute, or subject with subject, not a subject on one side of our copula with an attribute on the other. Hence arise two, and two only, *symmetrical* modes of expression.

1. Attribute identified with attribute: "some A is all B," or, the whole of the attributes constituting the concept B are identical with a portion of those constituting the concept A.

2. Subject identified with subject: "all A is some B," or, the whole of the things possessing the marks A are identical with a portion of those possessing the marks B.

The first of these is that to which we have above objected as admitting only analytical judgments; the second is that which we have adopted throughout the present remarks, and which is competent to all kinds of judgment. To express synthetical judgments in comprehension, a third and unsymmetrical form must be adopted, in which the sum of the attributes constituting the concept B are identified with a portion of those possessed by the things which also possess A. This last form is unsymmetrical and useless. It is unsymmetrical, because the things or objects thought under the concept are introduced on one side only of the equation: it is useless, as being only a circuitous mode of stating what is expressed directly in the

second form. For it is manifestly the same thing to say "the attribute B is one of those possessed by the objects which possess A," and "the objects which possess A are identical with some of those which possess B."

We do not advance the above objection as insuperable; indeed, we have that opinion of Sir William Hamilton's learning and philosophical genius, that if we venture to impugn any of his positions, it is with the expectation of being refuted. But it constitutes at least a difficulty in the system, and one which we have not yet seen satisfactorily disposed of. The view which we have given in the earlier part of these remarks, of the nature of the mental process of judging, and the consequent distinction between the matter and the form of judgments, has been adapted exclusively to the possible extension of the terms. The problem which we wish to see satisfactorily solved by the advocates of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine may be stated as follows: To construct a synthetical proposition containing an *equation* or *identification* of subject and predicate in any other respect than that of the objects thought under the compared concepts.*

A word, before concluding, on systems of notation. We object to the illustration of logical processes by geometrical diagram, as in the system usually attributed to Euler.† To compare the mental inclusion of one notion in the sphere of another with the local inclusion of one portion of space in another, is to confound the individual with the universal, the immediate presentations of intuition with the mediate cognitions of thought, and to lose sight of the characteristic feature of a concept, that it cannot be depicted to the sense or the imagination. As little do we approve of the algebraical method adopted by Mr. De Morgan, in which the premises of a syllogism are connected by a *plus*, and their relation to the conclusion expressed by the sign of equality, a method too redolent of the computation theory noticed above, and tending to confound the intuitive judgments of Arithmetic with the discursive inferences of Logic. The algebraical equation proper does not

* [Krug, 'Logik,' p. 214, holds all logical judgments to be analytical.]

† Euler appears to have been anticipated in this respect by Weise, whose method was published in Lange's 'Nucleus Logicæ Weisianæ' in 1712. See Drobisch, 'Neue Darstellung der Logik,' § 44.

represent a syllogism, but a proposition; a proposition which, like any other, may form part of a logical reasoning, but cannot with any propriety represent the whole. Sir William Hamilton's scheme is free from these objections, and possesses the merit of being distinct from the established notation of any other science. It is on all accounts to be preferred to any rival method that has hitherto appeared. But we confess that, as far as our own experience goes, we are inclined to an opinion the reverse of that of Mr. Thomson, who holds that "to be able to represent to the eye by figures the relation which subsists in thought between conceptions tends greatly to facilitate logical analysis."*

But it is time to close a discussion which we fear has already severely tested the patience of the reader. For the dry and abstruse character of its details, we trust a sufficient apology will be found in the present aspect of Philosophy in this country. Condemned since the days of Locke to a long period of unmerited neglect, Logic has within the last few years again engaged a considerable share of attention, and has been cultivated with much ill-regulated energy; an energy which, if not brought under the control of definite and fixed principles, threatens to produce consequences scarcely less to be regretted than the former lethargy. It is a question of no light importance to all interested in the progress of philosophical thinking, in what manner the reviving study shall be prosecuted. Discontented with the definite but narrow field which it can claim as a pure or formal science, there are some who would invest it with a spurious importance by adding to its speculative principles a portion of its practical uses. Against this confusion of the laws of thought with their material applications, we have in the above remarks more than once recorded our protest. By

* We have already expressed our dissent from the fundamental doctrines of Hegel's Logic. In the following passage, however, we fully concur, as applicable to all views of the science which recognise a distinction between intuition and thought. "Da der Mensch die Sprache hat, als das der Vernunft eigenthümliche Bezeichnungsmittel, so ist es ein müssiger Einfall, sich nach einer unvollkommenern Darstellungsweise umsehen und damit quälen zu wollen, Der Begriff kann als solcher wesentlich nur mit dem Geiste aufgefasst werden. Es ist vergeblich, ihn durch Raumfiguren und algebraische Zeichen zum Behufe des *äusserlichen Auges*, und einer *begrifflosen*, *mechanischen Behandlungsweise*, eines *Calculs*, festhalten zu wollen."—'Werke,' vol. v., p. 57. [Ed.]

whatever right one iota of the matter of thought can claim admission into the science by the same right the whole universe of human knowledge is entitled to follow. Logic thus cultivated must be arbitrary or impossible. As little, however, can we advocate the exclusive study of an isolated and barren formalism. It is in connexion, not in confusion, with the sister sciences, as a branch of mental philosophy, that Logic may and ought to be exhibited; and it is to the expediency of such a course that we earnestly solicit the attention of academical bodies. The University of Oxford, in its recent Examination Statute, has prescribed, "Si quis in dialectica se bene institutum probaverit, hoc in honorum distributione aliquantum momenti habeat." In the propriety of this decision we fully concur; the manner of providing for the *bona institutio* may, we think, be profitable matter of further legislation. Of logics made easy and logics made useful we have in all conscience had enough. The one have sufficiently shewn that it is possible to be shallow without being clear; and the other, that the method of a science may be utterly deformed without obtaining in the slightest degree the end proposed by the deformation.* But, on the other hand, if Logic is to be anything more than a mere sophistry of words or tissue of abstractions, it must neither, as with Hegel, aspire to fathom the infinite by the processes of reason, nor, as with Kant, disdain all connexion with the so-called empirical facts of psychology, which in truth are empirical only as it is empirical that we live and move and think at all. "La Logique," says M. Cousin, "n'est qu'un retour de la psychologie sur elle-même;" and the whole history of philosophy confirms the assertion. The philosopher to whom we owe nearly the whole material of Logic was the author of the 'De Anima.' The philosopher who has done most to

* On this point we have valuable testimony from Germany and from France. "So ist denn auch," says Rosenkranz, "die Logik hundertfach von philosophischen Stümpern *utiliter* gemisshandelt worden." "Sans la Logique," says M. St. Hilaire, "l'esprit de l'homme peut admirablement agir, admirablement raisonner; mais sans elle, il ne se connait pas tout entier: il ignore l'une de ses parties les plus belles et les plus fécondes. La Logique la lui fait connaître. Voilà son utilité; elle ne peut pas en avoir d'autre." Herbart too, the most eminent expounder of Formal Logic since Kant, expresses himself to the same effect. "Die Logik sollte ihr angefangenes Werk vollenden, in dem sie die im allgemeinen mögliche Verbindung der gegebenen Elemente des Wissens vollständig nachwiese; der Nutzen würde sich hinterher finden."

secure for the science an exact definition and province was the author of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' whose contributions to psychology furnish at once the best defence and the most valuable means of transgressing his own precepts with regard to Logic. The philosopher to whose influence it is mainly owing that Logic in Germany has ever been estimated at its proper value was the author of the 'Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement humain.' Sir William Hamilton's attainments in mental science will be acknowledged by all who are acquainted with his edition of 'Reid.' The philosopher whose dictum we have quoted above has contributed more than any living writer to the progress of psychology in France: the most valuable recent contributions to Logic in that country emanate from the same school, and are professedly written on the same principle. These facts need no comment.

THE LIMITS OF DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE.

CONTENTS.

Dr. Whewell's Letter.
Merits of Kant's Philosophy.
All Knowledge cannot be referred to Experience merely.
Matter and Form of Thought.
Formal and Material Clearness and Distinctness.
Necessary Truth.
Parallel between Mathematical and Physical Sciences.
Synthetical Judgments of Mathematics and Physics.
Comparison of the Ideas of Space and Force.
Geometry not founded on the Idea of Space, but on that of Magnitude.
The Axioms of Mechanics.
Definition of Truth.
Logical, Mathematical, Metaphysical, and Physical Necessity.
No Matter of Fact can be Matter of Demonstration.
'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.'
Appendix: On the Fundamental Assumptions of Geometry.

THE

LIMITS OF DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE.*

A LETTER TO THE REV. WM. WHEWELL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD,
April, 12*th* 1853.

DEAR SIR,—I regret that I have been unable to pay earlier attention to the Letter which you did me the honour to address to me in September last. And even now, the remarks I am about to make on the subject of that Letter have been somewhat hastily drawn up, and must be considered rather as explanatory of previous statements than as embodying the results of subsequent study. But the subject is one in which I feel much interest; your own remarks have contributed considerably to simplify the question apparently at issue between us; and I am not without hopes that a few explanations on my part may help in some degree to settle a controversy which perhaps is more verbal than real.

Another motive I may be pardoned for confessing to have had some influence with me. "It is not often," observes a critic in the 'Literary Gazette,' "that writers so distinguished as Dr. Whewell engage in controversy with those who criticise their published works." That the efforts of a tyro in philosophy should have attracted this notice from one of its most eminent masters is in itself most gratifying, while the candid and courteous tone of your Letter calls for a grateful acknowledgment on my part, and encourages me to hope that the observations which I have now to offer will be received in the same kind and liberal spirit.

Let me begin with a few words on the subject with which your Letter commences, the reception of the philosophy of Kant in this country. The disparaging criticism of Stewart must be taken for what it is worth, coupled with the author's

* A Letter to the Rev. W. Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, Author of the 'History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.'

confession of his entire ignorance of the German language, and his consequent reliance on translations and second-hand authorities. To this may be added the judgment of the greatest philosophical critic of the age, "that the tone and tenor of Mr. Stewart's remarks on the philosopher of Königsberg are remarkable exceptions to the usual cautious, candid and dignified character of his criticism."* The opinion of the "gentleman who has published a History of Moral Science," will hardly be deemed worthy of a serious notice.

It would probably astonish some of the critics who talk so comprehensively of German Metaphysics and German Theology, as if all Germans held the same opinions, to be told that the purport of the philosophy of Kant is to teach a lesson of humility, to inculcate the very limited nature of human faculties and human knowledge. And yet this is strictly true, however little of the same spirit may be discerned in the writings of Schelling or Hegel. Notwithstanding the historical connection between these earlier and later forms of German speculation, there is little real sympathy between the philosopher who announced as the moral of his critique, "Tecum habita, et noris, quam sit tibi curta supellex;" and him who proclaimed his Logic as the "exhibition of God as he is in his eternal essence, before the creation of nature and of finite spirits." But Kant, great as has been his reputation, has not received his true honour in his own country. He is the philosophical offspring of Locke and Hume; his writings are the natural supplement and corrective of theirs; and it may be that the spirit of philosophy is not so extinct among the countrymen of Locke and Hume, but that the "unsightly root" of the German sage may yet bear in another soil the bright golden flower which it has failed to produce in its own.†

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* Sir W. Hamilton, 'Reid's Works,' p. 886, n.

† Since the above remarks were written, I have met with the following judgment of a very competent critic, Mr. Morell, in his recently published 'Elements of Psychology,' p. 241: "There is a very prevalent opinion in this country that the writings of Kant are obscure and mystical. This opinion, I am bold to say, is wholly due either to the entire want of philosophical culture in the minds of popular writers who undertake to sit in judgment upon him; or to a positive ignorance of the meaning of the terms he employs. No one, I believe, who has taken the most moderate pains to read the works of this greatest of modern critics *intelligently*, will hesitate to agree with me in affirming that a more clear, steady, penetrating, dispassionate, *unmystical* mind, is not to be found in the whole circle of modern literature. His style

That this hope is not entirely fallacious, your own writings furnish no small assurance. It is to the honour of the Author of the 'History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' to have accomplished the most comprehensive and elaborate survey of the results of experience in a philosophical spirit the most remote from empiricism; to have acknowledged with Kant the existence of *a priori* conditions of consciousness in a work dedicated to the especial commemoration of the method of Bacon and the discoveries of Newton. It was mainly in consequence of my conviction of the very great services rendered by that work to Philosophy that I ventured in the 'Prolegomena Logica' to criticise a few passages, which, as understood by other readers as well as by myself, appeared to detract from the philosophical completeness of its theory. In the same spirit I wish now to exhibit, as briefly and plainly as I can, what appears to be the present state of the controversy, as modified by your subsequent explanations.

The theory which refers all knowledge to the single source of Experience, I have always considered to be, under any explanation to which it has been subjected, untenable. I have objected indeed to the vague expression, *origin of ideas*, which tends to confound under one formula two very different questions, one concerning the formation of *concepts*, the other concerning that of *judgments*.* But as regards both concepts and judgments, and indeed the whole province of thought, pure and mixed, I have distinguished between the *matter*, which alone is given by experience, and the *form*, which is communicated by the mind itself.† In this sense, at least, I can heartily subscribe to the concluding words of your Letter. "And with regard to the image of vegetable development, I may say, that as such development implies both inherent forms in the living seed, and nutritive powers in earth and air; so the development of our scientific ideas implies both a formative power, and materials acted on; and that, although the analogy

is *incomparably* more lucid than that of Locke; his use of terms far more defined, and his meaning grasped, on the whole, by a less stretch of thought. All he demands (which is surely not very unreasonable) is, that you shall learn the force of his terms at starting, and then keep to their proper meaning throughout." I am happy to be able to adduce the high authority of Mr. Morell in support of the opinion which I have long held of the philosophical merits of Kant.

* 'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 157; ed. 2, p. 170.

† Ibid. p. 228; ed. 2, p. 245.

must be very defective, we conceive that we best follow it by placing the formative power in the living mind, and in the external world the materials acted on: while the doctrine that all truth is derived from experience only, appears to reject altogether one of these elements, or to assert the two to be one."

It is not a valid defence of the opposite theory to use the term *Experience* in a wide sense, to include the consciousness of internal phenomena of mind, as well as of external phenomena of matter. It is not true that, even in this extended sense, all knowledge is derived from Experience. For Experience, whether internal or external, is of *individual* objects only, presented under the limiting conditions, of Space in the case of external phenomena, of Time in the case of both. My external experience may inform me of the presence of this or that colour or sound; my internal experience, of this or that appetite or volition; but in both cases the object is an *individual presented now or here*, and by these conditions distinguished from any similar phenomenon of consciousness presented in another place or at another time.

It thus appears that the very first step towards knowledge, the act of forming *general representative notions*, implies the existence of a faculty and a law of mind, instead of a mere *tabula rasa* on which experience registers its marks. In other words, the faculty of *comparison* by which the mind generalizes the results of external or internal presentation, is distinct from the consciousness of this or that single phenomenon, as the actual state of my mind at a given moment. Presentative Consciousness may be conceded to experience. Representative Consciousness implies a formative power in the mind itself.

This point has been overloooked both by the advocates and by the opponents of Sensationalism. Mr. Lewes, for example, asserts that the "nisi ipse intellectus" of Leibnitz is merely Locke's doctrine expressed in an epigram;* in other words, that the Reflection of Locke contains all that Leibnitz added to Sensation. It may be so; but this would not prove Locke's theory to be complete, but Leibnitz's to be defective. *Reflection* must not stand for two things at once. If it is an internal

* 'Biographical History of Philosophy,' vol. iii., p. 199. [Compare, however, the same author's 'History of Philosophy,' ed. 3, vol. ii., p. 255. ED.]

sense, *presenting* individual phenomena of mind, it cannot at the same time be a process of thought *representing* all objects of experience, external as well as internal, by means of general notions. The truth is, that both theories are imperfect. That of Locke, though unfortunate in its language, points correctly enough to the two great sources of presentation, but omits the necessary co-operation of the representative faculties. That of Leibnitz, while rightly calling attention to the fact that necessary truths cannot be derived from experience alone, has not sufficiently discriminated between the two different sources of experience, internal and external, both distinct from the understanding itself.

The admission, therefore, of two distinct sources of knowledge, experience without and the mind within, is true as far as it goes, but admits of a further subdivision. The workings of the mind are of two kinds, so distinct from each other that they may be properly referred to two distinct faculties, the presentative, or source of internal intuition, and the representative, or source of thought. The former contributes the *matter* of one portion of our knowledge, that of the special phenomena of mind, and its facts will furnish the empirical basis of an inductive Psychology. The latter contributes the *form* of our whole knowledge, whether of ourselves or of the world without, and is the source of those concepts or general notions, under which the several phenomena of experience are reduced to specific unity.

But within these limits the formative power of the mind has no value as a criterion of truth and falsehood, or as a principle of distinction between necessary and contingent truths. The form of a concept or judgment is equally contributed by the mind, whether the concept represent a real or imaginary object, whether the judgment be true or false. Up to this point the operations of the mind are concerned only with the logical properties of thought, with the conceivability of a notion, or with the possible truth of a judgment. Before the same principle is admitted into a philosophy of physical science, it will be necessary to ask a further question. Does the mind itself, in any state of cultivation, furnish a valid criterion of the conformity of our notions and judgments to the actual phenomena of external things? Can certain ideas, once *clearly* and

distinctly apprehended, enable us to place any physical science on a surer basis than that of observed facts; to determine, not merely empirically what the constitution of nature *is*, but axiomatically what it *must be?*

Perhaps there is a lurking ambiguity in the principal terms of this question. *Clearness* and *distinctness* were proposed by Descartes as criteria of the truth of ideas; but that philosopher has nowhere accurately distinguished between thought properly so called and other states of consciousness, nor between the *formal* clearness and distinctness which depend on the relation of one thought to another, and the *material* clearness and distinctness which depend on the relation of a thought to its object as presented. A concept is formally clear when it can be distinguished as a whole from any other; it is formally distinct when its several constituent elements can be analysed and distinguished from each other; but this is a criterion of logical reality alone, of the mental conceivability, not of the extra-mental existence of an object. If I have a clear and distinct notion of gold and of a mountain, I have also a clear and distinct notion of a golden mountain, though the objects of the two first notions are real, and that of the last imaginary. On the other hand, a concept will be materially clear and distinct if it accurately represents the character of the object itself and its component elements as they actually exist in nature. These qualities can obviously exist only in those notions which represent real objects; and in this case the clearness and distinctness can only be ascertained by an exact comparison of the notion with its object; *i. e.* by experience.

It is in the former sense only, that the terms *clearness* and *distinctness* are properly applicable to geometrical notions. It is not necessary that my conception of a straight line or a triangle should exactly conform to any material type. It is, indeed, by supposing such conformity to be necessary, that Mr. Mill attempts to reduce these concepts to mere generalizations from experience. He insists on "their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality: in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them." * This resemblance is so

* Mill's 'Logic,' vol. i., p. 309, bk. ii., cap. 5, § 5.

far from being implied in the mental distinctness of the geometrical idea, that it can only exist in the inverse ratio to it. In exact proportion to the clearness and distinctness of my conception of intelligible magnitudes, is my knowledge that they *do not resemble* the sensible. In proportion as I distinctly apprehend the mathematical character of a straight line or a triangle, in the same proportion am I conscious that no visible line is exactly straight and no visible body perfectly triangular. But if we admitted Mr. Mill's premises, I do not think we could avoid his conclusion. If there is any truth in the prevalent opinion that mathematical science is more certain than physical it is precisely because in the former there is not the same need of comparing our ideas with our sensations; because sensible magnitudes are not the proper objects of geometrical reasoning.

If, therefore, a philosopher asserts that physical science may attain to the same degree of certainty as mathematical, *provided only that its ideas can be apprehended with the same clearness and distinctness*, he would naturally be interpreted to mean, not material clearness and distinctness, which mathematical ideas neither have nor require, but formal clearness and distinctness, which they have. He would also be naturally understood to imply that it is entirely to this clearness and distinctness that the necessity of mathematical demonstrations is owing. I do not say that this interpretation could be consistently carried out by a reader of the 'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences:' on the contrary, he would find himself in that work continually reminded of the necessity of facts as well as of ideas, of material as well as of formal clearness and distinctness; but I say that such an interpretation is required to make the parallel between mathematical and physical science perfect, and I use it for the present only provisionally, to illustrate the difference between them.

Neither of the above positions is, I think, tenable; but in order to examine this question, we must first determine what is meant by *necessary truth*. There is a relative as well as an absolute necessity. An idea, however empirical in its origin, may logically involve certain consequences, which are so far necessary that they cannot be consistently denied of any object, so long as the original idea is affirmed of it. In this sense, any science may contain abundance of necessary and *a priori*

principles, *its fundamental idea being once given.** Such principles, however, do not contribute to the extension of our knowledge, but only to the more distinct consciousness of what we already possess. They exhibit separately the different attributes already comprehended in the given concept, but they do not enable us to add new ones. In the language of Kant, they are *analytical*, not *synthetical* judgments, and their necessity arises from the logical laws of thought, applied to the given matter of the fundamental idea.

This necessity is the only one that can arise from the formal clearness and distinctness of an idea; and the possible existence of such a necessity in physical science need not be disputed by the warmest advocate of empiricism; for no one will deny that a complex idea once given may be logically analysed, and its virtual contents actually exhibited. Nor is it denied that this power of analysis, depending mainly on the clearness and distinctness with which the fundamental idea is apprehended, will vary according to the intellectual and scientific culture of different persons. For though the laws which govern the process are logical only, and in their abstract character common to all men, yet the possession of the matter upon which they must operate in every actual exercise of thought, and the consequent possibility of their application in special cases, may be the privilege only of a small number of cultivated minds.

Thus far, all sciences may conceivably stand on an equal footing, though the conception has been much earlier realized in some instances than in others, and in many remains to this day only an idea of possible perfection which future generations may carry out. All sciences may contain axioms and deductions logically necessary as the legitimate developments of their fundamental ideas, and materially true *upon the assumption that the fundamental idea accurately represents the corresponding fact as it exists in nature.* Unless this assumption can be verified, they are necessary as *thoughts* only, and their claim to be regarded as *necessary truths* will depend upon the answer to the question, How is this fundamental assumption to be verified?

It is precisely at this point that the parallel between mathematical and physical science ceases. A science can be said in

* 'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 92; ed. 2, p. 101.

the highest sense of the term to contain *necessary truths*, if the object which its fundamental idea represents, as well as that idea itself, is given *a priori* by the laws or conditions of the mind itself, and not *a posteriori* in the facts of experience; in other words, if the matter as well as the form of its conception is necessary. A physical science will attain to mathematical certainty, if the verification of its fundamental idea, that is to say, the evidence of its correspondence to the phenomena of nature, can be placed on a basis equally necessary with the logical analysis of the idea itself. If, for instance, I can not only say "the fundamental idea of Force being such as I conceive it, it is impossible to suppose the scientific consequences to be different from those which I have deduced;" but also, "it is impossible to conceive a world in which Force could be manifested otherwise than in conformity to my fundamental idea," Mechanics will then be elevated into a science of necessary truths. But if I can only say, "Force, as manifested in nature, does as a matter of fact conform to my fundamental idea, but it is conceivable that the world might have been constituted otherwise," the science may then be accepted as a true explanation of nature *as it is*, but not as a necessary demonstration of nature *as it must be*.

The latter is obviously the condition of any science in which the verification of the fundamental idea depends upon experience. If the accuracy of my fundamental idea of Force is questioned, I cannot vindicate it simply by pointing out the logical harmony of its consequences. I must appeal to experience to show that the phenomena of force, as manifested in nature, are at least not inconsistent with the manner in which my idea represents them. I must occasionally verify my results as well as my principles by the same criterion, showing that my scientific theory sufficiently accounts for the observed character of the natural phenomena; that the effects which are exhibited in fact correspond with the effects which must necessarily be exhibited, if my fundamental idea is true. Whether any existing science as a matter of fact can attain even to this degree of necessity; whether the development of the clearest fundamental ideas does not continually require the assistance of further empirical premises, is another question; but the above is surely the utmost conceivable excellence in which a sober-

minded physical philosopher can hope to exhibit that department of science: viz. *as a methodized series of the necessary consequences of a fundamental idea, verified by their conformity to the actual phenomena of nature as given in experience.*

I say, a sober-minded philosopher; for a very different conception of natural philosophy has found favour with a people among whose intellectual merits sobriety of thought will hardly be reckoned. Philosophy, to be worthy of the name, is conceived as a *creative idea*, which, by a purely intellectual process, shall produce or reproduce the constitution of the world as existing *a priori* in the divine mind, and evolve an universe out of nothing. Such a conception, if realised, might indeed proclaim itself as a demonstrative exhibition of nature as it must be; but to this theory of physical necessity the whole spirit of the 'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' is diametrically opposed. Nor is such a conception, supposing it possible, really entitled to be considered as a more perfect method of physical science. As I have elsewhere observed,* a demonstration of a fact, if such were possible, would not add one tittle to the evidence of the fact as such in the eyes of any but an Egoist. By him it would be accepted as an additional proof that what are commonly considered as phenomena of the *non-ego* are really only modifications of mind and governed solely by mental laws. But to the Realist, who believes in the essential distinction of mind and matter, it could at most only suggest the possibility of a pre-established harmony between the laws of each, a suggestion which would require, in every special case, to be verified by an empirical examination.

Up to this point, then, the *necessity* of any physical statement, *i.e.* the *inconceivability* of its contradictory, is a formal necessity only, derived from the analysis of its fundamental idea, and belongs to the deductive, not to the inductive portion of the science. The synthetical judgments of Physics, those which state the relation of our ideas to the facts of nature, and those which add to an idea any new attribute beyond what it contained before, are based on an observation of facts as they are, derive their scientific value from their conformity to those facts, and are thus verified empirically. On the character of

* 'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 293; ed. 2, p. 313.

these latter judgments depends the whole question of the essential difference between mathematical and physical reasoning. If, as Mr. Mill maintains, mathematical ideas, like physical, are generalized from the phenomena of sense and must ultimately be verified by their agreement with those phenomena, then in mathematical as well as in physical science the synthetical judgments are *a posteriori*, and its reasonings are reduced to a statement of what *is*, instead of a demonstration of what *must be*. If, on the other hand, physical science could be shown to gain its synthetical judgments *a priori*, it would be elevated to the grade of mathematical certainty, and the constitution of the world might be deduced from the laws and conditions of the human mind.

The truth I believe to lie between these two extremes. The synthetical judgments of Mathematics are *a priori*, as concerned with the subjective conditions of intuition (Space and Time), which it is impossible to annihilate or change in thought. The synthetical judgments of Physics are *a posteriori*, as concerned with the objective facts of intuition, which it is always possible to annihilate or change in thought, however constant may be our experience of the facts themselves. It was on the ground of this distinction that I observed in the 'Prolegomena Logica,' "The clearness and distinctness of any conception can only enable us more accurately to unfold the virtual contents of the concept itself; it cannot enable us to add *a priori* any new attribute. In other words, the increased clearness and distinctness of a conception may enable us to multiply to any extent our analytical judgments; but cannot add a single synthetical one. Without something more than this, the philosopher has failed to meet the touchstone of the Kantian question, *How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?*"

In this passage, the terms *clearness* and *distinctness* were used in the formal sense, in which alone they are properly applicable to mathematical notions. In this sense they can give rise to analytical judgments only. On the other hand, if these terms be used in a material sense, to imply exact conformity with facts, they will give rise to synthetical judgments, but not *a priori*. To the *truth* of a science this is sufficient, but not to its *necessity*. If physical ideas could give rise to judgments equally necessary with mathematical, we should not only know

the system of nature as it is, but also that no other system can be conceived as possible. It is not enough that no other system should be possible, so long as our fundamental idea remains the same, or so long as the laws of nature continue unchanged. We should also know it to be absolutely inconceivable that the present system could be destroyed, and another substituted in its place, so as to give rise to a different fundamental idea, expressive of a different experience. We should believe not only that our fundamental idea correctly represents the existing phenomena of the world in which we live, but also that there cannot be in any other part of the universe, or at any other period of time, a system of phenomena other than our fundamental idea supposes.

All this is implied in geometrical necessity; and the explanation is to be found in the relation of its synthetical judgments to Space as a *subjective condition of intuition.* I do not understand by this expression the same thing that is meant in the 'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' by a *fundamental idea.* And I lay stress upon this distinction, inasmuch as in the 'Letter to the Author of Prolegomena Logica,' these two terms are spoken of as convertible. A fundamental idea is suggested by, if not altogether derived from, the facts of experience, and generalized by the mind from and after the observation of such facts. Hence its logical character is that of a *general concept* predicable of many individual objects, and its scientific value depends on the accuracy with which it represents those objects and explains the actual phenomena in each individual case. Now a concept is not limited by the laws of thought to any definite number of individuals, nor even to really existing individuals at all. Hence there is no difficulty in conceiving the destruction of any one of the individuals of which the concept is predicable, and consequently of all. My conception of a rose, for example, may have been drawn from the examination of ten actual roses, but does not in itself imply the existence of ten roses, neither more nor less. The notion once gained would remain if the number were reduced to nine, to eight, and finally to none at all. In such a case the logical value of the concept as the representative of possible objects would remain unchanged, but its material value as the representative of actual objects is destroyed. On the other hand, a subjective

condition, or, in Kant's language, *a form* of intuition, is not generalized by the mind from or after the facts of experience, for without it experience itself (and not merely a philosophy of experience) is impossible. Hence it is not a general concept, is not predicable or representative of a plurality of individuals, is not capable of verification by facts, and cannot be destroyed by any act of thought.

As an example, we may compare together the ideas of Force and Space. According to the mechanical conception of Force, as a cause of motion, known and measured by its effects, there are many forces in nature, greater and less, acting singly or in combination, and giving rise to a variety of phenomena. Any one of these may be conceived to be removed or changed with a corresponding change of phenomena; and there is no impossibility in supposing the existence of a world in which no exertion of force is manifested.* Force again is manifested in a particular class of sensible objects; and the objects may be observed by an unscientific mind without giving rise to the corresponding idea. On the other hand, Space is presented to consciousness as one only (for the distinction of spaces is purely arbitrary): it necessarily accompanies every perception and every imagination of sensible objects: it presents itself to every man's mind, and cannot in any act of thought be conceived as non-existent. A false conception of Force may vitiate our whole theory of the objects in which it is manifested; for Force is a representative concept, regulating our thoughts. A false conception of Space has no such consequences; for Space is a presented condition regulating our intuitions. Space, according to Locke's theory, as an idea derived from sensation, bears some resemblance to the fundamental ideas of science; but in this case it cannot be regarded as a form of intuition, and the theory fails to account for its principal characteristics. Space, according to Kant's theory, as a form of intuition, differs in a remarkable degree from the ideas of science. But the demonstrations of Geometry are not affected by this metaphysical controversy.

For these reasons, I do not think that Geometry can in strict

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* It may be true that the best mechanical conception of rest is that which represents it as produced by the equilibrium of forces; but this presupposes the idea of force as derived from motion. In a world wholly at rest, the conception of force would not arise.

accuracy be described as founded on the idea of Space, but rather on that of *Magnitude*, or continuous quantity, which can only be conceived as in space. Magnitude, like Force, is a concept predicable of various subordinate objects, equal or unequal, like or unlike; and the position of the one in Geometry is in many respects analogous to that of the other in Mechanics. Force is the subject of the *common notions* or analytical principles employed in Mechanics, as Magnitude is of those employed in Geometry. For instance: that two equal and opposite forces will destroy each other's effects, is an analytical judgment implied in the notion of equal forces; as that if equal magnitudes are added to equals the sums are equal, is an analytical judgment implied in the notion of equal magnitudes. Again, Force as estimated by its effects may be divided according to the objects on which it acts, as on a particle, a rigid body, or a system: these correspond to the various subdivisions of magnitude, the straight line, the triangle, &c. A person with an erroneous conception of Force may be unable to see the cogency of the reasonings in Mechanics; and it is not impossible that one with an erroneous conception of Magnitude may not be able to follow the demonstrations of Euclid.

Nevertheless, these two fundamental concepts exhibit differences no less remarkable than their resemblances. Force as conceived in Mechanics is representative of force as actually existing in nature; and the accuracy (or in a material sense the clearness and distinctness) of the conception depends on its agreement with the fact. Magnitude as conceived in Geometry exists only in the imagination; and the mental image would acquire no new value in pure Geometry by its conformity (if such existed) to a physical fact. The value would be confined to applied Geometry alone. An erroneous conception of Force would vitiate the *matter* of mechanical reasoning, by introducing such attributes as are incompatible with the explanation of the phenomena, or omitting such as are essential. An erroneous conception of Magnitude would vitiate the *form* only of geometrical reasoning, by introducing attributes inconsistent with the subsequent deductions of the science. Our conception of Force, even if now true, may be conceived as becoming for mechanical purposes non-existent: *i.e.* the constitution of the

world may conceivably be so changed that the conception may be no longer applicable. Our conception of Magnitude cannot be conceived as becoming geometrically non-existent: for it exists only as thought, and, being equally an object of thought in the conception of its non-existence, that conception is self-contradictory.

Neither Force in general nor Magnitude in general can give rise to synthetical judgments. For the subject of a synthetical judgment is not the concept as such, but the individual in which the conceived attributes are present. The judgment, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, is not true if interpreted to mean "the notion of two straight lines is the notion of lines which cannot enclose a space:" the notion of two straight lines is the notion of two lines which lie evenly between their points, or whatever other definition we may adopt, and it is nothing else. So the judgment, that the pressure of two equal weights upon the fulcrum of a lever is not affected by the length of the lever, in its synthetical interpretation (for it admits of more than one), does not state the identity of the two notions as such, but a fact concerning the things signified. But the general concept as such cannot be depicted to sense or imagination as an individual. I cannot perceive or imagine magnitude or force in general, but only this particular magnitude or force presented now and here, as a thing without the mind or an image within. Hence, to give rise to a synthetical judgment, the fundamental idea must be *individualized*. And in this process we find the same differences between the two sciences as in the concepts themselves. The synthetical judgments of Geometry are derived from the *imagination of a possible object* corresponding to a given concept: those of Mechanics from the *perception of an actual one*. I depict in my imagination a pair of straight lines, and the image as presented does not enclose a space; but the mind in this case is governed only by its own law of individualizing a concept, and consequently the image presented contains no adventitious elements, and is an adequate representative of any other image of two straight lines which I may depict on any future occasion. To conceive otherwise, I must conceive my mind as governed by other laws than its own, which, as conception is itself the servant of the law, is impossible. On the

other hand, the individual instance which I perceive of a rigid body acted upon by forces may contain many accidental features not common to other instances. There is need of experience and comparison of various instances to reject what is accidental and retain what is essential; and even then the essential features, being only such as the laws of nature require, may still be annihilated in thought; for thought is not bound by the laws of force acting on bodies.

To exhibit this in special instances, it will be necessary to separate, in the axioms of Mechanics, that which is logically necessary as an analysis of notions from that which is empirically true as a statement of facts; for these are frequently combined in the same formula. Take, for example, the first axiom of Statics as given in the 'Mechanical Euclid.' "If two equal forces act perpendicularly at the extremity of equal arms of a straight lever to turn it opposite ways, they will keep each other in equilibrium." "Axioms of this kind," we are told, cannot be verified by experiment, "without assuming other principles, which require as much proof as these do. If, for instance, Archimedes had wished to ascertain by trial whether two equal weights at the equal arms of a lever would balance each other, how could he know that the weights *were* equal by any more simple criterion than that they *did* balance?" In one sense the above axiom is a mere identical judgment. If by *weight* we understand a force manifested by its effects, and the equality of the weights is ascertained by their equilibrium on the lever, it is a mere identical judgment to say that equal (or balancing) weights balance each other. To make the axiom synthetical, *weight* must be interpreted to mean *heavy body;* and it is assumed that bodies equally heavy on one occasion will be equally heavy on any other. This may be true as a fact in nature, but surely the contradictory is not *inconceivable.* It is not inconceivable that the law of gravitation may be suspended altogether, or that bodies equally heavy to-day in England may be unequal to-morrow in France.* The same criticism may be applied to the confirmation of the axiom from the principle of sufficient reason. Assuming the uniform action of gravity, it furnishes a sufficient reason for the uniformity of the result;

* This criticism has been stated in another form in 'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 292; ed 2, p. 312.

but if we can conceive this law to be changeable, its change will be a sufficient reason for any uncertainty in phenomena.

The other axioms of Mechanics are I believe open to similar objections. The third, that the pressure on the fulcrum of a lever is equal to the sum of the weights, has been criticised by Sir William Hamilton on a principle substantially the same as that which I employed in the 'Prolegomena Logica' in reference to the first. I cannot help regarding this coincidence of two arguments published nearly at the same time and independently of each other, as some confirmation of the truth of the criticism. If by the sum of the weights is meant the sum at *any one* distance from the fulcrum, they are not *equal to*, they *are*, the pressure; and so far the judgment is merely identical. If, on the other hand, we mean the sum of the weights at *all distances* from the fulcrum, this assumes the uniform action of gravity, and reduces the axiom to a result of experience. It would not be difficult to apply the same reasoning to other cases. But I fear my argument is already getting somewhat prolix.

There is one other point of contrast, however, between Geometry and Mechanics, which it may be as well to notice: I mean the effect produced on the two sciences by a change in the fundamental idea. It is urged, that "to a person who is only beginning to think geometrically, there may appear nothing absurd in the supposition that two straight lines may enclose a space. And in like manner to a person who is only beginning to think of mechanical truths, it may not appear to be absurd that in mechanical processes Reaction should be greater or less than Action." The parallel seems to me to be more apparent than real. If two persons have different conceptions of force, both are designed to be representations of the same fact. Both persons mean by force, the cause of that motion which both alike perceive in bodies: they differ only as having a more or less adequate conception of the manner and conditions of its operation. Hence they may properly be said to have two ideas of the same thing, differing in accuracy or completeness. But if the image presented to my mind in connection with the name *straight line* corresponds to that suggested to another man's mind by the name *curve*, we are not thinking of the same thing; for the thing is the image, and

nothing but the image. We differ only in an equivocal use of language. I have not a wrong conception of a straight line, for I am not really thinking of a straight line at all: I am only expressing a valid thought in wrong language. My conception is really of a curved line; and the thought, as such, is mathematically accurate; but I am wrong in giving it the name which geometers have attached to a different image. And this explains the ground of a distinction which I have already noticed; viz. that an erroneous conception in Mechanics vitiates the matter of the reasoning, while an erroneous conception (if we may call it so) in Geometry vitiates only the form. The matter of Geometry exists only as a thought, and is produced by the mind acting according to its own necessary laws in the individualization of concepts. The attributes forming the concept being once given, error in the thought as such is impossible; for the mental process is amenable to its own laws only, and these it necessarily obeys in being an act of thought at all. But the given attributes themselves on any occasion may not be the same as those associated with the same name by the author of a particular geometrical demonstration. Hence it may be that, while apparently following his reasoning, I really start from a different fundamental thought, comprehending attributes incompatible with his demonstration. Neither my thought nor his is erroneous *per se*, but a contradiction arises from the attempt to unite them into one concept under one name. But in Mechanics two different conceptions are amenable to a test by which they can be distinguished as true or false; viz. the external fact which each is supposed to represent.

On these grounds it has been a matter of controversy among philosophers, whether mathematical science can properly be said to contain necessary *truths*. That they contain necessary *thoughts* is unquestionable; but can those thoughts be properly called *true?* The question may be answered in the affirmative or negative, according to our definition of truth. If truth be defined as consisting in the agreement of our thoughts with things out of the mind, Mathematics cannot be said to contain truths. Locke's defence of mathematical truth * is, I think, untenable, and inconsistent with other parts of his philosophy.

* Essay, iv., 4, 6.

Without previously recognising the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, and the *a priori* possibility of the latter, there is no more truth in the properties considered as belonging to the idea of a circle or a rectangle, than in those considered as belonging to the idea of a centaur or a chimera. Nor can we take the ground that the properties of the triangle are true of the real figure, if such exists. For this assertion can only be made on the ground of some previous relation of truth in the ideas themselves. But the above definition of truth is objectionable. Truth does not consist in the agreement of thoughts with *things in themselves*, but with *intuitions*. The thing is known only as presented in some intuition or other, whether *a priori*, as the image in Mathematics, or empirically, as the object of a sensible perception. The justification of the expression *necessary truth*, in relation to Mathematics, is to be found in the fact, that the concept proceeding by its own laws necessarily embodies itself in the corresponding image, which as a modification of space is intuitively invested with additional attributes. But the necessity of truth implies the impossibility of the corresponding falsehood; and it is therefore incorrect to speak of a false conception in Mathematics; for either it is no conception at all, or its error is one of language only. The opinion of Stewart, who regards Mathematical reasonings as containing hypothetical truth, based on the assumption of the definitions, confounds mathematical necessity with logical, and overlooks the distinction between synthetical and analytical judgments. But it is unnecessary to dwell upon an error which has been fully refuted in Dr. Whewell's 'Essay on Mathematical Reasoning.'

A word, in conclusion, in vindication of the consistency of my views on this subject with those maintained in other parts of the 'Prolegomena Logica.' I have acknowledged, in addition to logical and mathematical necessity, a metaphysical necessity, which I consider as more properly psychological, and, in a wider sense of the term, a physical necessity. This last, however, is in relation to thought contingent only; its contradictory being always *conceivable*, though never actually *true*.* In this sense, I have never objected to the use of the term *necessary truths*, to express the results of physical science. As regards

* 'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 162.; ed 2, p. 176.

metaphysical necessity: the ideas of Substance and of Cause, when they are supposed to imply anything more than mere phenomena, are so far from being treated as foundations of science, that they are regarded as, except in Psychology, essentially negative and obscure, and such as can never attain to scientific clearness and distinctness.* Physical causality, indeed, conceived according to Hume's limitation as an invariable relation of phenomena, is considered as the foundation of that belief in the uniformity of nature which renders physical science possible.† In this extent, it is admitted to be something more than a mere empirical generalization; being regulative of, not governed by, the facts of experience. But then, in this sense, it is to physical science no more than the principle of sufficient reason is to Logic. It does not discover any special law of nature: it only states the fact that all natural phenomena are governed by some law or other. It is thus equally compatible with the assignment of a true or a false cause in any special case; and it is equally presupposed in all attempts at scientific investigation, whether their theories be sound or unsound. The scientific discovery, that this particular effect is to be referred to this particular cause and to no other, remains to be made by experience; and when it is made, it possesses no higher degree of necessity than that of a fact in the constitution of nature, which is thus, but might conceivably have been otherwise.

The principle of the permanence of substance, which is only another form of that of causality, may also be referred to a psychological origin,‡ and in its most general statement is a necessary principle, controlling and correcting all possible experience. But in this general form it is also compatible with true or false theories in chemistry or any other branch of physical science; and it does not enable us to ascertain *a priori* any particular law as governing this or that special combination of elements. But surely the very fact, that such principles are necessary conditions of thought, and have, as such, been universally adopted by philosophers in all ages, is itself an additional proof, if proof were needed, that the actual constitution of nature is not determined by them as necessary. For

* 'Prolegomena Logica,' p. 131; ed. 2, p. 141 and 140; ed. 2, p. 155.
† Ibid. p. 145; ed. 2, p. 157.
‡ See Sir W. Hamilton's 'Discussions on Philosophy,' p. 585; ed. 2, p. 609-10.

how otherwise could various and contradictory opinions in matters of science have been held by men alike thinking under these regulative laws? How otherwise could a true conception of the constitution of nature as a whole consist with ignorance or error in relation to any of its details?

I have now got back again to the position which I originally maintained; viz. that no matter of fact, that is to say, no actual phenomenon of external nature, can in any possible state of human knowledge be a matter of demonstration. And it is this principle that fixes the limits of demonstrative science, separating the results of the necessary laws of mind from those of the generalized phenomena of matter. This position I hold to be psychologically certain, as the consequence of the distinction between the internal laws of thought and intuition, which may be passively suspended by ceasing to think at all, but which cannot be actively transgressed, and the external laws of natural phenomena, which may furnish a sufficient reason why certain phenomena take place in a certain manner, but which furnish no reason at all why I must think so. If this distinction is properly pointed out, I do not think that the term *necessary truths* is in itself objectionable as applied to the physical sciences. But the language is likely to mislead, if the difference between the various kinds of necessity is represented as one of degree only, and dependent upon accidental and remediable deficiencies, so that a physical idea may possibly be apprehended as clearly and distinctly as a mathematical one, and the science be raised to an equal grade of necessity. It is not a question merely concerning the *grounds* of the different kinds of necessity;* for the difference of grounds gives rise to a corresponding difference in the mental conviction itself. This difference need not be acknowledged by the advocates of either of the extreme theories between which the 'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' preserves in its conception and general spirit a just and philosophical mean. The sensationalist, who reduces mathematical science to a generalization from experience, may speak indifferently of *necessary* truths in Mathematics and in Physics; for both alike are conceived as attaining to the highest necessity of which the human mind is capable, a

* 'Letter,' p. 14.

constant association of ideas, the result of uniform experience. The transcendentalist, who dreams of producing a world from his creative thought, may use the same language; for Nature is with him, like Mathematics, a function of thought alone: no stubborn facts are allowed to rebel against his theory; or if they do, so much the worse for the facts. It is precisely because the 'History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' falls into neither of these extravagancies, but adopts a middle course, more sober, more thoughtful, more comprehensive than either, that its readers are occasionally struck with the apparent inconsistency of language which seems properly to belong to a more extreme and less philosophical theory.

Perhaps, after all, the few passages in that work from which I am compelled to dissent, are more matters of language than of principle. Perhaps I may have given an interpretation to certain expressions which they were not intended to bear, or strained with over scrupulosity words which were not designed to express technical exactness. It is natural that a critic approaching a subject from the opposite side to that of the author he is criticising should be led to attach importance to the minuter features of objects lying immediately before him, which are overlooked from a more comprehensive point of view.

> "The critic eye, that microscope of wit,
> Sees hairs and pores, examines bit by bit." *

But in this instance assuredly not without appreciating and admiring

> "How parts relate to parts, or they to whole,
> The body's harmony, the beaming soul." †

The 'Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' may have many abler critics, but few more sincere admirers, than myself; and I shall consider the purpose of my animadversions fully accomplished, if they contribute in any degree to render the able and energetic protest of that work against sensationalism and positivism more effectual, by lessening its liability to even a verbal misrepresentation.

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* Pope's 'Dunciad,' iv., 233.

† Pope's 'Dunciad,' iv., 235.

APPENDIX.

ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS OF GEOMETRY.

THE Propositions which have been regarded by different writers as constituting the foundation of geometrical demonstration may be classified as follows:

I. Definitions, analysing the complex notions of the several magnitudes or figures.

II. Postulates, assuming the existence of the objects defined.

III. Axioms proper to Geometry, or synthetical judgments, stating self-evident properties of certain magnitudes.

IV. General Axioms, or analytical judgments, logically involving the notions of equality or inequality.

Some one or more of these, under various names (for the language of the several writers has been by no means uniform), have been selected at different times as the fundamental assumptions or premises from which the conclusions of Geometry may be demonstrated. A brief examination of each may perhaps help to clear the question.

I. According to Stewart, the properties of geometrical figures follow from the *Definitions* of those figures; the general axioms being mere barren truisms, and the axioms proper (such as the 10th and 11th of Euclid), being theorems requiring demonstration. In this theory, mathematical necessity becomes identified with logical, being only the result of the harmony of a process of thought with its original assumption. This consequence is accepted by Stewart himself, as well as by Archbishop Whately, who speaks of the denial of geometrical propositions as *self-contradictory*.*

This view may be refuted either directly or by a *reductio ad absurdum*; for, firstly, it rests on an untenable assertion; secondly, it leads to an inadmissible consequence.

Firstly. If the properties of a figure follow from the definition of that figure, it must either be because they are implied in *some one attribute* of that definition, or because they are implied in *the whole*. A triangle, *e.g.*, will have its angles equal to two right

* This doctrine is also repeatedly asserted by Leibnitz. See 'Théodicée' *passim*; *e.g.*, p. 646, ed. Erdmann.

angles, either because it is a rectilineal figure, or because it is of three sides, or because it is both. The two first suppositions are manifestly false: the third begs the question; for why the notion of a triangle, regarded as a complex whole, has this property, is the very point at issue.

Hence it appears that the definitions of Geometry, so far as they are employed in demonstration, are merely nominal. From the analysis of the complex notion no conclusion is derived. The definition only serves to connect the notion as a whole with the name *triangle*. The question, why a rectilineal figure of three sides, be it called triangle or not, has its angles equal to two right angles, remains unanswered.

Secondly. If geometrical reasoning is merely "the logical filiation of consequences which follow from an assumed hypothesis," there is no reason why its conclusions should be more important than those of any other analysis of imaginary notions, such as (to use Mr. Mill's illustration) a deduction of the physiological properties of an imaginary animal, or the political history of an imaginary commonwealth. The whole character and history of mathematical science militates against the admission of this consequence.

II. Mr. Mill, while agreeing with Stewart that mathematical necessity is merely hypothetical and consequential, saw clearly that his doctrine concerning Definitions was untenable. This led him to adopt the second theory, according to which geometrical inferences depend on *Postulates* assuming the existence of the objects defined. Thus a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles because there may really exist a rectilineal figure having three sides; and this existence is implied, though not verbally expressed, in the definition.

This theory derives some apparent support from the use of the principle of superposition. When, for instance, the demonstration of the fourth proposition of Euclid supposes the triangle A B C to be applied to the triangle D E F, it clearly assumes the existence of both triangles, not merely as general notions, which are identical in thought, but as distinct individual magnitudes, occupying space, and capable of being transferred from one position in space to another. One nonentity cannot be applied to another. Thus far Mr. Mill's position is unquestionably true; but I think it may be shewn to be not itself the fundamental assumption of Geometry, but a consequence derivable from a higher assumption.

The existence is clearly only that which is implied in the possible construction of the figure. The actual or possible existence in nature of a body so figured, is not once appealed to in the demon-

stration, and might be denied without affecting its validity. The Postulate, therefore, implies the possible construction of a figure such as is contemplated in the proposition.

But this construction is mental, not manual. The figure as drawn upon paper is only a representative of the figure as imagined by the mind, and might be dispensed with altogether if the latter could be kept before us with sufficient steadiness. This brings us to Kant's principle of the possibility of mathematical science, viz., the power of *constructing* the objects of its concepts; *i.e.*, of presenting them *a priori* in a pure intuition.

But how is this construction itself possible, and what conditions is it required to fulfil? Mr. Mill regards it as only possible *a posteriori*, and as subject to the same conditions as an object of sense. He says, "the points, lines, circles, and squares, which any one has in his mind, are simply copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience. We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; but we cannot *conceive* a line without breadth." (Logic, b. ii., ch. v.) This is true; but the author is mistaken in supposing such a conception to be necessary to establish the *a priori* character of Mathematics. The true Postulate is not that of the possible existence of an object corresponding to the *definition*, but of one fulfilling the conditions of the *proper axiom*. We are not required to conceive a straight line as length without breadth: we are required to conceive it as such that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. The definition itself is but an imperfect attempt to describe in general terms what is known much more clearly by the image. It may serve to lead the thoughts of the learner to the proper image; but it was itself founded on a previous image in the mind of the teacher; and if the definition and the image differ, the former is in fault, not the latter.

III. This brings us to our third theory, which is that maintained by Kant. According to this theory, the fundamental assumptions of Geometry are *Proper Axioms*, or synthetical judgments *a priori;* and the possibility of forming such judgments depends on the power of constructing the objects to which they refer in a pure intuition, *i.e.*, in an intuition containing no adventitious element external to the mind itself. The images of geometrical figures differ from all others in being not represented modifications of body, but presented modifications of space; and the universal validity of the synthetical judgment is a consequence of the universal presence of space as the form of every possible perception of body.

Three of these synthetical judgments are given in the 10th, 11th, and 12th axioms of Euclid, and either these or other axioms analogous to these must be assumed as evident by intuition, before

any of the properties of more complex figures can be made known by demonstration. I do not say that Euclid has given the best and simplest forms of these axioms, but that in some form or other they are indispensable. To regard all such axioms as possibly demonstrable theorems is to be ignorant of the logical conditions under which demonstration is possible; for a synthetical judgment is demonstrable only on the condition that another synthetical judgment may be assumed. Οἱ γὰρ ἁπάντων ζητοῦντες λόγον ἀναιροῦσι λόγον.

It may be true that the image which gives rise to the intuitive perception of the axiom is not consciously contemplated as more perfect than the corresponding figure as seen in a body; but this does not prove that the axiom is really generalized from the latter. The inadequacy of sensible magnitudes for mathematical certainty does not arise from that of which we are immediately conscious, but from that of which we are not. The straight line as perceived is a quality of body; the straight line as imagined is a modification of space. The portions of the two actually presented at any time may not apparently differ from each other; but our empirical knowledge or ignorance of body may suggest actual or possible variations not perceived in the intuition; for the qualities of body have an objective existence independently of our perception, and therefore may or may not be adequately perceived at any one time. We see, for example, that a line running along the earth's surface is apparently straight; but we know that it is in reality an arc of the earth's curvature, and might be seen to be so in another position or with more acute organs. But the straight line in space exists only as imagined, and is imagined only as mathematically exact. The intuition, therefore, is adequate and valid for any extent of space, and in any portion. The apparent straightness of the visible line is the result of an imperfection in our bodily organs; and with more acute senses we might perceive its deviation. The presented straightness of the imaginary line results from the exactness of our constructive power; and a superior excellence in this would only enable us to extend the same image to a greater length, or to retain it more steadily before the mind.

IV. The synthetical axioms are thus the ground of all that is properly geometrical in our fundamental assumptions; but the analytical axioms are employed also, as expressing general conceptions of equality or inequality under which geometrical magnitudes may be brought. Stewart was led into his erroneous view of definitions by his contempt for the syllogism, which he would not allow to be under any circumstances the type of demonstrative reasoning. In this contempt Mr. Mill does not participate, and he

has accordingly exhibited the fifth proposition of Euclid demonstrated in syllogistic form. In this demonstration we see both analytical and synthetical axioms employed as major premises: the former as general formulæ, founded on the conception of *equality*; the latter as the means of applying this general conception to geometrical magnitudes in which the test of equality is *coincidence*. One or the other will be employed in different syllogisms, according as the major term to be proved is *equality* or *coincidence*. The minor premises are furnished by the conditions, given or constructed, of the particular figure.

Against the form of the geometrical syllogism as exhibited by Mr. Mill the logician will have no objections to allege; though the metaphysician will not be disposed to acquiesce in his statement that the axioms of both kinds are gained by induction. And it is not strictly accurate to represent the first three axioms of Euclid as capable of proof by an imaginary superposition. To the axioms in their general form this principle is inapplicable; for coincidence is not the test of equality in general, but only of equality in superficial magnitudes. To the axioms as employed in Geometry the principle of superposition may be applied: but even here it adds nothing to their evidence. Magnitudes given as the sums of equal magnitudes are *ipso facto* thought as equal; and to have recourse to superposition tends to confound the evidence of logical necessity resting on the laws of thought, with that of geometrical necessity resting on the conditions of intuition.

Much error and confusion on this subject might have been avoided, had modern philosophers observed Aristotle's distinction between ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν, or assumptions from which we reason, and ἀρχαὶ περὶ ὅ, or assumptions about the objects of our reasoning. In the former class he rightly places the axioms; in the latter, the definitions. But the true distinction between the axioms proper and the definitions, as synthetical and analytical judgments, has not, I think, been as yet accurately carried out in reference to Geometry.

Some interesting questions on the Logic of Mathematics still remain unanswered. But these must be postponed to another occasion.

[On the principles of this pamphlet it may be shewn that any attempt to demonstrate mathematically the being and attributes of God may be turned into a powerful argument in support of Atheism, and that the failure of all actual attempts of this kind is rather matter of rejoicing than of regret to a believer. If we can demonstrate the attributes of those notions only which we have constructed

for ourselves, it follows that a demonstrated God is a creature of human imagination. Of course, such a demonstration is not in itself incompatible with Theism; as a geometrical demonstration is not inconsistent with the real existence of perfect geometrical magnitudes; but a Theology which pretends to do more than it can is likely to be suspected of doing less than it actually performs; and to refute one of the favourite arguments of Theism will be popularly regarded as a triumph of Atheism. The Atheist may ask: if the God of demonstration prove a fiction, what higher proof is left? And he triumphs, so long as demonstration is paraded as the true method of Theology.]

MAN'S CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY.

AN EXAMINATION

OF

MR. MAURICE'S THEORY OF A FIXED STATE OUT OF TIME.

CONTENTS.

Introduction.

Ambiguity of the terms, *Time* and *Eternity*.

Limited and Unlimited Duration both Inconceivable.

Approximate Conception of each.

Time as a Form of the Internal Consciousness.

Eternity, as a State out of Duration, Inconceivable.

Negative Ideas, their Position in Metaphysics and in Theology.

Distinction between *Speculative* and *Regulative* Truth.

Position of the Latter in Holy Scripture.

Negative Ideas essential to a True Revelation.

Their relation to Reason and Faith.

Consequent necessity of accepting Truth as Regulative, not as Speculative.

Application of these Principles to Mr. Maurice's Theory.

Distinction between Eternity considered as an Attribute of God, and as a Future State of Man.

Time and Eternity only relative to a Conscious Being.

Regulative Purpose of the Conception of Eternity.

Conclusion.

MAN'S CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY.*

A LETTER TO THE REV. L. J. BERNAYS.

MY DEAR BERNAYS,—In our recent conversation on Mr. Maurice's explanation of the word *Eternal*, you may remember my observing that the controversy, if it was to be brought to a distinct issue at all, must be argued on metaphysical rather than theological grounds. It appeared to me that the attempt to refute Mr. Maurice by reference to texts of Scripture or formularies of the Church, which in his own sense he fully accepted, was merely to bring together two combatants, each of whom was beating the air in his own position, without being able to reach his adversary: and I considered that the turning-point of the whole controversy depended on the distinction between positive and negative ideas, and the legitimate use of each in theology. I have since endeavoured to put my views into a somewhat more connected form, as far, at least, as a limited space will permit. To discuss completely this and the collateral questions would require, what is much needed, a preliminary criticism of the laws and limits of religious thought; a work which, even had I the abilities or the leisure to attempt it, would be out of place here. For the present, I must confine myself to the single inquiry out of which these remarks first arose, the character of Time, considered as a form of human consciousness, and the positive or negative nature of the ideas connected with it.

It will be desirable, at starting, to notice an ambiguity in the use of the term itself. *Time*, in popular language, is distinguished from *Eternity*, as expressing, the former limited, the latter unlimited duration. In this point of view, neither Time

* 'A Letter to the Rev. L. J. Bernays, M.A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford.'

nor Eternity in the abstract is conceivable as a distinct whole; it being equally impossible to represent to ourselves in thought either a last moment of duration or a duration prolonged to infinity. The only positive conception which we can form of Time in this sense is one which represents it, not as an absolutely limited duration, but only as a portion of duration separated from that which succeeds it by some difference in the states of consciousness of which it is the condition. It is in this sense that I speak of the time when I was a boy, as distinguished from the subsequent time when I became a man; and it is in this manner only that I can conceive Time as distinguished from Eternity; namely, as the duration of a State of Being conceived as terminable, and to be succeeded by another which is to last for ever. In other words, Time and Eternity are viewed relatively, not absolutely, in the concrete, not in the abstract: we do not conceive a limit of duration itself, but only of the duration of this or that particular class of mental phenomena. Moreover, Eternity is distinguished from Time only negatively by the non-conception of a limit, not positively by the actual conception of unlimitedness; and the only approach to a positive notion is made by conceiving various portions of Time added one to another. Thus our conception of Eternity in this point of view is not really of *infinite*, but only of *indefinite* duration.

But there is another sense in which Time is spoken of, which does not of itself imply the conception of a limit at all; and this is more properly the sense in which Time is treated in Kant's Philosophy, and apparently also in Mr. Maurice's Essays and Letter, as a form or condition of our internal consciousness. In this sense Time is synonymous with Duration, and is so far from implying the idea of limitation, that what in the former sense was said of Time and Eternity together, is now true of Time alone; neither an absolute limit, whether beginning or end, nor yet an absolutely unlimited duration is conceivable. Duration or Time in this sense is known to us, not as any outward and real existence, but only as the condition under which changes take place in the phenomena of consciousness, one succeeding another. Now if we use the word *Eternity* as the opposite of *Time* in this signification, it can denote only the form of a consciousness not subject to the law of succession. Neither term

conveys any meaning at all, except in relation to a conscious Being, supposed to exist in one condition or the other. If his consciousness is supposed to embrace a succession of states, each succeeding the other, it is subject to the form or condition of Time: if it does not embrace such a succession, it may be said to be related to the form or condition of Eternity. Now Eternity in this sense represents no human conception at all. It cannot even be partially and approximately represented by means of the indefinite; for it indicates a condition, the elements of which, from their very nature, are removed from the entire sphere of human thought. To conceive Eternity would be to conceive an Eternal Being; and to conceive an Eternal Being would be to represent to ourselves a Mind in a state of consciousness in which all phenomena are simultaneously instead of successively presented. But we can conceive representatively in thought only what we have experienced presentatively in intuition. To conceive an Eternal Being, I must, therefore, have experienced a consciousness out of Time, *i.e.*, a consciousness other than human in its constitution. The term Eternity, in this sense, expresses not a conception, but the negation of a conception, the acknowledgment of the possible existence of a Being concerning whose consciousness we can only make the negative assertion that it is not like our consciousness.

The negative character of Eternity in this sense explains at once how and why an absolute limit of Duration is inconceivable; for the one idea is the counterpart and necessary supplement of the other. For an absolute limit of Duration would have to be conceived as the boundary-line at which succession in the phenomena of consciousness terminated, and consequently, at which the condition of non-succession commenced. To conceive this would imply a conception of both states, a power of comparison between human and non-human consciousness. On the other hand, an absolutely unlimited Duration is inconceivable; because, Duration being known only as the condition of successive mental states, to conceive an infinite Duration would be to run in thought through an infinite number of such states, a process which itself would require an infinite duration for its accomplishment.

We have thus two distinct senses of Eternity: the one that

of unlimited duration, approximately and partially conceivable as indefinite duration; the other, that of a consciousness out of duration, absolutely and totally inconceivable. An idea of this latter kind, which has never been presented in intuition, and consequently cannot be represented in thought, is what I mean by a *negative idea*, and our admission or rejection of Mr. Maurice's teaching depends, if I understand him rightly, on the question how far such negative ideas are admissible in theology.

Theology in this respect stands in a different position from any merely speculative science. Negative ideas have their metaphysical as well as their theological side; for metaphysic as well as theology has aspired to bring the finite into communion with the infinite: and the infinite is in no case a positive object of human thought. The intellectual intuition in which subject and object are identified—the absolute being which is at the same time absolute non-being—the one universal substance which underlies all phenomena—these and suchlike metaphysical terms express only the destruction of human consciousness and the negation of human thought. But there is this important difference between the metaphysical and the theological aspect of such ideas. The speculations of metaphysics rest in themselves as an end. The practical conduct of mankind is not affected by them. Men would equally, in their daily life, have to deal with mental and bodily phenomena, whether they can or cannot attain to a knowledge of the ultimate realities beyond them. The limits of thought which prevent me from attaining absolute truth involve here no important consequences in relation to belief or practice; for I am not metaphysically bound to any belief or practice at all in the absence of positive conceptions. Whether Time is the form of other intelligences besides those of men—whether that form will always exist in relation to human consciousness—whether infinite intelligence implies simultaneous consciousness of all things—and whether, in consequence of this, it is absolutely removed from all relation to Time,—these and suchlike speculative problems do not demand of me any assertion or belief at all, affirmative or negative; for I have no data for forming any. The sceptical ἐποχή becomes in this case the duty of the philosopher. But in theology this suspension of judgment is

often inadmissible. We are required to believe and to act upon much that we cannot comprehend; and our belief and practice must take such a form as is adapted to the constitution of our own minds, even though it may also be related to a possible ultimate truth which our present faculties are unable to seize. Hence it is that ideas and images which do not represent God as He is may nevertheless represent Him as it is our duty to regard Him. They are not in themselves true; but we must, nevertheless, believe and act as if they were true. A finite mind can form no conception of an infinite Being which shall be *speculatively* true; for it must represent the infinite under finite forms: nevertheless, a conception which is *speculatively* untrue may be *regulatively* true.

A regulative truth is thus designed, not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what God is, but how He wills that we should think of Him. It is useless to deny in theory what we are all compelled to acknowledge in practice. Pantheism and Anthropomorphism (using the latter term in its widest sense) are the two alternatives of religious thought, the one representing the negative, the other the positive side. If we aspire to comprehend the infinite, we are drawn by inevitable consequence into the negations of Pantheism. If we represent the Deity under finite symbols, these must be drawn from the phenomena of human consciousness, and be thus based on a more or less refined Anthropomorphism. But an anthropomorphism of this kind, if we accept its language and mode of thought as regulatively true, without attempting to determine its speculative significance, is so far from being either logically illegitimate or theologically unsound, that it is one which meets us in almost every page of Holy Scripture, which is implied alike in the letter and in the spirit of its teaching, and which furnishes the only mode in which that teaching can be applied to any practical use. No one who reflects on the manner in which God reveals Himself in His written Word, can fail to observe how constantly the Almighty, in communicating with His creatures, condescends to place both Himself and them upon what may, humanly speaking, be called a lower level than that on which the natural reason of man would be inclined to exhibit Him. He does not bid us to aspire to the most exalted conception which an imperfect mind can form of a Being of

infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. He tells us, indeed, that He is such a Being, and we believe though we do not comprehend it; but this belief, while it serves to warn us against certain gross and material conceptions of the divine nature, is neither designed nor fitted to influence the practical portion of religion. We are not told to feel and act towards God as towards a Being whose boundless wisdom needs not to be informed of our wants, whose unchanging and passionless nature cannot be swayed by motives and occasions, or whose divine goodness has so ordered all things for the best, that not one pulse of that eternal movement can or ought to be other than it is. On the contrary, He appeals to us under the form of a human mind and affections, as one who will be informed of our needs, who will be entreated by our supplications, who will even be urged by our importunities, as the wise and benevolent King listening to the petitions of His subjects, as the tender Father, whose ears are open to the prayers of His children.

The existence of ideas which are speculatively negative, and furnish no basis of dogmatic truth, is implied in the very conception of Revelation as a communication from an infinite to a finite intelligence. A false religion may contain nothing but positive dogmas; for its author, being a mere man, addressing himself to minds similarly constituted to his own, need have nothing to communicate which transcends the limits of human consciousness. Nay, if he confines himself to a system fully communicable, he must needs contain himself within ordinary limits; for mysticism and all abnormal states are essentially incommunicable. They must be either blindly accepted on the *ipse dixit* of the mystic; or the disciple must, by a distinct process, raise himself to the ecstatic condition of his master, and thus receive the same doctrines independently for himself. But a true religion, while accommodated to the faculties of the receiver, is still an accommodation only, and implies the existence of a higher form of truth in relation to a higher intelligence. Many of our religious controversies are at once a proof of the truth of the Christian Revelation, and of the negative character of some of its principal ideas.

In this impotence of Reason, what is the office of Faith? Will Faith enable us to see speculative truth more clearly, by lifting us to a form of thought transcending the natural limits

of human consciousness? May we, with Mr. F. W. Newman, believe every man to be inspired in proportion to his own faithfulness? Such an inspiration, supposing it to exist, must clearly be confined to the personal religion of the individual, and in no respect authorizes him to be a teacher of others. A teacher professing to communicate religious truth from a higher stage of consciousness than that of his hearers must first authenticate his divine mission by proofs addressed to the ordinary understanding. Faith in his teaching must be based on a rational approval of his evidences, if sober belief is in aught to be distinguished from the wildest fanaticism. And even then, Faith does not emancipate the consciousness of the uninspired believer from obedience to the ordinary laws of thought: it only teaches him to rest content within their limits. I believe that difficulties, and even contradictions, insoluble by my own reason, are not really so in the sight of God; but I cannot propose any actual solution; for the instant I attempt to do so, I begin to think, and the impossibility of solution arises from the very laws of my thinking. I believe that, intellectually as well as morally, this present life is a discipline and preparation for another, and that that portion of knowledge which my limited faculties can attain to, though it be but partial truth, is not absolute falsehood. But such a belief does not enable me to make that partial truth total: it checks the pride of reason by telling me that there are truths which I cannot see; but it does not increase my actual powers of vision, nor convert natural darkness into supernatural light.

My belief in a revealed truth which I cannot comprehend must, therefore, be limited to the express words of the Revelation, and cannot be extended to any merely human explanation of them. If I may not, with the older Rationalists, cut down the Word of God to the positive limits of human thought, still less may I endeavour, with the later Rationalists, to accommodate it to the negation of thought. And every attempted explanation implies one or the other of these. I believe, for example, that God hears and answers prayer. I believe also that His counsel is immutable, and that with Him is no variableness neither shadow of turning. But I confess that I cannot reconcile the apparent opposition between these two truths, though I believe that it is apparent only. But if any one attempt (as

I have heard it attempted) to accommodate them to each other by explaining that the true object of prayer is not to move God by man's entreaty, but to bring man's will into subjection to the fixed purposes of God—that the effect represented as objective is really subjective,—I can only reply, "I am not called upon to believe this, for it is not written." It explains nothing in reality; for, as my conception of the nature and purposes of God is merely negative, that of man's harmony therewith must be negative also. It merely changes one regulative principle which rests on the authority of God for another which rests on the authority of man. So again, it is our duty to believe equally in man's free will and in God's foreknowledge, though reason is unable to reconcile the two. But I am not warranted in asserting, by way of reconciliation, that the Divine Consciousness has no relation to succession; for this is not a form under which God has represented Himself, nor one in which man could receive the representation. It may be true, as thousands of other truths may exist, which, in our present state, we are incapable even of imagining; but to substitute this for the regulative truth contained in the representation of an Everlasting Being, is merely to subordinate the language of Scripture to an assumption warranted neither by Reason nor by Revelation. Not by Reason, for the Infinite is not an object of human Reason at all. Not by Revelation, for Revelation does not tell us what God is in Himself, but only under what accommodations he has vouchsafed to represent Himself to the limited capacities of His creatures.

I fear I have hitherto been somewhat tedious; but on questions of this kind it is dangerous, both to writer and reader, to say too little. I will now endeavour to sum up briefly the conclusion to which the foregoing remarks lead, and to apply that conclusion to the case out of which they arose. Revelation, to have any practical effect, must be adapted to the constitution of its human recipient, not to that of its Divine Author. Such an adaptation apparently implies the existence of a more absolute form of truth related to a more perfect intelligence. But of such absolute truth our conception is negative only; we know it only as the condition of an intelligence which is not ours. Revelation cannot make this conception positive, which would be possible only by a change in the laws of our mental

constitution; nor yet, while it remains negative, can it be turned to any practical account, except to remind us of the limited nature of our faculties, and to warn us to be prepared for intellectual difficulties beyond our power to solve. Our practical concern lies rather with the positive and partial forms under which the invisible things of God have been made discernible to the eye of man,—forms which it is our duty to accept as regulatively true for the purpose of our intellectual and moral training during this present life; though we cannot determine how much of them is speculatively true for every form of intelligence, and how much is relative and dependent upon the existing laws of human consciousness.

Mr. Maurice's position, if I understand him rightly, involves one of these two propositions. Either we are not required to think of our future state as a state of duration at all, or we are not required to think of that duration as unlimited rather than as limited. The psychological import of these two propositions is very different. For the first implies that we should abandon the law of succession to which all human consciousness is subject, and rest on the mere negative idea of a possible future which shall be so wholly unlike our present state of existence as to be incapable of representation to thought or imagination, and which therefore cannot be regarded as a continuation of our former being. Nay, it is even inconceivable how such a state can be *ours;* for personality, in its human manifestation implies memory, and memory implies the condition of Time. That a person now subject to the law of succession should be identified with one hereafter not so subject, appears to imply a self-contradiction; for it implies a consciousness of the relation of Present to Past, and the absence of Time, the basis of that relation.* The second proposition, on the other hand, involves no psychological impossibility; but it appears still to confine us within those human forms of thought from which Mr. Maurice seems desirous to emancipate us. For I can conceive a future state of limited duration, only by conceiving it as succeeded by another state. The conception of our *entire* future as limited involves the conception, either of a final annihilation, or of a

* [Cf. Kant, 'Das Ende aller Dinge,' 'Werke,' vol. vii., pp. 419, 420, ed. Rosenkranz.]

final state of consciousness freed from the law of time, and thus only postpones to a more remote point the difficulties and contradictions involved in the first proposition.

This second proposition I shall not attempt to discuss. It turns entirely on a question of Scriptural interpretations, viz., Whether, supposing our future state to be a duration at all, Holy Scripture has or has not left the limits of that duration undetermined. On this point I may personally differ from Mr. Maurice, without presuming to maintain that his doctrine is altogether untenable. I will only observe that this view of the question introduces no new element into the controversy. The terms of the question are the same as those which have always been employed in controversies between the Universalists and their antagonists; and if we refuse to dogmatise with either, we only leave the old dispute an open question. The conceptions dealt with are on all hands the same, whether we form of them affirmative or negative judgments, or refuse to form any judgment at all. This part of the controversy I leave to the theologian.

All that Mr. Maurice has contributed to the controversy seems to consist in an *apparent* approximation to the first proposition, viz., That we are not required to think of our future state as a state of duration at all. I say *apparent*, for even the acutest thinker cannot wholly avoid adapting his language to the universal conditions of human thought, even when he strives to repudiate them. When we meet with such language as, "The redeemed creature holds his treasure by *continual* dependence on a righteous and loving Being. *While* he trusts in God he has no fear that any good *will be* taken from him," we see how unavoidably the idea of time is associated with all human thought and language, how it clings even to the words which would depict eternity as "a fixed state out of time." Assuredly I have no intention of denying Mr. Maurice's assertion, that "to draw our minds from the temporal to fix them on the eternal is the very aim of the divine economy;" but I cannot accept that assertion, if interpreted to mean that our minds are to be withdrawn from all conception of existence in duration; for *that*, as we are now constituted, would be to withdraw us from the conception of existence at all. For the same reason, I cannot agree with him that our Lord has "delibe-

rately excluded" the notion of duration from that of eternal life. Whether such notion is or is not implied in the word *αἰώνιος* is a question which must be discussed on different grounds. But let that word denote what state of consciousness it may, I cannot deliberately exclude the only condition under which human consciousness is conceivable at all. For, be it remembered, we are speaking of Eternity, not as an attribute of the Divine Being, but as a state of the human mind, a distinction which Mr. Maurice seems occasionally to have lost sight of. For example, the words which he quotes from St. Augustine, "Quis tenebit illud et figet illud ut paullulum stet et paullulum rapiat splendorem *semper stantis æternitatis*," are primarily designed to describe Eternity in its relation, not to man but to God.* Even then, they amount to an assertion concerning the Divine Consciousness which we have no warrant for making; but if we accept them as thus far true, it by no means follows that similar language may be used of Eternity when taken to denote the future condition of mankind. For the same reason, the doctrine of St. Athanasius, asserting the *eternal* generation of the Son, however true in itself, is inapplicable to the present question.

Augustine, and the Schoolmen after him, in speaking of Eternity as a *nunc stans*, and still more Mr. Maurice, when he speaks of the word *αἰὼν* as suggesting the thought of a fixed state out of Time, appear to have overlooked the merely relative character of the notion of Time itself. Duration, whether limited or unlimited, cannot be conceived as existing independently of the consciousness of an intelligent Being. I know Time only as the condition or law of certain facts in the constitution of my own mind, the successions, namely, of various phenomena of consciousness as earlier and later. To suggest the thought of a fixed state out of Time means, if it means anything, to suggest the possible existence of an intelligent Being whose consciousness is not subject to the law of successiveness. The state of such a Being is a state out of time, relatively, that is to say, to his own consciousness and no further. We cannot speak of him as absolutely out of Time, for Time cannot be

* [On the other hand, Augustine says of Eternity in relation to man, "eam quippe vitam æternam dicimus, ubi est sine fine felicitas."—'De Civ. Dei,' vi., 12.]

conceived as an absolute existence at all; neither can we speak of him as out of Time from the point of view of other intelligent Beings; for this depends on the condition of their consciousness, not of his.

But such a state, though in this sense we admit its possibility, is not by that admission made conceivable by us. We perceive and feel and think as under the law of Time. It bounds us alike in relation to the actual and the conceivable; for conception is itself the servant of the law, and cannot rebel against it. To demand that I should fix my mind on the thought of an intelligent Being out of Time, is to demand that I should think by the laws of his faculties, not of mine. To demand that I should compare such a state with one in Time, is to go further still: it is to demand that I should think at once with two distinct and mutually exclusive mental constitutions, and then, by the aid of a third constitution distinct from either, should be able to compare together the otherwise incommunicable results of each.

The assertion that the Divine Consciousness *in itself* has no relation to Time, that is, to Duration, though not demonstrably false, is objectionable, as being the pronunciation of an opinion in the absence of all possible data for forming it. Equally objectionable, for the same reason, is the opposite assertion, that Eternity, *considered as an attribute of God*, is identical with endless duration. But that the latter, rather than the former, is the regulative idea under which God reveals Himself to man, appears to be confirmed by the analogy of all similar regulative ideas, of which the purpose is to accommodate Revelation to human faculties, not to require us to transcend them. The same conclusion is, I think, far more strongly forced upon us when we are considering, not the eternal existence of God, but the future eternity of man. It seems to be inconsistent with the whole design of Revelation viewed on its human side—at variance with the whole object of regulative truths—incompatible with the conception of the next life as a continuation and development of the present, or of the present life as a discipline and preparation for the next—to believe that our future consciousness will be exempt from the law of succession. It seems, moreover, though of this we cannot adequately judge, to be incompatible with the conception of a finite intellect at all, even

of one perfect after its kind, or of a state of progress and increasing knowledge. It seems to substitute a negative notion for a positive one; to exchange the vivid anticipation and foretaste of a real living futurity for the vague and meaningless intimation of some possible state of existence under no conditions which we can figure to ourselves of human consciousness or human personality.

Such appear to me to be the theoretical difficulties and practical objections which encumber the representation of man's future life as a fixed state out of Time, if by Time we mean that form of the internal consciousness which does not necessarily imply the idea of a limit. I am conscious how little justice can be done to all the higher features of Mr. Maurice's teaching by a dry formal examination of one particular proposition. I am aware how much the language of an earnest and eloquent writer becomes divested of life and vigour by being submitted to a logical analysis; and I know how easy it is to misunderstand abstruse problems of metaphysics, even when conveyed in the language most favourable to their communication. Mr. Maurice, personally, must always command the respect and admiration even of those who, like myself, know his character only by the perusal of his writings and the report of his other labours, or as reflected in the testimony of those who have listened to his teaching or enjoyed his friendship. But I regret that one so estimable in so many respects should be associated with a doctrine which some will condemn on theological grounds, and which those who endeavour to take a less polemical view find it difficult or impossible to realise as a clear or distinct conception. Perhaps, after all, I may have partly misunderstood the position which I have controverted, and may have been fighting with a shadow of my own creation. I shall rejoice to find it so; as I have deeply felt, in the course of my not self-imposed task, how little I am qualified to act the part of judge. I can only say that I have honestly tried to understand the opinions which I have been examining, and that I came to the task sympathising earnestly in many things with the purpose and cause of the writer,—a sympathy which I trust will not be lessened by differences on obscure points of metaphysical speculation, or even, if need be, by the duty of professing a respectful dissent from theological doctrines.

PSYCHOLOGY

THE TEST OF

MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY.

CONTENTS.

Introduction.

Metaphysics at present decried.

Nature and Purpose of Moral Philosophy: Erroneous Conceptions of it.

Paley's Argument against the Existence of a Moral Sense criticised.

Moral Theories ultimately reducible to that of Duty and that of Interest: the latter is, really, the Denial of Morality.

Moral Philosophy not superseded by Revelation.

The Psychological Question which determines the Possibility of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.

The Problem of Metaphysics: Reply to the Question *Cui bono?*

Cause and Substance.

Substance and Accident.

Finite and Infinite.

Pantheism and Determinism.

Facts of Consciousness the Criterion of Philosophy.

Appendix. On Prof. Ferrier's Primary Law of all Knowledge.

PSYCHOLOGY

THE TEST OF

MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY.*

THE duties attached by the Founder to the office which I have the honour to hold would probably elicit from critics of the present day, at least in this country, very different estimates of their respective importance. "Philosophiam legat moralem vel metaphysicam," indicates an union of studies occupying a very different position in public opinion now, from that which they held when this Statute was first enacted. "Mortua quinetiam jungebat corpora vivis," will be the natural exclamation of many a student, fresh from recollections of the recent history of British Philosophy, or of the animadversions of sundry modern critics. For while Moral Philosophy, in this country, and especially in this University, has constantly exhibited an active, sometimes even a noisy vitality, and has boasted from generation to generation a goodly array of admirers, students, and expositors, Metaphysics, for upwards of a century, has been suffered to lie in obscurity, or has been occasionally exhumed only for the purposes of censure or ridicule. While Moral Philosophy has been illustrated and adorned by the labours of Butler, and Hutcheson, and Adam Smith, and Price, and Tucker, and Paley, and Bentham, and Reid, and Stewart, and Brown, and Mackintosh, to say nothing of incidental notices that occur in works more strictly concerned with the intellectual than the active faculties, Metaphysical Philosophy, with a few exceptions, and those mostly in the direction of scepticism, has met with little more than a scornful passing notice, as "the ontology and pneumatology of the schools," or "the idle abstractions and subtleties of the dark ages;" or if it has at times received a more favourable consideration, has owed it mainly to an abuse

* An Inaugural Lecture delivered in Magdalen College.

of language, by which its name has been transferred to researches altogether foreign to those which it was originally employed to designate.* From the days when Arbuthnot employed all the resources of his exquisite humour and extensive learning to delineate the metaphysical theses of Martinus Scriblerus, to the days when the recent historian of Philosophy delivered his dictum to the effect, that Metaphysical Philosophy never has had any certitude, and never can have any, the study has by the almost universal consent of English minds been banished to that limbo,

> Where Entity and Quiddity,
> The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly.†

And the labours of the few eccentric spirits who have occasionally ventured to trespass on the subject have been placed on a par with the employments which an earlier satirist of the Metaphysicians of his day assigned to the philosophical officers of Queen Quintessence, of the realm of Entelecheia.‡

And yet, different as has been the past fortune and the present reputation of these two branches of Philosophy, an examination of the history and literature of both appears to suggest to the inquirer one and the same fundamental question, and to demand that the claims and pretensions of both should be subjected to the same scrutiny and investigated from the same point of view. The question: "Is a science of Metaphysics psychologically possible?" "Do the limits of human knowledge, as determined by an examination of human consciousness, include or exclude the attainment of a Philosophy of Being?" has been asked, and but partially answered, in a country far more fruitful in modern times of metaphysical authors and

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* "Nothing contributes so much to form this talent, as the study of Metaphysics; not the absurd Metaphysics of the Schools, but that study which has the operations of the mind for its object."—Stewart, 'Philosophy of the Human Mind,' vol. i. ch. 2. p. 67, ed. Wright, 1850. In the earlier and more accurate use of the term, this study would not be regarded as a branch of Metaphysics at all.

† Hudibras, Part I., canto 1. [Ed.]

‡ "I then saw a great number of the Queen's officers, who made blackamoors white as fast as hops, just rubbing their bellies with the bottom of a pannier. Others, with three couples of foxes in one yoke, ploughed a sandy shore, and did not lose their seed. Others washed burnt tiles, and made them lose their colour. Others extracted water out of pumice-stones; braying them a good while in a mortar, and changed their substance. Others sheered asses, and thus got long fleece wool. Others gathered off of thorns grapes, and figs off thistles."—'Rabelais,' book v., c. xxii., Motteux's translation.

systems than our own; but in Moral Philosophy, whatever differences may exist among us as to its principles or details, it will probably have occurred to few of my present hearers to question the possibility of the Science itself. It will probably be presumed on all hands, that,—whatever paradoxes may occasionally be advanced by an over-hardy scepticism, defending its thesis in spite of itself,—practically, in the minds of all sober thinkers, Moral Philosophy has proved the possibility of its existence, as Diogenes proved against Zeno the possibility of motion: namely, by actually existing. It will probably be maintained on all hands, that, whatever latitude may be allowed to the speculative crotchets of the Metaphysician, the great rules of moral duty embody truths which it is sin against God and against man to trifle with or to call in question: that the imperative obligations of morality carry with them their own evidence, which no diversity of system can shake: that, while the same great rules of practice are acknowledged by all, it matters little whether we account for them on this or that theory.

As such reasoning would derive considerable support from some of the best known and most approved definitions of Moral Philosophy, it will be necessary, in order to shew the true meaning and importance of the question to which I have referred, to modify in some degree these definitions, and to offer what I believe to be a more accurate account of the nature and purpose of the Science. According to Paley, Moral Philosophy may be defined as "that Science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it."* From the same point of view Sir James Mackintosh observes: "The purpose of the Physical Sciences, throughout all their provinces, is to answer the question, *What is?* They consist only of facts arranged according to their likeness, and expressed by general names given to every class of similar facts. The purpose of the Moral Sciences is to answer the question, *What ought to be?* They aim at ascertaining the rules which *ought* to govern voluntary actions, and to which those habitual dispositions of mind which are the source of voluntary actions *ought* to be adapted."† The office thus

* 'Moral Philosophy,' book i., ch. 1. [Ed.]

† 'Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy,' ed. Whewell, 8vo., Edinb., 1836, p. 56. [Ed.] [Cf. Kant, 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' 'Werke,'

assigned by these authors to Moral Philosophy, that of teaching men their duty, or telling them what they ought to do, is rather one which must already be accomplished before Moral Philosophy proper can exist. It is no more the province of a Science of Morals to teach men their duty than it is the province of a Science of Optics to teach them to see. As the existence of a faculty of sight and a discernment, as matter of fact, of visible distinctions must be presupposed, before Science can inquire into the laws and causes on which the phenomena of vision depend; so the existence of a moral faculty, and an actual discernment between right and wrong as such, must be presupposed antecedently to any philosophical inquiry into the grounds and reasons of the distinction. But when the faculty of natural vision has revealed to us the existence of different colours, Science proceeds to inquire, what is the common feature on which depends the characteristic of each separate class; what are the laws of reflection and absorption of light, by virtue of which one body is red and another blue. And so in like manner, when the faculty of moral vision has made known to us the existence of the qualities of right and wrong in various individual actions; when it has told us that, as a fact of consciousness, we look naturally and necessarily on some acts with approbation, and on others with abhorrence; when conscience, the application of this faculty to our own individual acts, has practically taught us our duty, commanding us to do this and to avoid that;—then commences the work of Moral Science, in investigating the principles on which the moral character of acts is dependent; in examining what common feature, if any, runs through good actions on the one side, and evil on the other, constituting the foundation of the goodness or badness which, as a matter of fact, they exhibit.

And surely it is well for mankind that this is the case. God has not left men to learn their duty from Philosophy: if He had, not one man in a thousand would ever learn it at all. The path of duty must be trodden alike by the sage and the peasant, by the learned and the illiterate, by the man who has leisure for philosophical inquiry and by him who is occupied

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vol. v. p. 647, ed. Rosenkranz: "die Philosophie der Natur geht auf Alles, was da ist; die der Sitten auf das, was da sein soll."]

with the cares of business. And, as in our natural, so in our moral life, the precepts of duty come self-taught, grow with our growth and strengthen with our strength, and we may pass a lifetime in the practice, without ever having reflected on the theory. The burnt child dreads the fire, without a knowledge of the laws of combustion: the plain man abstains from food which he has ascertained to be unwholesome, though he may never have bestowed a thought on the physiology of the digestive organs: and in morals too, Nature educates her children, like the father of the Roman poet,

> "Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu
> Sit melius, causas reddet tibi; mî satis est, si
> Traditum ab antiquis morem servare, tuamque,
> Dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri
> Incolumem possum."*

The well-known sarcasm of Locke† against the syllogism: "God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational," proceeds on the erroneous assumption, that Logic has a practical rather than a speculative object; that it is designed to teach men how to reason, rather than to investigate the laws of that reasoning which all men, consciously or unconsciously, alike make use of. A similar error respecting Moral Philosophy has so far hindered men from investigating its true basis and necessary conditions, that it is not too much to assert, that half the Ethical systems which have been at different times in vogue have started from a psychological assumption, which, consistently carried out, would make all Ethical philosophy impossible.

As an instance, let us take the argument against the existence of a moral sense, as it is ably stated in the language of Paley. "There is scarcely a single vice, which in some age or country of the world has not been countenanced by public opinion. Suicide in one age of the world has been heroism, in another is felony; theft, which is punished by most laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently rewarded." "Moral approbation," he continues, "in most instances follows the fashions and insti-

* Horat., Sat. I. 4, 115. [ED.]

† 'Essay,' bk. iv., chap. 17, § 4. [ED.]

tutions of the country we live in; which fashions also and institutions themselves have grown out of the exigencies, the climate, situation, or local circumstances of the country, or have been set up by the authority of an arbitrary chieftain, or the unaccountable caprice of the multitude."* From hence it is concluded, that we have no natural power of discerning right and wrong in themselves; that a sentiment of approbation was first associated with a certain line of conduct from observation of its utility; and that the instinct of imitation has been the chief cause of its subsequent continuance and diffusion.

To estimate the value of this argument, we have only to suppose, that that peculiar constitution of the eye which is known by the name of Daltonism, or colour blindness, were a little more common than it is, and perhaps in some degree influenced by local circumstances. Let us then imagine a writer on Optical Science reasoning as follows. "It is notorious that the very same bodies which produce upon one eye in one place the sensation of red, will affect another in another place with the very different sensation of green. Hence we may conclude, not that the sense of sight is often an erroneous guide in the distinction of colours, but that no such sense exists at all. The origin of names, and apparently of notions corresponding to such distinctions, among a people totally blind, may be satisfactorily accounted for, by supposing that one of the blind leaders of these blind men first annexed the name of scarlet to the impressions of another sense, such as the sound of a trumpet, from observing the martial feelings which that sound excites; and that the influence of authority and the instinct of imitation have continued the appellation ever since."

It seems never to have occurred to theorists of this character, that error has its conditions as well as truth, and that, in order that an idea may be misapplied, it is first necessary that the idea should exist. As the possession of a faculty of sight is shewn from the fact of men distinguishing between colours at all, not by the uniform application of the distinction in every instance; so the existence of a moral faculty must be determined by the possession by men of the notions of right and wrong at all, however those notions may be misapplied in rela-

* 'Moral Philosophy,' book i. chap. 5. [Ed.]

tion to particular acts. Education, custom, the imitative instinct, the authority of a chief, or the caprice of the multitude, may pervert an idea, but cannot possibly create it. It is a true and happily expressed remark of Locke's, in which he observes: "The dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding, is much-what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding any simple idea, not received in by his senses from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds."* The language of the latter part of this passage requires some correction, owing to the indistinct, if not positively erroneous notion of the process of reflection, which runs through the whole of Locke's Essay; but the important truth which it contains, namely, that the operation of thought is discursive only, and not intuitive, is fatal to every theory, including that of Locke himself, which admits the possibility of a moral philosophy, while denying the existence of a moral sense.

The question at issue really resolves itself into one of psychological fact, which any man may answer for himself by a careful examination of his own consciousness. Do we as a matter of fact experience, in contemplating a virtuous act, a feeling distinct from that which we experience in regarding one as beneficial?† We are conscious of the utility of many objects to whose action we attribute no moral character whatever. A spring of water in a desert is in the highest degree beneficial to the traveller. Does he therefore regard it with exactly the same feelings as those with which he contemplates an act of

* 'Essay,' book ii. chap. 2, § 2. [Ed.]

† [See 'Correspondence of R. E. H. Greyson,' vol. ii., p. 339.]

moral heroism? The spring of water, it may be replied, is not a voluntary agent: it dispenses its benefits unconsciously, and without any intention of doing good. True; but it is difficult to see how this consideration can affect our judgment, without virtually conceding the whole point in dispute. If the sentiment of moral approbation is not in itself distinct from that of utility; if *right* means no more than that which is serviceable, immediately or ultimately, to ourselves or to others, and *wrong* in like manner that which is hurtful, our estimates of different effects will differ in degree only, not in kind, will be determined by the magnitude of the benefit, not by the intentions of the benefactor. Why should I regard the beneficial acts of a man with a totally different feeling from that with which I regard the services of a horse? I can see no other reason than the conviction, that the one acts from a sense of duty, which the other does not: but this concedes the question of the prior and independent existence of duty and right as such, and involves the admission, that virtue is not entitled to approbation because it is useful, but utility because it is virtuous. The only consistent ground which the antagonist theory can take is that of denying that there is any real difference between the two sentiments: a position which not only gives the lie to consciousness, but renders a system of moral philosophy, as distinct from a calculation of interests, psychologically impossible, as being based on no facts of human nature.

The various principles which have been at different times advocated, as forming the foundation of Moral Philosophy, may be ultimately reduced to two, one of which virtually implies the existence of Moral Philosophy as a distinct branch of knowledge, while the other virtually denies it, by stripping its facts of their distinctive features, and merging them in another class of mental phenomena, and consequently identifying their study with another department of knowledge. The former starts from the assumption, that right and wrong are positive qualities, discernible in individual acts by a peculiar faculty of the intuitive consciousness, call it moral sense or any other name you please. The latter denies the existence of any such qualities in acts taken by themselves, and makes the distinction between right and wrong to lie, not in the acts themselves, but in their consequences, according as they finally lead to a greater

amount of happiness or misery,—that is to say, in a more or less refined sense, of pleasure or pain,—to the individual committing them. The principles assumed by other systems may be made ultimately to depend on one of these two. The "greatest happiness principle," for example, which is sometimes advocated as a less selfish form of the utilitarian theory, must itself depend on an ulterior assumption. Moral acts can only be committed by individuals, and motives and inducements must therefore be ultimately addressed to the individual agent. Why then am I, as an individual, called upon to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number? Clearly for one of two reasons: either because it is my duty, or because it is my interest, to do so. The former reason makes this principle dependent upon an antecedent perception of right and wrong *per se:* the latter makes it subordinate to that of personal expediency. The theory of the sophist of old, who made morality to depend on positive enactment and the will of the strongest, is another subordinate position; for I am induced to obey such enactment only because it is my duty or my interest to do so. Even the will of the Deity, which has again been appealed to as an ultimate criterion, is available only on one of two suppositions. We can discern the will of God, either by a moral nature analogous to His own, and which He has given us as a guide to determine from their own features what acts He wills us to do and what to avoid, or by the consequences which He has annexed to such acts, whether by a natural law of cause and effect, or by a special interposition of reward or punishment.

We have thus two alternatives between which to choose; and the existence of Moral Philosophy depends upon our choice. To make morality dependent upon the consequences of our acts, is, as I have already observed, to make Moral Philosophy impossible. The consequences of acts, whether naturally brought about or specially inflicted, can be considered as reward or punishment, only by pre-supposing the moral character of the acts rewarded or punished. Otherwise, every virtue is a minor vice, and every vice a minor virtue. That which leads to happiness, is *ipso facto* virtuous. That which leads to a greater degree of happiness, is therefore more virtuous; and that which leads to a less degree, is less so.

But happiness, if there is no *à priori* distinction of good and evil, is identical with pleasure. Every act, therefore, so far as it leads to pleasure, is *pro tanto* virtuous; and the happiness or misery annexed by the Providence of God to certain acts, differ only in duration or intensity from those which a tyrant imposes on obedience or disobedience to his commands. To say that virtue is rewarded, becomes the empty truism, that what is rewarded is rewarded; for the essence of the virtue consists in its leading to the reward as a consequence. To speak of the goodness of God becomes an unmeaning sound; for I can conceive such moral attributes only as I have experienced in some degree in my own consciousness; and if morality with me is only the pursuit of my own interest, I can form no other conception of the moral nature of the Deity Himself. My only conception of God is that of a Dispenser of pleasures and pains, not, however, by way of moral government, but arbitrarily, and as a mere exhibition of power. My only motive to obey the commands of God rather than those of man is, that He has more power to make me uncomfortable if I do not do so.

The province of Philosophy is to assign reasons for facts, and Moral Philosophy postulates the existence of moral facts. Facts, to whatever order they belong, can exist as phenomena of consciousness, only by virtue of being *presented* in some form or other of direct intuition. By *intuition* or *presentation*, as distinguished from *reflection* or *representation*, is meant that form of consciousness of which the object is an individual thing, act, or state of mind, having a distinct existence as *presented* now or here, *i.e.*, under the conditions of Time or Space. In *reflection* or *thought*, on the other hand, the object is *represented* by a concept or general notion, gained by comparison, and hence implying the existence of preceding intuitions which have been remembered and compared together. Owing to the neglect of this distinction, another class of Philosophers, in all other respects the antagonists of the Utilitarian School, have, like their opponents, attempted to construct Moral Philosophy upon an assumption which renders all Philosophy impossible. Cudworth and Clarke, by maintaining that moral distinctions, like truth and falsehood, are discerned by the Reason, *i.e.*, by an exercise of thought, have overlooked the fact, that thought itself is possible only within the field of possible experience;

i.e., as exercised upon the representations of objects which are capable of being presented in intuition. If, on the performance of certain individual acts, by myself or by another, I can intuitively perceive in my mind the simple and indefinable ideas of right and wrong, these ideas may give rise to general notions, and thus provide materials for the operations of reason; but conceptions of right and wrong without an intuitive moral faculty are as impossible as conceptions of colours without a sense of sight. Without underrating the necessary functions of the Reason in moral researches, we must hold its office to be posterior to that of a moral sense. Truth and falsehood, in moral as in other matters, consist in the agreement or disagreement of our representative notions with the intuitions which they represent, and presuppose the fact of the intuitions themselves. The same reason that investigates the optical laws which determine why snow is white and vermilion red, may also inquire into the moral laws by which benevolence is virtuous and ingratitude vicious; but the fact, that a given object does possess a given quality, must, in the one case and in the other, be furnished by the intuition, before reason comes into operation at all.

The view which has been here taken of the nature and purpose of Moral Science may also furnish us with an answer to another line of argument, which is sometimes, though not often in this place, employed in depreciation of the study. Granted, it is urged, that the perception of right and wrong does exist, and may serve as a guide in the path of duty; though too often, as its warmest advocates admit, an erring and uncertain one:—what is that to us, to whom a better light and a surer guide has been granted? To the Heathen, left to struggle as he best might through the night of evil, by the faint glimmerings of the light of Nature, Philosophy might be all in all. To the Christian, the wisdom of man has been superseded by the revelation of God. This argument again proceeds on the supposition which I have all along been combating: namely, that Moral Philosophy is a body of rules, not a science of facts. If we look upon Moral Philosophy simply as a code of precepts to tell us our duty, it may at any time be superseded by a more perfect system, emanating from a higher authority. But in the view which I have hitherto taken of the

nature of this Science, to speak of its being superseded by a better law, is not merely erroneous; it is self-contradictory. Moral Philosophy can in no sense be said to be *superseded* by Revelation; for either it is based upon facts of human nature which existed from the beginning, antecedently to Revelation, or it is not. If it is, those facts exist still, and still form its legitimate province. If it is not, then it has not been superseded; but it was from first to last impossible: it never had, it never could have, any real existence at all. So far is Revelation from superseding Moral Philosophy, that it has given it a higher value and a deeper significance. The history of the Fall is to the moral world, what the history of the Creation is to the material world. The natural philosopher may inquire, eagerly yet reverently, into the mysteries of the sensible universe; and the more so, that, no longer dreaming of cosmogonies, he knows no other science of the origin of things than that God said, "Let there be light: and there was light." And the moral philosopher has his field of inquiry in the facts and laws of that consciousness of right and wrong which ever lives within him; and the more so, that the dark and endless researches of curious minds into the origin of evil are confessed to yield no more than the plain narrative of Holy Writ, which tells him how moral distinctions were created in the hearts of our first parents, when their eyes were opened, and they became as gods, knowing good and evil. But we cease not to adore God in His works because He has revealed Himself to us in His word. The astronomer may still pursue his wonted study of the heavenly bodies, while acknowledging with the Psalmist, "that the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handywork." And the moral philosopher finds a no less fitting and no less pious theme of inquiry, in the facts and laws of the soul within him; while every step of his progress through the tangled maze of consciousness bids him draw the lesson of religion from his mental no less than from his bodily organization, and exclaim with the same inspired writer, "I will praise Thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made." "Bless the Lord, O my soul: and all that is within me, bless His holy Name."

The "previous question," therefore, in relation to any branch of Philosophy, is to be found in the psychological inquiry,

What are the presentative faculties of the human mind? Every such faculty may furnish distinct materials for thought; and without such a faculty, positive thought can have no place. Physical Science is possible, if the external senses present us with material phenomena, whose relations and laws it is the business of thought to investigate. And Moral Science is possible, if an internal sense, call it by what name you please, presents us with the fact of moral approbation and disapprobation of this or that action in itself and for its own sake: and it is possible in no other way. The question is then prepared for reason to investigate: Whence do these feelings of approbation and disapprobation arise, and on what laws are they dependent?

Metaphysics too must be judged by the same criterion, and that criterion has as yet been only partially applied. With the exception of the criticism of Kant, which requires a special and separate consideration, Metaphysical Philosophy has for the most part been pulled down by a dogmatism no less arrogant, and more pernicious, than that by which among the predecessors of Kant it was built up. There is a dogmatism of assumed ignorance, as there is a dogmatism of assumed knowledge. One teacher constructs a system whose ultimate principles rest only on the *ipse dixit* of the author: another dogmatically denounces dogmatism, and declares *suo periculo* that such questions are beyond the reach of man's faculties. These dogmatists in negation forget that error has its laws and conditions as well as truth: that it is not enough to declare authoritatively that certain studies are a delusion; but that it is necessary to shew how, according to the laws of the human mind, that delusion could have originated.

A philosophy of the laws and limits of human error would be an appropriate sequel to the elder Mr. Caxton's projected history of the same phenomenon. But, pending the appearance of that mythical and probably voluminous publication, we may venture to state, as a psychological certainty, that error as well as truth must have its origin in a presentation. Thought, whether proceeding on a right or a wrong path, cannot create its own object: it can only transfer to one class of presentations a notion which it has acquired from another. If the ideas of Substance and Cause, the chief objects of metaphysical research,

have never been given as individual things in any phase of the intuitive consciousness, metaphysical science is indeed impossible, but metaphysical delusion is impossible also. Thought becomes destitute, alike of the stones wherewith to rear a solid edifice, and of the cobwebs to weave into a palace of enchantment. Metaphysics, like the book of Michael Scott, philosopher as well as wizard, may contain—

> "Much of glamour might,
> Could make a lady seem a knight;
> The cobwebs on a dungeon wall
> Seem tapestry in lordly hall;
> A nutshell seem a gilded barge,
> A sheeling seem a palace large." *

But, even for this amount of deception, it is at least necessary that the lady, the cobwebs, the nutshell, and the sheeling, should exist somewhere. The threat of the witch in Macbeth, to appear in the likeness of "a rat without a tail," embodies an old superstition, in which an allegorical interpreter might detect a germ of philosophical truth. The witch can *transform*, but cannot *create*. The several members of the human body admit of a possible metamorphosis into the corresponding limbs of the quadruped; but the caudal appendage is lacking, for want of an analogous development in the human organization. So it is with Philosophy likewise. She may delude by false appearances; but it must be by changing the form of that which is real, not by creating a phantom out of nothing. But some of the recent declaimers against all metaphysical inquiries, with a singular ignorance of the limits which bound man's power even of self-deception, while they accuse the philosopher of constructing tails innumerable, refuse to concede to him, as the basis of his operations, even the slightest elongation of the *os coccygis*.

The problem of Metaphysics has been variously stated at different times and by different schools of Philosophy; but all indicate, with more or less precision, one great want and yearning of human nature,—a yearning which, like other passions and feelings, may often lead us astray, may be often

* Scott, 'Lay of the Last Minstrel,' canto iii., stanza 9. [Ed.]

deceived, often disappointed; but which cannot have been implanted altogether for no purpose. Whether we look to its earliest definite statement, in the dogma of Parmenides, that Being is one and unchangeable, and change exists but in the fancy of men; or to the boast of Zeno, that he would explain all things, if there were only given to him the One; whether we examine Plato's conception of the science of Dialectic, as contemplating real existence by the aid of the pure intellect, illuminated by the brightness emanating from the essential Form of Good; or ask the question which the same philosopher describes as embracing at once the deepest mysteries of existence and the pettiest quibbles of sophistry: "How can the One be Many, or the Many One?"* whether we adopt Aristotle's definition of the First Philosophy as the Science which contemplates Being as Being, and the attributes which belong to it as such; or, with Kant, divide objects into Noumena and Phenomena, things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to human faculties; or, with Herbart, find a common object of all metaphysical inquiries in the solution of the contradictions which present themselves in experience:—in these and other various statements we hear the echoes of one and the same voice speaking within to each and to all of us;—a voice which is to the speculative that which conscience is to the practical aspect of things;—a still small voice, it may be, but one which will not be put to silence; whose warnings may be slighted or disobeyed, but cannot be divested of their authority; which commands us to come forth from the cave where we have taken refuge, to face the light as we best may, though the eye be dazzled, and the brain bewildered; to pursue the path that lies before us, though the foot be often wearied by its length and the judgment at fault in its mazes; to prize inquiring error higher than uninquiring indolence; and, in thought no less than in practice, to deem rest a sin, while there remain before us doubts unsolved or duties unperformed. If existence be indeed a mystery, it has been made a mystery to us for some good purpose, because our intellectual and moral nature is the better even for the unsuccessful attempt to pene-

* [On this question, see Plato, 'Parmenides,' p. 164; 'Sophistes,' p. 251; 'Republic,' book viii., p. 524; 'Philebus,' p. 14.]

trate it. In our moral and religious life we are bidden to aim at a goal which we never reach, and to persevere in our efforts, though the perfect ideal of duty still flies from us as we pursue it, still shines afar off the higher we ascend. Why should the trial of our intellect differ from that of our faith and our will? The pursuit of truth is more to be desired than the attainment; for intellectual activity in acquiring is better than intellectual repose on our acquirements. To condemn Philosophy because no man has solved its riddle, is as absurd as to condemn Morality because no man has reached perfection.

Of course, we must expect, in this country and in this age especially, to be met on the very threshold of our inquiry by that unceasing cry: "What after all is the use of such studies? Will they in any degree extend that empire over the world of matter of which the present generation is so justly proud? Will they enable us to add one item to the physical comforts of man, or diminish aught of his necessary labour and suffering in earning his daily bread?" We will not retort upon such adversaries in the words of the poet, who utters a similar complaint against their own favourite pursuits.

> "What though beneath thee man put forth
> His pomp, his pride, his skill;
> And arts that made fire, flood, and earth,
> The vassals of his will;—
> Yet mourn I not thy parted sway,
> Thou dim discrowned king of day:
> For all those trophied arts
> And triumphs that beneath thee sprang,
> Healed not a passion or a pang
> Entailed on human hearts." *

We will not reply, that utility, after all, is no more than the gratification of some want; and that to engage in philosophical inquiries in obedience to the dictates of an intellectual craving is at least as worthy and as lawful a pursuit, as to provide material comforts at the demand of our bodily needs and desires. We would rather plead in behalf of metaphysical study the defence long ago put forth by Aristotle, in behalf of that and moral knowledge together: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν

* Campbell's 'Last Man.' [Ed.]

ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν.* The exercise of any faculty of our nature upon its proper object is its own utility and its own reward. The faculty was given us that we should exercise it, and the consciousness of the want was designed by our Maker to urge us to the action. If the conceptions of Substance and Accident, of Cause and Effect, of Reality and Appearance, exist anywhere in the human mind (and if they did not exist, Metaphysics could never have been dreamed of, even as a delusion), it is a legitimate theme of inquiry to ask, what those conceptions import, and to what objects they correspond. If the perception of the Finite suggests the idea of the Infinite, it is right to ask, what amount of truth the idea conveys to us, and what is the solution of the contradictions which it apparently involves. Metaphysical concepts at any rate exist as thoughts, and thought calls upon thought to investigate it. "If it be not thought trifling," says Hegel, "to have discovered upwards of sixty kinds of parrots and a hundred and thirty-seven varieties of the cuckoo pintle, surely we should not regard as trifling the discovery of forms of thought. Is not a figure of reasoning something higher than a parrot or a cuckoo pintle?" † But it is the mere empiric alone who will ask the question or need the answer. The true philosopher, who studies the results of experience as the material for thought, will be the last to despise that branch of Philosophy whose office it is to make the results of experience conceivable.‡

I have spoken of Metaphysical inquiry as originating in an imperative want of our nature. The demand of that want is, that we should reconcile consciousness with itself; that we should supply the blanks and explain the discrepancies that present themselves when the results of experience are compared with those of thought. That I think, is no less certain than that I see or hear: it is equally irrational, equally suicidal, to condemn the deliverances of thought as delusions,

* Aristotle, 'Ethic. Nic.,' VI. 12, 4. [Ed.]

† 'Subjective Logik,' I. cap. 3, d. Anmerk., 'Werke,' vol. v., p. 139; cf. 'Geschichte der Philosophie,' Theil I. Absch. 1; 'Werke,' vol. xiv. p. 365. [Ed.]

‡ "Die Metaphysik hat keine andre Bestimmung, als die nämlichen Begriffe, welche die Erfahrung ihr aufdringt, denkbar zu machen."—Herbart, 'Einleitung in die Philosophie,' § 149.

and to reject the testimony of the senses. Now it is a matter of fact that what experience presents as manifold, thought is compelled to regard as one; that where experience is silent, thought is compelled to act without her warrant. While experience presents to several senses the manifold phenomena of extension and colour and shape and resistance, we think of Body as neither any one of these, nor the aggregate of all these; but as one thing, beyond and distinct from, though not separable from, its phenomenal manifestations. It is a matter of fact, that I am conscious by experience of impressions and ideas; while reason tells me, to use the words of Bishop Berkeley, "that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle, that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas."* Philosophers of eminence, in this country especially, have laid down, as the foundation of their systems, the suicidal axiom, that we have no consciousness either of mind or matter, as independent and unchanging substances, but only of their dependent and variable qualities. Yet is it not a fact of consciousness, that I am compelled to acknowledge my own personal unity and identity, in the midst of the endless variety of impressions and ideas to which I am subject? Nay, the very conception of change, whether in mind or matter, implies the existence of an unchanged and permanent element; otherwise it would be no change, but rather the annihilation of one object and the creation of another. If matter is identical with its qualities, what do we mean when we say, that ice is *changed* into water, and water again into steam? If mind is identical with its qualities, why is the man who laughs to-day the same who wept yesterday? If neither mind nor matter is identical with its qualities, in what form of consciousness are we told of their diversity, and what is the amount and value of its testimony? It is a matter of fact again, that, while experience presents us only with the appearance of succession, one sensible impression followed by another, thought affirms the existence and operation of something beyond this, of power operating to produce change; in one word, of a *Cause*. What is the origin and import of these two

* 'Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, III. Works, ed. Fraser, vol. i., p. 329. [Ed.]

necessary conceptions, *Substance* as distinct from phenomenon, *Cause* as distinct from change? or rather, of these two different sides of one and the same conception; for Cause is but Substance in operation, as Substance is but Cause resting after its labour.

The distinction between Substance and Accident, between independent and dependent being, (*esse per se* and *esse in alio,*) may provoke the censure of modern criticism, as a revival of what is often contemptuously styled the jargon of the Schools. Yet there can be no caricature without a likeness; and even scholastic subtlety seldom went to work without some foundation to build upon. This distinction, or one analogous to it, is one which forces itself upon us the instant we begin to think, and which has under various modifications been accepted in modern times by philosophers whose whole spirit and method has been most remote from Scholasticism. The distinction, for instance, between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, is but another application of the same principle. To the uninstructed mind it is natural to suppose that things are as they appear. Yet the most superficial reflection is sufficient to establish a broad distinction between phenomena which are supposed to exist absolutely in themselves, and others which depend on a temporary relation of objects. It is soon perceived, for example, that the smell and the taste of a body can but exist in relation to a sensitive organization; and that the material thing which gives rise to this sensation, be it what it may, is something different from the phenomenon as perceived by the senses. But reflection cannot stop here. Even if we reject that theory of perception which reduces extension, solidity, and figure, to a like dependence on the organization of the percipient subject, we cannot help seeing that these qualities also depend on a juxtaposition of parts, whose reality cannot consist merely in their combination. Continuity in space is but a relation between several parts, and these parts must one or more of them be real in themselves; else no reality could result from their composition. Must this division be carried on *ad infinitum*, (as it must if extension is regarded as a thing in itself,) or must extension, and consequently space, be regarded as itself a phenomenon dependent on some ulterior reality? Existence, like the mirage of the desert, seems to fly

as we pursue it: if we halt for an instant, contradictions meet us on every side; yet the same law of our thinking which forbids us to rest on contradictions, tells us also that the real must exist somewhere, else would there be no possibility of the seeming. The same difficulty which extension in space presents to our researches after a material reality, is presented by succession in time with reference to our personal reality. The task of Metaphysics, in each case, is to unravel the contradictions which arise, or appear to arise, when, on the one hand, we attempt to identify the one substance with its many modifications, or, on the other hand, to isolate it from them.

But further. All that experience conveys to us is finite: yet are we compelled to conceive the Finite only as existing by and in relation to the Infinite. The perception of phenomena suggests the idea of Being; and from Being we are irresistibly carried on to the foundation of all Being; from that which is, to that which must be; from that which exists dependently, to that which exists in itself. "I am all that was, and is, and is to be, and my veil hath no mortal ever lifted up." Such was the sublime inscription which the philosopher-priests of Egypt engraved on the fane of Isis, their symbol of the Infinite. "The human reason," says Kant, "first convinces itself of the existence of some one necessary Being. In this Being it acknowledges unconditioned existence, and it finds the notion of the unconditioned in that which contains all reality. The unlimited All is absolute Unity, and carries with it the notion of one only, that is, of the highest Being."* Mysticism and Idealism, Religion and Philosophy, the spirit of Intuition and the spirit of Thought, the Feelings and the Reason of mankind, alike appear to direct us to the Infinite, as the only full and perfect manifestation of the idea of Being. But can the Infinite and the Finite *be* together? If we endeavour to think of the Infinite and the Finite as correlatives, is the Finite an additional Being to the Infinite, or is it not? Is the sum of Being contained in the Infinite and the Finite together greater than either of its terms taken separately, or is it not? If it is, we fall into the absurdity of supposing a greater than the Infinite. If it is not, the gulf of Pantheism yawns before us:

* 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' p. 614 (5th edition).

the Infinite alone exists; the Finite is but a mode and manifestation of the one only Being. Yet Pantheism offers no escape; for if it does not contradict itself, it avoids doing so only by contradicting the whole testimony of consciousness, and thus destroying the evidence of all truth, its own included. The Pantheist tells me that I have not a real distinct existence and unity of my own; but that I am merely a phenomenal manifestation, or rather an aggregate of many manifestations, of the One Infinite Being. Yet my only conception of a distinction between Being and its manifestations,—the only meaning that I can attach to the terms,—is derived from the direct intuitive consciousness of my own personal being and unity, in the midst of the many affections to which I am subject. It is because I *perceive* myself to be one and real, that I *conceive* other objects as being one and real likewise. Pantheism thus falls into the same logical inconsequence with reference to the idea of Substance, into which its practical counterpart and complement, Determinism, falls in reference to the idea of Cause. My notion of Causality, of *power* as distinct from mere succession, is derived from my immediate consciousness of my own activity in volition. From this I proceed by a natural law of association to assume the presence of a similar power whenever I observe a change. But from my consciousness of myself as a determining cause, the Necessitarian, having generalized the fact of consciousness into an universal axiom, concludes that I am a determined effect; and the Pantheist in like manner, having generalized my personal consciousness of my own being, infers from thence that I am no being at all, but merely a phenomenon. The deductions of Pantheism thus contradict the very intuition from which they arose, and on which their whole significance depends. Their apparent force arises mainly from a juggling combination of words in various relations, used like algebraical signs, without verification by reference to their original meaning; a trick of which modern Pantheists, from Spinoza downwards, have been especially prolific, and the more so, in proportion as they have pretended to a mathematical rigour of demonstration.* Indeed, there is one warning which

* May I venture so far to shock the prejudices of certain philosophers, and writers about philosophy, of the present day, as to insinuate that their idol,

it is useful to impress at the outset upon all young students of Metaphysics. If there is one conclusion more than another which the united evidence of Logic and Psychology renders certain, it is this: that no matter of fact, no truth relating to things without the mind, whether real or phenomenal, can possibly be matter of demonstration. If ever you meet with a man who professes to demonstrate metaphysical or physical truths with the same certainty as a proposition of Euclid, set that man down at once as postulating his own failure. But if a logical demonstration of the Infinite in relation to the Finite can accomplish nothing but contradiction, do we fare better, if we abandon the idea of relation altogether, and aspire, with Schelling, to a knowledge of the Infinite as absolute, by means

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"the holy and repudiated Spinoza," is little better than a word-juggler? Yet so it is: witness the following specimen.

Ethica, P. I. Def. III. Per *substantiam* intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur: hoc est, id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.

Def. IV. Per *attributum* intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.

Def. VI. Per *Deum* intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.

[Def. III. shews that by *substance* is meant the general notion of a thing as conceived, not the many individuals to which the same notion may be applicable; *est*, therefore, and *concipitur*, though apparently distinct, are really one, since general notions exist only by being conceived.

Def. VI. clears an ambiguity in Def. IV., and shews that *attributum* is used to signify, not the whole nature or essence of a substance, but only any one of the constituent parts thereof: in other words, that one substance may consist of more attributes than one.]

Propos. V. In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ aut plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ sive attributi.

Demonstr. Si darentur plures distinctæ, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum, vel ex diversitate affectionum. Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo non dari nisi unam ejusdem attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum, &c.

This demonstration contains almost as many fallacies as words. In the first place, existence as a thing *in rerum natura*, is assumed to be identical with existence as a notion conceived in the mind. In the second place, *attributum*, which in the definition was explained to signify any one essential part of the nature of a thing, is now assumed to be identical with the whole nature. In the third place, it is assumed, that substances must differ either in the sum total of their attributes, or in that of their affections; whereas to constitute a difference, diversity in a single attribute is sufficient. And, lastly, by this juggle of *attributorum* and *attributi*, it is finally concluded that because the whole nature of two notions cannot be identical, therefore they cannot have a single point in common (*Aliquid* inter se commune, Prop. VI.). The demonstration really proves no more, than that two notions composed of precisely the same attributes are one and the same notion; and this harmless truism is paraded as an important discovery throughout the rest of the treatise.

When it is remembered that every proposition in Spinoza's 'Ethics' is a necessary link in the demonstration of those which follow, the reader may estimate the value of the rest of the treatise, after such a stumble on the threshold of the argument.

of an intellectual intuition which is above relation and therefore above consciousness? or if, with Hegel, we find in contradiction itself the essence of truth, and lay down as the basis of all Philosophy the identity of Being and not-Being?

I do not say that it is the duty of the metaphysician to solve this mystery of Being; but it is his duty to find out why it is insoluble. The ideas which it involves must have an origin according to the laws of our mental constitution, and an import as mental phenomena. What is the truth of consciousness? What are the limits of thought? Where may we trust to reason? Where must we walk by faith? If reason is co-ordinate with faith, the testimony of the two must be brought into harmony with each other. If reason is subordinate to faith, it will learn to submit itself only when its proper boundaries are definitely and unmistakeably pointed out.

You are the victim, says the Positivist, of your own delusions. Being itself is a delusion. There exists nothing in nature but phenomena; dreaming theorists have invented the rest. It may be so; but how came they to invent it? The dogmatic assertion of non-existence helps us no more than the dogmatic assertion of existence. So long as consciousness, even in appearance, contradicts itself, the whole superstructure of knowledge is erected on a quicksand, and the breath of scepticism may in a moment overturn it. It is useless to cut the knot by mutilation; to make an arbitrary separation of the facts of consciousness; to say this is true and to be accepted, that is false and to be set aside. When humanity retains its heritage of truth only by being divided against itself; when men feel that they have their treasure in earthen vessels, and watch doubtfully and anxiously for the time when the frail casket shall be shivered, and the contents scattered abroad, it is hopeless to attempt to silence the instinct of our nature which cries out within us, demanding a surer possession and a more harmonious utterance. The critic may seat himself like a Solomon in judgment, and give sentence that the living man be divided; but in instant appeal, from his decision is heard the voice of the human nature within us, pleading in all the anguish of parental yearning against the dismemberment of her offspring.

Whatever doubt or obscurity may hang over the objects of

Metaphysical conceptions as things, thus much at least is clear, that such conceptions exist as thoughts in the human mind; that they have incessantly existed and occupied the attention of thinking men in various ages and in various countries; that they must be accepted as facts of our inner consciousness, and be explained according to the laws of our mental constitution. And this consideration points at once to the source from which alone a solution of our difficulties may reasonably be expected. We must commence with that which we have and know, not with that which we have not and may never know. Instead of projecting the mind out of itself into the unknown region of abstract entities, and asking what is that law in the constitution of things by virtue of which they appear under such and such aspects to our minds; let us look into the more familiar field of our own consciousness, and ask what is that law or condition of human thought, by virtue of which we are compelled to form such and such conceptions of things. In Metaphysical, no less than in Moral Philosophy, it is to Psychology that we must look to reconcile conflicting systems, and to lay the foundation for real progress. By examining the facts of consciousness in their actual state, not as mutilated to suit a preconceived hypothesis of their origin, and more especially by a more exact analysis of the idea of personality and conscious existence,* and by endeavouring to trace out the laws and limits of error in accordance with what we know already, or may learn further of the laws and limits of thought in general, we may hope either to lay a foundation in facts for the construction of a Metaphysical system, or at any rate to shew why such a system cannot be constructed, and what is the origin and real meaning of the delusion which led men to dream of its possibility. Pursued by this method and in this spirit, Metaphysical inquiry, whether it succeed or fail in its ultimate object, cannot be otherwise than a wholesome and instructive discipline of the mind. Like the labourers in the fable, its votaries may not succeed in finding the buried treasure for which they turn up the soil, yet will their labours have prepared the intellectual field for its proper harvest; and they may hope to attain to a knowledge more valuable perhaps than

* See Appendix.

that for which they sought, a knowledge of themselves and of their powers, of what they may and what they may not aspire to know, of the laws and limits of Reason, and, by consequence, of the just claims of Faith. They will learn at least what is the full and perfect utterance of that one and indivisible consciousness, whose voice is to the mass of mankind like the music of the spheres, which they hear not, because it is never silent.* They will learn to listen to it with reverence, and to interpret it with care, not merely when it tells them of the passing sensation, or the hasty emotion, of the phenomena that arise and perish; not merely when it bids them

> Νωμᾷν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκούην
> Καὶ γλῶσσαν,†

but also when it calls them away from the things of sensible experience, to bear witness not less true of

> "Those obstinate questionings
> Of sense and outward things,
> Fallings from us, vanishings;
> Blank misgivings of a creature
> Moving about in worlds not realised,
> High instincts, before which our mortal nature
> Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised:
> Those first affections,
> Those shadowy recollections,
> Which, be they what they may,
> Are yet the fountain-light of all our day,
> Are yet a master-light of all our seeing;
> Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
> Our noisy years seem moments in the being
> Of the eternal Silence: truths that wake
> To perish never;
> Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavour,
> Nor all that is at enmity with joy
> Can utterly abolish or destroy.
> Hence in a season of calm weather,
> Though inland far we be,
> Our Souls have sight of that immortal sea

* [Cf. Hobbes, 'Elementa Philosophiæ,' iv., 25 (Opera, ed. Molesworth, vol. i., p. 321): "Sentire semper idem et non sentire ad idem recidunt."]

† Parmenides, 55; ed. Mullach, p. 120. [Ed.]

Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore."

[To the following note, Professor Ferrier has replied in his 'Scottish Philosophy,' second edition, p. 56. According to his reply, matter *per se* is not an absolute non-entity, but a nonsensical or incomplete object, which may be unintelligently, but not fully apprehended. But this seems to amount to a confession that matter *per se* has an existence out of my intelligence; and on Mr. Ferrier's system out of all intelligence, for a nonsensical object is still something. But again, we may urge that the nonsensical has the same relation to a mind that cannot comprehend it that the intelligible has to a mind that can comprehend it. The nonsensical, therefore, cannot be identical with matter *per se*, but depends on a certain relation to my mind; out of that relation, it may be no longer nonsensical. The nonsensical itself cannot be determined, save by a prior cognition of the laws of the human mind. Professor Ferrier appears to reverse this process, and to make the limits of the human (and indeed of all) intelligence, depend upon the prior assumption of an absolute *nonsensical per se*.]

APPENDIX.

NOTE, p. 148.

THE mention of the personal consciousness as the presentative source of the idea of unity and substance, may remind the reader of Professor Ferrier's primary law or condition of all knowledge, from which he attempts to deduce a complete science of Knowing and Being; "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself."*

In one sense, this proposition is true, and highly valuable, as a reaction against the suicidal position maintained by the Scottish philosophers of the last generation, namely, that we have no consciousness of either mind or matter as things, but only of their several attributes. Professor Ferrier's indignation against Pyschology in general is almost excusable in this particular instance. If the ancients, according to Bacon, corrupted physics with logic or metaphysics, physics has in modern times returned the compliment with a vengeance, by poisoning with its crude analogies the very fountain and source of mental philosophy. Attributes, material and mental, are arranged in neat parcels on either hand; extension, figure, motion, on the one side; sensation, thought, volition, on the other; and of these it is allowed that we are conscious; but of mind, no less than of matter, of myself, the thinking and sensitive substance, as well as of the extended and moving substance, I am wholly ignorant and unconscious. Who then in this case is the *I* that am conscious of sensations, and how can I be conscious of such sensations as *mine*? In this case it would be more accurate to say, not that I am conscious of my sensations, but that the sensation is conscious of itself; but thus worded, the glaring absurdity of the theory would carry with it its own refutation.

Thus far Professor Ferrier's proposition is unassailable, and he has done good service to Philosophy by the prominent position he has given to it. But it may be questioned whether within these limits it is capable of supporting the superstructure which the author has reared upon it. Thus far, it is merely an analysis of the notion of consciousness, which in itself implies a subject and an object, a conscious self and something of which he is conscious. In this sense, which is the only one in which the axiom is self-evident, it is a mere analytical judgment, and, as such, cannot of

* 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' p. 75. [ED.]

itself be the foundation of a science. The peculiarity of Professor Ferrier's theory consists in the assumption, that this conscious self is also known as part of the object of consciousness. While others analyse consciousness into two constituent elements, the subject and the object, he decomposes it into three; firstly, the *ego* or subject which is conscious; secondly, another *ego* or subject-object, forming part of that of which the first *ego* is conscious; and, thirdly, a *non-ego*, or object-object, which combines with the second *ego* to complete the object of which the first *ego* is conscious. This *non-ego* he subsequently identifies with the material world, as apprehended by the senses.

It is this assumed reduplication of the *ego* in consciousness, which forms the synthetical, or properly metaphysical portion of Professor Ferrier's axiom; and this, with all his ingenuity, he has not succeeded in making self-evident. His "Observations and Explanations" sufficiently establish (which was hardly needed) the first part of the axiom; the second, on which his entire claim of consequences hangs, is not only assumed without proof, but is assumed in a manner which renders proof impossible. If true, it is a fact of human consciousness; and it is no more. But to human consciousness the Professor expressly refuses to appeal, and holds it to be absolutely indispensable for the salvation of his argument, that his law should be binding, not on human reason only, but on every possible intelligence. The reason is obvious. As a fact of human consciousness his position may be true, but it cannot be necessary. As a fact of human consciousness, it can rest on human experience only; and the science constructed upon it, however true, however important, is true only as an empirical statement of that which is, instead of being, as he claims to make it, a mathematical demonstration of that which must be.

But is the presence of a double *ego* in every act of consciousness admissible as a matter of fact? Consciousness surely does not tell us so. It tells us indeed that in the complex relation between subject and object the *ego* is present as one element: I know every state of consciousness as *mine*, and the poverty of language compels me to say I am *conscious of* myself as apprehending, and hence apparently to represent the *ego* as a part of the object. But if we build on this imperfection of language, it proves too much. What is implied when we say that the *ego* must be a part of the object proper of consciousness? According to Professor Ferrier, the apprehension of matter *per se* is a contradiction. I can only apprehend myself-as-apprehending-matter. But this second self is, *ex hypothesi*, equally incapable of apprehending matter *per se*. It can only apprehend it under the same condition as the first self, namely, by apprehending itself along with it. I cannot therefore apprehend myself as appre-

hending matter; but I must apprehend myself as apprehending myself-as-apprehending-matter. But the third self again is under the same law as the second. Wheel within wheel, *ego* within *ego*, the process continues *ad infinitum*. The argument which Herbart urges against Fichte's assumption of a subject-object tells with greater force against Professor Ferrier. Once admit the necessary presence of two selves in consciousness, and we may with equal reason maintain the existence of two thousand.

As a clear thinker and a vigorous writer, Professor Ferrier is a model to metaphysicians. He is everywhere acute, everywhere intelligible, and the force and elegance of his style is sufficient to lend attraction to the most uninviting of subjects. But he has failed, because he has attempted the impossible. Disdaining to seek a foundation for Metaphysics in the facts of Psychology, he aspires to construct a series of demonstrations which shall be as strict as any demonstration in Euclid, and valid for every possible intelligence. Before the first of these conditions can be accomplished, Metaphysics must cease to be Metaphysics. Before the second can be accomplished, the author must cease to be a man. As regards the first condition: Metaphysics emphatically proclaims itself as the science of the real; the propositions of Euclid are demonstrable, precisely because their objects are not real. Geometry is demonstrable and necessary when applied to figures as conceived by the mind: it has only a hypothetical and empirical truth when applied to figures as existing in nature. In like manner, a system of Metaphysics demonstrated with mathematical severity must cease to be a science of things, and claim only to be a science of thoughts. It cannot shelter itself under the plea that Thought and Being are identical; for this supposed identity is a question of fact, which can only be determined empirically, and which, if so determined, remains a fact, and nothing more. As regards the second condition: a theory of knowing which shall be valid for other than human intelligences can only be constructed by one who has himself been emancipated from the conditions of human thought. Till this is accomplished, an unacknowledged anthropomorphism pervades the whole of our speculations: we conceive other intelligences only by first identifying them with our own. Let us try Professor Ferrier's theory in three special instances, selecting that portion of his axiom which, as limited to human consciousness, is unquestionably true.

1. Whatever state of consciousness I experience, I must know that state as mine.

2. Whatever state of consciousness an angel experiences, he must know that state as his (the angel's).

3. Whatever state of consciousness an oyster experiences, he must know that state as his (the oyster's).

Are these three statements equally self-evident? Most people at first sight would admit the first and second, but doubt about the third. How do we know, they might ask, that the oyster has an idea of self at all? How do we know that he has memory; that he can associate one sensation with another, and know himself as the subject of all? Why then are we more confident about the angel, in whose case we have no more warrant of experience than in that of the oyster? Simply because we can subtract from the sum total of our own consciousness, but cannot add to it. I think of a lower intelligence as a part only of my own; and I see that the subtraction may possibly change the entire result. I think of a higher intelligence as my own and something more; but, this something being totally unknown, I assume, quite gratuitously, that it will not interfere with the normal operations of the remainder. Hence I have no difficulty in anthropomorphizing the angel; but I do not find it so easy to anthropomorphize the oyster. Where my own intelligence is but a part, I am well content to reason as if it were the whole; but where it is the whole, I am not equally ready to identify it with a part. But I have not thereby advanced one step in the knowledge of the conditions of other than human intelligences. I have only made my own intelligence the representative of all. I have generalized the *Ego* and named it Pan: I have gazed on the image of my own mind, and in that microcosm I have symbolized the Universe.

It is necessary to notice Professor Ferrier's system, because he is the latest as well as the ablest opponent of the position which I have been advocating: namely, that Metaphysics, like every other branch of Philosophy, must be based on Psychology. His system, if it could be established, would constitute an epoch in the history of Philosophy; but I feel confident that the time will come when the attempt to establish such a system will be regarded in the same light as the attempt to square the circle. But though compelled to dissent from the author's fundamental principles, I am bound gratefully to acknowledge the many merits of his work. He has produced the most readable book on Metaphysics that has ever been written. He has exposed many errors in the popular systems of Psychology, and shewn the necessity of a thorough revision of the commonly received doctrines on the subject. His work is one which no student of philosophy can afford to neglect; and if he has been more successful in assailing the doctrines of others than in establishing his own, he has only experienced in this respect a fate shared by some of the most illustrious names in the history of Philosophy.

ON THE

PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

CONTENTS.

Defects of Kant's Criticism of the Pure Reason: its true Character and Import.

The Origin of our Ideas according to Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Leibnitz.

The Question is twofold: 1. What is the Subjective Character of our Ideas? 2. What is their Objective Character?

Kant's Answer to these Questions.

Presentative and Representative Consciousness.

Phenomena and Things in themselves.

Analytical and Synthetical Judgments.

Results of Kant's Criticism.

Metaphysics impossible.

Kant's Inconsistencies.

His Doctrine of the Speculative Reason.

His Theory of the Practical Reason.

Fundamental Fallacy of Kant's Practical Philosophy.

Systems of Philosophy occasioned by Kantianism.

Conclusion.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Lecture was originally delivered as a supplement to a previous course, in which the contents of the 'Criticism of the Pure Reason' were exhibited more in detail. It is, however, sufficiently independent of its predecessors to admit of a separate publication. And it is published, partly in compliance with the wishes of some who were present at its delivery, and partly in the hope that its brevity may attract readers who might be deterred by a more elaborate exposition. Within the limits of a single lecture, it is of course impossible to attempt more than a slight and cursory survey of a few leading principles and results; but my purpose will be answered if I should succeed in interesting a few readers in the subject, and in furnishing a few useful cautions to those who may be inclined to prosecute further the study of the philosophy of modern Germany, to which that of Kant is the key. And however great may be the evils to be apprehended from that study incautiously pursued (and I am not disposed to underrate them), they will be best obviated by the cultivation of a sound and sober philosophical spirit among ourselves, not by uninquiring neglect or indiscriminate condemnation. If the following remarks can contribute in the slightest degree to this end, by pointing to the true lesson of philosophy—a knowledge of the limits of the human reason,—they will have accomplished all that their author can expect or desire.

ON THE

PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.*

THE reader who has gone through Kant's 'Criticism of the Pure Reason' carefully and entirely, cannot have failed to observe and regret how much the cumbrous style and elaborate details of the work have overlaid and choked the growth of its most valuable and fertile contents. We meet perpetually with thoughts and observations calculated, in what they directly convey, and still more in the train of consequences which they suggest, to cast a flood of light on some of the darkest problems of philosophy, and to supply the wisest precepts of the right use and legitimate boundaries of reason; yet when we would follow out the clue thus placed in our hands, we find it at almost every step tangled or broken, leading through rugged and scarcely practicable paths, returning back upon its former traces, or branching out into the barren wilderness of the unknown and unknowable. Philosophy in the writings of Kant appears like Draco in the theatre of Ægina, smothered under the garments which her admiring expositor has heaped upon her. And hence it is that the spirit and lesson of the whole are liable to be overlooked or misunderstood, while the mind is overwhelmed and distracted by minute attention to parts; that inconsistencies lurk unnoticed, and errors stand uncorrected, and conclusions have been deduced from the details of the work calculated in their ultimate consequences to overthrow its fundamental principles. For this reason, it is especially necessary, before proceeding to compare the doctrines of this work with those of other writings of the same author, or with the later philosophy of the same country, to remedy the defects of a close analysis by a brief and less technical summary of the principal results.

* A Lecture delivered at Magdalen College, May 20, 1856.

To understand the true character and import of the 'Criticism of the Pure Reason,' we must look to the circumstances of its origin. Kant himself confesses that his mind received its first impulse in this direction from the writings of David Hume. This at once assigns to the treatise its place as a contribution to that inquiry concerning the origin, and consequently the value, of our ideas, which, indicated rather than commenced by Descartes, was carried on and developed by Locke and Hume. Descartes, in announcing his celebrated test, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, had laid the foundation of an appeal to the consciousness, and to the several phenomena of consciousness, or, in the language of himself and his followers, to our *ideas*, as the immediate source and guarantee of all knowledge and all truth. But these ideas or states of mind—for the word has this extent of signification—of which we are conscious within us, whence come they? What is the cause of their existence within us,—the nature and purport of that truth which they convey? Descartes, though not expressly applying himself to this question, may be considered as having indicated three distinct kinds of ideas, proceeding from three distinct sources.* The first class comprises *innate ideas*,† not in the sense in which Locke professed to refute them, as if consciously developed from the moment of birth; but such as are implanted by God in the constitution of the mind from the beginning, to grow up and develope along with it, without the need of a special experience to impart them. Their innateness is manifested, not by their actual existence prior to all experience, but from their being, though simultaneous with or subsequent to experience, yet different in kind, both from the qualities of the object empirically affecting, and from the movements of the organism affected, and hence, being only states of the conscious substance itself, determined by the laws of its own constitution.‡ The second class of ideas are those properly adventitious or empirical; that is to say, images of material objects, conveyed through the senses, the mind being perfectly passive in their reception.

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* 'Œuvres de Descartes,' ed. Cousin, vol. ix. p. 166, x. p. 94. [Compare 'Meditatio Tertia,' p. 17. ('Œuvres,' vol. i., p. 268).] Cf. Renouvier, 'Manuel de Philosophie moderne,' p. 79.

† [See Stowart, 'Dissertation,' and Laromiguière, 'Cours.' See also Descartes' own explanation in his strictures on the 'Program of Regius.']

‡ See Hamilton on Reid, p. 782.

The third class is that of voluntary ideas, or such as we construct for ourselves by an act of will. Locke's corrections of this classification are well known. Rejecting altogether the innate ideas, and limiting the power of the will to the combination or separation of previously existing materials, he recognised no other class of ideas than the empirical or adventitious, regarding the mind in its natural state as resembling a blank sheet of paper, on which experience registers its marks. But Locke, unlike the majority of his followers both in England and France, distinctly recognised two forms of experience, giving rise to two distinct classes of ideas: *Sensation*, by which the mind becomes conscious of the phenomena of the world without; and *Reflection*, by which it is conscious of what takes place within itself; or, in his own words, by which it perceives and reflects on its own operations. The classification of Locke is a considerable improvement on that of Descartes, and contains, indeed, on one side, the germ of the entire truth. That that germ is, however, imperfectly developed, and the truth which it contains but obscurely intimated, may be concluded from the vast amount of misrepresentation to which the doctrine has been subjected. To class Locke, as is frequently done, as the disciple of Hobbes, and the parent of Condillac and the French ideologists, is to suppress or misrepresent at least one-half of his theory; yet it cannot be denied that passages may be quoted from Locke's writings, and inferences drawn from his premises, in which the ultra-sensational doctrine is implicitly contained, if not actually stated. The truth is, that the word *reflection* is defined by Locke in one sense and employed in another. When he speaks of the mind *reflecting* on its own operations, we are naturally led to conclude that he considered the operations themselves as distinct from the act of reflecting upon them. I may reflect, for example, upon sight, or hearing, or any other sensation which I have experienced; and the sensation itself is in this case clearly distinct from the reflection of which it is the object. If the mind in this sense *reflects upon* its own operations, what, it may be asked, are the operations upon which it reflects? We can find none but sensations; for sensation and reflection are the only recognised sources of knowledge; and, if reflection implies a previously existing operation of mind, that operation can be none other than

sensation. It was in this sense that Condillac and his followers interpreted Locke, and, upon that interpretation, consistently maintained that sensation was the only original source of ideas, and furnished the whole material of our knowledge. But on the other hand, throughout the greater part of Locke's Essay, it is manifest that he treats of reflection, not as if, as its etymology implies, it were a turning back of the mind upon objects previously existing, but as being an original and independent source of ideas, not distinct from, but identical with, the acts which are its object; as being, in fact, the consciousness of those internal states of the mind by which it is placed in relation to itself, just as sensation is the consciousness of those states of the mind by which it is placed in relation to an external world. Both sensation and reflection* are thus original states of consciousness, and exist only in so far as we are conscious of them. For example: I see, and I am conscious that I see. These two assertions, logically distinct, are really one and inseparable. Sight is a state of consciousness, and I see only in so far as I am conscious of seeing.† Here, then, is one source of ideas, the consciousness of external objects affecting our bodily organs of sense; and whatever comes from this source is classed by Locke under the general head of *ideas of sensation.* But again: I am angry, and I am conscious that I am angry; I fear, and I am conscious that I fear; I will, and I am conscious that I will. Here, too, are acts, which exist only in so far as we are conscious of them, which point to another and a distinct source of ideas, the consciousness, that is to say, of internal phenomena taking place in the mind itself; and whatever comes from this source is classed by Locke under the general head of *ideas of reflection.* It is in this sense that Locke, however vacillating may be his language, undoubtedly ought to be understood; and in this sense accordingly he was understood by his successor, Hume, who made a further step in

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* [Locke, indeed, uses the term "internal sensation" as equivalent to reflection, Essay, bk. ii. 11, 17, and "internal sense," bk. ii. 1, 4.]

† Ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει. . . . ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν. Arist. 'Eth. Nic.,' ix. 9, 9. Compare the important discussion on this subject in the 'De Anima,' iii. 2. In this point of view, it is not necessary to notice the otherwise important question of the relation of *attention* to sensation, nor to examine those affections of the sensitive organism which do not penetrate to the consciousness.

the analysis of consciousness, by grouping together, under the name of *Impressions*, Locke's two original classes of ideas, while he reserved the term *Ideas* to denote the subsequent representations of those impressions which the mind calls up for itself in meditating upon them. The distinction, however, loses most of its value in Hume's hands, by the inaccuracy with which he marks the characteristics of the two classes, and by the unfortunate metaphor by which he declares that every idea is an *image* of an impression.

Leibnitz, as is well known, expressed in three words the deficiency which, according to his interpretation, existed in the doctrines of Locke. To the dogma, "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu," we must add, he said, "nisi intellectus ipse." This memorable addition has in turns been praised as an important philosophical discovery, and censured as a mere epigrammatic paradox. Both the praise and the blame have been too indiscriminating. As a criticism on Locke, Leibnitz's *dictum* is unfair; for if the Reflection of Locke is to be understood as identical with the internal consciousness, Locke did not derive all knowledge from Sensation; and if it is to be understood as an operation of the mind on sensations previously existing, it implies the existence of that very *intellectus ipse* which Leibnitz proposes to add. But, accepting the former as unquestionably the truer interpretation, the criticism of Leibnitz, if unfair towards Locke, yet furnishes the groundwork of an important addition to his doctrines; for it is equally true, as we shall see hereafter, that the whole of the presentative consciousness, external and internal alike, requires the co-operation of the representative faculties of the understanding itself. In another part of his writings, by distinguishing between *intuitive* and *symbolical knowledge*,—that, namely, of ideas in themselves, and that of ideas as represented by words,—Leibnitz furnished a hint, though vaguely and inaccurately expressed, of a distinction whose full development constitutes one of the most valuable and important features of the philosophy of Kant.

Such was the state of the question when Kant took it up. In order to the clear understanding of what Kant himself contributed to its solution, it should be observed that the inquiry, as hitherto treated, involved two distinct questions:

1. What is the *subjective character* of our ideas as facts of consciousness; that is to say, how does the mind become possessed of them? 2. What is their *objective character*; that is to say, what is their value when acquired, as representations of things? Are they true or false, adequate or inadequate copies of the realities which are the ultimate objects of thought? The former question, as we have seen, Locke had partially answered, by indicating the two sources of Sensation and Reflection. The latter he had also partially answered, by adopting the Cartesian distinction between *primary* and *secondary* qualities of body: the former term denoting properties, such as *extension, solidity, figure,* and *motion,* in respect of which our sensations are supposed to be exact likenesses of the attributes as they exist in things; the latter term denoting such qualities as colour, heat, taste, smell, and the like; which are indeed produced in the mind by some cause existing in the bodily object, but which, as sensations, bear no resemblance to that cause, and furnish us with no means for determining its real nature. This distinction, in the hands of Locke, was open to an obvious criticism. "If, as you say, we have no cognisance of things in themselves, but know them only through our ideas of them, how can we decide that any given idea is an exact copy of the thing, or that any other is not? By your own hypothesis, we have never seen the things themselves, so as to make the comparison. On your own shewing, we could not make it without first divesting ourselves of our own faculties, so as to behold things without their intervention." Accordingly, the distinction was rejected altogether by Locke's immediate followers, Berkeley and Hume; the former of whom, as is well known, denied the existence of matter;—by which he meant, that we have no right to argue from the existence of ideas which we do perceive, to the existence of an unperceived something which those ideas represent:—while the latter completed the circle of scepticism, by maintaining that we have no more knowledge of mind as a reality, than of matter; but are cognisant only of our own impressions and ideas of each.

The answers to the above two questions constitute the two most important contributions of the Kantian Criticism to philosophy. The former Kant answered by his distinction between *Intuitions* and *Conceptions;* in other words, between presentative

and representative consciousness; the latter he answered by the accompanying distinction between *phenomena* and *things in themselves*. On these two distinctions it is necessary to dwell at some length, as forming the cardinal points of the Kantian philosophy, and the criterion for determining the amount of truth or falsehood which it contains. What, it was asked in our first question, is the subjective character of the facts of consciousness, that is to say, how did the mind become possessed of them? Are they impressed upon us by their objects as experienced; or are they created by the active operation of the mind itself? Philosophers had hitherto answered this question by distinguishing between these two sources of ideas: Kant answered it by combining them. While the advocates of innate ideas had maintained that some ideas are impressed by their objects, and others are created by the mind itself; while Locke and his followers, on the other hand, had regarded all ideas as derived from experience, external or internal, the mind itself being in both alike passive, as a blank sheet receiving the writing that is inscribed on it,—Kant asserted that both sources are united in the production of each and every fact of consciousness. He started from the same elements as his predecessors, but combined them differently. The distinction might he illustrated by an imaginary parallel case. Let us suppose all philosophers agreed that in a certain supposed world there could be but two colours, yellow and blue; the question being to determine how these two are exhibited in objects. One school, like the Cartesians, might maintain that the two colours are found in distinct bodies, some being entirely blue, and some entirely yellow. Others, like Locke, might assert that the blue alone is discernible, the yellow ground being in every instance overlaid and invisible. A third school would take up a position resembling that of Kant, in declaring that the yellow and blue elements are blended together in every instance, and consequently that the universal colour of the objects is *green*.

This decision virtually furnishes an answer to the second question also,—What is the objective character of the facts of consciousness, as representative of things? For as the colour of green furnishes a distinct sensation from those of blue and yellow, compounded of both, but resembling neither, so the fact of consciousness cannot be regarded as furnishing a copy or

resemblance of the thing which it represents; that thing contributing, not the whole idea, but one ingredient only of the compound. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities at once vanishes; the fact of consciousness being in all cases partly caused by, but in none exactly resembling, the external object. Hence arises the Kantian distinction between *phenomena* and *things in themselves;* the former being the facts of consciousness compounded of the nature of the representing mind, and of the objects with which it deals; the latter being those objects in their own nature, out of relation to the mind. And accordingly he maintains throughout, that the senses and the understanding alike are cognisant of *phenomena only*, not of *things in themselves;* that is to say, that they contribute a part, by virtue of their own constitution, to every fact of consciousness, and can in no case throw off that constitution and behold the object as an absolute reality.

In short, the method of psychology before Kant may be likened to a kind of mental mechanics; that of Kant himself to a kind of mental chemistry. In the former, mind and its object are like two forces acting against each other; two weights, for example, in opposite scales, each retaining its own absolute and determinable value, though counteracted or overbalanced by the influence of the other. In the latter, mind and its object are united, like oxygen and hydrogen in the composition of water, neither element being discernible in the compound. There is, however, this important distinction,—that philosophy does not, like chemistry, possess the means of analysing the compound and examining the character of each ingredient in itself and by itself.*

Facts of consciousness, thus reduced to the general character of *phenomena*, must be further divided when we take into account the reflective operation of the mind. For hitherto Kant has dealt with consciousness from Locke's point of view—as regards

* It is true that Kant does profess to discover the subjective elements of consciousness; those of the Sensibility being found in Space and Time, and those of the Understanding in the Categories. But this virtually amounts to a confession that neither element can be examined and appreciated apart. For as, on the one hand, pure space or time and pure unity or plurality, without objects existing in or under them, are inconceivable; so, on the other hand, the thing *per se* is inconceivable, being out of space and time, and not comprehended under any category of thought.

the primary acquisition of its ideas. He has next to examine it from Leibnitz's point of view—as regards the further operations by which the mind reflectively deals with ideas already acquired. Every fact, as presented to consciousness, is an *individual phenomenon*, having a separate existence in time or space or both. My external perception, for instance, is of this individual tree or stone, presented to my sight now and here. My internal perception, in like manner, is of this individual emotion of anger or fear, felt at this particular instant of time, and numerically distinct from any similar emotion which I have felt yesterday or may feel to-morrow. But my *notion* of a tree or a stone in general may be indifferently representative of fifty individual objects in various parts of space; and my notion of fear or anger in general may be indifferently representative of fifty different emotions felt at different periods of time. Hence we must distinguish between *presentations* or *intuitions*, and *representations* or *conceptions;* the former being a consciousness of individuals existing now and here, the latter a consciousness of general relations by which many individuals are represented.

The term *Representation* (*Vorstellung* *) may thus be used in a twofold sense in reference to the philosophy of Kant. Intuitions are in one sense *representations*, as standing to our consciousness in the place of things in themselves, of which, by the fundamental hypothesis of Kant's philosophy, we are unable to take cognisance. In this sense, *intuitions* are representative of *things*. Conceptions may also be called *representations*, as formed by the mind from several individuals, and standing in the place of those individuals in the operations of thought. In this sense, *thought* is representative of *intuitions*. It is manifest, however, that this twofold language, though sanctioned by Kant himself, involves a confusing, and at the same time a wholly unnecessary, ambiguity. The thing in itself, being *ex hypothesi* unknown and unknowable, may be dropped out of our reckoning altogether; and the intuition, or consciousness of an individual object, as the ultimate point to which our

* Etymologically, the word "Vorstellung" rather means presentation than representation. In its actual employment in philosophy, however, the latter sense predominates.

knowledge can extend, may be more accurately distinguished as the *presentative consciousness*, of which thought, or the *representative consciousness*, is the reflective product.

With this question is intimately connected another famous distinction which owes its origin to Kant,—that between *analytical* and *synthetical judgments*. The whole *matter* of our judgments must be derived from intuition; for thought *presents* to us nothing; it only *represents* or reflects in other forms what we had given before. Accordingly, we must distinguish between those judgments in which the predicate adds new matter to the conception of the subject, and those in which the subject is merely decomposed into predicates which it virtually contains in itself. The former are *synthetical*, the latter *analytical* judgments. The latter alone can be formed by an act of thought: the former require a direct intuition or presentation of the object thought about,—whether *pure* or *a priori*, as in the mathematical intuitions of space and time, or *empirical* or *a posteriori*, as in the intuitions of the senses. From my *mere conception* of a triangle, I can determine such predicates as that conception virtually contains, and no more: I can determine that it is a rectilinear figure, and that it has three sides. To ascertain any further properties, I must have recourse, not to an analysis of the conception, but to a construction, mental or manual, of the figure or portion of space which that conception represents. So, too, my conception of a tree or a stone contains certain attributes which I can evolve from the conception itself; but, to ascertain any further properties, I must examine, not the conception, but the sensible object which the conception represents. Thus Kant follows Locke in maintaining that thought cannot create its own materials, but must limit itself to combining and separating materials already given; or, in the language of Kant, the understanding has no power of intuition, and all synthetical judgments are intuitive. This criterion is decisive as to the possibility of any proposed branch of knowledge. We can think so far as we possess intuitions, and no further. Our intuitions of material phenomena by the senses form the foundation of physical science: our intuitions of spiritual phenomena by the internal consciousness form the foundation of mental science: and a science of metaphysics must in like manner be pronounced possible or impossible,

according as we have or have not intuitions presenting to us the real as distinguished from the phenomenal.

But though, in the analysis of consciousness, we may thus distinguish between *intuition*, the source of presentations, and *thought*, the source of representations, it is important to remember that in actual consciousness, at least as performed in the maturity of our faculties, thought and intuition are combined together. It is thought that distinguishes the objects of intuition *as objects*, by uniting together under one representative notion the manifold phenomena presented by intuition. I see, for example, a tree, and I recognise it as such. The sight is an act of intuition; but to know it as a tree is to embrace it under a general notion, and this is an act of thought. Again, to distinguish the trunk of the tree from the branches, and the branches from the leaves, or even to discern any individual leaf amid the dark foliage and the intervening glimpses of light which surround it, we must constantly call in the aid of notions or conceptions by which one portion of a confused intuition is marked off and separated from the surrounding phenomena, and thus gathered together as a single object. And this is done by an act of thought operating in combination with intuition.

The most important results of Kant's 'Criticism of the Pure Reason' may therefore be summed up as follows. The facts of consciousness, in their subjective character, are produced partly from the constitution of the conscious mind, partly from the nature of the things of which it is conscious; and hence, in their objective character, they are *phenomena*, or objects as they appear in relation to us, not things in themselves, *noumena*, or realities in their absolute nature, as they may be out of relation to the mind. The subjective elements which the mind itself contributes to the consciousness of every object are to be found, as regards intuition, in the forms of space and time; and as regards thought, in the categories, unity, plurality, and the rest.* To perceive a thing in itself would be to perceive it

* The following is a list of Kant's Categories of the Understanding, derived from the four logical forms of the judgment:—

I. Categories of Quantity.
Unity.
Plurality.
Totality.

II. Categories of Quality.
Reality.
Negation.
Limitation.

neither in space nor in time; for these are furnished by the constitution of our perceptive faculties, and constitute an element of the phenomenal object of intuition only. To think of a thing in itself would be to think of it neither as one nor as many, nor under any other category; for these again depend upon the constitution of our understanding, and constitute an element of the phenomenal object of thought. The phenomenal is the product of the inherent laws of our own mental constitution, and, as such, is the sum and the limit of all the knowledge to which we can attain.

The distinction between the real and the phenomenal (τὸ ὂν and τὸ φαινόμενον) is coeval with the commencement of philosophy, and in fact constitutes its commencement. Philosophy commences when men begin to doubt; and to doubt is to question the reality of some apparent testimony of consciousness. Inherited from the Eleatics, this distinction occupies a prominent position in the philosophy of Plato, and constitutes the criterion by which he distinguishes his Dialectic, or the science of real Being, from other branches of inquiry which are concerned with the shadows of Being. But Plato allowed to reality a place in consciousness which Kant was compelled to deny to it. Distinguishing between the fixed and the fluctuating in consciousness, Plato contrasted the variable and contradictory evidence of the senses with the uniform and permanent principles of the intellect. A sensible magnitude, for example, appears great when compared with one magnitude, and small when compared with another; it is great at one distance, and small at another; it is one when viewed as a whole, and many when viewed as a combination of parts. Yet greatness and smallness, and unity and plurality, in themselves, are conceived by the intellect as fixed, and not as fluctuating, as inherent in objects permanently, not as present or absent according to the accidental relations in which those objects are placed. The same may be said of beauty and deformity, justice and injustice, and other opposite qualities. In our empirical cognition a quality can never be fully distinguished from its opposite: in our intellectual cognition it

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III. Categories of Relation.
Inherence and Subsistence.
Causality and Dependence.
Community or Reciprocal Action.

IV. Categories of Modality.
Possibility or Impossibility.
Existence or Non-existence.
Necessity or Contingence.

can never be confounded with it. May not philosophy enable us to separate the quality as it is in itself from the sensible accidents by which it is disguised, and thus to arrive at a knowledge of the real and the unchangeable? With Plato, the sensible world (*τὸ αἰσθητόν*) was phenomenal, and matter of opinion; the intelligible world (*τὸ νοητόν*) was real, and matter of knowledge. But Kant carried the distinction a step higher. With him all is phenomenal which is relative, and all is relative which is an object to a conscious subject. The conceptions of the understanding as much depend on the constitution of our thinking faculties, as the perceptions of the senses do on the constitution of our intuitive faculties. Both *might be* different, were our mental constitution changed; both probably *are* different to beings differently constituted. The *real* thus becomes identical with the *absolute*, with the object as it is in itself, out of all relation to a subject; and, as all consciousness is a relation between subject and object, it follows that to attain a knowledge of the real we must go out of consciousness.

It is easy to see the effect of such a doctrine as this on the pretensions of metaphysics to be considered as a science of the real or the absolute. It annihilates the very conception of such a science, both as regards its matter and its form. It annihilates it in its matter; for the matter of science comes from intuition, and intuition, as a state of consciousness can furnish only the relative, not the absolute—the phenomenal, not the real. It annihilates it in its form; indirectly, because thought can only elaborate the materials given by intuition; and directly, because thought, like intuition, is a state of consciousness, and its conceptions, therefore, must be of the relative only. It is the great merit of Kant's criticism to have brought this question to a decisive issue. The unconditioned, *i.e.*, that which depends on no antecedent law of matter or mind,—in other words, the absolute or the real,—is inconceivable by human consciousness. You must therefore either abandon the science, or seek it by transcending your own consciousness. The common sense of mankind accepts the former horn of the dilemma; the German successors of Kant chose the latter.

The sum and substance of this portion of Kant's criticism is this:—Metaphysics has in all ages been proclaimed as the science of the *absolute*, the *unconditioned*, the *real*. These three

terms, differing slightly in their origin, may in their philosophical use be regarded as synonymous. The absolute, taking its etymological sense, may be explained as that which *is free* from all necessary relation; which exists in and by itself, and does not require the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The unconditioned, in like manner, is that which is subject to no law or condition of being; which exists, therefore, in and by itself, and does not imply the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The absolute and the unconditioned are also identical with the real; for relation is but a phenomenon, implying and depending on the prior existence of things related; while the true real is the unrelated. Such a science, according to Kant, must be unattainable by man; for all knowledge is consciousness, and all consciousness implies a relation between the subject or person conscious, and the object or thing of which he is conscious. An object of consciousness cannot be the absolute; for its existence as such implies an act of consciousness, and consciousness is a relation. It cannot be the unconditioned; for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, and these are conditions. It cannot be the real; for the laws of our consciousness can only give us things as they appear to us, and do not tell us what they are in themselves.

Yet, while thus pointing out the limits of reason in Philosophy, Kant himself was the advocate of the most unlimited Rationalism in Religion;* and while denying the conceivability of the unconditioned, he paved the way for the most direct and systematic philosophy of the unconditioned that the world has yet seen. The cause of this anomaly we need not seek far to discover. Kant's heart and head led him in two opposite directions. He worshipped in secret the idol which he openly overthrew, and gave but a half assent to the iconoclasm which he had himself organized. It is this divided allegiance which gave birth to the two grand inconsistencies in Kant's philosophy, and determined the subsequent course of German specu-

* In his 'Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,' ('Werke,' vol. x. p. 185, Ed. Rosenkranz), Kant defines a pure Rationalist as one who, without denying the reality of a Divine Revelation, yet maintains that the knowledge and acceptance of it is not an essential part of Religion. And to this extent Kant is himself a Rationalist. See especially pp. 159, 228 of the same work.

lation in a direction diametrically opposite to that in which he had designed to guide it. The first of these inconsistencies is his exaltation of the Speculative Reason into the position of a distinct faculty, beyond and superior to the Understanding;* the second is his elevation of the Practical Reason into a faculty distinct from and superior to the Speculative. The unconditioned, Kant virtually said, is unattainable by consciousness; and yet, he added, the Speculative Reason has a sort of partial and regulative consciousness of it, and the Practical Reason completely attains to it. The force of self-contradiction could go no further. "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" The philosophy of the absolute could not be finally destroyed by such stammering and inconsistent criticism as this.

The Speculative Reason, according to Kant, differs from the Understanding, in that it tends towards, though it never actually reaches, the idea of the unconditioned; and the idea has a regulative value, as giving unity to our thoughts, though specula-

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* Kant's use of the terms Understanding and Reason has been a good deal misunderstood. It is frequently said that he reversed the current nomenclature of philosophy, employing the term Understanding to denote the discursive faculty, which former philosophers had called Reason, (λόγος, διάνοια,) and using Reason to signify the intuitive faculty, previously known as Intellect or Understanding, (νοῦς). This is incorrect. Reason, in Kant, as in most previous writers, denotes a discursive, not an intuitive faculty, and to it accordingly he refers the process of reasoning by syllogism. But Kant held that the highest truths (i.e. the unconditioned) are not directly apprehended *per se*, but inferred to exist from the consciousness of those subordinate truths which depend upon them. Hence he rightly distinguishes as *Ideas of the Reason*, those ultimate realities which Plato, from a different theory, assigned to the intuitive consciousness. The νοῦς of Plato is so far from corresponding to the Reason of Kant, that it has no place in the Kantian system, in which neither Reason nor Understanding has any power of intuition. The use of the term *reason* to denote an intuitive faculty belongs, not to Kant, but to his antagonist Jacobi, who, in his later writings (playing on a supposed derivation of *Vernunft* from *Vernehmen*) identifies Reason with what in his earlier writings he had termed Belief, (*Glaube*,) and calls it an organ for perceiving the supersensible, as the eye perceives the visible. (See the Preface to the second volume of Jacobi's collected works, p. 9, and his 'Letter to Fichte,' vol. iii. p. 19. So also Coleridge, 'Aids,' p. 113.) The English expositors of Kant are curiously in error on this point. Coleridge, in his 'Aids to Reflection,' and Mr. Morell, in his 'Philosophy of Religion,' both exhibit the views of Kant's antagonist, apparently under the full conviction that they are those of Kant himself. In the very able translation of the 'Republic,' by Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, the authors have been seduced, by the example of Coleridge, into employing the term *reason* as equivalent to the Platonic νοῦς,—a rendering likely to lead to serious misapprehension both of Plato and of Kant, to say nothing of the objection that *reason* in this sense never reasons.

tively it is inferred only, not apprehended, and cannot without self-deception be regarded as implying a corresponding reality. The answer to this theory is obvious. If the idea of the unconditioned is never apprehended, how do we know that we possess it at all? Kant confesses that we have no intuition of the unconditioned; that we only infer its existence as implied by the conception of the conditioned. But this admission reduces the former idea to the mere negation of the latter; a negation as empty regulatively as speculatively, and assuredly not needing a special faculty for its conception, inasmuch as it is never conceived at all.* Kant, in fact, mistakes the indefinite for the infinite; he treats that which by his own shewing is merely ceasing to think of the conditioned, as if it were actually thinking of the unconditioned. He treats an impotence of thought as if it were a faculty. The infinite and the indefinite may be thus distinguished: the former implies an actual conceiving the absence of limits; the latter is a not conceiving the presence of limits;—processes as different as searching through a house and discovering that a certain person is not there is from shutting our eyes and not seeing that he is there. Infinity belongs to the object of thought; indefiniteness to the manner of thinking of it. Now it is obvious, under this distinction, that the idea of the infinite can exist only as it is actually attained in thought; an idea which we tend towards, but never reach, is indefinite, but not infinite; for, at whatever point we rest, there are conditions beyond which remain unexhausted. How then, we ask, is the Reason to be distinguished from the Understanding?

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* Kant's three Ideas of Pure Reason are—the Soul considered as a substance; the World considered as a real whole; and God considered as the *ens realissimum*, or sum of all possible being;—giving rise to the three pretended sciences of Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology. The purpose of his criticism is to shew that, in relation to all these three objects, the Reason is liable to a delusion, by which it mistakes the regulative principles of its own thoughts for the representations of objective realities. This delusion, says Kant, is inherent in the constitution of the Reason, and we cannot help being deceived by it. But if the Reason deceives us, what is to undeceive us? ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν; and if Reason deceives us, what is the value of a rational criticism of Reason? Why is the instrument more trustworthy in the hands of the critic than in those of the dogmatist? The paradox arises from the separation of Reason from Understanding. If the so-called Reason is a mere impotence of the Understanding, its self-deceptions may be easily explained; but if it is a special faculty, we must believe in the existence of a faculty of lies, created for the express purpose of deluding those who trust to it.

Wherever we conceive a definite object, there is necessarily implied the existence of an indefinite universe beyond, which is not conceived. In conceiving any object as what it is, I thereby distinguish it from all that it is not; but my relation to this *all* is purely negative. I know it only as something different from that which I am at the moment conceiving. The Understanding thus implies the indefinite: it implies, that is to say, that in thinking of A, I am at the same time not thinking of not-A: and the Reason does no more; for an unrealized tendency of thought is merely the acknowledgment of the existence of a something of which we do not think.

The effect of this one flaw was to overthrow the whole building which Kant had so carefully erected. He committed himself to the paradox, that our thoughts may be regulated by that of which we do not think; and his successors were not slow to push this admission to its full consequences. Kant neither absolutely accepted the unconditioned as a product of Reason, nor absolutely rejected it; but assigned to it a kind of shadowy existence on the confines of light and darkness, speculatively unknown and unknowable, regulatively present and in operation. He feared, in destroying the unconditioned, to destroy philosophy along with it. He could not, or would not, see that the legitimate result of his principles was to lay a surer foundation for a Philosophy of the Conditioned. He "scotched, not killed," the old serpent of metaphysics. The ghost of the unconditioned still hovered about the spot where the body was lain, shortly to be once more united to it, and endowed with a vampire vitality, to suck blood and life, thought and sense, reverence and faith, from the victims it haunted.

Kant's Speculative Reason is only his Understanding under another name, occupied, whenever it acts at all, with the same objects, governed by the same laws, representative, not presentative, operating only on matter given by intuition, and hence incapable of grasping the unconditioned; for the laws of intuition and thought are themselves conditions. This inconsistency might be easily removed from his system, without materially affecting the stability of the remainder. But what shall we say to his theory of the Practical Reason, in which he attempts to construct once more, in its most dogmatic form, that philosophy of the absolute which his criticism of the Speculative

Reason was expressly instituted to overthrow? At the close of the 'Criticism of the Pure Reason'* we find an intimation of perhaps the most strange and startling inconsistency which the whole history of philosophy can furnish,—an inconsistency which was afterwards more fully developed in the author's practical philosophy. Speculative truths, he tells us, are relative, and based, partly at least, on the laws of our mental constitution; but moral truths are absolute, and binding in the same form upon every possible intelligence. Hence he endeavours to reconstruct, from a practical point of view, the whole of that fabric of metaphysical philosophy which his previous criticism had pronounced a delusion.† Man, as the subject of speculative thought, is but a phenomenon, existing in time, and subject, as such, to the rigid law of an infinite series of pre-existing causes; but man, as the subject of moral obligations, is a phenomenon no longer; but a free and self-determining being. The existence of moral obligation implies that of moral desert in those who fulfil it; and hence there is an *a priori* necessity for a perfect correspondence between virtue and happiness. Such a correspondence does not exist in this life; and therefore there must be a future existence, to set right the balance between merit and reward, which is often so wrongly adjusted upon earth. This again implies the existence of an all-wise and all-powerful Distributor, who can read the hearts of all men, and have full authority over all things, that He may be able, in the adjustment of the balance, to render to every man according to his works. Hence the three great ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, which speculative philosophy is unable to deal with without involving itself in a web of delusions, are demonstrated beyond a doubt by the aid of practical philosophy.

My limits will only allow a very brief notice of the tissue of fallacies which the details of this reasoning involve. In the

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* ['Methodenlehre,' chap. iii., sect. 2. Cf. 'Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,' p. 5, 'Werke,' vol. viii., p. 5, ed. Rosenkranz.]

† [Dorner, 'Lehre von der Person Christi,' p. 275 [ed. 2, 1851-53, vol. ii., p. 990], has an acute criticism upon Kant. If the speculative reason contains contradictions and self-delusions, why may not the practical? Why may not reason contradict itself, by commanding that which is impossible? What then becomes of "du sollst, also du kannst"? Compare also Marheineke, 'Grundl. der chr. Dogm.,' § 168; and Saisset, 'Phil. Rel.,' p. 275.]

first place, the supposed necessary relation between virtue and happiness is really a speculative, and not a practical principle; the practical precept extending no further than to command us to do right without regard to consequences. In the second place, the terms of the theory contain a latent ambiguity; for if *happiness* is understood to mean temporal prosperity, it proves too much; and if understood to mean mental satisfaction, it proves too little. For while we grant that temporal prosperity is in this life disproportioned to moral worth, strict reasoning, upon Kant's principles, requires us to conclude that this is the balance to be set right hereafter. While, on the other hand, if mental satisfaction be the reward due to virtue, we are by no means sure that it is unequally distributed in this present life. We have surely as much right to maintain with the poet, "Virtue alone is happiness *below*," as to argue with the philosopher, "Virtue is, comparatively speaking, unhappiness here; and therefore we conclude that it will be happiness hereafter."

To this it may be added, that a critic who was disposed to deal in the *argumentum ad hominem* might completely refute, not perhaps the philosophy, but certainly the philosopher, from his own premises. For in his speculative argument concerning the freedom of the will, Kant sets aside the direct testimony of consciousness altogether, and argues that the consciousness of man, being under the conditions of space and time, is phenomenal only, and that man as a phenomenon must be determined by antecedent phenomena; though as a reality, of which he is not conscious, he may be a free agent.* Let us transport this argument to the practical philosophy. If our whole consciousness is phenomenal, the happiness or unhappiness of which we are conscious in this life must be equally phenomenal with the rest. What need, then, or what right, have we to argue from phenomena which we know to things which we cannot know? †—an argument which the whole Critical Philosophy has hitherto so emphatically condemned. Surely we have in

* See the discussions connected with the third Antinomy of Pure Reason, 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' Transc. Dial., bk. ii., chap. ii.

† [Kant is also inconsistent in first denying an intuitive knowledge of the *ego*, and then basing his practical philosophy on the will. How can I know that *I will*, if there is no *I*?]

that philosophy a much easier and simpler escape from the difficulty. The Kantian comforter has only to address suffering virtue somewhat in the following strain:—"My virtuous friend, I confess that to all appearace you are very unhappy. But I have before told you that you have two distinct existences —a phenomenal existence, of which you are conscious, and a real existence, of which you are not conscious. In the life of consciousness, I have already proved by an elaborate argument that you are subject to the most rigid laws of causation, however much you may fancy yourself to be free; but I have also shewn that the laws of phenomena do not extend to realities. Take comfort, then, and be assured that though in your phenomenal existence you are, or fancy yourself to be, afflicted with all the sufferings of Job; yet in your other character, as reality, (of which, however, you are never conscious, and never will be,) you may, for anything that you or I know to the contrary, be the very happiest of created beings."

I need not dwell upon the religious objections to a philosophy which makes future happiness the necessary reward of virtue, nor ask what comfort a Christian oppressed with the consciousness of sin can derive from the prospect of a future life in which he has nothing to trust to but the justice of God in strictly assigning to every man that which he deserves.* I must pass on from details to notice the fundamental fallacy which underlies the whole fabric of Kant's practical philosophy, and to point out how this and the cognate inconsistency in his theory of the Speculative Reason affected the subsequent course of German thought.

"We can know only phenomena, not things in themselves; for our knowledge must be in part determined by the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and we can never know what things are in themselves out of relation to those faculties." This position, the centre and the sum of the Kantian criticism, is affirmed in his speculative philosophy, and denied in his practical. Yet it is obviously an assertion which must be universally true or universally false.† I can think only as the laws of my faculties require me to think, whether the object

* [In Kant's system, says Dorner ('Person Christi,' p. 275) [ed. 2, vol. ii., p. 989], man is his own Redeemer; what he ought to do, that he can do.]

† [Compare Jacobi, 'Werke,' iii., p. 179, *sqq.*]

of my thoughts be a mathematical problem or a moral precept; and the laws of thought are the same in the one case as in the other. I can perceive moral relations only as the constitution of my moral sense compels me; as I can perceive material relations only as determined by the constitution of my natural senses. To determine in either case how much is relative and how much absolute, it would be necessary to examine the object with a different set of faculties, having at the same time a perfect remembrance of our former mental constitution, in order by comparison to determine how much of the object is relative and peculiar to one intelligence only, and how much is absolute and common to all.

It was not to be expected that an inconsistency of this kind should not vitiate the legitimate results of the Kantian criticism. If Kant undertook, as he did undertake,* to criticise *a priori* the contents of Revealed Religion, on the assumption that the only possible purpose of Religion must be to give a divine authority to man's moral duties, it was not to be expected that his successors should lay seriously to heart the original motto of his philosophy: "Tecum habita, et noris, quam sit tibi curta supellex." If Kant gave to the unconditioned a shadowy existence in the dreams of the speculative reason, it was natural that his successors should attempt to interpret the dream, and behind the shadow to grasp the substance. Kant saw, as he imagined, the horizon where heaven comes in contact with earth, the real world with the phenomenal,—a visible horizon at least, even though it flies as we pursue it. He did not see that the firmament which seemed so real was but the limit of his own powers of sight. He did not see that our inability to conceive the unconditioned indicates an impotence, and not a power,—the boundary of the understanding, not the operation of a faculty beyond it. His successors saw this clearly; but of the two alternatives which it offers, they accepted the wrong one. Instead of saying: "the unconditioned is not actually conceivable, therefore the supposed special faculty of Reason is a nonentity," they argued: "the faculty exists, and therefore its object must be attainable." But it could not be

* See the work above referred to; 'Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,' especially p. 184.

attainable by Kant's method. To give the Reason reality, it must reason no longer: Kant proved, though he did not accept his own conclusion, that whatever is made known by conciousness must be relative: his successors admitted the conclusion, and consistently attempted to construct a philosophy of the absolute which should be above consciousness. Kant had proved it to be impossible to bring the object within the grasp of the subject: there remained the yet wilder attempt to expand the subject to the immensity of the object. And this was attempted in two different ways:—by Schelling from the side of the presentative faculties; and by Hegel from that of the representative. The former based his philosophy on the fiction of an Intellectual Intuition emancipated from the conditions of space and time; the latter, on that of a Logical Reason emancipated from the laws of thought. So long as the relation between subject and object exists, so long they are relative to each other, and limit each other. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither by itself is the universe. To attain the Absolute, Subject and Object, Thought and Being, must be identified; and the human consciousness of the *ego* contemplating the *non ego* must be swallowed up in the mystical ecstasy of the Absolute contemplating itself, and existing in so far as it contemplates, yet without consciousness in its contemplation. The pure Intuition of the Absolute, as the point of indifference, in which subject and object are one,—the pure Conception of the absolute, as the identity of Being and not-Being, are theories which, however opposed in their methods, rest alike on the important and instructive confession, that to grasp the absolute we must transcend consciousness;* that to attain to a knowledge of God as He is, man must himself *be* God.

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* An able attempt has recently been made by Mr. Calderwood to reconstruct, in opposition to the theory of Sir William Hamilton, a Philosophy of the Absolute on the basis of Consciousness. While admitting the ability of Mr. Calderwood's work, and the merit of many of his details, I cannot help thinking that he has failed in his main purpose. He defines the Absolute, which he rightly identifies with the Infinite, as "that which is free from all necessary relation:" "it may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence." Hence he holds that the absolute may exist in the relation of consciousness, and in that relation be apprehended, though imperfectly, by man. On this theory we have two absolutes: the absolute as it exists out of consciousness, and the absolute as it is known in

Thus from a philosophy which set out with the purpose of exhibiting the narrow limits of human reason, there sprang up in the end a gigantic scheme of Intellectual Pantheism, in which human reason, and human consciousness in general, are merged in the processes of the one Infinite Mind: in which Thought is at the same time Creation,—the contemplation of the world being identical with the creative thought which called it into being; in which, in the words of Schelling, "the Philosophy of Nature is the Creation of Nature;" or, in the words of Hegel, "the logical process is the immediate exhibition of God's self-determination to Being." Presumptuous as such conceptions must appear to us, daringly profane as their language must sound to one who believes in a personal God, their study is not without its value in the *reductio ad absurdum* which it furnishes of the principles from which such conclusions spring. The neophyte in Rationalism, who timidly removes one or two stones from the edifice of his faith, who begins by rejecting this or that portion of the revealed attributes of God, hoping to rest on a conception more satisfactory to his speculative or moral reason, may take timely warning of the conclusions to which his method leads by those which it has actually attained. The history of philosophy in Germany, since Kant, carries this lesson and warning to the thinkers of every age and country. There is no resting-place for a Religion of the Reason but Pantheism or Atheism. And Pantheism is, for all religious purposes, identical with Atheism; for if there is no God, whom are we to worship? and if all things are God, who is to worship Him? And Pantheism, the logical result of Rationalism, is logical in its progress only by sacrificing logic at its starting-point. It escapes self-destruction in its course, only by an act of suicide at the outset: it avoids the necessity of contradicting itself in

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consciousness. Mr. Calderwood's theory rests on the assumption that these two are one. How is this identity to be ascertained? How do I know that *the* absolute is *my* absolute? I cannot compare them: for comparison is a relation, and the first absolute exists out of relation. Again, to compare them, I must be in and out of consciousness at the same time: for the first absolute is never in consciousness, and the second is never out of it. Again, the absolute as known is an object of consciousness; and an object of consciousness, as such, cannot exist, save in relation. But the true absolute, by its definition, can exist out of relation: therefore the absolute as known is not the true absolute. Mr. Calderwood's Absolute in consciousness is only the Relative under a false name.

thought, by setting aside the only conditions under which thought itself is possible: it is saved from convicting itself of falsehood by annihilating *in limine* the distinction between truth and falsehood themselves. For if man can only conceive the absolute by being himself the absolute; if, from the finite struggling after the infinite, he becomes the infinite contemplating itself, every process of that infinite is equally divine, equally true, and equally false; or rather equally indifferent; for difference is limitation, and limitation belongs to the finite. If God is all that exists, whether represented as universal substance, as universal cause, as universal law, as universal thought, or in any other form of conscious or unconscious being, He thinks all that is thought, He does all that is done.* There can be no intellectual difference between truth and falsehood;† for God is the only thinker, and all thoughts are equally necessary and equally divine. There can be no moral difference between right and wrong; for God is the only agent, and all acts are equally necessary and equally divine.‡

The logical result of Kant's principles would be to annihilate for ever a philosophy of the absolute and the infinite. Their historical result has been to give birth to a philosophy of the absolute and the infinite, the most systematic and consistent (even in absurdity) that has yet been given to the world. But if we turn back from this to the more legitimate alternative, and renounce the Absolute altogether, do we therefore renounce Philosophy, even in that limited sense of the term in which it is identical with Metaphysics? By no means; but we assign to it a different office. The duty of philosophy is, not to transcend consciousness, but to make consciousness at unity with itself. The ancient philosophers had a truer conception of the problem of metaphysics than the moderns. The true Intelligible World is that of Plato and Aristotle, not that of Schelling and Hegel; the *Noumenon* as distinguished from the *Phenomenon*, the Real as distinguished from the Apparent, is the uniform and permanent in consciousness, not the unknown and unknowable beyond

* [Thus Spinoza ('Ethica,' Part i., Prop. 26) asserts that whatever operates is determined by God.]

† [Cf. Spinoza, 'Ethica,' Part. ii., Props. 32, 33, 35.]

‡ [Thus Spinoza ('Ethica,' Part iv., Prop. 64) maintains that evil results only from the inadequacy of our ideas, and Hegel ('Encykl.,' § 35; 'Werke,' vi., p. 73) reduces evil to a mere negation which may be identified with good in the Absolute.]

it. It is the world of human thought in its fixed and unchanging laws, ever thought indeed, but ever human, and subject to such limitations as our human constitution imposes. In other words, the true Metaphysic is a Metaphysic of the Conditioned. The questions that consciousness can ask, consciousness may attempt to solve; those that lie beyond consciousness cannot even be asked intelligibly. Our powers of answering are indeed limited; but so are our powers of questioning; and the same finite nature which admits us but to a partial knowledge of truth, also gives us but a partial insight into difficulties. This is the true purpose of philosophy—to reconcile consciousness with itself; not to abolish the laws of thought, but to justify them; to reduce to order and harmony the discordant elements of human sense and human reason; and where the human ceases, to rest humbly on the convictions of faith, in confidence that now we know in part, but that, when that which is perfect is come, then, and then only, shall that which is in part be done away.

But this conception of philosophy, interesting and important as it is, is fraught with painful recollections now. It reminds us that within the last few days we have had to mourn the loss of one, the labour of whose life was devoted to this very object, and whose contributions to a philosophy of the conditioned, fragmentary and incomplete as they are, contain the germ of nearly all that future research can articulately develope, and which none can hope to develope as he, if his life had been longer spared, might have done. For where now, among the philosophers of this or of any other country, shall we find such vast endowments of intellect accompanied by such a just appreciation of their limits? Where shall we find one with a tithe of his attainments, who will so consistently and with such authority proclaim the duty of a learned ignorance? Where shall we find one to exhaust, like him, the whole field of philosophical learning, and in the end to proclaim, as the moral and the motto of his whole teaching, "Magna, immo maxima pars sapientiæ est, quædam æquo animo nescire velle"?* Above all, in these presumptuous days, when human reason aspires to strip the veil from the hidden things of God, and to proclaim its own speculations as identical with the eternal movements of the

* Cf. Sir W. Hamilton's 'Discussions,' ed. 2, p. 640, note. [Ed.]

Divine Mind determining itself in Creation, where shall we find a philosopher of such eminence and authority, to announce, as the surest ground of belief in the truth of a philosophical system, that its doctrines are in harmony with those of Revelation?* It is not now the time to enter upon a fuller examination of the writings of one whose name hereafter will assuredly be reckoned among the greatest in the history of British Philosophy:—

> "His grave is all too young as yet
> To have outgrown the sorrow that consigned
> Its charge to it." †

But the place of his early education may be allowed at least a passing tribute to his memory; and if ever the time shall come, when the Philosophy of the Conditioned shall occupy its fitting place as the handmaid and the auxiliary of Christian Truth, voyaging through the seas of thought with the laws of the human mind for its chart and the Word of God for its pole-star, among the fathers and teachers of that philosophy, most consulted and most revered, will stand the name of Sir William Hamilton.

This hope belongs to the future of philosophy. But the history of the past, with much to warn, contains much to encourage also. We have seen how the head of the Philosophy of the Absolute was wounded as it were to death by the hammer of "the all-crushing one;" and we have seen how that philosophy revived again in another form, and a nation bowed down and worshipped the beast whose deadly wound was healed. But we do not therefore despair of philosophy; for we cannot believe that our whole consciousness is a lie; and the office of philosophy is but the articulate expression of consciousness. Error, though manifold, is yet finite in its forms, and the errors of each generation are a beacon to the next. Philosophy has striven in vain to assimilate the Absolute

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* "Such (*φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν*) are the hints of an undeveloped philosophy, which, I am confident, is founded upon truth. To this confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of my own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above all, however, I am confirmed in my belief by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy and those of revealed truth."—Sir W. Hamilton, 'Discussions,' p. 625, second edition.

† Shelley, 'Adonais,' stanza 51. [Ed.]

to herself; she has striven in vain to assimilate herself to the Absolute; a third course remains yet open to her—to acknowledge that the Absolute is above philosophy.

In the beginning of Time, says the Hindoo fable,* when Brahma and Vishnu strove together for the sovereignty, Siva offered to acknowledge as supreme the one who could discover the crown of his head or the soles of his feet. For ten myriads of years Brahma soared upwards, and found no summit in the infinite height; Vishnu dived downwards, and found no base in the infinite depth. Then at last the rival gods owned the fruitlessness of their search, acknowledged their superior, and were reconciled. From the birthday of human thought, men have striven by two opposite paths to gauge the height and the depth of the Infinite Mind. Let us trust that the day will come when the rival seekers, baffled and wearied with the fruitless search, shall turn back once more to the common ground of that human nature from whence they both set forth, and, learning the lesson of humility from the study of that nature's laws and limits, shall confess with the Patriarch of old,—"Behold, I go forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive Him: on the left hand, where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him: He hideth Himself on the right hand, that I cannot see Him." †

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* ['Asiatic Researches,' vol. iii., p. 147, and Southey, 'Curse of Kehama,' canto xix. 5.]

† Job xxiii. 8.

MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

CONTENTS.

Can German Philosophy be made Intelligible to English readers?
Mr. Morell's Essays.
Common Sense despised by the Germans.
Dualism *versus* a Unitarian Philosophy.
Fichte's Absolute Ego: leads either to Atheism or Autotheism.
Philosophy of Kant.
Nihilism of Fichte's earlier Philosophy.
The Absolute Identity of Schelling.
The Intellectual Intuition.
Hegel's System as the Supplement and Corrective of Schelling's; the Identity of Existence and Non-Existence.
Fallacies and Errors of the Hegelian Philosophy.
Fundamental Error of all Unitarian Schemes.
Conclusion.

MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.*

CAN German philosophy be made intelligible to English readers? Judging merely from the success of most of the attempts with which we are acquainted, we should be disposed to answer this question at once and decisively in the negative. Indeed, it seems to be generally admitted, that the majority of German philosophical speculations are, to use the words of a recent writer, "decidedly repugnant to the English understanding;"—that, whatever may be the affinity of the two nations in other respects, there is in the domain of philosophy, as the Germans understand the term, a great gulf fixed between them, over which it is hopeless to attempt any communication. The English palate may take kindly enough to Bavarian beer; it may even, by judicious training, be brought to relish sauer-kraut; and without any training at all, there is international sympathy in the mutual inhalation of tobacco. But between the laborious induction which traces all ideas to sensation and reflection, and the "high priori" method which deduces a theory of the universe from the innocent assumption that A is A, or the bold paradox that A is equally not A, what concord or fellowship can be hoped for? What can an Englishman do with the absolute ego which posits its own existence, or the identity of identity and non-identity? From the former what fruit can be expected, beyond the produce gathered by the logical Clown in 'Twelfth Night:' 'For as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, *That that is, is;* so I, being master parson, am master parson; for what is that but that, and is but is?" While the latter startling axiom, if it meets with any notice at all, can hardly be expected to receive a more lenient sentence than old Hobbes

* Published in Bentley's 'Quarterly,' 1859, and occasioned by the publication of 'Modern German Philosophy: its Characteristics, Tendencies, and Results.' By J. D. Morell, M.A. London and Manchester, 1859.

(not an unfair specimen of the ordinary English mind in metaphysical speculations) pronounced on a philosophical technicality of another kind: "It is found only in school-divinity, as a word of art, or rather as a word of craft, to amaze and puzzle the laity."

But, on the other hand, the argument of Shylock may be urged, *mutatis mutandis*, in favour of an opposite view of the question. "Hath not a German eyes? hath not a German hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as an Englishman is?" With all these indications of a common humanity, there must surely be some discoverable channel by which a mental communication may be carried on between the two nations—some touch of that nature which makes the whole world kin—traceable even among the clouds and fogs of Teutonic metaphysics. However distant from each other the English and the German courses of thought may be in their final development, there must be some common point in human nature from which both diverge; and this point, if it can be ascertained, will serve as a post of observation from which we may contemplate the more remote positions of each.

It is no disparagement to the merits of Mr. Morell's essays the title of which, in compliance with the usual custom, has been prefixed to this article, if we say that they are not calculated, as indeed they were not intended, to fill up the chasm which we have mentioned as separating the thinkers of the two countries from each other. They are well suited to give an English reader a general idea of the problems to be solved; but they do not attempt to throw light on the method of solution. They exhibit in a brief outline the manner in which such questions might have been treated, had they been dealt with by English writers; but they convey little or no information as to the manner in which they actually have been treated by Germans. The more elaborate 'History of Modern Philosophy' by the same author, though on the whole the best work of the kind in our language, is least satisfactory in this portion of its subject, principally from falling into the opposite extreme. It is too apt to give abstracts of German arguments and transla-

tions of German expressions, in a form to which an English reader can attach no definite meaning. This is especially the case with regard to Schelling and Hegel, the two philosophers whose modes of thought are most removed from an Englishman's point of view, and whose reasonings will least bear a literal exhibition in another language. Our own attempt will perhaps not be more successful, especially as our limits allow us only a very brief outline of the principal problems and methods.

There are probably few Englishmen who, whatever may be their views upon other questions, would hesitate to give their assent to two propositions, as sufficiently self-evident to need no proof and to admit of no refutation. These are, first, that the things which I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do really exist; and, secondly, that I, who see and touch them, really exist also. They feel instinctively that neither the perceiver nor the perceived is created in and by the act of perception; that the table on which my hand is resting existed before I touched it, and will continue to exist afterwards; and that I, the toucher, am likewise not indebted for my existence to the mere act of touching. This is a dictum of John Bull's common sense which no logic can wrest from him; and even in his most meditative moods he would think little enough of any system of philosophy which does not preserve intact these two primary convictions.

Not so the German. The very authority to which the Englishman appeals in support of his instinctive beliefs, is regarded by his transcendental kinsman as an impostor and a simpleton. That which Mr. Bull calls *common sense*, and venerates as an oracle of practical wisdom, Herr Tiefsinn styles *understanding*, and bestows upon it the contemptuous epithets of *coarse, vulgar, narrow, uncritical*, and so forth. Nor has he more respect for the dictum itself than for the faculty which asserts it. If there is one word in the whole vocabulary of speculation which a philosophic Teuton regards with supreme contempt and dislike, as the source of all that is shallow and all that is erroneous in human thought, that word is *dualism*. And common sense, in affirming the simultaneous existence of myself and of the object which I perceive, is unquestionably guilty of dualism. The Pythagoreans placed all good in unity, and all evil in plurality: with a German, the root of all mischief is the number

two. As restless as Haman at the sight of Mordecai at the king's gate, the Teutonic thinker finds no "stand-point" for his speculation, so long as a pertinacious *Nicht-Ich*, or *not myself*, is permitted to dispute the claim of his personality to the monarchy of all he surveys.

For this is the distribution of the universe in which German philosophy especially rejoices—into *myself* and *everything else; das Ich* and *das Nicht-Ich*, the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego*. And quaint as the nomenclature may sound to unaccustomed ears, the division is unquestionably the most trenchant and the most philosophical of all that have hitherto been invented for speculative purposes. *Soul* and *body*, *mind* and *matter*, involve a tacit assumption of the nature of the two things contrasted, and possibly leave room for the supposition of a *tertium quid*, intermediate between the two. *Subject* and *object* labour under the disadvantage of a historical ambiguity, and do not sufficiently distinguish between a man thinking about himself and a man thinking about something else. But between *self* and *not-self* there is a sharp and undeniable contradiction. Be *I* what I may, according to the various definitions of philosophers—a rational animal, a biped without feathers, a system of nerves, a bundle of sensations, a combination of soul and body—one thing at least is indisputable: I am myself; and the rest of the universe (provided always that there is an universe and a rest of it) is not myself.

Thus the highest aim of speculative philosophy, according to the German conception, is to reduce to unity these twin factors of all human consciousness. The manner in which this reduction is to be effected admits of many varieties of theory; and from these differences adverse systems have arisen; but that it must be effected somehow, is admitted by all philosophers worthy of the name. "Whether the dog devour the hog, or the hog the dog," said the *insouciant* Sultan, calmly surveying the battles of his Christian neighbours, "is all one to the true believer." Whether the Ego annihilate the Non-Ego, or *vice versâ*, or whether both be swallowed up by some superior principle, is of little consequence, provided only that the swallowing be so complete as to leave one in the place of two. Anything short of this is dualism; and philosophy has declared that dualism is an abomination.

We are now, perhaps, in a position to understand the meaning of a word which figures perpetually in German metaphysical writings and treatises thereanent—*the Absolute*. So long as the act of knowledge implies a real distinction between the person knowing and the thing known, so long knowledge is only possible in the form of a *relation* between two things, each of which may exist independently of the other. The objects which I am capable of knowing exist whether I know them or not; and my knowledge is real only in so far as it corresponds to the actual constitution of the thing known. But, again, my own mind has an existence independent of any particular act of knowing; and such an act can only be produced by the exertion of my faculties according to the laws of my mental constitution. Hence, the relation which constitutes knowledge must be regarded as a derivative result, dependent on some prior reality or realities. To admit *realities* is dualism: a true unitarian philosophy is therefore compelled to assume that the things related are but opposite manifestations of one and the same primary existence; and this existence is the Absolute.

But to this assumption common sense demurs with an awkward question. The relation which is thus summarily to be got rid of is that by which all human knowledge is constituted. Granting, then, the existence of the supposed higher reality, how can such a reality be known to exist? For the knowledge of its existence, as out of relation, implies the annihilation of one of the elements without which no knowledge is possible. Either the *ego* has devoured the *non-ego*, or the *non-ego* has devoured the *ego*, or, like the Kilkenny cats, they have devoured each other, and the Absolute is the residuary tail. How, then, can philosophy attain to a knowledge of the Absolute, when the very assumption of the Absolute necessarily implies either that there is nothing to be known, or no one to know it?

The most obvious answer for philosophy to make, and the one least offensive to the interrogator, common sense, is, "I am the Absolute; and that of which I am conscious is myself." There is something so astounding in the paradox of commencing a system of thought with the annihilation of the thinker, *Cogito, ergo non sum*, that it is not surprising that philosophy should attempt every other subterfuge before adopting this last

desperate remedy of "committing suicide," like St. Patrick's serpent, "to save itself from slaughter." If, then, philosophy is not possible without the existence of a philosopher, and if philosophy, to be worthy of the name, is bound to reduce all existences to one, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that this one existence must be the philosopher himself.

Thus we are introduced to the earliest form of the modern German philosophy of the Absolute,—that of Fichte. The reasoning to which he has recourse, though somewhat different in form from that on which we have hitherto proceeded, will be found to be in substance very much the same. Philosophy, he argues, must commence with an assumption, which, both in its form and its matter, is self-evident and independent of all prior conditions. Self-evidence in form there is no difficulty in finding. The first law of all thought, the primary condition without which all subsequent reasoning falls to the ground, is the assumption that everything is itself, or A = A. This is undeniably a proposition which needs no higher principle to justify it. It is simple; for it postulates only one existence: it is absolute; for it implies no necessary relation to any other assertion. But though thus satisfactory in form, it requires some further justification as regards its matter. A, in the above statement, may stand for any existence whatever, original or derived; and the fact of any real object existing to correspond is not yet guaranteed. *If* any A exists, assuredly it exists as A; but how are we to convert the *if* into a categorical assertion? To obtain material as well as formal certainty, we must find an A which undoubtedly exists; and this A is to be found in *myself*. For in thinking that A is A, I, the thinker, unquestionably exist. We have thus a proposition absolute and simple in its matter as well as in its form; and the principle, which in its general statement was a merely logical formula, has now acquired a metaphysical significance.

But common sense is still not satisfied. "How," asks this obstinate unbeliever, "can I be the Absolute? I am certain that I did not exist from all eternity: I am certain, also, that I did not, at any period of time, make myself. It is clear, therefore, that my existence must be dependent on some higher cause; and if philosophy insists on asserting the contrary, philosophy is a lying rascal." To meet this objection, Fichte's system intro-

duces a distinction. The *ego* which is identical with the Absolute, is not the *ego* whose existence is manifested in consciousness; for consciousness has many modes, and each separate mode can only be regarded as the attribute of some higher substance. I am conscious, for instance, of a thought, of a feeling, of a desire; but I am conscious, also, that I am not identical with any one nor with all of these; though I become conscious of my own existence only as manifested in some of these special modes. Thus the *I* of consciousness implies a higher *I*, neither a thinking I, nor a feeling I, nor a desiring I, but an "I-by-myself I;" and this I is the Absolute.

Under this assumption, the question "What am I out of consciousness?" or "What was I before the commencement of consciousness?" has no force, and, indeed, no meaning. The *self* about whom I can ask such a question, or, indeed, about whom I can think at all, is only the self manifested in consciousness. By supposing a self out of consciousness, it is at once implied that we can no longer think about it or ask any question concerning it. Undoubtedly the self of which I am conscious exists only by the existence of consciousness; but that very existence implies the existence of a higher self, of which I never am conscious and never can be.

Having thus laid down as a condition of the Absolute, that it is unknown to consciousness, the rest of the demonstration is encumbered with no further difficulties. Common sense has not a word more to say; for common sense can only deal with that of which it is conscious. The rest of the deduction is a mere series of verbal sequences, in which thought has no share. As Mephistopheles advises Faust—

> "Haltet euch an Worte,
> Dann geht ihr durch die sichre Pforte
> Zum Tempel der Gewissheit ein."

Fichte admits in express terms that *self* or the *ego* can only be an object of thought in and by consciousness; yet he proceeds immediately to lay down the laws of development of the absolute self beyond consciousness, which, by his own confession, we never think about at all. His first formula, "A = A," or "the *ego* posits itself," may, subject to the above explanations, be interpreted to mean, "the fact of a necessary thought implies the existence not

only of a thinker, but of a real substance, capable of becoming a thinker, and learning its own existence by thinking."

But this absolute self, being originally free and independent of any particular mode of consciousness, must be determined to consciousness by some cause acting upon it. Hence, the *ego*, in becoming conscious of its own existence, is compelled at the same time to assume, though it is not directly conscious of, the existence of another reality upon which its consciousness depends. This reality is called the *non-ego;* and the principle upon which it is assumed is technically expressed in the formula "— A ≠ A," or "the *ego* implies a *non-ego*."

But this supposed *non-ego*, though in its first aspect it is an independent reality acting upon the *ego*, yet appears, on further examination, to be a product of the *ego* itself. It is by an act of my own thought that I am compelled to assume its existence, in order to account for the fact of my becoming conscious of myself. Beyond the necessity of my own thought, I have no guarantee of its existence. Hence arises the third principle of Fichte's philosophy: "The *ego* and the *non-ego* are both posited by the *ego* itself." In other words, "the conscious self, and the object implied by consciousness, both owe their existence to the fact that the absolute or unconscious self becomes conscious."

Hence we are enabled to reduce to one principle the apparent opposition between the theories of universal necessity and absolute freedom, which, at first sight, seems to make speculative and practical philosophy each the contradictory of the other. Speculative philosophy endeavours to reduce all existence to a dependence upon one absolute principle or cause. Practical philosophy is compelled to assume that moral obligation implies the freedom and therefore the independence of the moral agent. The two are reconciled by identifying the absolute cause with myself, the free agent. Speculative philosophy is employed in the examination of the *non-ego*, which manifests itself as a cause limiting and determining the acts of the *ego*. Practical philosophy resolves this determination into a higher freedom, by assuming that the *non-ego* is the product of the *ego* itself. Practical philosophy is thus, in the order of nature, prior to speculative; for freedom (not, however, the freedom of consciousness) is the first and highest assumption of philosophy. The *ego* strives

to realize completely its own absolute freedom; and practical philosophy is the result of the effort.

It seems, at first sight, impossible either to establish or to refute a system which starts from the assumption of an object of which we never are and never can be conscious. If we know nothing about the absolute self at all, how can we say whether the description which the philosopher gives of it is true or false? But, in truth, the refutation admits of an easier method than the establishment. For we may refute a theory, even without understanding it, if the language in which it is conveyed is inconsistent with itself. The rules of logic are as applicable to signs without meaning as to thoughts represented by significant terms. If a man asserts, in the course of an argument, that A is B, and also that A is not B, we may convict him out of his own mouth, even though we have no knowledge of the objects which A and B represent. And thus we are at liberty to criticise Fichte's theory of the absolute self, though that absolute self, by his own admission, is not and cannot be an object of thought. For there is a self-contradiction in the terms of the theory, which no explanation can remove. The absolute self is described as being at the same time simple and complex, one and many, free and constrained. It is a simple subject, having no attributes or modifications; yet it contains within itself a necessary law of self-development. It is the one solitary principle of all things; yet it is acted upon by something distinct from itself. It is absolutely free; yet, in order to realize this freedom, it is compelled to place over against itself, first, a real not-self, and, secondly, a phenomenal world of the objects of consciousness.

The objections might be carried further, if we were to examine the doctrine, not merely in its principles, but in its consequences. The absolute self, the one primitive existence, takes the place of the Deity; and the philosopher is thus reduced to the alternatives of either Atheism or Autotheism—he has no God, or he is God to himself. And to one of these alternatives Fichte was actually driven, when the iron necessity of his logic forced from him the memorable assertion: "The moral order of the universe is itself God; we need no other, and we can comprehend no other."

It may perhaps contribute to throw some additional light on

the meaning and purpose of this method of speculation, if we turn our attention for a few moments to its historical position and the circumstances which gave rise to it. The philosophy of Fichte professed to be a further development of the principles of Kant. It is true that the master by no means admitted the validity of his disciple's inferences; but this assumed paternity, whether legitimate or illegitimate, will at least help us to understand the point of view at which Fichte took his stand to contemplate the universe of thought and existence. Now the prominent feature of the Kantian philosophy—indeed the very cardinal point of his whole system—is the distinction between *phenomena*, or things as they appear to us, and *noumena*, or things as they are in themselves. According to the philosopher of Königsberg, the human mind, whether in perception or in thought, is subject to certain necessary *laws* or *forms*, inherent in the constitution of the mind itself, which impart a corresponding character to all the objects of which we can take cognisance, whether by the senses or by the understanding. These forms, as regards the perception of individual objects, material or mental, are to be found in the conditions of Space and Time; and, as regards the conception of general notions, in the categories of Unity, Plurality, Totality, &c. Hence the objects of consciousness cannot be considered as exact copies of things as they exist, but as compounds formed by the mixture of two elements, the one external, dependent on the nature of the thing, the other internal, dependent on the constitution of the mind. Such a compound is, in Kant's sense of the term, a *phenomenon*, from which is distinguished the *noumenon*, or thing in itself; *i.e.*, the thing as it exists out of all relation to human faculties. Hence it is evident that the thing in itself is to human faculties unknown and unknowable. To perceive a thing in itself, I must perceive it neither in space nor in time; for these conditions are furnished by the constitution of our perceptive faculties, and form the subjective element of all objects of perception. To think of a thing in itself, I must think of it neither as one, nor as many, nor under any other category; for these again depend upon the constitution of our understanding, and form the subjective element of all objects of thought.

Our present argument is concerned only with the speculative

philosophy of modern Germany, as it descended in direct succession from Kant to its later representatives. The moral branch of the critical philosophy, however valuable and interesting in itself, is, logically considered, merely an episode and an inconsequence in the system. We shall not, therefore, attempt to describe how Kant attempted, by means of his practical philosophy, to escape from the charmed circle of phenomena which his speculative theories had drawn round him, or to point out the logical incongruities in which he was thereby involved. It will be sufficient for the present to state that in the speculative system of Kant, from which the subsequent systems of his countrymen took their start, the limitation of human consciousness to mere phenomena was insisted upon as stringently in relation to the consciousness of our personal existence, as it was in relation to any object of the material world. The self of consciousness is apprehended under the condition of time, and is perceived as the one in relation to the many, as the single subject of various mental states. Hence, like all other objects of consciousness, it is known only as a phenomenon; the real self being thus an unknown something, distinct from the self of consciousness, and admitting of no resemblance to or comparison with it. In short the Cartesian evidence of real existence, *Cogito, ergo sum*—in so far as I am conscious I exist, is in the Kantian philosophy the evidence of mere appearance; *Cogito, ergo videor esse*—in so far as I am conscious, I have merely a phenomenal existence.

These principles being premised, a philosophy which starts from *myself* to deduce the universe, whatever may be its other errors, is not so utterly paradoxical as at first sight it would appear. For the world which is to be deduced is not, as common sense takes it to be, a system of external things existing before me, and independently of me; and the *I* from which it is to be deduced, is not the individual Kant or Fichte, whose existence began at a definite point of time some few years ago. The universe, as phenomenal, is, partly at least, dependent on the laws of the percipient mind, and so far is a development of the representative faculties of that mind; and the mind itself, as phenomenal also, is but the temporal manifestation in consciousness of some ulterior reality, existing out of time, and developed by its own laws into the temporal existence of the individual.

In other words my real existence as a thing is by no means identical with my consciousness of that existence as a phenomenon. But to let our philosophy rest here—as Kant, in fact, left it—would be to expose it to the reproach of that abomination of all right-minded Germans, speculative dualism. A real *ego* on the one side and a real *non-ego* on the other, cannot be tolerated together. "Two stars keep not their motion in one sphere;" and, to satisfy the demands of philosophy, the weaker must go to the wall. Thus the *non-ego* is thrust aside by the superior pretensions of the *ego*. What need is there to suppose that the objects of my consciousness are produced partly from within and partly from without? If my representative faculty can spin half a phenomenon, like the spider, from its own entrails, why not the whole? The problem thus assumes the form in which it appears in the theory of Fichte,—to exhibit the representative faculty, and the objects which it represents, as phenomena resulting from the self-development of an absolute *Ego* or I-by-myself I.

It is manifest, however, that if this conception of the problem be once admitted, we are on the high road to Nihilism or Pantheism. The *ego* as a thing, is out of all consciousness, and therefore unknown and unknowable. What evidence, then, have we that there is such a thing at all? Why may not the universe be an endless series of phenomena with no reality at the bottom? Why do we postulate a reality to account for phenomena but because our thought seems to need it? And what is thought itself but a phenomenon, and conversant with the phenomenal only? There may be an apparent necessity to assume an apparent reality; but appearance, as we have seen already in the case of the *non-ego*, is no guarantee that the supposed reality truly exists. We live in a world of delusion,

> "Where nothing is, but all things seem,
> And we the shadows of the dream."

Why, then, is one shadow to claim beyond its fellows the privilege of denoting real existence? Reality is as much out of place as the substantial Æneas in the phantom bark of Charon, and its presence produces a similar result.

> "Gemuit sub pondere cymba
> Sutilis, et multam accepit rimosa paludem."

Our philosophy has sprung a leak; and, to save the vessel, we must make a Jonah of the absolute Ego. Having bidden the world and all that it contains to "come like shadows," we must complete the incantation with "so depart."

If we shrink from Nihilism, there remains perhaps the alternative of Pantheism, as, at least, a more logical resting-place than our present half-way house. The instincts of our nature plead against annihilation, and maintain, in spite of philosophy, that there must really exist—something somewhere. Another horn is ready to complete the dilemma "on baith haffets." Granting that something exists, why is that something to be called *ego?* What qualities can it possess which shall make it *I* rather than *thou*, or any one being rather than any other being? My thoughts, so far as they are *mine*, are manifested in relation to a self of whose existence I am directly conscious. Philosophy tells me that this consciousness is a delusion, that this self is but the phenomenal shadow of a further self of which I am not conscious. But why should philosophy stop at this further self as the ultimate reality? Why may not it also be a shadow of something further still? Why may there not be a yet more remote reality, which is itself neither self nor not-self, but the root and foundation, and at the same time the indifference of both? This ultimate existence, the one and sole reality, is then set up as the deity of philosophy, and the result is pure Pantheism. The two last stages of this process of reasoning indicate respectively the point at which Fichte in his earlier system stopped, and that at which Schelling took up the argument, and exhibited it in its ultimate aspect.

The conclusion of Fichte's earlier philosophy in its speculative form was pure Nihilism. Though assuming the existence of a real Self as implied by, though not exhibited among, the facts of consciousness, he could not evade the conclusion that this self, as beyond consciousness, is to human knowledge as though it had no existence. In answer to the question, "What can I know?" speculative philosophy returns the sole reply, "All that I know is my consciousness itself, immediate or mediate, of self or of not-self. The mediate consciousness is only possible through the immediate; and thus the consciousness of self is manifested only as accompanying my successive representations. At each moment of consciousness I can but repeat I, I, I, and

always I; and thus at each moment I vanish to be produced again. . . . There is nothing enduring, neither without me nor within me; only an unceasing change. I know of no existence, not even of my own. There is no existence. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images alone are present in consciousness, and they know themselves after the manner of images. They vanish without the existence of anything to which they vanish: they are formed of images and by images; with nothing imaged by them; without meaning and without aim. I myself am one of these images; or, rather, I am not even this, but only a confused image of the images. All reality is changed into a wondrous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; a dream composed of a dream of itself. Perception is a dream; thought is the dream of that dream." [1]

It is true that Fichte, like Kant, endeavoured to escape, by the aid of his moral philosophy, from the desolating consequences of his speculative theories; but this part of his system it would be irrelevant to our present argument to discuss. We must pass on to the second alternative of the egoistic method—that of Pantheism as exemplified in the theory of Schelling. The system of this philosopher, though at its outset it adopts language almost identical with that of Fichte, is in reality based on a broader principle, which may be designated as that of Absolute Identity. In the formation of Schelling's theory, as in Fichte's, the *ego* and the *non-ego* are the principal elements; but their signification is by no means the same. The *ego* in Schelling's hands loses even the small remnant of personality which it had retained in those of its predecessor. Instead of an absolute Self or Person, not conscious, but capable of becoming so, we have now an absolute Entity, having no attribute whatever, but that of simple existence; though capable of development into personal and impersonal existence alike. The assumption of this mere existence under the name of *self* or *ego* may perhaps be rendered intelligible as follows. The self of consciousness, or of any mode of personal existence implied by consciousness, is a finite and determinate self—is one out of many. There is an *I*, and there is also a *thou* and a *he;* and each of these, in

[1] 'Die Bestimmung des Menschen,' b. ii. Fichte's Werke, ii., pp. 244, 245.

different relations, exists as the *ego*. The *ego* of John is the *non-ego* of Thomas, and *vice versâ*. This is the conclusion to which Fichte was driven by the demands of his practical philosophy, though his speculative system recognised no self save that implied by the thinker's own consciousness. But this conclusion, while it saves the demands of morality, does so only by placing human reason at variance with itself; the assertions of the moral reason or conscience or faith being in direct contradiction to those of the speculative reason. To reconcile the two, we must find a broader basis on which their conflicting theories may be merged in a common point of agreement. We need a first principle, not of knowledge merely, but of existence, which shall unite the subject and the object of consciousness by annihilating the difference between them. The ego from which speculation is to commence must not be *my* ego more than *yours*, nor *his* more than *ours;* but must be above and independent of personal existence and of the whole finite universe. Yet it may still retain the name of the *ego*, though in a different sense from that in which it is applicable to the personal self. For let us suppose for an instant that I, the person, am not a substance, but a transient mode of some higher substance, just as my thoughts and feelings are transient modes of me. The true *ego*, the real thing whose absolute existence is implied in my relative appearance of existence, is thus no longer *self* as distinguished from *not-self*, but the absolute substance of which self and not-self are both temporary modifications. The personal self is no longer conceived as a substance to which consciousness belongs as a phenomenon, but is merged in a higher substance, to which personality itself and all its modes, and likewise all impersonal existence, equally belong as phenomena. This higher substance, or only real existence, is the *absolute ego* of Schelling, which he does not hesitate to call by the name to God. Thus the system which emerges is one of pure Pantheism; God or the absolute alone exists; the phenomena of the finite world, whether of mind, on the one side, or of matter on the other, are but opposite modes of the Divine One and All.

We have thus apparently got back to the old Pantheism of Spinoza, with its universal Deity manifested in thought and extension. But Schelling's system, though in its results it has

much resemblance to Spinoza's, differs from it widely in the manner in which those results are obtained. Spinoza, as Schelling himself has remarked, endeavoured to attain to an absolute principle of all things by starting, not from the conception of the subject of consciousness, or *ego*, but from that of the object or *non-ego*. Commencing with the assumption that the things of which we are conscious, if not themselves realities, are at least representatives of some ulterior reality, Spinoza endeavoured to exhibit the objects of consciousness, and the conscious mind along with them, as modes of one absolute substance, the substratum and support of the whole. Schelling, on the other hand, commencing, not with a hypothetical substratum invented for the support of the objects of consciousness, but with an immediate affirmation of consciousness itself, namely, that *my* thoughts are modes of *me*, proceeds to deduce a conclusion ultimately destructive of the very fact on which itself depends. For he infers that the self of consciousness and its several modes, as well as the objects which those modes imply, are but phenomenal manifestations of an absolute subject, in which the apparent subject of consciousness is itself swallowed up in common with the rest of the finite universe. Pantheism is no doubt the conclusion of both systems, as it is the logical consequence of every consistent philosophy of the Absolute; but the two philosophers arrive at one termination by opposite courses, as two travellers journeying eastward and westward will finally meet at the same spot.

Against the fundamental position of Schelling, as against that of Fichte, common sense repeats its former objection. Even granting that the theory is true, how can any man know it to be true? As in Fichte's system all possibility of knowledge seems to be destroyed when the knowing subject becomes so absolute as to leave nothing to be known; so in Schelling's system a similar impossibility results when both subject and object are swallowed up in the indifference of the Absolute. Granting that the Absolute exists, how can I know that it exists, or that it *is* the Absolute? As conscious, I must be conscious of my own existence and of my relation to the object of which I am conscious. If I am merely an accidental mode of the Absolute, if my real existence is undistinguishable from that of the One and All, I cannot possibly know this to be the case; for the

very act of knowledge implies the distinction of the knower and the known. To meet this objection, it is necessary to postulate the existence of an absolute knowledge, not merely answering to, but identical with, the supposed absolute existence. *Intellectual Intuition*, which Schelling regards as the only true instrument and method of philosophy, is a state above and beyond consciousness, and superior to the laws of consciousness—an ecstatic vision, out of time and out of difference, in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object is merged in the indifference of both.

This intuition is obviously a state quite distinct from consciousness. To be conscious, I must be conscious of something; and the *I* and the *something* stand thus distinguished from and related to each other. We have thus two mental states, distinct from and antagonistic to each other, one of which asserts that I am identical with the Absolute, and the other, that I am distinct from it. Neither of these assertions can be compared with the other; for there is no common faculty which can take cognisance of both. The two states, supposing both to exist, must exist as separate and incommunicable; each ceasing before the other can begin, each denying what the other affirms. "Which is the wiser here? Justice or Iniquity?" Why is not consciousness as trustworthy in denying the supposed identity as the intellectual intuition in affirming it?

To supply this break in the chain of philosophy is the aim of Hegel's system, as the supplement and corrective of Schelling's. The abnormal intuition of indifference and the normal consciousness of difference cannot be allowed to stand, as in Schelling's theory, isolated and apart from each other; there must be a connecting link—a common process of absolute thought—from which both must spring, and by which each may be compared with the other. The process of identification must be carried to its highest possible pitch: the true method of philosophy must commence neither with consciousness as such, nor with unconsciousness as such, nor with any one mental state as distinguished from any other mental state; but with an Absolute Process, which shall start from the assumption of no definite contents, and proceed to develop all identity and all difference, all thought and all existence, as opposite sides of the great fundamental negation. The Absolute, the starting-point

and principle of philosophy, may be defined, according to Hegel, as the identity of being and not-being. This comprehensive principle, while thus annihilating all difference, necessarily annihilates along with it all definite contents in itself; and the Hegelian method may thus be briefly summed up in the following problem, "Given nothing, to deduce everything."

To make the principle of this system intelligible to an English reader, it will be necessary to adopt a mode of exposition very different from that employed by the author himself. The philosophy of Hegel has been described by his disciple and editor Michelet, as an attempt to *re-think the great thought of creation;* but this expression requires to be understood in a different sense from that which at first sight would suggest itself. In the first place, *creation* must not be interpreted to mean the generation of the visible universe: the world, in the Hegelian philosophy, is not an aggregate of sensible phenomena, but a system of rational laws. An illustration adopted by Mr. Morell will serve to throw light on this distinction.

"Suppose you are revisiting a charming waterfall which you had seen and admired the previous summer. The scene that your senses actually gaze upon is precisely the same as it was before; there is the stream rolling over its ridge of rock; there are the hues of the sunshine playing upon it; the spray throwing its almost invisible mist over the surface; the green leaves, the flowers, the shadows of the trees, and the roar of the cataract. And yet, when you *interpret* the scene which the senses reveal, by your inward *reason*, you know that not one particle of what we term the actual, material reality that before met your eye, is now left. The water has flowed to the ocean; the sunshine renews itself every instant; verdant nature has died away and reproduced itself; nay, if we could only understand the secret physiology at work through every atom of its organic structure, you would see that its very existence is a constant process of life and death, and never for one instant a fixed existence. Well, then, what do you *really* see when you stand and contemplate the scene? You simply see the *complex result of a number of natural laws*—laws which form the interior essence of nature herself, and are but the outward expressions of the infinite *thought* from which it came. *Which then shall we say is the reality?*—the mere phenomenon which the senses reveal, or the laws which produce that phenomenon, and which are accessible only to the grasp of reason?

'Clearly the latter; for that alone is the abiding truth, while the other is a mere outward appearance that passes away and anon renews itself." *

In the second place, we must not think of creation as the act of a Creator. In identifying existence with thought, and thought with a creative process, we must not conceive this creative thought as a mode of the Divine consciousness, analogous to the human act of thinking, nor indeed as implying a thinker at all. The *thought* is nothing more than the law or purpose which the world, consciously or unconsciously, carries out in its phenomenal development; and when thought is declared to be identical with being, it is not meant that any conception of an object is identical with the object itself, but that real existence is to be sought, not in the phenomena of sense, but in the law or process of which those phenomena are the manifestation. Hence it is obvious that, the higher the abstraction into which we can resolve the phenomena, the nearer we approach to the true conception of existence. The transitions, for instance, of any number of sensible objects from one form to another, of the tree from verdure to barrenness, of the stream from water to ice, may be comprehended under the general notion of *change;* and change is thus, as a general notion, a nearer approximation to true existence than the various relations of phenomena which are comprehended under it. Pursuing this argument to its final consequence, it will follow that the highest abstraction of all, which ordinary logic regards as the creation of our own minds, is in the Hegelian system the fullest and most complete reality.

Such an abstraction is to be found in the conception of *Being* in general. All phenomena are manifestations of that which *is;* and the law of Being in general, if any such law can be discovered, is the true conception of the process which constitutes existence. To ascertain this law, we must first strip the conception of Being of all characteristic attributes—of everything that constitutes it this kind of being rather than that; for in proportion as we approach to definiteness we recede from reality. Pure Being has, therefore, no distinguishing marks—in other words, it is identical with pure Nothing. And thus, by

* 'Modern German Philosophy,' pp. 50, 51.

placing the principle of existence in the abstraction of all definiteness, we arrive at the first axiom of Hegel's philosophy —the identity of existence and non-existence.

But it is also necessary to assume for this pure Being—this Nothing-Something—a law of self-development, by which it may represent the reality which underlies the changes of sensible phenomena. Let us, then, again generalize upwards from the conception of *change*. Water, for instance, becomes ice; what, then, is meant by *becoming?* Water, in so far as it is water, is not ice; ice, in so far as it is ice, is not water. Water, therefore, becomes not-water, and not-ice becomes ice. The process of *becoming* is thus the union of *is* with *is not*—of a particular mode of existence with the negation of that mode. This representation, in its most general terms, forms the second axiom of Hegel's philosophy—becoming is the union of Being with Nothing or Not-Being. In this abstraction we have the type or general law of the process of existence in all its special modifications: the *union of contradictories* is the reality of which all phenomena are the manifestations.

But when we proceed to examine more closely this ingenious evolution of all things from the primeval nothing, we shall find only another instance of the truth of the maxim *E nihilo nihil fit.* Existence, according to Hegel, is a process by which absolute being, which is identical with absolute nothing, develops itself into definite forms. In other words, it is relation with nothing to be related. For the abstraction which removes all finite things, removes, at the same time, all possibility of the three relations of *thesis, antithesis,* and *synthesis,* which are only possible between distinct finite objects placed in opposition to or in conjunction with each other. "Substance," says Aristotle, "is in its nature prior to relation:" there can be no relation without things to be related. Hegel, on the contrary, endeavours to make relation prior to substance; and, in so doing, he is compelled, at the same moment, to affirm and to deny his original position. Pure being is pure not-being; so far the two elements are identical and undistinguishable. Being and not-being constitute becoming; so far the two elements are separate ingredients, distinct from and opposed to each other.

In fact, Hegel endeavours to transfer to the region of the infinite and absolute a principle which has no significance

except in the sphere of the finite and relative. The union of contradictories exists only in so far as a finite object is viewed in opposite relations. Every finite object is conceived as being that which it is, and as not being that which it is not. But this relation of *is* and *is not* holds good only so long as two definite objects are compared together, and vanishes entirely as soon as we attempt to unite the two special objects into one general notion. We once heard Hegel's philosophy explained to a circle of the uninitiated in the following manner: "You will allow that that which is a dog is not a cat." "Granted." "Well, then, strike off dog and cat, as minutiæ unworthy of a philosopher, and it remains that that which is, is not." The exposition is hardly a caricature; but it is strange that so profound a thinker as Hegel should not have seen that the conception of definite objects, such as *dog* and *cat*, is prior, in nature no less than in knowledge, to the conception of abstract relations, such as *is* and *is not*, and that, by annihilating all definite existing objects, we annihilate the possibility and even the conceivability of existence itself.

Hegel's famous principle of the identity of contradictories thus falls to the ground; and we are brought back once more to those laws of finite thought which the philosopher repudiates as inapplicable to the processes of the higher reason and valid only for the understanding. We are compelled, in spite of Hegel's protest to the contrary, to admit the principles of identity and contradiction as the conditions of all legitimate thought; and these are necessarily manifested as limitations of the object conceived; everything of which we can think being necessarily excluded from partaking of the nature of its logical contradictory. Hence it follows, not that there is a philosophy of the unlimited, superior to relation and undaunted by contradiction, but that all thought is *ipso facto* limitation, and that what is beyond limits is also beyond philosophy. In one sense Hegel's opening paradox is true—pure being is pure nothing. For we can conceive no object, save as definite and distinguished from other objects; and by repudiating the conception of this or that definite existing thing, we obtain simply the negation of all conceivable existence. Hegel's error lies in mistaking this mere non-conception of the relative for a conception of the absolute; in supposing that we have ascended to a higher mode of

thought, when we have merely rejected the conditions under which thinking is possible, and thereby refused to think at all.

We have now probably inflicted on our readers as much metaphysics as will be tolerated in a single article; and it may therefore be prudent to conclude, though some subordinate and some antagonist developments of German philosophy remain unnoticed. But imperfect as our sketch necessarily is, it is, we trust, sufficient to show the one great error which pervades all the systems which we have described, and to point out the practical lesson which is to be drawn from the study of them. The history of German philosophy during the early part of the present century is especially valuable as testifying to the unanimous admission of the profoundest thinkers of modern times, that a philosophy of the absolute can only be reached by transcending the laws of human consciousness. The absolute self of Fichte, the absolute identity of Schelling, the absolute notion of Hegel—and the same may be said of the principal antagonist systems also—are alike based on assumptions which it is impossible to verify if true, and impossible to convict if false; for truth and falsehood are alike relations, and imply an object and a thought about that object, distinct from each other, and agreeing with or differing from each other. Yet the problem which suggested these extravagances must have a meaning; otherwise men could never have even attempted to solve it. That the natural consciousness of man bears witness to the existence of a distinction between the real and the apparent, the permanent and the transitory, the substance and its modes, is a truth announced by the failures no less than by the triumphs of philosophy, and confirmed by the whole history of human thought in every age and in every country. What is the true nature of the problem which has been disguised under so many false appearances? what is the real testimony of consciousness concerning the distinction between things and phenomena?—is a question which we cannot attempt to discuss now. One point, however, may be considered as established, both by what philosophy has done and by what she has left undone; namely, that the reality of which we are in search can never be attained in the form of an absolute unity. The first testimony of consciousness is to the distinct existence of *self* and *not-self*,—of the conscious subject and of the object of which he is conscious;

and every system of philosophy which begins or ends with the denial of this distinction can accomplish nothing more than an intellectual suicide. That a complete investigation of the problem of reality and appearance from the side of common sense is likely to be attempted by British thinkers in the present generation, is more than we can venture to anticipate; but if we may presume to offer a suggestion to our more metaphysical kinsmen on the other side of the German Ocean, how to turn their speculative faculties to a better account than hitherto, we should take the liberty, notwithstanding the shock to national prejudices, and emboldened by the failure of all other recipes, to tender our advice to the rising generation of philosophers in the approved style of the modern literature of advertisements:—"Try Dualism."

SENSATION NOVELS.

CONTENTS.

Morbid Craving for Excitement.
Causes of the "Sensation Novel": its worthless, ephemeral Character.
Varieties of the Sensation Novel.
The Didactic Novel.
Proximity and Personality of Sensation Novels.
Bigamy Novels: 'Lady Audley's Secret,' 'Aurora Floyd,' 'Recommended to Mercy,' 'No Name,' 'Nobly False,' 'The Law of Divorce.'
The Criminal Novel.
The Theological Novel. 'Ashcombe Churchyard.'
Cheap Sensational Literature: 'May Dudley.'
The Disease and its Remedy.
Conclusion.

SENSATION NOVELS.*

"I DON'T like preaching to the nerves instead of the judgment," was the remark of a shrewd observer of human nature, in relation to a certain class of popular sermons. The remark need not be limited to sermons alone. A class of literature has grown up around us, usurping in many respects, intentionally or unintentionally, a portion of the preacher's office, playing no inconsiderable part in moulding the minds and forming the habits and tastes of its generation; and doing so principally, we had almost said exclusively, by "preaching to the nerves." It would almost seem as if the paradox of Cabanis, *les nerfs, voilà tout l'homme*, had been banished from the realm of philosophy only to claim a wider empire in the domain of fiction—at least if we may judge by the very large class of writers who seem to acknowledge no other element in human nature to

* From the 'Quarterly Review,' April, 1863.

1. 'Lady Audley's Secret.' By M. E. Braddon. 3 vols. Seventh edition. 1862.
2. 'Aurora Floyd.' By M. E. Braddon. 3 vols. Second edition. 1863.
3. 'No Name.' By Wilkie Collins. 3 vols. 1862.
4. 'Recommended to Mercy.' 3 vols. 1862.
5. 'Such Things are.' By the Author of 'Recommended to Mercy.' 3 vols. 1862.
6. 'The Last Days of a Bachelor.' By James M'Grigor Allan. 2 vols. 1862.
7. 'Nobly False.' By James M'Grigor Allan. 2 vols. 1863.
8. 'The Law of Divorce.' By a Graduate of Oxford. 1861.
9. 'Wait and Hope.' By John Edmund Reade. 3 vols. 1859.
10. 'The Old Roman Well.' 2 vols. 1861.
11. 'Miriam May.' Third edition. 1860.
12. 'Crispin Ken.' By the Author of 'Miriam May.' 2 vols. Third edition. 1861.
13. 'Philip Paternoster.' By an ex-Puseyite. 2 vols. 1858.
14. 'The Weird of the Wentworths.' By Johannes Scotus. 2 vols. 1862.
15. 'Passages in the Life of a Fast Young Lady.' By Mrs. Grey. 3 vols. 1862.
16. 'Only a Woman.' By Captain Lascelles Wraxall. 3 vols. 1860.
17. 'Harold Overdon.' By Chartley Castle. 1862.
18. 'Liberty Hall, Oxon.' By W. Winwood Reade. 3 vols. 1860.
19. 'Danesbury House.' By Mrs. Henry Wood. 1861.
20. 'The Daily Governess.' By Mrs. Gordon Smythies. 3 vols. 1861.
21. 'The Woman of Spirit.' 2 vols. 1862.
22. 'Clinton Maynyard, a Tale of the World, the Flesh, and the Devil.' 1862.
23. 'Spurs and Skirts.' By Allet. 1862.
24. 'Ashcombe Churchyard.' By Evelyn Benson. 2 vols. 1862.

which they can appeal. Excitement, and excitement alone, seems to be the great end at which they aim—an end which must be accomplished at any cost by some means or other, "*si possis, recte; si non, quocunque modo.*" And as excitement, even when harmless in kind, cannot be continually produced without becoming morbid in degree, works of this class manifest themselves as belonging, some more, some less, but all to some extent, to the morbid phenomena of literature—indications of a wide-spread corruption, of which they are in part both the effect and the cause; called into existence to supply the cravings of a diseased appetite, and contributing themselves to foster the disease, and to stimulate the want which they supply.

The sensation novel is the counterpart of the spasmodic poem. They represent "the selfsame interest with a different leaning." The one leans outward, the other leans inward; the one aims at convulsing the soul of the reader, the other professes to owe its birth to convulsive throes in the soul of the writer. But with this agreement there is also a difference. There is not a poet or poetaster of the spasmodic school but is fully persuaded of his own inspiration and the immortality of his work. He writes to satisfy the unconquerable yearnings of his soul; and if some prosaic friend were to hint at such earthly considerations as readers and purchasers, he would be ready to exclaim, with a forgotten brother of the craft (alas, that we should have to say *forgotten* after such a *hiatus!*):

> "Go, dotard, go, and if it suits thy mind,
> Range yonder rocks and reason with the wind,
> Or if its motions own another's will,
> Walk to the beach and bid the sea be still;
> In newer orbits let the planets run,
> Or throw a cloud of darkness o'er the sun;
> A measured movement bid the comets keep,
> Or lull the music of the spheres to sleep:
> These may obey thee; but the fiery soul
> Of Genius owns not, brooks not, thy control."

Not so the sensation novelist. No divine influence can be imagined as presiding over the birth of his work, beyond the market-law of demand and supply; no more immortality is dreamed of for it than for the fashions of the current season. A commercial atmosphere floats around works of this class, redolent of the manufactory and the shop. The public want

novels, and novels must be made—so many yards of printed stuff, sensation-pattern, to be ready by the beginning of the season. And if the demands of the novel-reading public were to increase to the amount of a thousand per season, no difficulty would be found in producing a thousand works of the average merit. They rank with the verses of which "Lord Fanny spins a thousand such a day;" and spinning-machines of the Lord Fanny kind may be multiplied without limit.

Various causes have been at work to produce this phenomenon of our literature. Three principal ones may be named as having had a large share in it—periodicals, circulating libraries, and railway bookstalls. A periodical, from its very nature, must contain many articles of an ephemeral interest, and of the character of goods made to order. The material part of it is a fixed quantity, determined by rigid boundaries of space and time; and on this Procrustean bed the spiritual part must needs be stretched to fit. A given number of sheets of print, containing so many lines per sheet, must be produced weekly or monthly, and the diviner element must accommodate itself to these conditions. A periodical, moreover, belongs to the class of works which most men borrow and do not buy, and in which, therefore, they take only a transitory interest. Few men will burden their shelves with a series of volumes which have no coherence in their parts and no limit in their number, whose articles of personal interest may be as one halfpennyworth of bread to an intolerable quantity of sack, and which have no other termination to their issue than the point at which they cease to be profitable. Under these circumstances, no small stimulus is given to the production of tales of the marketable stamp, which, after appearing piecemeal in weekly or monthly instalments, generally enter upon a second stage of their insect-life in the form of a handsome reprint under the auspices of the circulating library.

This last-named institution is the oldest offender of the three; but age has neither diminished the energy nor subdued the faults of its youth. It is more active now than at any former period of its existence, and its activity is much of the same kind as it was described in the pages of this Review more than fifty years ago.* The manner of its action is indeed inseparable from

* 'Quarterly Review,' vol. iii., pp. 340, 341.

the nature of the institution, varying only in the production of larger quantities to meet the demand of a more reading generation. From the days of the 'Minerva Press' (that synonym for the dullest specimens of the light reading of our grandmothers) to those of the thousand and one tales of the current season, the circulating library has been the chief hot-bed for forcing a crop of writers without talent and readers without discrimination. It is to literature what a *magasin de modes* is to dress, giving us the latest fashion, and little more. Its staple commodities are "books of the present season," many of them destined to run their round for the season only,—

> "Sons of a day, just buoyant on the flood,
> The numbered with the puppies in the mud."

Subscription, as compared with purchase, produces no doubt a great increase in the quantity of books procurable, but with a corresponding deterioration in the quality. The buyer of books is generally careful to select what for his own purposes is worth buying; the subscriber is often content to take the good the gods provide him, glancing lazily down the library catalogue, and picking out some title which promises amusement or excitement. The catalogue of a circulating library is the legitimate modern successor to that portion of Curll's stock in trade which consisted of "several taking title-pages, that only wanted treatises to be wrote to them."

The railway stall, like the circulating library, consists partly of books written expressly for its use, partly of reprints in a new phase of their existence—a phase internally that of the grub, with small print and cheap paper, externally that of the butterfly, with a tawdry cover ornamented with a highly-coloured picture, hung out like a signboard, to give promise of the entertainment to be had within. The picture, like the book, is generally of the sensation kind, announcing some exciting scene to follow. A pale young lady in a white dress, with a dagger in her hand, evidently prepared for some desperate deed; or a couple of ruffians engaged in a deadly struggle; or a Red Indian in his war-paint; or, if the plot turns on smooth instead of violent villainy, a priest persuading a dying man to sign a paper; or a disappointed heir burning a will; or a treacherous lover telling his flattering tale to some deluded maid or wife.

The exigencies of railway travelling do not allow much time for examining the merits of a book before purchasing it; and keepers of bookstalls, as well as of refreshment-rooms, find an advantage in offering their customers something hot and strong, something that may catch the eye of the hurried passenger, and promise temporary excitement to relieve the dulness of a journey.

These circumstances of production naturally have their effect on the quality of the articles produced. Written to meet an ephemeral demand, aspiring only to an ephemeral existence, it is natural that they should have recourse to rapid and ephemeral methods of awakening the interest of their readers, striving to act as the dram or the dose, rather than as the solid food, because the effect is more immediately perceptible. And as the perpetual cravings of the dram-drinker or the valetudinarian for spirits or physic are hardly intelligible to the man of sound health and regular appetites, so, to one called from more wholesome studies to survey the wide field of sensational literature, it is difficult to realize the idea which its multifarious contents necessarily suggest, that these books must form the staple mental food of a very large class of readers. On first turning over a few pages of the average productions of this school, he is tempted to exclaim "*Quis leget hæc?*" but the doubt is checked as it rises by the evidently commercial character of the whole affair. These books would certainly not be written if they did not sell; and they would not sell if they were not read; *ergo*, they must have readers, and numerous readers too. The long list of works standing at the head of this article is, with a few exceptions, but a scanty gleaning from the abundant harvests of the last two seasons. Great is the power of fiction in attracting readers by its name alone. We have heard of a lady who was persuaded into reading 'Plutarch's Lives' by being told that the book was a delightful novel, and who was indignant at the trick, when she discovered that history had won her approbation under the guise of fiction. If the name of a novel can carry down, with readers of this class, the bitter pill of solid merit, it may easily have its influence in seasoning the less unpalatable morsel of trash. It would be well, indeed, if this were all. Unhappily there is too much evidence that the public appetite can occasionally descend from trash to garbage.

We have ourselves seen an English translation of one of the worst of those French novels, devoted to the worship of Baal-Peor and the recommendation of adultery, lying for sale at a London railway-stall, and offered as a respectable book to unsuspecting ladies; and the list now before us furnishes sufficient proof that poison of the same kind is sometimes concealed under the taking title of the circulating library.

A sensation novel, as a matter of course, abounds in incident. Indeed, as a general rule, it consists of nothing else. Deep knowledge of human nature, graphic delineations of individual character, vivid representations of the aspects of Nature or the workings of the soul—all the higher features of the creative art—would be a hindrance rather than a help to a work of this kind. The unchanging principles of philosophy, the "thing of beauty" that "is a joy for ever," would be out of place in a work whose aim is to produce temporary excitement. "Action, action, action!" though in a different sense from that intended by the great orator, is the first thing needful, and the second, and the third. The human actors in the piece are, for the most part, but so many lay-figures on which to exhibit a drapery of incident. Allowing for the necessary division of all characters of a tale into male and female, old and young, virtuous and vicious, there is hardly anything said or done by any one specimen of a class which might not with equal fitness be said or done by any other specimen of the same class. Each game is played with the same pieces, differing only in the moves. We watch them advancing through the intricacies of the plot, as we trace the course of an x or a y through the combinations of an algebraic equation, with a similar curiosity to know what becomes of them at the end, and with about as much consciousness of individuality in the ciphers.

Yet even the dullest uniformity admits of a certain kind of variety. As a shepherd can trace individual distinctions in the general air of sheepishness which marks the countenances of his fleecy charge; as the five sons of Sir Hildebrand Osbaldistone exhibited an agreeable variety in the mixture of the ingredients of sot, gamekeeper, bully, horse-jockey, and fool; so in the general type of character which marks a novel as belonging to the sensational genus, there may be traced certain minor differences constituting a distinction of species. A great philo-

sopher has enumerated in a list of sensations "the feelings from heat, electricity, galvanism, &c.," together with "titillation, sneezing, horripilation, shuddering, the feeling of setting the teeth on edge, &c.;" and our novels might be classified in like manner, according to the kind of sensation they are calculated to produce. There are novels of the warming-pan, and others of the galvanic-battery type—some which gently stimulate a particular feeling, and others which carry the whole nervous system by storm. There are some which tickle the vanity of the reader, and some which aspire to set his hair on end or his teeth on edge; while others, with or without the intention of the writer, are strongly provocative of that sensation in the palate and throat which is a premonitory symptom of nausea. To go through the details of any minute division would be impossible with such a voluminous list as we have before us: they may, however, all be classified under two general heads—those that are written merely for amusement, and those that are written with a didactic purpose.

Of the two, we confess that we very much prefer the former. As a fly, though a more idle, is a less offensive insect than a bug; as it is more pleasant that the exhilaration of a noisy evening should be forgotten in the morning than that it should leave its remembrance in the form of a headache; so it is better that the excitement of a sensation novel should evaporate in froth and foam, than that it should leave a residuum behind of shallow dogmatism and flippant conceit. For what other results can be expected from the popular novelist's method of prejudice teaching by caricature? There is nothing under the sun, divine or human, to which this method cannot be applied; reversing the power of Goldsmith in Johnson's epitaph, it leaves nothing untouched, and touches nothing which it does not deface. As universal as the oracles of the Athenian sausage-seller, it is ready on the shortest notice to discourse on all subjects—

> "About the Athenians,
> About pease-pudding and porridge, about the Spartans,
> About the war, about the pilchard-fishery,
> About the state of things in general,
> About short weights and measures in the market,
> About all things and persons whatsoever."

Let a writer have a prejudice against the religion of his neigh-

bour, against the government of his country, against the administration of the law, against the peerage, against the prohibition that hinders a man from marrying his grandmother, against plucking in examinations, against fermented liquors, against the social position of women who have lapsed from virtue, against capital punishments, against the prevailing fashion in dress, against any institution, custom, or fact of the day—forthwith comes out a tale to exhibit in glowing colours the evil which might be produced by the obnoxious object in an imaginary case, tragic or comic, as suits the nature of the theme or the genius of the writer, and heightened by every kind of exaggeration. The offensive doctrines are fathered on some clerical Tartuffe; the governmental department is exhibited as a "Circumlocution Office;" the law ruins the fortunes of some blameless client, or corrupts the conscience of some generous young practitioner; the nobleman of the tale is a monster in depravity, or an idiot in folly; the table of prohibited degrees breaks two loving hearts who cannot live without each other; the promising youth is plucked for his little-go, and plunges into reckless dissipation in consequence; the single glass of port or sherry leads by sure stages to brandy and *delirium tremens*, and the medical virtues of pure water work cures in defiance of the faculty; &c. &c. The method is so far perfectly impartial that it may be applied with equal facility to the best things and the worst; but an argument that proves everything is of precisely the same value as an argument that proves nothing. Mr. Dickens, we regret to say, is a grievous offender in this line; and, by a just retribution, the passages that are written in this spirit are generally the worst in his works. He never sinks so nearly to the level of the ordinary sensation-novelist as when he is writing "with a purpose." Unfortunately, *decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile;* the vice of a great writer has been copied by a hundred small ones, who, without a tithe of his genius, make up for the deficiency by an extra quantity of extravagance.

The sensation novel, be it mere trash or something worse, is usually a tale of our own times. Proximity is, indeed, one great element of sensation. It is necessary to be near a mine to be blown up by its explosion; and a tale which aims at electrifying the nerves of the reader is never thoroughly effective unless the scene be laid in our own days and among the people we are in

the habit of meeting. We read with little emotion, though it comes in the form of history, Livy's narrative of the secret poisonings carried on by nearly two hundred Roman ladies: we feel but a feeble interest in an authentic record of the crimes of a Borgia or a Brinvilliers; but we are thrilled with horror, even in fiction, by the thought that such things may be going on around us and among us. The man who shook our hand with a hearty English grasp half an hour ago—the woman whose beauty and grace were the charm of last night, and whose gentle words sent us home better pleased with the world and with ourselves—how exciting to think that under these pleasing outsides may be concealed some demon in human shape, a Count Fosco or a Lady Audley! He may have assumed all that heartiness to conceal some dark plot against our life or honour, or against the life or honour of one yet dearer: she may have left that gay scene to muffle herself in a thick veil and steal to a midnight meeting with some villainous accomplice. He may have a mysterious female, immured in a solitary tower or a private lunatic asylum, destined to come forth hereafter to menace the name and position of the excellent lady whom the world acknowledges as his wife: she may have a husband lying dead at the bottom of a well, and a fatherless child nobody knows where. All this is no doubt very exciting; but even excitement may be purchased too dearly; and we may be permitted to doubt whether the pleasure of the nervous shock is worth the cost of so much morbid anatomy if the picture be true, or so much slanderous misrepresentation if it be false.

Akin to proximity is personality, and its effect is similar in creating a spurious interest. Personality, moreover, has an additional advantage, resembling that which Aristotle attributes to the use of metaphors in rhetoric. It gives rise to a kind of syllogism, whereby, without too great an exertion of thought, the mind of the reader is enabled to conclude that this is that. Of these advantages our novelists are not slow to avail themselves. If a scandal of more than usual piquancy occurs in high life, or a crime of extraordinary horror figures among our *causes célèbres*, the sensationalist is immediately at hand to weave the incident into a thrilling tale, with names and circumstances slightly disguised, so as at once to exercise the

ingenuity of the reader in guessing at the riddle, and to gratify his love of scandal in discovering the answer. Sometimes the incident of real life is made the main plot of the story, sometimes it figures as an episode in the history of two imaginary lovers, with whom the flesh-and-blood criminal comes in contact, like the substantial Æneas on board the shadowy bark of Charon, nearly making shipwreck of the frail vessel of their fortunes. The end and moral of the narrative, in the one case and in the other, is much the same; namely, to elicit from the gratified reader the important exclamation, "I know who is meant by So-and-so!"

Of particular offences, which are almost always contemporary and sometimes personal, undoubtedly the first place must be given to Bigamy. Indeed, so popular has this crime become, as to give rise to an entire sub-class in this branch of literature, which may be distinguished as that of Bigamy Novels. It is astonishing how many of our modern writers have selected this interesting breach of morality and law as the peg on which to hang a mystery and a *dénouement*. Of the tales on our list, no less than eight are bigamy stories:—'Lady Audley's Secret,' 'Aurora Floyd,' 'Clinton Maynyard,' 'Recommended to Mercy,' 'The Law of Divorce,' 'The Daily Governess,' 'Only a Woman,' 'The Woman of Spirit,' all hang their narrative, wholly or in part, on bigamy in act, or bigamy in intention, on the existence or supposed existence of two wives to the same husband, or two husbands to the same wife. Much of this popularity is, no doubt, due to the peculiar aptitude of bigamy, at least in monogamous countries, to serve as a vehicle of mysterious interest or poetic justice. If some vulgar ruffian is to be depicted as having a strange influence over a lady of rank and fashion, it is a ready expedient to make him conscious of the existence of another husband, or the child of another husband, supposed to be long dead. If lowly virtue is to be exalted, or high-born pride humiliated, the means are instantly at hand, in the discovery of a secret marriage, unsuspected till the third volume, which makes the child of poverty the heir to rank and wealth, or degrades the proud patrician by stripping him of his illegal honours. It is really painful to think how many an interesting mystery and moral lesson will be lost, if Sir Cresswell Cresswell's Court continues in active work for another generation. Bigamy

will become as clumsy and obsolete an expedient for the relief of discontented partners as the axe was in Juvenal's day, compared with the superior facilities of poison. With such an easy legal provision for being "off wi' the auld love," it will be worse than a crime, it will be a blunder, to have recourse to illegitimate means of being "on wi' the new."

Of our list of Bigamy Novels, some will be noticed under other characters, and some are not worth noticing at all. The two first-named claim a notice as bigamy novels *par excellence*, the whole interest of the story turning on this circumstance. Though both exaggerated specimens of the sensational type, they are the works of an author of real power, who is capable of better things than drawing highly-coloured portraits of beautiful fiends and fast young ladies burdened with superfluous husbands. Lady Audley, *alias* Mrs. George Talboys, is a Vittoria Corombona transferred to the nineteenth century and to an English drawing-room. But the romantic wickedness of the 'White Devil of Italy' suffers by being transplanted to home scenes and modern associations. The English White Devil, however, if not quite so romantic and interesting, is more than the rival of her prototype in boldness and guilt. She does with her own hand what Vittoria does by means of others. She has married a second husband, knowing or suspecting her first one to be still living; and the desperate means to which she has recourse to avoid discovery furnish an abundance of incidents of various degrees of ingenuity and villainy. She advertises her own death in the newspapers, having previously procured a young woman who resembles her in person to die and be buried in her stead; she throws her first husband down a well, whence he finally emerges, we are not told how, with a broken arm; she breaks into a lawyer's chambers during his absence, and destroys his papers; she burns down a house to get rid of a dangerous witness, having locked the door of his room to prevent his escape. Yet, notwithstanding all the horrors of the story—and there are enough of them to furnish a full supper for a Macbeth—notwithstanding the glaring improbability of the incidents, the superhuman wickedness of the principal character and the incongruities of others; notwithstanding the transparent nature of the "secret" from the very beginning; the author has succeeded in constructing a narrative

the interest of which is sustained to the end. The skill of the builder deserves to be employed on better materials.

It is difficult to do justice by extracts to a work whose chief merit consists in the cleverness with which an interesting whole is made out of faulty parts. The following description is not, perhaps, the best specimen of the author's powers; but it is worth quoting, not only in itself, but as exhibiting in strong contrast the personal fascinations of the lady whose character and actions have been described above. Here is a portrait of the heroine under her supposed maiden name of Lucy Graham:—

"Wherever she went she seemed to take joy and brightness with her. In the cottages of the poor her fair face shone like a sunbeam. She would sit for a quarter of an hour talking to some old woman, and apparently as pleased with the admiration of a toothless crone as if she had been listening to the compliments of a marquis; and when she tripped away, leaving nothing behind her (for her poor salary gave no scope to her benevolence), the old woman would burst out into senile raptures with her grace, her beauty, and her kindliness, such as she never bestowed upon the vicar's wife, who half fed and clothed her. For you see Miss Lucy Graham was blessed with that magic power of fascination by which a woman can charm with a word or intoxicate with a smile. Every one loved, admired, and praised her. The boy who opened the five-barred gate that stood in her pathway ran home to his mother to tell her of her pretty looks and the sweet voice in which she thanked him for the little service. The verger at the church who ushered her into the surgeon's pew; the vicar who saw the soft blue eyes uplifted to his face as he preached his simple sermon; the porter from the railway station who brought her sometimes a letter or a parcel, and who never looked for reward from her; her employer; his visitors; her pupils; the servants; everybody, high and low, united in declaring that Lucy Graham was the sweetest girl that ever lived."

Aurora Floyd, as a character, is tame after Lady Audley. The "beautiful fiend," intensely wicked, but romantic from the very intensity of her wickedness, has degenerated into a fast young lady, full of stable talk, deep in the mysteries of the turf, and familiar with 'Bell's Life,'—a young lady with large beautiful eyes, and with very little else to command any feeling either of love or the reverse. She runs away from school to

contract a secret marriage with a consummate blackguard of a groom—

"A bridegroom, say you? 'tis a groom indeed."

She separates herself from him after a short and bitter experience of his character, comes home, and deceives her father by assuring him that "that person" is dead when she knows him to be alive; afterwards, on the report of his death, deceives two worthy men by accepting one and marrying the other without breathing a word of her previous escapade (we are informed that "her natural disposition is all truth and candour"); and finally deceives her husband again, when she discovers that the man she had supposed dead is alive, by making arrangements for sending the obnoxious individual to Australia and retaining the second and illegal spouse as the more agreeable personage of the two. She is inferior to Lady Audley, as a pickpocket is inferior to a Thug; but there is this important difference,—that Lady Audley is meant to be detested, while Aurora Floyd is meant to be admired. The one ends her days in a madhouse; the other becomes the wife of an honest man, and the curtain falls upon her "bending over the cradle of her first-born." By a fortunate arrangement of nature, which is always at the command of novelists, the birth of the infant is delayed beyond the usual time, till the groom is really dead and a re-marriage has repaired the irregularity of the bigamy. Fortunately also, there is no little pledge of affection born to the Damasippus of her first vows.

Though the moral teaching of the story is more questionable than that of its predecessor, and the interest, on the whole, less sustained, the individual characters are drawn with greater skill. Aurora, with all her faults, is a woman and not a fiend; and John Mellish, the honest, genial, tender-hearted, somewhat henpecked husband, is a portrait superior to any in the more romantic volume. As a companion to the picture of Lucy Graham in a calm may be exhibited the following description of Aurora Floyd in a storm. The "stable-man" of the piece is not the one whom she has acquired a conjugal right to chastise, but another of the same profession, by no means so good-looking, but as great a scoundrel:—

"Aurora sprang upon him like a beautiful tigress, and catching

the collar of his fustian jacket in her slight hands, rooted him to the spot upon which he stood. The grasp of those slender hands, convulsed by passion, was not to be easily shaken off; and Steeve Hargraves, taken completely off his guard, stared aghast at his assailant. Taller than the stable-man by a foot and a half, she towered above him, her cheeks white with rage, her eyes flashing fury, her hat fallen off, and her black hair tumbling about her shoulders, sublime in her passion. . . . . She disengaged her right hand from his collar, and rained a shower of blows upon his clumsy shoulders with her slender whip; a mere toy, with emeralds set in its golden head, but stinging like a rod of flexible steel in that little hand."

In direct opposition to the bigamy-novels are those which, instead of multiplying the holy ceremony, betray an inclination to dispense with it altogether. There is a school of fiction the practical lesson of which seems to be to reduce marriage to a temporary connexion *durante bene placito*, and to exalt the character of the mistress at the expense of that of the wife. This is a favourite theme with French novelists of a certain class; and the tale entitled 'Recommended to Mercy' may claim to be considered as an English exponent of the same doctrine. It has, indeed, an episode of bigamy, to show the inconveniences of matrimony; but the chief interest centres in a heroine whose ideas on this subject are rather on the side of defect than of excess. Helen Langton, *alias* Mrs. Vaughan, is a young lady whose opinions on the conjugal relation are borrowed from Eloisa, filtered through the dregs of Mary Wollstonecraft:—

> "Not Cæsar's empress would I deign to prove;
> No, make me mistress to the man I love"—

reappears from the mouth of this strong-minded young lady in the form of the following declaration volunteered to a male cousin:—

"I consider the ceremony of marriage as one of the most absurd inventions ever inflicted on human beings by mortal men. . . . . In the first place, do we not swear to *love* always and to the end, when to do so is too often clearly and simply out of our power? Is human love the growth of human will? Certainly not; and as certainly is it only as words of course, that we vow to 'honour and to obey' the man who may turn out a dishonourable wretch, or a monster of tyranny and oppression."

The practice of this fair philosopher is in accordance with her theory. She lives for some years as the mistress of the man she loves; is discarded, as a matter of course, on his marriage; leads a life of virtuous and ill-used poverty for a time; returns to her lover again when he has separated from his wife on suspicion of her infidelity; becomes the legatee of his whole property on certain peculiar conditions of trust; and is thus enabled to become a model of virtue in wealth, as formerly of virtue in poverty (her charities furnishing some graphic illustrations of the manners and customs of the "social evil"); and finally makes a magnanimous surrender of her riches to the rightful heir, on making a discovery which enables her to do so according to the conditions of the will.

Such is the outline of the story. The moral that would be drawn by the author may be conjectured from the title of the book; that which will be drawn by many of its readers may be summed up in the comfortable doctrine of Hans Carvel's wife,—

> "That if weak women went astray,
> Their stars were more in fault than they."

In truth, we much doubt the wisdom or the morality of drawing fictitious portraits of noble-minded and interesting sinners, by way of teaching us to feel for the sinner while we condemn the sin. We do not deny that the feeling is a right one, nor that such characters may actually exist; but it makes all the difference in the world to the moral whether we meet with the persons in real life or in a novel. The real person is a human being, with human qualities, good or bad, to which the particular sin in question attaches itself as one feature out of many. The fictitious character is but the sin personified and made attractive as the source and substance of many virtues. In the one, the person is the principal figure, the sin is accessory; in the other, the sin is the primary idea, to embellish which the rest of the character is made to order. And when, as a foil to this diamond with but a single flaw, is drawn the "respectable" woman whose chastity is beyond the breath of scandal, but who sullies that one virtue by a thousand faults—cold, selfish, pharisaical, hollow-hearted, ill-tempered, &c.—to what does such a story naturally lead, but to the conclusion,

that, whatever a censorious world may say to the contrary, female virtue has really very little to do with the Seventh Commandment? Novelists of this school do their best to inculcate as a duty the first two of the three stages towards vice—"we first endure, then pity, then embrace;" and, in so doing, they have assisted in no small degree to prepare the way for the third.

'No Name' is principally a protest against the law which determines the social position of illegitimate children. But the prosecution of this main purpose involves, as a subordinate purpose, a plea in behalf of the connexion to which such children owe their existence. Hence the same stage-trick of exhibiting the virtuous concubine in contrast to the vicious wife is brought forward to give effect to the piece. Andrew Vanstone, when a mere boy, is privately married in Canada to a wife whom he afterwards discovers to have been a woman of profligate character; but, inasmuch as her irregularities are all antenuptial, there is no pretext for dissolving the marriage, and the only resource of the husband is to pension her off, on condition that she shall never trouble him by asserting her conjugal rights. Mr. Vanstone then returns to England, and finds an accommodating young lady, who is content to discharge the duties and assume the name of his wife, without being too particular in demanding a legal right to them. On the death of his real wife, Mr. Vanstone marries the mother of his children, but is prevented by an untimely death from making a new will, his former one being invalidated by the second marriage. The consequence is that his property goes to the heir-at-law, and his children are left penniless, because a cruel jurisprudence does not permit them to be made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents. Against this state of the law Mr. Collins, through the mouth of the family solicitor, declaims in the following strain:—

"I am far from defending the law of England, as it affects illegitimate offspring. On the contrary, I think it a disgrace to the nation. 'It visits the sins of the parents on the children; it encourages vice by depriving fathers and mothers of the strongest of all motives for making the atonement of marriage; and it claims to produce these two abominable results in the names of morality and religion. But it has no extraordinary oppression to answer for, in

the case of these unhappy girls. The more merciful and Christian law of other countries, which allows the marriage of the parents to make the children legitimate, has no mercy on *these* children. The accident of their father having been married, when he first met with their mother, has made them the outcasts of the whole social community: it has placed them out of the pale of the Civil Law of Europe."

We have often heard an illegal connexion and its result euphemistically designated as a "misfortune;" but this is the first time, as far as we are aware, in which a lawful marriage has been denominated an "accident." Unfortunately for the author, it is of that kind which is known among logicians as an "inseparable accident." This, however, is not the only *fallacia accidentis* of the author's argument. Let us, as we are at liberty to do, suppose all the other accidents of the case reversed. Let us suppose that a heartless husband has deserted an innocent and amiable wife to live with an abandoned mistress, and that, late in life, having quarrelled with his virtuous relatives, he is enabled, by a marriage with his paramour, to provide himself with a ready-made family of lawful children, and to ruin the prospects of some exemplary and ill-used brother or nephew, upon whom the property is settled in the absence of direct heirs; thus securing, through the mercy of the law, the pleasures of adultery during his youth, and the advantages of matrimony in his riper years. Would not such materials, in the hands of a skilful story-teller, make quite as good a case against the new law which Mr. Collins would enact, as he has made against the old law which he desires to repeal? Does not he see that all the virtues which he heaps on the erring couple, and all the vices which he attributes to the lawful wife, are simply so much dust thrown in the eyes of the reader, to blind him to the real merits of the argument? Does he not see that the existing law would have been exactly as just, or exactly as unjust, had the forsaken wife been the most admirable of women, and her illegal successor the most shameless of harlots? Or can any law be contrived by human wisdom which may not be made to appear oppressive by this sort of special pleading? Does not the punishment of a felon inflict a stigma on his children? And should there be, therefore, no punishment for felony?

As a pendant to the practical philosophy of the author, it is only fair to subjoin a specimen of his speculative meditations. It is instructive, as showing the sort of sententious platitudes which can be penned by a really able writer, when he condescends to lower himself to the sensation level:—

"Nothing in this world is hidden for ever. The gold which has lain for centuries unsuspected in the ground, reveals itself one day on the surface. Sand turns traitor, and betrays the footstep that has passed over it; water gives back to the tell-tale surface the body that has been drowned. Fire itself leaves the confession, in ashes, of the substance consumed in it. Hate breaks its prison-secrecy in the thoughts, through the doorway of the eyes; and Love finds the Judas who betrays it by a kiss. Look where we will, the inevitable law of revelation is one of the laws of nature: the lasting preservation of a secret is a miracle which the world has never yet seen."

It would be strange, indeed, if the world had seen it, since, in order to see it, the secret must no longer be preserved. The most completely preserved secret is, of course, that whose existence is least suspected; and if ten thousand such secrets existed, the world, simply because they are preserved, could not possibly know them to exist. The marrow of all this wordy wisdom is contained in the self-evident proposition, that a secret, so long as it is a secret, is a secret. Surely never was truism so pompously expanded in the mouth of a *spruch-sprecher*, or *sayer of sayings*, since the oracular declaration of the clown in 'Twelfth-Night:' "*Bonos dies*, Sir Toby: for as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, *That that is, is;* so I, being master parson, am master parson. For what is *that* but *that*, and *is* but *is?*"

Our next tale of this class is one which gives us some ground of hope that this folly at least is in a fair way of curing itself by its own extravagance. When a fashion becomes vulgar, there is a prospect of its ceasing to be fashionable; and there is some chance for matrimony when fornication is patronised by Mr. James M'Grigor Allan. This zealous propagandist, having compounded a very insipid mixture of dulness and self-conceit in the 'Last Days of a Bachelor,' has ventured to flavour these ingredients with a seasoning of immorality and unbelief in

'Nobly False.' The character of the hero, who bears the romantic name of Gerald Lindor, "is suggested," as the author tells us, "by that of Shelley the poet, . . . a man who was in advance of his age, and consequently in some degree a martyr to his invincible and uncompromising love of truth." But the "pard-like spirit, beautiful and swift," evaporates in Mr. Allan's crucible, leaving a *caput mortuum* in the likeness of a vulgar infidel demagogue. The author has about as much appreciation of his hero as the Roman imitators who went with bare feet and unshorn beards in admiration of the virtues of Cato. He is quite incapable of understanding that there is a difference between loving or admiring a man in spite of his errors, and loving or admiring him in consequence of them. He selects, as the prominent features of Shelley's character, his religious scepticism and his lax opinions on marriage, and transfers them, according to the approved receipt for a sensation novel. to the hero of a tale ending in the year 1861. Gerald, the son of a rich baronet, falls in love with a peasant girl, named Miriam Groves; but having promised his dying mother not to marry before he is twenty-five, he keeps the promise to the letter by taking Miriam as his mistress instead of his wife. Another match being in contemplation for Gerald, Miriam resolves to sacrifice herself to his family interests, but thinks that the sacrifice will be incomplete unless she also makes him hate her memory. In pursuance of this design she makes an assignation with another man, and appears with him in public at the representation of 'La Traviata,' having previously fortified herself with brandy, or, as the author elegantly expresses it, with "alcoholic stimulus." Having thus laid in a stock of courage, she follows up the brandy by strychnine, and finally dies in a hospital, after an interview with her lover, in which she frustrates her purpose by explaining it. A year after her death, Gerald marries the lady intended for him by his family, and completes the sacrifice by shooting himself on his wedding-night. The *moral* of the story, as expressed by its title, is, that the noblest sacrifice a woman can make to her lover is the surrender, first of her virtue, and then of her fair fame.

There is, however, a grander sacrifice in the book—and that is, the self-immolation of the author. Not Dogberry himself

ever manifested such anxiety to be "writ down an ass" in the discharge of his duty, as does Mr. M'Grigor Allan to appear in the same character in behalf of his darling theories. The preliminary bray of his preface is a direct challenge to the reader, to forewarn him what sort of an animal he is to expect:—

"Respecting my heroine, Miriam, an ideal of womanly love and disinterestedness, of which I have dreamed for years before I attempted to fix the image of my fancy; I have doubtless been influenced in the conception of her character by such world-renowned types as those contained in 'Undine,' 'Paul and Virginia,' the 'Haidée' of Byron, 'Marguerite' in Faust, 'Atala,' 'Romeo and Juliette' (*sic*), 'The Bride of Lammermoor,' &c. &c. . . . It is superfluous for me to say that I do not for an instant *compare* my humble work with any of these master-pieces. All I would say, while bowing before my intellectual liege lords, and gratefully and reverently acknowledging the inspiration I have received from them, is, that in Miriam I have dared to dream of striking a still higher chord of sympathy, of a woman's devotion more sublime and complete than I have yet seen presented in fiction; a devotion even more heart-moving than that exemplified in Jeptha's (*sic*) daughter cheerfully offering her bosom to the sacrificial knife, since it is illustrative of the strongest of human ties—Love."

The author further tells that the incidents of his tale "have been wrought with an eye to future adaptation to the stage." Imagine the dramatic effect of the two following scenes:—

"All was done which medical science and skill could suggest, to neutralize the effects of the strychnine which Miriam had swallowed. The stomach-pump was used, and the proper antidotes, emetics, decoctions of bark, and warm water, liberally applied, and with tolerable success, so far as counteracting the direct agency of the poison was concerned."

* * * * * *

"'It is too late,' said Gerald, with a ghastly look. 'God alone can read your heart! If you truly repent! Oh, my heart is on fire! I carry death in my veins! My will is below! Downey! This poison is too slow! It racks, and does not kill! Miriam, I come!' and pressing the pistol to his forehead, he pulled the trigger, and fell against the picture of Miriam, which was stained with his blood!"

Our exhibition would be incomplete without the following specimen of the author's adoption of the favourite cant of a certain school of theology of the present day:—

"Your mind is not of the calibre to understand that *higher faith* which may exist with honest doubts, or even a bold denial of that puerile conception, the God of the Priests."

'The Law of Divorce,' like 'Recommended to Mercy,' is a tale written to illustrate the superiority of illegal over legal connexions between man and woman, though using a somewhat different machinery for the purpose. Roland Elsmere, the hero of this tale, though not exactly guilty of bigamy, nevertheless finds himself hampered by the opposing claims of two simultaneous wives—one the wife *de facto*, the other, in the opinion of the author, the wife *de jure*. In plain language, he has divorced his first wife, for the most sufficient of all causes, and has married a second; and the purpose of the tale is, by means of various arguments, theological, moral, and artistic, to hold up to execration the law which has permitted him to do the one and the other. The theological and moral arguments we shall not attempt to discuss. They belong to a question which is admitted by the highest authorities to be one of exceeding difficulty and delicacy, and which assuredly cannot be satisfactorily treated in connection with a work of fiction. But, in the name of common reverence and common decency, we are bound to protest against the levity which mixes up the solemn reflections which belong to these aspects of the question with the claptrap devices and theatrical artifices of a fourth-rate sensation story. Side by side with quotations from Scripture and appeals to the authority of the Church, the reader is regaled with an artistic commentary consisting of the same kind of special pleading that is conspicuous in the novels previously noticed. There is an exhibition of highly-coloured fancy portraits of repulsive virtue and attractive vice. Catherine, the second wife, the wife by law, is described as cold-hearted, suspicious, mean, hard, coarse, violent. Harriet, the first wife, and still, in the author's opinion, the wife *jure divino*, is gentle, affectionate, fascinating, with every moral and religious excellence that can adorn a woman—except, of course, the one which society has perversely selected as the cardinal virtue of the sex.

"True it is, she has one failing:
When had woman ever less?"

She is an adulteress, and that under aggravating rather than

extenuating circumstances, being, by her own confession, the seducer as well as the seduced. But the moral teaching of this class of novels is to extenuate this particular sin, as compared with many others towards which society is more lenient. From all this licentious twaddle it is really refreshing to turn to downright old Johnson's coarse but honest reply to a similar strain of sophistry: "My dear Sir, never accustom your mind to mingle virtue and vice. The woman's a ———, and there's an end on't."

Besides having two wives, the hero of this tale has also a sister-in-law; and his position between the divorced wife and her sister might almost suggest that other marriage laws besides that which gives the title to the book were acting as a cruel restraint on his capacious affections:—

"He sat between her and Harriet on the couch; his right arm clasped the one sister, and his left was twined round the waist of the other; and the head of each lay warm, glossy, odorous, and beautiful, on his anxious bosom."

The sister, however, soon finds a lover of her own in the person of an Italian patriot, who is burning to fight the battles of his oppressed country under the banner of Garibaldi; and only remains in inglorious peace because he "has received a blow under the right eye which has materially enfeebled its sight." The effects of this blow are described by the sufferer himself:—

"The purpose of my life was frustrated. One half hour of anger and wounded pride had robbed me of my career of glory. Again and again I have sought to serve even as a private soldier in the cause of my country; *but no army-surgeon will admit me into a regiment, in consequence of the impaired vision which I owe to that unhappy duel.*"

We tremble to think what might have become of Greek and Roman history, if Philip of Macedon and Hannibal had been subjected to the inspection of these fastidious army-surgeons, to say nothing of the double disqualification of John Zisca and "blind old Dandolo!" It is difficult to match this exquisite absurdity; but the following interrogative sketch of the Galatea to this warlike Polyphemus may perhaps be thought not unworthy to stand beside it:—

"Was there no counterpart to these questionings in the breast of Lizzy—gentle, thoughtful Lizzy? Were her slumbers unbroken? Did her beauteous head lie motionless and unturned on its pillow? Did no mellifluous voice ring in her ears through the passages of the night? Did no vision of a young and noble-hearted patriot haunt her in her dreams?" &c. &c.

From vice to crime, from the divorce-court to the police-court, is but a single step. When fashionable immorality becomes insipid, the materials for sensation may still be found, hot and strong, in the 'Newgate Calendar;' especially if the crime is of recent date, having the merits of personality and proximity to give it a nervous as well as a moral effect. Unhappily, the materials for such excitement are not scanty, and an author who condescends to make use of them need have little difficulty in selecting the most available. Let him only keep an eye on the criminal reports of the daily newspapers, marking the cases which are honoured with the especial notice of a leading article, and become a nine days' wonder in the mouths of quidnuncs and gossips; and he has the outline of his story not only ready-made, but approved beforehand as of the true sensation cast. Then, before the public interest has had time to cool, let him serve up the exciting viands in a *réchauffé*, with a proper amount of fictitious seasoning, and there emerges the criminal variety of the Newspaper Novel, a class of fiction having about the same relation to the genuine historical novel that the police reports of the 'Times' have to the pages of Thucydides or Clarendon. More than one of the books on our list belong to this class. The very dull tale called 'Wait and Hope,' consisting for the most part of insufferably tedious conversations, aims at enlivening its general torpor by exciting a momentary shudder at the carpet-bag mystery of Waterloo Bridge; while the author of 'Recommended to Mercy' deals out the same wares on a larger scale, under the appropriate title of 'Such Things are.' The latter author "ventures to remind the reader of the fact that all which trenches on either the mysterious or the horrible has for the present generation an apparently irresistible attraction;" and by way of feeding this depraved taste, has "brought again to the light of recollection a shadowy vision of two past but as yet undiscovered crimes,"—in other words—the Road murder and the Glasgow

poisoning. These two crimes are taken out of their original associations, and, with some change of circumstances, are fastened upon two "fast young ladies," bosom friends to each other, and who, by a most marvellous coincidence, become the wives of two brothers. The one, some time after her marriage, is discovered by her horrified husband to be the person principally suspected of "the famous Bogden murder;" the other, on the eve of her marriage, being threatened with an exposure of some passages in her earlier life, quietly gets rid of the obnoxious witness by a dose of strychnine, and, on the day but one following, figures as a bride in a "quiet and unostentatious wedding at St. George's, Hanover Square."

There is something unspeakably disgusting in this ravenous appetite for carrion, this vulture-like instinct which smells out the newest mass of social corruption, and hurries to devour the loathsome dainty before the scent has evaporated. When some memorable crime of bygone days presents features which have enabled it to survive the crowd of contemporary horrors, and, by passing into the knowledge of a new generation, has in some degree attained to the dignity of history, there is much to be said in defence of a writer of fiction who sees in the same features something of a romantic interest which makes them available for the purposes of his art; but it is difficult to extend the same excuse to the gatherer of fresh stimulants from the last assizes. The poet or the philosopher may be allowed to moralise over the dry skeleton turned up to view in the graveyard or the battlefield, but we doubt whether the strongest-stomached medical student would find a theme equally poetical or equally instructive in the subject laid out in the dissecting-room.

But all this is done, as the author tells us, "with a purpose," to warn fast young ladies, forsooth, of the fatal consequences to which fastness may lead them! As if any moral end could be served by a real crime tacked on to an imaginary criminal, without even a *callida junctura* to disguise the clumsy patchwork! Crimes of this horrible individuality are the very last from which any one will draw a general moral: they are the crimes of their perpetrators, and of no one else. Even the plain lesson that might be drawn from the real dying speech and confession of the actual criminal is lost in this diluted

mixture of fact and fiction. Everybody knows that the crimes as described were not really committed by the persons to whom they are attributed in the story, but by very different persons and under very different circumstances; and the whole moral is at once destroyed by the glaring untruthfulness and incongruity of the story. A book of this sort is simply a chamber of horrors without even the merit of giving a correct likeness of the criminals exhibited. To think of pointing a moral by stimulants of this kind is like holding a religious service in a gin-palace.

Where the excitement of a real police-court is wanting, the novelist of criminal life may supply its place by variety and strangeness of imaginary adventure. Of all heroes of the felonious class, commend us to George Messenger, *alias* Scarisbrick, *alias* Dandy Dangerfield, the prominent figure in the group of blackguards of both sexes who form the principal *dramatis personæ* of the 'Old Roman Well.' This marvellous personage, within the compass of two volumes, goes through adventures enough to furnish half a dozen Turpins or Jack Sheppards. He begins life, where George Talboys is supposed to end it, at the bottom of a well—scarcely in this case the habitation of truth—though his biographer, more communicative than the narrator of 'Lady Audley's Secret,' is kind enough to explain the circumstances under which he got out unhurt, after falling a depth of a hundred and fifty feet. "I expex, ye know, it's owin' to its bein' so light—all gristle instead of bones—and p'raps its clothes spread out as it wint down, and so sunk its fall like." Thus marvellously preserved, the child is doubtless destined to be a great man; but unfortunately his greatness is of the wrong kind—that of a scoundrel, not of a hero. He first figures as a juvenile poacher in the country; then runs away to London, and falls into the meshes of a beautiful fiend, a sort of Lady Audley of low life (these female fiends are a stock article with sensation novelists), and passes through various stages of town rascality, under the tutorage of a gentleman who has graduated in the successive honours of a "shiverer," a "cadger," a "duffer," an "area-sneak," a "shop-bouncer," a "fogle-buzzer," a "swell-mobbite," a "rampsman," and a "cracksman." Under this hopeful instructor, he ascends from theft to robbery, and from robbery to murder, with interludes of softer vice as a lady-

killer; is hanged, very justly, in the middle of his course; is brought to life again through a wonderful elixir administered by an old ferryman, who turns out to be the husband of the beautiful fiend; is sent by the said ferryman to America, furnished with medical secrets by which he makes his fortune as a doctor; comes back to England in ten years, rolling in wealth, and with a "supernatural paleness" (the remains of the *sus. per coll.*) which disguises his identity from all his former friends; spends untold thousands in all kinds of charitable works; succeeds to the estates of his ancestors, whom he discovers to be of an old family in his native county; becomes a husband and a father; and dies at last in the odour of sanctity, under the influence of which "his face glowed with a heavenly light." The reader closes the book impressed with a conviction (not in the judicial sense) of the beneficial effects of hanging as a moral restorative, if the patient is only fortunate enough to survive the operation, and of the author's profound acquaintance with thieves' Latin, which he coins *ad libitum* by the simple process of spelling words backwards.

A very brief notice will be sufficient to dispose of some of the smaller fry on our multifarious list.

'Miriam May,' 'Crispin Ken,' and 'Philip Paternoster' are specimens of the theological novel, which employs the nerves as a vehicle for preaching in the literal sense of the term. The object of these tales is to inculcate certain doctrines, or rather a hatred of opposite doctrines, by painting offensive portraits of persons professing the obnoxious opinions. The two former preach on the High-Church side, by exhibiting villainous specimens of Low-Churchmen and Dissenters; the third preaches on the Low-Church side, by drawing ludicrous caricatures of Tractarians, and by the original and ingenious witticism of calling St. Barnabas St. Barabbas. 'The Weird of the Wentworths' (a sensation title) teaches a lesson the very opposite of theological, being chiefly remarkable as showing the agreeable varieties which it is possible to introduce into the art of profane swearing. 'Passages in the Life of a Fast Young Lady' (another sensation title) is one of those tales of personal scandal of which we have already spoken. 'Only a Woman,' a tale of feminine passion and masculine weakness, is chiefly remarkable for the author's high estimate of the female sex—

the heroine being a young woman whose animal charms are dwelt upon with unnecessary minuteness; but who is described as having "no troublesome moral principles to keep her in check;" while at the same time she is "as far above" another young woman "as Cotopaxi is above Primrose Hill." 'Harold Overdon' and 'Liberty Hall, Oxon,' are offenders of another and a far worse kind—coarse tales of unblushing profligacy, which would be mischievous were not their immorality counteracted by their stupidity. 'Ashcombe Churchyard' is an attempt to combine the sensational with the domestic. The double purpose extends the story to a tedious length, and the glowing tints of the former ingredient harmonise badly with the sober background of the latter. In connection with the quiet history of an impoverished family, and commonplace moral reflections coloured to match, we are dazzled by fitful flashes of the pathetic and the horrible, comprising a cruel father and a victim daughter; a seduction transacted in a *more ferarum* style, which it is to be hoped is not often to be met with in fact or in fiction; a murder, or something very like one, through medical breach of trust; a mysterious legend and a family doom; a second murder—this time by a pistol—and three broken hearts, leading respectively to immediate death, imbecility, and lunacy. The hero or villain of the piece (in tales of this kind the two terms are nearly synonymous) is a certain fascinating dispensary doctor, whose charms beguile his female patients into a forgetfulness, sometimes of prudence, sometimes of duty, sometimes of common decency; who is attached, rather beyond Platonic bounds, to another man's wife; is assailed with fierce love by an earl's daughter on one side, and an heiress of vast wealth on the other and is finally married, sorely against his will, and shot on his wedding-day; after which we are confidently told that his spirit waited at the gates of Paradise till it was joined by that of a married lady (not his own wife), with the following celestial results:—

"They had found the star that had shone a moment on their early youth and then disappeared, leaving them to grope to the end of their pilgrimage in darkness. They had found the harp that they had strongly swept in life's morning, but which, as soon as it was touched, 'passed in music out of sight,' leaving them in a howling wilderness of discord. They had found the solution of that

dark enigma which had been propounded to them when they began their rugged march through earth, and the meaning of which seemed till now hidden from them by a thousand mystical wrappings. They had found the missing verity."

The above samples may be considered as belonging to the aristocratic branch of sensational literature, so far at least as high prices and hotpressed paper can make them so. But the craving for sensation extends to all classes of society—

"Plebeium in circo positum est et in aggere fatum;"

and our task would be incomplete without some notice of the cheap publications which supply sensation for the million in penny and halfpenny numbers. These publications are not directly included in the list of works contemplated in our previous observations, and to examine them in detail would require a separate article, and a somewhat different method of treatment; but, indirectly, they belong to our subject, as the anatomy of the skeleton frame belongs to the surgical treatment of the living body. In a rigidly scientific study of the subject they would perhaps claim the principal place, so far as science aims at studying effects in their causes, at analyzing compounds and exhibiting their simplest elements. These tales are to the full-grown sensation novel what the bud is to the flower, what the fountain is to the river, what the typical form is to the organised body. They are the original germ, the primitive monad, to which all the varieties of sensational literature may be referred, as to their source, by a law of generation at least as worthy of the attention of the scientific student as that by which Mr. Darwin's bear may be supposed to have developed into a whale. Fortunately in this case the rudimental forms have been continued down to the epoch of the mature development. In them we have sensationism pure and undisguised, exhibited in its naked simplicity, stripped of the rich dress which conceals while it adorns the figure of the more ambitious varieties of the species. A few specimens will serve the purposes of study better than many descriptions. The reader is requested to observe the compact structure of the sentences, as well as the exciting nature of the theme. In these infinitesimal doses is contained the whole virtue of sensationism, as surely as the virtue of a homœopathic medicine is contained in the concen-

trated globule, whatever may be the volume of water in which it is diluted. Here is a dose, labelled 'May Dudley, or the White Mask,' possibly the original of 'Mokeanna, or the White Witness.' The scene, it should be remembered, is laid in the reign of George III., with the manners of whose Court the author displays an intimate acquaintance:—

"The Queen began to fan herself, and unable to restrain his curiosity, the King strolled towards May. She opened the book of prints, and placed her finger on what she had written.

"The words were like fire to the King.

"'In half an hour the White Mask will arrive at the Palace, with the roquelaire (*sic*) of the fair Susannah, and ask for a private audience of the Queen.'

"'Yah! Bah! Boo!' cried the King.

"The Queen started to her feet.

"The ladies of honour looked about them in amazement.

"The King pretended to limp, and held up one foot.

"'The corn again!' he said. 'The pain in our right toe—a dreadful pain! Good morning, ladies—good morning. Forced to go away to look after our toe. Forced to go to the—the—Red Room at top of the back stairs. Hem! hem!"

"The King limped from the room.

"May Dudley, in the confusion, had quietly torn out the picture from the book of prints on which she had written the few words that had so affected the King.

"The Queen rose.

"'Ladies, till three o'clock we have no occasion for your kind service.'

"The ladies all bowed low, and the Queen left the room."

From this contemplation of the state and ceremony of royalty we may proceed, under the guidance of the same author, to a study of the gentle loves of aristocracy, and the lawless violence of plebeian criminality. We are thus favoured with an introduction to all classes of society. Here is a picture of refined love painted to the life:—

"For one short hour!

"Only one circlet of the golden hands of the costly Sèvres time-piece on the chimney-piece of that fair and luxurious boudoir of May Dudley, let us, O reader, step back with you into the realms of time past.

"While May is contending with Sir Reuben Digby in the Park,

Rachael is at home with a heart so full of fears—so full of love—so full of deep anxiety to do something that shall testify to all that love and all that devotion she felt for May Dudley, that at times it seemed as though it would burst the confines of her bosom with its swelling emotions.

"And had Rachael, too, no deep feelings and anxieties specially of her own?

"Oh, yes!

"She, too, loved.

"She loved May, but it was as the cold glitter of the moonbeams upon alpine summits in comparison with another love that had found a home in her heart.

"She loved Joseph Digby.

"How strange a woven web is human life!

"How ill-assorted, at times, seem the colours, and how oddly mixed the fabrics! Here were four people—May Dudley, Rachael, Justin Rivers, and Joseph Digby.

"They all loved.

"All had warm, affectionate natures—all gentle and noble aspirations—and yet they were all unhappy!

"Some with fear.

"Some with the hopeless agony of a lost passion.

"It was only a narcotic—only the drowsy influence of the nodding poppy—that brought slumber to the vexed brain of Justin Rivers; for his every nerve, his every sense, was in a state of powerful tension—in the constant fear that some evil would befall his darling May.

"And she—she, the beautiful, admired, and courted May Dudley—was she happy?

"No, no!

"Her thoughts were with her wounded lover, and were full of all those vague surmises which torment the soul when suffering sits on the brow of the loved one.

"But still May and Justin were comparatively happy.

"That is, comparatively with Rachael.

"Comparatively with poor Joseph.

"They knew that they loved, and were beloved in return; but poor Rachael and poor Joseph had no such blessed consolation.

"Little did Joseph Digby imagine that he had lit up in the bosom of Rachael a flame that was consuming her existence.

"She loved him as such a nature as hers only can love.

"Once and for ever.

"Perhaps had Joseph Digby not been so much blinded by his own hopeless passion for May Dudley, he would have observed something

in the looks, in the tone, in the manner of Rachael, which would have let him perceive the state of her affections.

"But he did not. His view in that house was limited, and bounded by the sweet eyes of May.

"And now we go back that brief hour we have mentioned, and we find ourselves in the principal drawing-room of the mansion of May Dudley.

"Rachael is there, resting her head upon her hand, mourning her lost affections.

"Quite lost affections, since she knew so well that the heart of Joseph was another's.

"There is a tap at the door of the apartment.

"Listlessly Rachael gives the permission to enter. She scarcely looks up, but there is something in the very atmosphere that surrounds the loved one, ever proclaiming his or her presence.

"Before the visitor was across the threshold of the room, Rachael knew that it was Joseph.

"With a flush, and then a paleness, and then a flush again of colour that was deeper than before, she rose to meet him.

"Then she half shrieked, for there was a look upon the face of Joseph that was horrible to see.

"It was not sickness!

"It was not fear!

"It was something heroic mingled with something despairing.

"The sort of look with which some martyr might go to death to testify to some sublime truth against which the hand of persecution had been armed.

"And that was just the feeling of Joseph.

"He was going to die for May Dudley!

"That was the look!

* * * * * *

"She sunk to his feet.

"She uplifted her hands in the attitude of prayer.

"'Joseph! Joseph! you must not, you shall not die, even for Justin Rivers and for May, since you too are loved!'

"The looks!

"The attitude!

"The tone!

"All sufficient to proclaim the cherished secret of Rachael's heart Joseph knew then that she loved him!

"'Oh! this is very sad,' he said gently.

"Rachael burst into tears."

The plebeian scene represents an attempt made by May Dudley, in the disguise of the White Mask, to rescue the captive

Joseph from "the old Gatehouse in Westminster," in which he has been imprisoned by his father, Sir Reuben Digby, the "chief of the Secret Police." She has summoned to her assistance a fraternity of thieves residing in a subterranean vault under Hungerford Market —

"May spoke now in cold, harsh tones of command.

"'I, the White Mask, demand of you by what right you hold here, as a prisoner, one Joseph Digby?'

"'Joseph—Digby! A warrant!'

"'I granted no warrant, and I do not permit any one to be here a prisoner, without one, who is a friend of mine.'

"'A friend?'

"'I have said so. We are three.'

"'Three?'

"'Yes. As this is!'

"May touched the White Mask.

"'Three highwaymen! Three White Masks! One, two—oh!'

"The Governor was getting bewildered.

"May spoke again.

"'You will surrender to me, and to freedom, Joseph Digby.'

"'I—I—dare not!'

"'But you will.'

"May took a gold repeater from her pocket, and cast it to the floor at the feet of the Governor.

"'If you have light enough, see that one minute more elapses not on that dial before you obey me, or you die!'

"'I can't see it.'

"'We can, then, provide you with death easier than with more light.'

"'Joe the Cracker stepped forward, and put right into the ear of the Governor the muzzle of a pistol.

"'Shall I settle him, noble Captain?'

"'No; he will obey.'

"The Governor was white as—ay, as white as the White Mask, only that upon his face there was the expression of intense fear, and upon that there was none.'

"'I cannot!' he said. 'A man can but do but what he can.'

"'Don't make any excuses,' said Joe. 'Where's the goldfinch?'

"'Let me get up.'

"'With all the pleasure in life.'

"The Governor was assisted to his feet.

"'I cannot help all this,' he said. 'If you ring my bell again twice, it will bring the prison clerk, and the man you speak of can

then be released. Ah, no! Ha, ha! Corn in Egypt! Ha, ha The Light Horse! Rescue, rescue, rescue!'

"With a dash and a clatter, a party of the King's Light Horse, escorting a coach, reached the door of the prison."

This specimen belongs to one of the lower forms of sensational life. The following is from a journal of higher character, and may be regarded as representing a transition stage to the superior organization. The taste for revelations of the inner life of the aristocracy displays itself with unabated vigour, accompanied by the genuine sensation device of a pre-matrimonial secret:—

"'But,' cried the marquis, eagerly, 'it is precisely before our marriage——"

"'With which you have nothing to do,' interposed the marchioness, sternly. 'Let me not have to repeat that I wish to see the man no more. I shall make it my endeavour to prevent the chance arising of ever meeting him more. And now, my lord, I have brought our interview to a close. All that I could have expected from it has taken place. Whatever may have been your anticipations, you must be content with the result, and take it as it is. We now, and at this moment, part for ever, or resume our relations as they have been, without, however, one allusion being made at any time to what has just passed between us. If it is your will that we shall part for ever, I shall know it by receiving from you no communication between my departure from this room and an hour hence. If, on the contrary, you are content to let the world maintain its inflated sense of your untarnished dignity, you will send to me, ere the expiration of an hour, a note which will contain only the words, "I assent." I shall follow the receipt of that note by ordering preparations to be secretly made—you will not, my lord, object, I know, to that part of the arrangement—to proceed abroad, say Rome, where we can make a stay for at least one, perhaps two years, the term will depend on your lordship, and—a——'

"She hesitated: a flush of colour went across her face, disappeared instantly, and left her deathly pale.

"'What?' he inquired curiously, as she paused.

"Her voice faltered.

"'The duration of one of our lives,' she added. 'In such case the survivor would naturally return to England. Lord Westchester, I leave the decision in your hands. Do not complain if, in making your election, you should err, and your mistake should prove fatal. You, and you alone, will be to blame.'

"She bowed stiffly and grandly to him, and glided from the room.

"He made a movement to stay her, but she was gone.

"Bewildered, excited, astounded, overwhelmed by the mastery over him, which from the first she had seized, and to the last maintained, he gave way to an ebullition of frantic emotion, and flung himself upon the ground with all the wildness and frenzy of a maniac."

To these specimens of the sensationist's power of making, may we venture to add one more as a sample of his ability in marring? Even the genius of Scott must succumb to his touch. Behold the 'Heart of Mid-Lothian' metamorphosed into 'Effie Deans, or the Lily of St. Leonards,' by George Armitage, author of 'The Felon's Daughter, or Pamela's Perils.' The author, as will be seen, is smitten with a desire to emulate the poetry as well as the prose of his great original:—

"The night was mirk and drear.

"The scene, a piled up mass of rocks, terminating in the wild and picturesque boulders known as Salisbury Crags, near to the town of Edinburgh.

"Lightning from storm-riven clouds each instant imparted a ghastly reality and radiance to the desolate scene.

"The roar of a cataract close at hand drowned all minor sounds in the tumbling rush of its waters.

"'Help!—oh, help me now, husband! Geordie, I do love you—I did love you! In the sight of heaven I am yours—your own wife, Effie!'

"'Peace, girl, or this knife shall soon drink the life-blood of the bairn!'

"These last words were uttered by what might be a woman by the dress and general appearance, although the tall, unfeminine stature, and the fierce attitude, combined with the hoarse voice, that was heard above the roar and tumult of the storm, seemed to give a negative to the supposition.

"Crouching down close to a rock, the slippery surface of which afforded no hold to her, although she strove in vain to grasp it with one disengaged hand, was a young girl.

"So young, so child-like, so lovely in her deep distress and tears; her flood of golden hair, all dishevelled and streaming to the wild night blast; her tartan cloak and hood streaming from her in the wind like the banner of some clan of the Highland heaths; agony upon her fair and gentle face; her voice raised to a shrieking cry,

that gathered echoes as it flew from rock to rock, repeating the word 'Help! help!'

"And clasped to her breast, with the other hand—held closely, and wrapped up in the folds of a cloak of costly cloth, clasped by a jewel, this young girl, who called upon heaven and earth to aid her, held a child!

"An infant!

* * * * * *

"'No, mother—no!' screamed a strange voice, and the uplifted hand and arm of the hag was stayed. 'No, mother, you must not kill the bairn, for poor Meg's sake. Geordie will love her again if she has a little bairn to show him! Ha! ha! ha! ha! ha! ha! I like the sea-bird's shriek, and I can mock it!

"Meg o' the Sea, Meg o' the Sea,
She loved too well her bonny lad;
Joy was dancing in her e'e,
But her heart was sore and sad.

Nay, mother, you shall not kill the bairn. Geordie loves her for the bairn, and he will love poor Meg Murdochson again, if she hold it to his lips for a bonny kiss.

"A bairn's a bairn, for a' that,
And a' that, and a' that,
A bairn's a bairn, for a' that;
Whoe'er the lassie be.'"

"Bless thee, Bottom! bless thee! thou art translated."

It is unnecessary to multiply our examples, whether of the higher or the lower order. Evidence enough has been adduced to show that sensation novels must be recognized as a great fact in the literature of the day, and a fact whose significance is by no means of an agreeable kind. Regarding these works merely as an efflorescence, as an eruption indicative of the state of health of the body in which they appear, the existence of an impure or a silly crop of novels and the fact that they are eagerly read are by no means favourable symptoms of the conditions of the body of society. But it is easier to detect the disease than to suggest the remedy. The praiseworthy attempts of individual proprietors of circulating libraries, to weed their collections of silly or mischievous works, have been too partial and isolated to produce any perceptible result, and have even acted as an advertisement of the rejected books. A more general and combined attempt in this direction is a thing rather to be wished than expected. Could a taste for the best class of fictions be

cultivated in the minds of the rising generation, it might, perhaps, have its effect in lessening the craving for this kind of unnatural excitement; and could any check be imposed on the rapidity of production, it might improve the quality of the article produced. It is difficult to believe that the habitual devourers of sensation novels have ever read Scott; indeed, we have known young persons, familiar with the latest products of the circulating library, who not only had never read Scott, but who had no idea that he was worth reading. It is as easy to imagine that the blessed sun of heaven should prove a micher and eat blackberries, as that one capable of appreciating the creations of the Great Magician should relish the sort of stuff of which three-fourths of the books on our present list are made. But, alas! Scott himself has well-nigh shared the fate which he lamented as having befallen Richardson, Mackenzie, and Burney. A new generation of readers has sprung up, who have reversed the fault of which Horace complains, and gone back to that for which Homer apologises. We have no need of the subtlety of "the rule that laid the horsetail bare" to argue against readers who admire no authors of less than a hundred years old: we have rather to echo the comment of Telemachus on the taste of his day:—

> "For novel lays attract our ravished ears,
> But old, the mind with inattention hears.'

By way of experiment, and to give the old at least a fair chance of competing with the new, we should like to see a lending library established somewhat on the principle of the 'Retrospective Review,' which should circulate no books but those which have received the stamp of time in testimony of their merits. No book should be admitted under twenty years old, a very liberal allowance for the life of a modern novel, and which is long enough to give rise to a new generation who could not have read the book on its first coming out. Such an establishment, if the public mind could be persuaded to tolerate it, would have at least one commercial advantage which is denied to some of its present rivals. It would be relieved from the necessity, which is often imposed upon them, of buying up nearly the whole impression of the last work of some popular author, which, having been already published for a very trifling

sum in the pages of some magazine, is forthwith reprinted at five or six times the price, as a separate work.* A real competition between old favourites and new would have a good effect, not in destroying, which is not to be wished, but in weeding the luxuriant produce of the present day. The appetite even of a novel-reader, has its limits; and if the best of the old books could be brought in, the worst of the new must drop out to make way for them. There would be an increased struggle for existence, under the pressure of which the weaker writers would give way, and the stronger would be improved by the stimulus of effective competition.

Even if no remedy can be found, it is something to know the disease. There is a satisfaction in exposing an impostor, even when we feel sure that the world will continue to believe in him. The idol may still be worshipped, yet it is right to tell its worshippers that it is an idol; grotesque, it may be, or horrible in its features, but mere wood or stone, brass or clay, in its substance. The current folly may be destined to run its course, as other follies have done before it; and it must be confessed that there are as yet but few signs of its abating. But the duty of the preacher is the same, whether he succeed or fail. Though we cannot flatter ourselves with the hope that our protest will have the disenchanting influence of "Dian's bud o'er Cupid's flower," we are not the less bound to place on record the grounds of our belief, that, when the reading public wakes up from its present delusion, it will discover, with regard to some at least of the favourites of the day, that its affections have been bestowed upon an object not very different in kind from the animal of which Titania was enamoured.

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* The following comparative table of the prices of some of our most popular novels, on first and second publication, has been furnished through a friend. It is curious, as showing how much of the cost of a book is due to the "getting up" of it.

			Published separately.	
		s. d.		s. d.
'A Strange Story,' in Nos. of	'All the Year Round,' ..	4 4	.... 2 vols.	24 0
'The Woman in White'	ditto ..	6 8	.... 3 vols.	31 6
'No Name'	ditto ..	6 8	.... 3 vols.	31 6
'Great Expectations'	ditto ..	4 4	.... 3 vols.	31 6
'Verner's Pride'	'Once a Week'	8 0	.... 3 vols.	31 6
'The Channings,' 24 penny Nos. of	'The Quiver'	2 0	.... 3 vols.	31 6
'Mrs. Halliburton's Troubles,' 34	ditto	2 10	.... 3 vols.	31 6
'Lady Audley's Secret,' 12 Nos. of	'The Sixpenny Mag.'	6 0	.... 3 vols.	31 6

MODERN SPIRITUALISM.

CONTENTS.

Grounds for Suspension of Judgment as to Modern Spiritualism.
Ancient and Modern Miracles.
Absurdity and Childishness of several of Mr. Home's Stories.
Modern Necromancy.
General and Special Presumptions against the Spiritual Hypothesis.
Circumstances connected with Mr. Home requiring explanation.
Mr. Howitt's Book; his Intemperate Language; his Inaccuracy.
American Spiritualism.
Lord Bacon's Spiritual Utterances.
Mr. Calhoun's Sentence.
An Illiterate Spirit.
The Spirit of Tom Paine.
Writing Mediums.
The Sceptical Conclusions apparently Necessitated by the alleged Phenomena.

MODERN SPIRITUALISM.*

SPIRIT-RAPPING is unquestionably one of the great facts of our time; we mean as regards the rapping, not necessarily as regards the spirits. That Mr. Home and his fellow-rappers can "call spirits from the vasty deep," we no more doubt than that Owen Glendower possessed a similar faculty; but whether the said spirits come when they are called, we are inclined, with Hotspur, to put in the form of a query. Not that we profess absolute unbelief; our state of mind rather approaches to that "honest doubt" which theologians of advanced views are never weary of telling us, after Tennyson, contains more faith than half the creeds. If this pretty saying of the laureate be anything more than an epigrammatic paradox, we may boast of having a very respectable share of that faith which rappers tell us is indispensable to all who would presume to criticise their performances. In virtue of this faith, which is at the same time doubt, a "becoming," as a Hegelian would say, compounded of "being" and "not-being," we profess for the present a sceptical suspension of all judgment, thereby correcting the teaching of one Hume by that of another; for the family name of Daniel the medium is identical with that of David the sceptic, and was originally, as the said David informs us, spelt in the same way, as it is still pronounced. The Southern reader will have to bear in mind this caution, framed after the example of the Prologue to the 'Rovers:'

> "Though the nice ear the erring sight belie,
> For *u* twice dotted is pronounced like *i*."

Our scepticism seems the natural result of the extraordinary and conflicting features which Mr. Home's autobiography ex-

* Published in the 'Quarterly Review,' July, 1863. 1. 'Incidents in my Life.' By D. D. Home. London, 1863. 2. 'The History of the Supernatural.' By William Howitt. 2 vols. London, 1863.

hibits. By all the rules of *a priori* reasoning, by every internal test that has hitherto been proposed to distinguish true miracles from false, the book, by its own witness of itself, would be pronounced utterly incredible. If exceeding silliness in many of the stories narrated; if the absence of all apparent purpose, beyond the gratification of a morbid curiosity; if modes of exhibition similar to those usually adopted by charlatans; if manifestations not merely marvellous to the intellect, but revolting to the moral feelings—if features such as these form a reasonable *a priori* presumption against a narrative of apparently supernatural occurrences, such presumptions undoubtedly exist and press with no light weight against the narrative before us. But on the other hand, we are bound, in justice to Mr. Home, to admit that this internal evidence against his statements has to be weighed against a very respectable amount of external evidence in their favour; that his own character, so far as we have been able to ascertain, offers no ground for suspecting his integrity; and that the authorities whom he brings forward, both as vouchers for his own trustworthiness and as eye-witnesses of the marvels which he exhibits, are such as would probably be sufficient to ensure belief in any story less intrinsically incredible.

It will, perhaps, be said, that we are not competent to determine on *a priori* grounds what the character of such supernatural manifestations ought to be, and that therefore the internal improbabilities of the narrative form no valid reason for rejecting it. We grant that such improbabilities are not the only evidence admissible in the case; that they furnish, not certainties, but only presumptions, and but one class of presumptions, to be taken into account along with other evidence for or against. We admit, also, that such presumptions may be overcome by evidence on the other side. But we must assert also, that the improbabilities in this case are of such a kind as to require an enormous amount of evidence to overcome them; that a large amount of the evidence procurable must, to the vast majority of mankind, that is to say, to all who are not themselves mediums, necessarily be at second-hand, and contain hypotheses mingled with its facts; and that the interests at stake are not of such a kind as imperatively to require us to make up our minds whether to believe or disbelieve. If the

miracles of the New Testament, to which these spiritual manifestations have been, not very reverently, compared, had been performed, not in the open day, in the streets and highways, and on such occasions as naturally offered themselves, but at sittings arranged beforehand, in an appointed place, before a few invited spectators, and by an imperfect light; if all the silly or revolting stories of the Apocryphal Gospels had been mixed up with the canonical narrative in such a manner that both must stand or fall together; if all the petty passions and wayward caprices of the spurious legends were blended into the moral atmosphere of the supernatural, together with the purity and holiness of the genuine history; if no living institution perpetuated the memory of its founder, and no important consequences, here or hereafter, depended on our belief or unbelief, —surely these circumstances, though by no means precluding the examination of evidence, would have at any rate seriously increased the difficulty, and in the same proportion diminished the importance, of belief.

We do not approve of this comparison, and we should not have made it of our own choice; but it has been made for us, and forced upon us by the writings of some of the recent defenders of "Spiritualism," who have not hesitated to claim for the modern rappings, as for the older ghost-stories, a rank as phenomena of the same kind (they do not venture to say of the same degree) with the miracles of Christ and His Apostles. No doubt this is done with a good intent, and in the supposed interests of Christian belief; but the effect on the mind of the reader is, not to raise the modern manifestations to the rank of the Scripture miracles, but rather to sink the latter to the level of a common ghost-story. When Mr. Howitt, for instance, in his preface, tells us that, "So far from holding that what are called miracles are interruptions or violations of the course of nature, he regards them only as the results of spiritual laws, which in their occasional action subdue, suspend, or neutralise the less powerful physical laws, just as a stronger chemical affinity subdues a weaker one;"—and when in his first chapter, headed 'An Apology for Faith,' after alluding to the spiritual influence acknowledged in the Scriptures, "from the first page to the last, from the Creation to Christ," he adds, "it glows in the Zend-Avesta; it stands mountain-high in the Vedas; Buddhu

lives in it in divine reverie; Brahma proclaims it in his Avataras;"—he does, in effect, concur with Professor Powell, in maintaining that "the constant belief in the miraculous may neutralise all evidential distinctions which it may be attempted to deduce;" and with Mr. Atkinson, the correspondent of Miss Martineau, when he asserts that "Christ, the prophets, the oracles, all exhibit features of the same great fact," that great fact being Mesmerism.*

To us, we must confess, so far as such a comparison can be made at all, the strange stories in Mr. Home's book appear far more nearly to resemble the marvels recorded in the Gospel of the Infancy, than the miracles of the genuine Scriptures. Some of Mr. Home's spirits are very Pucks for wanton mischief, reminding us strongly of that "merry wanderer of the night" lurking in a gossip's bowl for the noble purpose of spilling the ale; others betray the impotent petulance of a spoilt child against some person who has offended him; others appear to delight in tricks of a grotesque and ludicrous character, simply for their absurdity; while nearly all exhibit that aimless love of the marvellous for its own sake, which is characteristic of false miracles as compared with true ones. Take, for example, the following "spiritual" exhibitions:—

"Mr. Home was then thrown into the trance state, and taking the decanter in his right hand, he walked a few feet from the table, holding it in full view all the time, when, to my astonishment, I saw another decanter, apparently precisely similar to the other, in his left hand. Thus, in each of his hands I saw a decanter; and so real was the second, that I could not have told which of them was the material one. . . . . A little later, Mr. Owen's spirit came, and desired his wife's writing-desk to be placed on the table: and now the room was darkened to see if we could distinguish spirit lights, which were then seen by three of us. Presently we

* This marvellous correspondence, the preface to which is dated November, 1850, affords a remarkable instance (our modern "spiritualism" has many such) of the union of the extremes of unbelief and credulity in the same mind. In concluding her portion of the correspondence, the lady is enthusiastic in her gratitude to her guide, philosopher, and friend, for having emancipated her mind from "the little enclosure of dogma"—that is to say, among other things, from belief in a personal God. In the same autumn of 1850 appeared an account, by the same lady, of the wonderful cure effected by mesmerising a cow! To be sure, Crummie had been bled and physicked, as well as mesmerised; but the cure was attributed to the "passes made along the spine."

heard the writing-desk opened, and a hand was placed in mine, another in my wife's, and a third in Mr. Home's, each hand differing in size from the others. The alphabet was called for, and 'I fear I may have spoilt your Claude,' was spelt out. We could not understand this; but when the lamp was relighted, we found that some paint had been taken from the box from inside the desk, and had been freely used on one of my paintings, which hung several feet from where we were sitting."—pp. 181–2.

Surely this is a worthy companion to the roasted crab and the three-foot stool of the original hobgoblin, unless we suppose that the "decanter" had something to do with the double vision and the subsequent phenomena. The following is nearly as silly, petulance being substituted for mischief:—

"We had amused ourselves during the time with the article 'Spirit-rapping made easy,' in the magazine 'Once a Week,' which we left on the chiffonier. I saw something pass from the room with great velocity, which vanished under the table. A curious noise was heard, like the crumpling of paper, a spirit hand arose, appeared, and placed in the medium's hand a sheet of 'Once a Week,' crumpled up and torn. The spirits were at work destroying the magazine; they rubbed it strongly over Mr. Home's shoe, and then placed his foot upon it. The spirits gave each person a bit of the mangled magazine, and the remainder was raised up by a large spirit-hand, and placed on a vacant chair, which, by invisible power, had a short time before been moved from a distance to the table. The table was violently moved up to the centre window, before which stood a piece of the bough of the northern poplar which had been sent from the Château de C———, and which was part of that from the fall of which Mr. Home so miraculously escaped. The height of the bough was three feet eight inches, and the circumference three feet. Luminous hands were now and then visible, the table rose gently, and tipped many times against the bough; the spirits threw bits of the torn magazine about it, and placed one piece under it. I asked, in Hindostanee, 'Are you making Mr. Novra do *pooja* * to the branch?' To which they loudly rapped 'Yes.'"—p. 193.

Sometimes the departed spirit of a pickpocket exhibits a

* The word *pooja*, we are informed, always denotes worship paid to the Supreme Being: it is never used for any inferior homage. If this information is correct, the above story leaves us between the horns of a dilemma. Either the spirits did not understand the meaning of the word, or they offered divine worship to a block of wood.

hankering after his earthly vocation; whether from pure mischief or felonious design is not stated:—

"During the *séance* I had the border of a white cambric handkerchief just appearing out of the side-pocket of my paletot, which was open; and though I could see no agency, I felt something twitching at the handkerchief, and very gradually drawing it from my pocket. Simultaneously with this, my eldest daughter, who sat opposite to me, exclaimed, 'Oh! I see phosphoric fingers at papa's pocket!' and, now visibly to all, the handkerchief was slowly pulled out, and drawn under the table; whilst at the same time I felt an arm that was doing it, but which was invisible to me."—p. 77.

Here is a specimen of the grotesque, reprinted from the 'Cornhill Magazine.' The performer is a table:—

"Turning suddenly over on one side, it sunk to the floor. In this horizontal position it glided slowly towards a table which stood close to a large ottoman in the centre of the room. We had much trouble in following it, the apartment being crowded with furniture, and our difficulty was considerably increased by being obliged to keep up with it in a stooping attitude. Part of the journey it performed alone, and we were never able to reach it at any time together. Using the leg of the large table as a fulcrum, it directed its claws towards the ottoman, which it attempted to ascend, by inserting one claw in the side, then turning half-way round to make good another step, and so on. It slipped down at the first attempt, but again quietly resumed its task. It was exactly like a child trying to climb up a height. All this time we hardly touched it, being afraid of interfering with its movements, and, above all things, determined not to assist them. At last, by careful and persevering efforts, it accomplished the top of the ottoman, and stood on the summit of the column in the centre, from whence, in a few minutes, it descended to the floor by a similar process."—p. 155.

The law of gravitation, indeed, is sometimes entirely suspended in favour of tables, though we have not as yet heard that the same immunity has been extended to other articles of upholstery, or to anything not forming part of the furniture of a room. At one time, a long telescopic dining table is "made light and heavy at command" (p. 67); at another, the phenomenon is still more extraordinary, if genuine, though apparently not very difficult as a conjuror's trick:—

"The table, which was mahogany, and perfectly smooth, was elevated to an angle of thirty degrees, and held there, with everything remaining on it as before. It was interesting to see a lead pencil retaining a position of perfect rest, on a polished surface inclined at such an angle. It remained as if glued to the table, and so of everything else on it. The table was repeatedly made to resume its ordinary position, and then again its inclination as before, as if to fasten upon us the conviction that what we saw was no deception of the senses, but a veritable manifestation of spirit-presence and of spirit-power. They were then requested to elevate the table to the same angle as before, and to detach the pencil, retaining everything else in their stationary positions. This was complied with. The table was elevated, the pencil rolled off, and everything else remained. They were then asked to repeat the experiment, retaining the pencil and everything else upon the table stationary, except the glass tumbler, and to let that slide off. This also was assented to, with the like result. All the articles retained their positions but the tumbler, which slid off, and was caught in the hands of one of the party, as it fell from the lower edge of the table."—pp. 33–4.

On another occasion Mr. Home is thrown into a state of ecstasy, in which he is placed under the guidance of a spirit bearing a strong resemblance to Asmodeus in 'Le Diable Boiteux':—

"For the first time I now looked to see what sustained my body, and I found that it was but a purple-tinted cloud, and that, as I desired to go onward with my guide, the cloud appeared as if disturbed by a gentle breeze, and in its movements I found I was wafted upward until I saw the earth, as a vision, far, far below us. Soon I found that we had drawn nearer, and were just hovering over a cottage that I had never seen; and I also saw the inmates, but had never met them in life. The walls of the cottage were not the least obstruction to my sight; they were only as if constructed of a dense body of air, yet perfectly transparent; and the same might be said of every article of furniture. I perceived that the inmates were asleep, and I saw the various spirits who were watching over the sleepers."—p. 46.

Another spiritual manifestation suggests the ghost of the gentle Katharina, somewhat softened in her temper since the days when in her earthly body she broke the head of the unfortunate Hortensio for telling her "she mistook her frets":—

"Then the guitar was moved from its place by the spirits, and brought towards the circle; but, encountering a heavy mahogany chair on the way, *the instrument was laid down, and the chair dragged several feet* out of the way; after which the guitar was taken up and carried all *around the circle* by the invisibles, and at length deposited in the *opposite* corner! In a few moments more the writer saw it *poised in the air*, top upwards, and nearly over his head! The remark was made, 'Well, if I did not *see* this myself, I wouldn't believe it on other testimony;'—whereupon the instrument *reached forward and playfully tapped the speaker three times upon the shoulder.* Then it was passed across the table (over his head) towards Mr. Home, whom it lightly touched several times upon the head! Being close to it during this performance, I watched it narrowly by the aid of the fire-light. The bottom end of the instrument was very near my face, while the opposite end was thus being used; it was not, in fact, six inches above my head, and just in front of me. *The indistinct outline of a human hand could be seen grasping the instrument just below its centre.*"—p. 59.

The following occurrence admits of two interpretations. The author gives one; we will venture to suggest another:—

"One evening, at the château, as we were seated at the table, the spirits having requested that the candles should be extinguished,* the table drawn to the window, and the curtains opened to admit the moonlight, there had been some striking manifestations, and the time had been passing almost imperceptibly to us all, when a gentleman who was present said that he felt much exhausted, and he asked for a glass of brandy-and-water. It was brought, and he took it in his hand, and was about raising it to his mouth, when a spirit hand suddenly appeared, took hold of the lower part of the glass, and disappeared with it under the table. We laughingly said that our unseen friends surely did not believe in the use of stimulants. To this they assented by emphatic raps, and at the same moment the glass slowly rose again before him empty. The windows being closed, we supposed the water had been thrown upon the floor, and we arose to see where it was. We could discover no trace of it. About two minutes had elapsed, when the same glass, which was standing empty before him, was seen without any visible cause gradually to approach the edge of the table, and

* The "requests" made at these spiritual assemblies are sometimes curious. The author of 'Strange Things among us' mentions, "a *séance* at a house situated in a London thoroughfare," which commenced by requesting that "Sperrits would be good enough to speak up, 'cos of the 'busses."

to disappear beneath it. I do not believe that above two seconds could have elapsed before it again appeared with the brandy-and-water in it, apparently not less in quantity than when first brought in, though the quality had certainly undergone some chemical change, as it had now lost much of its brown colour. By the raps, a warning was given to all of us against such indulgence."—pp. 170, 171.

Instead of the "warning," we would suggest that, on the homœopathic principle of *similia similibus*, the spirits are themselves fond of spirits; that they drank the brandy-and-water, and substituted a milder liquor in the glass. A German spirit is mentioned by Mr. Howitt as having drunk a glass of beer; why should not a French spirit drink brandy-and-water?* At any rate we have seen far more wonderful effects produced from a conjuror's bottle.

We will conclude our extracts by a specimen of spiritual logic, which may be entitled "Signs and tokens to know a grandfather by." The reasoning is hardly so conclusive as Sir Andrew Aguecheek's,—"I knew 'twas I; for many do call me fool":—

"A strong hand came, stated to be that of my grandfather. I asked, 'How am I to know that this is my grandfather?' The hand moved from my forehead to my temple, over my eyebrow and eye, and then passed down over my face, the fingers patting me in the most gentle manner possible. At another time, at my request, hands patted my forehead with such force that the *sound* could be heard, I am confident, in any part of the room."—p. 52.

We have made these copious extracts from Mr. Home's book, in order to justify our assertion that it contains some stories which almost refute themselves from their exceeding silliness and want of purpose. We do not deny that the book contains also better things than these; but the better and the worse are so linked together as to form a continuous chain; and no chain, as a whole, can be stronger than its weakest link. That such phenomena, or something like them, may have occurred, or seemed to occur, we have no right to deny in the face of

* "What was strangest of all, they saw a jug of beer raise itself, pour beer into a glass, and the beer drunk off."—*Howitt*, vol. i., p. 64. We should like to have seen the process of visible beer entering into an invisible stomach.

respectable testimony; but when we are told that they occurred by means of spiritual agency, we are disposed to comment after the manner of Pieter Snoye in the ballad of 'Roprecht the Robber,' when the said Roprecht's body had disappeared from the gallows:—

> 'You may well think we laughed in our sleeve
> At what the people then seemed to believe;
> Queer enough it was to hear them say
> That the Three Kings took Roprecht away;
> Or that St. Ursula, who is in bliss,
> With her army of virgins, had done this:
> The Three Kings, and St. Ursula too,
> I warrant, had something better to do."

If the spirits of the departed can interfere in earthly things, on such occasions and in such modes as these, assuredly there is no occasion, however trivial, and no mode, however ludicrous, in which they may not be supposed capable of interfering. If the laws of material nature can be tampered with in the manner here described, assuredly we have no security for their permamanence in any of the ordinary affairs of life. No chemist performing a delicate experiment can be sure that some tricksy spirit may not alter the proportions of his ingredients and vitiate the entire result. No cook, preparing some *chef-d'œuvre* of his art, is safe from the danger of unseen hands substituting salt for sugar, or assafœtida for spice. No plain man can buy groceries by weight without the danger of some roguish defunct tradesman aiding the frauds of his successor by "gravitating" the figs and raisins or "levitating" the weights. All this, no doubt, seems very absurd; but we submit that it is not a whit too absurd to be true, if Mr. Home's spiritual manifestations are to be taken as samples of the truth.

In addition to the ludicrous nature of many of these manifestations, there is something painful and revolting to the moral feelings in the idea of a *séance* for the purpose of holding communication with the spirits of the dead. There are times, no doubt, in the life of most, if not all of us, when we have ardently longed for such a communication if it were possible; when, in the sense of irreparable bereavement, we have felt that to surrender years of intercourse with the living were a light price to pay for one hour of converse with the dead. But in proportion to the intensity

of this longing, is the feeling also of its sacredness and delicacy, as a thing for solitude and privacy, to be kept jealously apart from prying eyes and tattling tongues. The more we love and revere the memory of those we have lost, the more we shrink from the thought of calling up the beloved presence by the arts and devices of necromancy, seeking "unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep and that mutter;" the more are we revolted by the thought of making an exhibition of our heart's treasure to an assembly of spectators, met together to gratify a prurient curiosity or to gather materials for a scientific theory. "The heart knoweth his own bitterness; and a stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy."

To show that we are not singular in this feeling, we will venture to quote an expressive passage to the same effect from a work which, under an unattractive title and a dry subject, conceals many vigorous and genial outbreaks of eloquence and fancy. Speaking of clairvoyance and spirit-rapping, Professor Ferrier exclaims:—

"These, however, are not to be set down—at least so it is to be hoped—among the normal and catholic superstitions incident to humanity. They are much worse than the worst form of the doctrine of materiality. These aberrations betoken a perverse and prurient play of the abnormal fancy—groping for the very holy of holies in kennels running with the most senseless and God-abandoned abominations. Our natural superstitions are bad enough; but thus to make a systematic business of fatuity, imposture, and profanity, and to imagine, all the while, that we are touching on the precincts of God's spiritual kingdom, is unspeakably shocking. Ye who make shattered nerves and depraved sensations the interpreters of truth, the keys which shall unlock the gates of Heaven, and open the secrets of futurity,—ye who inaugurate disease as the prophet of all wisdom, thus making sin, death, and the devil the lords paramount of creation,—have ye bethought yourselves of the backward and downward course which ye are running into the pit of the bestial and the abhorred? Oh, ye miserable mystics! when will ye know that all God's truths and all man's blessings lie in the broad health, in the trodden ways, and in the laughing sunshine of the universe, and that all intellect, all genius, is merely the power of seeing wonders in common things?" *

* Ferrier's 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' pp. 224-5.

But we are told by the advocates of spirit-rapping that these manifestations have been vouchsafed to us for a great religious purpose, necessary at this time—to confute the doctrines of materialism, and to give sensible proofs of the immortality of the soul. "Already," says the author of the Introduction to Mr. Home's Life, "Spiritualism, conducted as it usually is, has had a prodigious effect throughout America, and partly in the Old World also, in redeeming multitudes from hardened atheism and materialism, proving to them, by the positive demonstration which their cast of mind requires, that there is another world—that there is a non-material form of humanity—and that many miraculous things, which they have hitherto scoffed at, are true." To the same effect Mr. Howitt says, "As materialism has made a great advance, this grand old Proteus of Truth has assumed a shape expressly adapted to stop its way. As materialism has tinctured all philosophy, spiritualism has spoken out more plainly in resistance of it." A noble purpose, assuredly, if the means were but adequate to the end. But what sort of an immaterialism do these rapping *séances* exhibit, and what kind of an immortality is it which they promise us? What an elevating and cheering prospect is held out to the immortal soul on its release from its earthly tabernacle! To lift tables, knock against wainscots, pinch people's knees and pull their dresses under the table, daub pictures, play tricks with brandy-and-water, tear up obnoxious magazines, steal pocket-handkerchiefs, rap people's heads with guitars, and such like! We shall all of us learn to play on the accordion, sometimes in a "wretched style," to the great annoyance of the company and of other spirits who play "most admirably" (see p. 191); and such of us as in this life were "powerful muscular men," will enjoy a similar prerogative of lifting heavy "masses of timber"—a sort of muscular immortality, by way of pendant to the muscular Christianity now so much in vogue (see p. 177). As for the evidence of a "non-material form of humanity," the writer seems not to be aware that a wreath of smoke or a vibrating atmosphere is as material as a prize-ox or a stone-wall; that, in short, whatever can be seen, heard, smelt, touched, or tasted, by the bodily senses (rappings and spirit-hands included), is itself bodily, in common with the organs of sense which perceive it. If we are not justified by these considera-

tions in doubting the Christianity of Mr. Home's spirits, we may at least, on his own showing, set them down as "Christians unattached," since they appear to have faithfully adhered to him through his several phases of belief, first as a member of the Kirk of Scotland, then as a Wesleyan, then as a Congregationalist, then as a catechumen in Swedenborgianism, and finally as a Roman Catholic; though, on his conversion to the last-mentioned faith, he was assured by his confessor that, as he was now a member of the Catholic Church, his power would not return to him.*

In addition to these general presumptions, which may be urged, not, perhaps, against the phenomena themselves, but against the "spiritual" hypothesis adopted to account for them, there are also, as it appears to us, some suspicious circumstances in the particular manner in which the phenomena are manifested. These we shall proceed to mention, as circumstances which, if they do not warrant the imputation of imposture, at least suggest the need of extreme caution before we receive the accounts in the form in which they are offered to us.

In the first place, the very circumstance of these phenomena taking place at an appointed meeting or *séance* (the latter has now become a naturalised word in this special signification) is in itself suspicious. People go to these meetings with their expectations raised, and their imaginations excited; they come prepared to see, and desiring to see, something wonderful; and the tone of their minds is thus attuned beforehand into harmony with the marvels that are expected. The influence of imagination, thus excited, on the nervous system, and even on the organs of sense, is a well-known and acknowledged cause, explaining many instances of false or perverted perception. The expectation which made a veteran chemist, on first handling a piece of potassium, apparently feel that it was heavy; the instance mentioned by Sir Henry Holland, of sensations of heat, weight, &c., produced by the mere *show* of the application of a slip of paper to the limb;† the influence of suggestion and

* We are told that Mr. Home's last conversion has given great scandal to some of the Protestant organs of spiritualism in the press, who, however, console themselves with the thought that he may, perhaps, be destined to convert the Pope to a belief in rapping.

† 'Chapters on Mental Physiology,' p. 25.

pre-conceived ideas in relation to mesmeric phenomena, as noticed by Dr. Carpenter;* the cures effected by Dr. Haygarth's painted tractors, and a hundred other instances, may be cited to show the effect (now, indeed, generally admitted) of expectation, on persons of excitable temperament, in bringing about the phenomena expected. We do not adduce this fact as a sufficient explanation of Mr. Home's exhibitions; but we mention it as suggesting a caution that phenomena taking place at a *séance* should be received with more suspicion than those which present themselves without any such preparation.

In the second place, the article of furniture almost invariably employed in these manifestations is of a character liable to be suspected. A table, as compared with most other pieces of furniture, has a greater amount of leverage in proportion to its weight; it has, moreover, a large vacant space under its broad surface, which leaves room for the application of the power; and it furnishes, through its usual companion the table-cloth, an easy means of concealment. We do not say that these facilities are actually put in requisition by professors of the rapping art; but a writer in 'Once a Week' has published an ingenious description with pictorial illustrations, showing that use *might be* made of such means; and it would be well that our accredited mediums, like Cæsar's wife, should be not only above guilt, but also above suspicion. Surely it is in their own power to clear themselves. To spirits so muscular as some of Mr. Home's familiars have shown themselves to be, it can be of very little importance whether their forces are exerted on a table or on some other piece of upholstery. If they would only move a bookcase without feet, resting entirely on the floor, or a side-board, or some other article of similar character, it would be a great boon to those sceptical persons who are fond of suspecting mechanical agency, and for the removal of whose materialistic doubts, we are told, these demonstrations have been especially granted.

In the third place, it is suspicious that nearly all the higher manifestations of spiritual presence require to be exhibited by an imperfect light; and that on some occasions, as we have seen, the spirits themselves request that the candles may be

* 'Human Physiology,' 4th edition, pp. 860, 861.

extinguished. It is true that midnight has been from time immemorial the orthodox hour for ghostly apparitions, and cock-crow the signal for their vanishing; but surely the presence of a candle or a lamp is not incompatible with the due observance of the witching hour. Doubtless there may be spiritual reasons, of which we know nothing, why darkness should be preferred to light; but, unhappily, those sceptical materialists, who are the very persons who most need to be convinced, will persist in saying that the same darkness, which is indispensable to the true manifestation, is also favourable to the false.

In the fourth place, we should very much like to have a fuller account of the rise and progress of the knocking language, from its origin in the Hydesville farmhouse to the present time. By what means did a system of purely arbitrary signs come to be established conventionally as a medium of communication between two orders of beings who are supposed to be incapable of communicating without it? If, as we are informed by the initiated, three raps signify *yes*—one, *no*—and two, the need of further information—who was it that gave these particular significations to these particular sounds, and how did he make it known that he had done so? If the spirits can talk the language of mortals, the knocking language is superfluous; if they cannot, how did the knocking language itself acquire a meaning? There is a third supposition which naturally suggests itself, namely, that some of the spirits can talk and some cannot; and that the talking spirits instituted the language for the benefit of the dumb ones. But as knocking has now become the established and normal means of communication, we have still to inquire what is the reason why such a melancholy deprivation of speech should have befallen the whole spirit world, with the exception of one or two garrulous interpreters. This mystery, if it could only be cleared up, might throw some light on the vexed question of the origin of language in general. The French philosopher, Maine de Biran, has well stated the difficulties of this question, in a passage which we will transcribe in the original language:—

"Pour que ces premiers signes donnés deviennent quelque chose pour l'individu qui s'en sert, il faut qu'il les institue lui-même une seconde fois par son activité propre, ou qu'il y attache un sens.

Supposé que Dieu eût donné à l'homme une langue toute faite, ou un système parfait de signes articulés ou écrits propres à exprimer toutes ses idées; il s'agissait toujours pour l'homme d'attribuer à chaque signe sa valeur ou son sens propre, c'est-à-dire, d'instituer véritablement ce signe avec une intention et dans un but conçu par l'être intelligent, de même que l'enfant institue les premiers signes quand il transforme les cris qui lui sont donnés par la nature en véritables signes de réclame." *

If any professor of spiritualism will inform us when and how the spirit-language was converted from unmeaning knocks into significant symbols, when and by what means mankind was informed of the fact that *rat-tat-tat* is equivalent to *y-e-s*, and other knocks to other verbal signs, he will have done much towards supplying a solution of the problem whose difficulties are thus clearly stated by the French metaphysician.

In the fifth place, the knocking language, supposing it to have been established by some means or other, is again liable to suspicion in its own nature and in the mode of its employment. Sounds of this kind are the most easy to produce by mechanical means,† and are, moreover, in many cases by no means easy to trace to the exact quarter from which they come. A well-known anecdote narrated by Dr. Reid may be cited in illustration of this point. "I remember," he says, "that once lying a-bed, and having been put into a fright, I heard my own heart beat; but I took it to be one knocking at the door, and arose and opened the door oftener than once, before I discovered that the sound was in my own breast." "It is probable," he continues, "that, previous to all experience, we should as little know whether a sound came from the right or left, from above or below, from a great or a small distance, as we should know whether it was the sound of a drum, or a bell, or a cart." ‡ The discovery of the cause and direction of the sound will of course be more difficult when the attention of the hearer is directed to another object, as is the case when, according to the approved

* 'Nouvelles Considérations sur les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme,' p. 93.

† Governor Tallmadge reprints a passage from the 'North British Review,' in which it is asserted that the noise is produced "by the displacement of the tendon of the *peronæus longus* muscle;" but his only reply is to charge the writer with "ignorance and folly, not to say superstition and bigotry." We can only say that we have actually heard the sound produced in this manner, but, of course, not by a "medium."

‡ 'Inquiry into the Human Mind,' chap. iv., section i.

mode of spiritual intercourse, he is employed in repeating the alphabet, waiting for the assenting knocks when he comes to the right letter. Besides diverting the attention, this mode of communication may also furnish a clue to the answer required. Let us suppose, for instance, that the first expected letter is E. The anxious patient, already excited by the promise of an interview with an inhabitant of the other world, begins, as quietly as he or she can, to spell through the alphabet in succession. A—no answer; B—ditto; C—ditto; D—ditto. Thus far the spirits are clearly in the right. Can they really be true spirits, and will they rap when the fatal letter comes? The letter E comes in its turn; a slight tremor betrays his anxiety; and the astute spirit, or his representative, raps out the affirmative signal. The patient is still more excited by this partial success; and his increasing anxiety manifests itself still more clearly as he comes to the other letters in their order. We do not say that such things are; but the mere possibility that such things may be, suggests a caution.

In the sixth place, it seems a suspicious circumstance that the old-fashioned visible ghost has in these modern *séances* been almost entirely superseded by the *Poltergeist* or noise-making spirit. The theory of optical illusions has been the subject of much scientific inquiry, and is now tolerably well understood; while that of acoustical deceptions has been by no means so fully investigated. Shifting his ground with the advance of science, the ghost, so far as he professes and claims to be a true ghost and not a spectral illusion, has retired from the field of vision, and taken refuge in that of hearing. A partial exception must be indeed admitted in the case of some of Mr. Home's exhibitions, at which, as at the recomposition of St. Gengulphus,

> "Two hands assist, though nipped off at the wrist;"

but in the matter of these spirit-hands, the recent exponents of spiritualism seem hardly consistent with each other. Mr. Home asserts that the spirits manufacture (or rather *facture* without *manu*) hands for themselves, "incarnating them out of the vital atmospheres of those present," * and "that the pre-

* What is meant by a person's "vital atmosphere"? That which one exhales after consuming the oxygen is anything but vital, as all dwellers in overcrowded

senting spirits could often make one finger where they could not make two; and two, where they could not form an entire hand; just as they could form a hand, where they could not realise a whole human figure; and he also said that this was one reason why they did not show themselves aboveboard, because they did not like imperfect members to be seen." Mr. Howitt, on the other hand, who regards all spiritual manifestations, ghosts included, as the results of one and the same universal principle, agrees with Stilling and Swedenborg in holding that "the animated spirit, the divine spark in man, is inseparably united with an ethereal or luminous body." Hence arises a question—Is this ethereal or luminous body visible or invisible to mortal eyes? If visible, what is the need of incarnating hands out of vital atmospheres; and why are hands alone, and not whole human figures, visible at Mr. Home's *séances*? If invisible, how comes it that the old-fashioned ghost managed to make himself seen from head to foot; and not himself only, but likewise the ghost of a dress, which, with a due regard to modesty, he used to put on? If he "incarnated" his body from the vital atmosphere of the single individual to whom he generally appeared (and his dress, we must suppose, from the atmosphere of that individual's habiliments), why cannot one of Mr. Home's spirits do as much from the united atmospheres of a whole well-clad company? If he succeeded in making his luminous (body and garments) visible without incarnation, why has that power so lamentably degenerated in the grander and more advanced manifestations of the present day? The apparitions, like the figure of Prior's Nut-brown Maid, have become "fine by degrees and beautifully less," till we are reduced to the condition of the ghost-seers in Brank-some—

> "Some saw an arm, and some a hand,
> And some the waving of a gown."

If this diminuendo scale goes on much longer, these visible apparitions run a serious risk of sharing the fate of Duncan McGirdie's mare,—vanishing altogether just as the science which operates upon them has arrived at its full perfection.

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rooms know well. Or is the word *vital* used after the manner of *lucus a non lucendo*, and do the spirits "incarnate" their hands out of azote?

Against these presumptions, we have to balance on the other side the respectable character of Mr. Home, and the improbability of his being a party to any imposture. And this consideration, so far as we have the means of judging, is fully entitled to be taken into account; but it must be acknowledged that there is, to say the least, an enormous weight of improbability, and even of apparent absurdity, resting on the credit of a single man. We say, of a single man; for the admissibility of the collateral witnesses mainly depends on the credit to be given in the first instance to their principal. If the phenomena are really what they are said to be, these witnesses furnish so many independent testimonies to the nature and number of the phenomena so produced; but if, on the other hand, the medium is an impostor, the other witnesses testify only to the fact of their having been imposed upon.

A favourite argument of the advocates of spiritual agency, from the *impossibility* of such phenomena being produced by natural means, is one to which we cannot attach much weight. Many seeming impossibilities of this kind have actually been performed by natural means, which, were it not for the confession of the performers, might pass for as good spirit-manifestations as the majority of Mr. Home's exhibitions. Take, for example, the following specimen, exhibited before Louis Philippe at St. Cloud, by M. Robert Houdin:—

"I borrowed from my noble spectators several handkerchiefs, which I made into a parcel, and laid on the table. Then, at my request, different persons wrote on cards the names of places whither they desired the handkerchiefs to be invisibly transported. When this had been done, I begged the King to take three of the cards at hazard, and choose from them the place he might consider most suitable."

Of the three places thus proposed, the King chooses that the handkerchiefs be sent "into the chest of the last orange-tree on the right of the avenue." The narrative continues:—

"The King gave some orders in a low voice, and I directly saw several persons run to the orange-tree, in order to watch it and prevent any fraud. I was delighted at this precaution, which must add to the effect of my experiment, for the trick was already arranged, and the precaution hence too late.

"I had now to send the handkerchiefs on their travels; so I

placed them beneath a bell of opaque glass, and, taking my wand, I ordered my invisible travellers to proceed to the spot the King had chosen.

"I raised the bell; the little parcel was no longer there, and a white turtle-dove had taken its place."*

We must give the conclusion of the story in an abridged form. It is sufficient to say that the orange-tree chest was opened by one of the King's servants, who drew from it "a small iron coffer, eaten by rust." The key was found hanging to the neck of the turtle-dove; and the box, being opened, displayed a packet, carefully sealed with the seal of Cagliostro, which was torn open by the King and found to contain the six handkerchiefs which a few moments before were lying on the conjuror's table.

If we wished for an easy and lazy mode of explaining this feat, we should at once have recourse to the theory of spirit agency. This theory has the advantage, in common with the famous walk of St. Denys, that it is only the first step that is at all difficult of belief. If it is once admitted that spirits are in the habit of taking part in mundane affairs in the manner asserted by Mr. Home and his brethren, we have no means of testing the limits of their power, and therefore we have no difficulty in attributing all extraordinary occurrences to their intervention. We may easily suppose, then, that some spirit, possibly that of Cagliostro,† placed the handkerchiefs in the packet, sealed them with his seal, and deposited them in the place where they were found; indeed, so plausible is this hypothesis, that Mr. Howitt, who notices the story, seems half inclined to convert Robert Houdin, *bon gré mal gré*, into a spiritual medium. "The feat of Houdin at St. Cloud," he says, "was either done by great previous preparation and collusion on the part of the people of the palace, or it was not mere sleight of hand. To send several handkerchiefs out of a room, in the presence of spectators, into the palace garden,

* 'Memoirs of Robert Houdin,' vol. ii., p. 77, sqq.

† Cagliostro is rather a favourite *Deus ex machinâ* with our modern spiritualists, but unfortunately their accounts of him do not agree together. Mr. Howitt mentions a woman having the gift of mediumship, who "saw Cagliostro, and perceived that he had spiritual power, but used it as a necromancer." To Mr. Home, on the contrary, his spirit appears in brilliant light and with "three wafts of perfume," and states that his power was that of a mesmerist, but all misunderstood by those about him.

introduce them into the tub of an orange-tree guarded by officials, into an old iron chest, and under the root of the tree, requires something more than the cleverest leger-demain." Unfortunately, M. Houdin himself refuses to be converted into a medium for the sake of a theory; and, though in this instance he confesses to preparation, he denies collusion. All his feats, he tells us, are performed by real sleight of hand, and without the aid of accomplices. We doubt whether any person, except a professed *prestidigitateur*, could explain by what means this and many other of M. Houdin's marvels were performed; but we do not therefore doubt that they were performed by natural means of some kind or other.

We should be inclined at once to adopt a similar conclusion with regard to many of the performances recorded by Mr. Home (others perhaps would more naturally suggest an abnormal condition of the mind or the nerves), were it not for his own positive declarations to the contrary. And it is this dilemma, and this alone, which, in the case of this extraordinary autobiography, drives us to the third course of absolute suspension of all judgment. It is impossible to believe, without violating all the ordinary rules of credibility; and it is impossible to disbelieve, without imputing frauds which we have no means of proving. But if the whole superstructure of this marvellous narrative is to rest, as it seems at present to rest, on the credit due to Mr. Home's personal testimony, we are at least justified in demanding, as a preliminary condition, that a satisfactory account should be given of one or two unpleasant circumstances, which, so long as they remain unexplained, prevent us from receiving that testimony as wholly above suspicion.

It has been asserted, for instance, by a writer in 'Once a Week' (vol. iii., p. 405), that when Robert Houdin was summoned before the Emperor of the French to see Mr. Home, no manifestation took place. Mr. Home, who is at the pains to contradict many of the statements of the press concerning his adventures in France, takes no notice of this.

It has been asserted, again, by a writer in 'All the Year Round' (vol. vii., p. 608), that a gentleman who "had been trumpeted about London as the most wonderful of all the wonderful mediums ever wondered at" (can this be any other than Mr. Home?), "could succeed in nothing when he was attentively

watched by five persons seated in his own room, at his own table; of which five persons, the writer was one, the conductor of the journal another, and M. Robin, of the Egyptian Hall, a very dangerous third.

It has been asserted, again, by the same writer, that the same medium, having undertaken to communicate with the spirit of a deceased friend of the writer's, elicited no responsive rap to any name out of a long list, with the exception of that of an eminent public character recently deceased—the said eminent person not being the friend thought of by the writer, but being the only one on the list whom the medium must have known to be dead.

Another circumstance, not as yet satisfactorily explained, is the anachronism, already noticed by two of Mr. Home's critics, in connexion with one of his *séances* at Paris. In a hotel situate on the Boulevard des Italiens, Mr. Home met two English officers just returned from the Crimean campaign. While talking together, they were visited by a spirit who spelt out on the alphabet the name of "Gregoire," and informed them that he had passed from earth, giving the time of his departure. The two officers were incredulous, for they recognised the name of an intimate friend in the French army, whom they had left in the Crimea slightly wounded, but apparently in no danger. On subsequent inquiry, however, it was ascertained that the French officer had actually died at the time mentioned by the spirit. This occurrence, as originally narrated in Mr. Home's 'Life,' is placed among the events occurring during a visit to Paris in the latter part of 1857,—more than a year after the termination of the Crimean War. In a subsequent letter, published in the 'Times' of April 16th, 1863, Mr. Home so far corrects his original statement as to place the event in the autumn of 1856. But as the Crimean War ended in the May of that year, it is still difficult to understand why an officer only slightly wounded should have lingered on the spot to die there in the autumn. The inaccuracy is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the occurrence, according to Mr. Home's later statement, took place during the year in which the spiritual power had left him, and could hardly have failed to be noticed as a signal exception.

We mention the above circumstances as matters connected

with Mr. Home's history which require explanation, and which, till they are explained, prevent us from putting implicit faith in his narrative. Yet we are bound to state, on the other hand, that the general tone of his book resembles that of a man who writes with simplicity and good faith, and that his intellectual calibre, as exhibited in his writings, seems hardly compatible with any great amount of brilliant invention or consistent simulation. If he should turn out, after all, to be a wolf in sheep's clothing, he may at least claim the credit of having worn the borrowed fleece with an air of sheepishness which looked very like nature.

If Mr. Home is the Mohammed, Mr. Howitt may fairly claim to be the Ali of spiritualism. He writes in a temper which savours strongly of the declaration of that zealous vizier of the prophet, "Whosoever rises against thee, I will dash out his teeth, tear out his eyes, break his legs, rip up his belly." He furnishes a startling instance (not the only one in our day) of the fiercely pugnacious qualities which may be developed from the peaceful training of the Society of Friends. Poor Bishop Douglas has the misfortune to take a different view from Mr. Howitt of the miracles performed at the tomb of the Abbé Paris; and our energetic champion of spiritualism gives vent to his feelings in the assertion that "the *mildest* term for Bishop Douglas's 'Criterion' is 'an infamous book,' fraught with the most frightful falsehoods penned in the very face of the most remarkable, most irrefutable mass of official and other evidence perhaps ever brought together"—a specimen of mildness which reminds us of some of the speeches of Boatswain Chucks in 'Peter Simple,' beginning with, "Allow me to observe, my dear man, in the most delicate way in the world," and ending with, "Do it again, and I'll cut your liver out." Nonconformists are not much better treated than bishops. Dr. Calamy, for his opposition to the miraculous pretensions of the Cevennois, is facetiously metamorphosed by Mr. Howitt into "Dr. Calumny." Nor is Friend William's noble rage entirely exhausted by the publication of his book: it breaks out again in a letter published in the 'Spiritual Magazine,' in which he says of his reviewers in general, "In almost every instance the so-called criticisms have been a series of deliberate falsehoods;" and of one luckless wight in particular, "There must have been some radical

impenetrability in his nature to the grand principle of truth: his training would seem rather to have been under the especial care of that very ancient and paternal professor known as the Father of Lies." Assuredly, if Spiritualism is destined hereafter to rise to the rank of a liberal art, it has not yet proved its claim to the title by softening the ferocity of its disciples' manners.

Sometimes, however, Mr. Howitt's denunciations are accompanied by blunders so ludicrous that the indignation they are intended to excite in the reader explodes prematurely in a fit of laughter. Of the *bête noire* of his book, Bishop Douglas, he says: "This system [a system for the annihilation of Christianity] was adopted with avidity by the infidels of France . . . and it had now travelled back to England from France with wonderfully augmented effect under the excitement of the French Revolution. There was a new atmosphere for a new champion to work in; and Douglas therefore came out with a bolder and more dogmatic mien. He professed to combat David Hume, but in reality he fought most vigorously on his side." The reader who remembers Goldsmith's 'Retaliation' may be somewhat startled to find "the scourge of impostors, the terror of quacks," cited as a disciple of the French Revolution; but the 'Criterion' might perhaps be a work of the author's old age. The simple fact however is, that Mr. Howitt has mistaken the second edition of the 'Criterion,' published in 1807, for the first, published in 1754; and, under the influence of this erroneous date, has invented the influence of the French Revolution from his own imagination. In another passage, Mr. Howitt denounces the Church of England in general, in the following eloquent and classical language: "Look onward still, and behold the learned professors of arts and sciences, with their souls all shrivelled up by the exsiccating process of this Anglican drying-house, and whose looks and words are of the purest Dryasdust order—*capites-mortuum-men*, of the earth, earthy." Could not the same spirits who, we are gravely told, have more than once enabled people to speak Greek without learning it, have inspired their latest champion with two words of correct Latin?

The same habit of inaccuracy manifests itself in other parts of Mr. Howitt's book, rendering it, however amusing as a collection of stories, almost worthless for any other purpose.

Though the whole tone of the book is fiercely controversial, the author never seems to have understood clearly what is the conclusion which the controversy is intended to establish, or what premises are required to establish it. Statements the most inaccurate are assumed as the basis of reasonings the most irrelevant. His subordinate details and illustrations and the conduct of his main argument both exhibit the same characteristics of careless assertion and confused thought. He cites Dr. Johnson as a believer (in common with himself) in the Cock-lane ghost; though Johnson, in fact, was one of those by whom the imposture was detected. He quotes Rogers, the poet, as pronouncing "spiritualism"

> "That oracle, to man in mercy given,
> Whose voice is truth, whose wisdom is from heaven;"

whereas Rogers is speaking, not of "spiritualism" in any form, but of the *mariner's compass!* He adduces in evidence the ghost that appeared to Shelley and uttered the words *Siete sodisfatto;* though the very biographer whom he quotes adds, that "the dream is said to have been suggested by an incident occurring in a drama attributed to Calderon," and another of Shelley's biographers gives a full account of the very work from which the apparition and the question were borrowed. He charges Niebuhr with rejecting the miraculous stories in Livy, probably with the intention that the same system should be applied to the Bible; though Niebuhr has recorded his belief in the miracles of the New Testament in language as clear and emphatic as it is possible for man to use. This last statement, indeed, is in accordance with Mr. Howitt's whole argument, the purport of which is to leave no middle course open between the hardest rationalism and the blindest credulity; to allow of no reasonable belief in the miracles of Scripture, except on condition of believing also in the Cock-lane ghost and the Drummer of Tedworth. He seems to divide all mankind into two great classes: those who believe everything that is supernatural, and those who believe nothing; the former representing the good principle of humanity, under the name of Spiritualists, the latter representing the evil principle—being all of them, consciously or unconsciously, virtually or actually, Materialists.

It is difficult, in reading Mr. Howitt's book, to maintain the

balance between the respect that is due to the excellence of his intentions and the regret which we must feel at the extreme want of judgment manifest in his performance. With a deep and earnest conviction of the divine authority of Scripture, he has given expositions of the sacred text which, it is to be feared, will rather furnish mirth to the scorner than edification to the believer. The writer who can find in the Transfiguration an authority for seeking to the spirits of the dead, and who sees in spirit-rapping an illustration of the words, "Behold, I stand at the door and knock," is not likely to instil into the minds of his readers that reverence for Scripture which he evidently feels himself. But perhaps the most singular and the least trustworthy part of Mr. Howitt's book is that which treats of spiritualism and materialism in the Church of England. Ignoring all distinction between ordinary and extraordinary, invisible and visible, exercises of spiritual power, he treats the writers whom he criticises as if all "spiritualism" were of one kind, and must stand or fall as an indivisible whole. Divines who venture to doubt whether visible miracles have been continued in the Church up to modern times, or whether satanic agency is now manifested in sensible phenomena, are treated as unbelievers in all spiritual influence, good or evil; while on the other hand, passages written in defence of the Scriptural miracles, or in recognition of those unseen spiritual influences which all Christians acknowledge, are pressed without scruple into the service of "spiritualism" in general, including ghost stories, table-turning, and spirit-rapping.*

But the great stronghold of Mr. Howitt's argument is America. All the great mediums of the present day have been Americans, or from America; and the various physical manifestations of spiritual agency have been far more powerfully exhibited in America than here. This is attributed partly to the fact that the Americans are conspicuously a more nervous and excitable people than we are, and partly to the circumstance that "our denser atmosphere, less electrical and magnetic in its character, and our different telluric conditions, are less favourable to the

* We may instance his treatment of Douglas, Paley, and Bishop Marsh on the one side, and of Hooker, Tillotson, Sherlock, Ken, Penrose, and Le Bas on the other.

transmission of spiritual impressions." The former supposition seems to suggest a subjective illusion rather than an objective apparition; and the latter seems better adapted to the theory of a material than of a spiritual impression. But if the American manifestations have an advantage over those of other countries in number and frequency, they can scarcely be said to exhibit a corresponding superiority as to quality. We are glad to pass as hastily as we can over the coarser and more profane examples which are to be found in the voluminous records of Transatlantic spiritualism—the lady who was brought to bed of a motive force, the doggrel verses purporting to emanate from the Saviour himself—compounds of the ludicrous and the horrible, in which the laugh due to their absurdity is checked by the shudder at their blasphemy.* We prefer to call attention to one or two instances of a higher kind, which, from their own character, compared with the respectability of the witnesses by whom they are attested, may be fairly or even favourably selected as crucial tests of their class. For profession, station, and character, it would be difficult to select three more unexceptionable witnesses than George T. Dexter, an American physician, John W. Edmunds, some time Judge of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, and Nathaniel P. Tallmadge, late U.S. senator and governor of Wisconsin, the three gentlemen whose names appear as sponsors to two bulky volumes on "Spiritualism," the former of which, if its title-page may be trusted, had reached a tenth edition in 1854.

It seems that the American spirits, whether owing to the excitability of the Yankee nervous system or to the electricity of the atmosphere, or to any other cause, have been peculiarly successful in the invention of means of communication with the nether world. In addition to the knocking alphabet, they have discovered the happy and more direct device of spirit-writing, by which the arm of the medium is acted upon from without, and compelled to write down whatever the presiding spirit dictates. In this manner were compiled the above two volumes of spiritual communications, written by the hand of Dr. Dexter, chiefly from the dictation of the ghosts of Bacon and "Sweeden-

* Some account of these will be found in an article in the 'Westminster Review' for January, 1858.

borg," the latter name, whether at the request of the owner or not, being invariably spelt with two *e*'s.

The following specimens are interesting as showing the English style of the golden-mouthed Chancellor in his spiritual state of existence. The reader will be able to judge how far, according to his own statement, he has "progressed" since he left the earth:—

"If you feel that the teachings of the spirits are beautiful, and if the views which they have presented to your mental eye elicit emotions of joy, how much more will you realise the ecstatic pleasure in store for you when death shall have opened the glorious realities of spirit-life! Eye hath not beheld, human heart hath not conceived, the truths that death will unfold. Oh! when the last pulse is fluttering, when the heart's throb is almost past, when gasping and struggling in the pangs of expiring mortality, then, then will your spirit-eye behold the gates of immortality opening before you, and your soul catch a glimpse of the gorgeous beauties of death. . . . Eloquent? Who would not be so when he is trying to illustrate the joy, the unspeakable emotions that fill every sentiment of his spirit? Sweedenborg tells you that any step taken in advance on earth produces a corresponding accordance in the spirit-world; and our congenialities are so intimate, that an elevated expression, an idea uttered in harmony with the realities of our existence here, meets with a response in our souls, and produces emotions simulating your own. . . . Thus it was, while listening to your reading, that my internal was excited by the emotions of your minds; for know that when there is accordance between two minds on earth, it increases the electric affinities and makes easier the power to communicate. Thus, I say, it was that my internal was prompted by your minds, and I felt myself compelled to give utterance to the sentiments I have expressed. I beg you to understand that my nature has somewhat progressed * since I have left the earth. I am not that dull matter-of-fact spirit as I was when a man on earth; but I feel that each day unfolds some new attribute of my soul, some higher power to feel, to comprehend, what I so

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* We have somewhere seen the use of the verb *to progress* censured as an Americanism. The criticism is not quite accurate: witness Shakspeare,—

"Let me wipe off this honourable dew
That silvery doth progress on thy cheeks."

We strongly suspect, however, that if the Yankee Bacon had dictated his posthumous communication aloud, the word would have been pronounced with a nasal accent and an emphasis on the final syllable. The next sentence, "I am not the dull matter-of-fact spirit *as I was*," is at any rate a conclusive proof how far Bacon has "progressed" in his mastery of English.

much desire to know, and that I can realise more clearly the high and important duties I have to perform," &c. &c.

It needs not to be a medium, or a man of science, or a conjurer, to apply the test furnished by this passage:

"Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua carmina, Mævi."

If any man, woman, or child who has read three pages of Bacon's writings can believe that the great Chancellor, in the flesh or out of the flesh, could give utterance to the above pompous platitudes, such a person is worthy to believe all the extravagancies and absurdities recorded in the ample library of American spiritualism. On another occasion Bacon takes leave of the company with the truly Yankee valediction, "*I guess* we will all go home; and so, good night." The communication which was closed in this characteristic manner, contained the following eloquent and logical denunciation of the opponents of spiritualism. The comparison of truth to a mist, and error to the sun, may at least claim the merit of a novel use of a hackneyed image:—

"Let the dog bark, the cat mew, or the ass slavishly toil for mere animal existence; still nature will assert its just claims, whether in man or brute. And to him who, without evidence of either right or wrong, can denounce that as untrue which he has not investigated, you may justly attribute the true prerogatives of his nature. He will bark dog-like to the compulsion of his brute-like organization; and he will toil like the ass, to perpetuate the slavery of opinions to which he is bound by error and prejudice. It is not worth while to contest the truth of spirit-revelation with those who do not believe. Truth is like the misty vapour encircling the mountain's top. The sun of error, of superstition, of priestly teachings may, in its full blaze, dissipate the cloud, but its cloudy substance is disseminated through the whole atmosphere, and descends in grateful showers to replenish and fructify the thirsty earth."

In the Appendix to this volume, among other stuff of the same kind, is a communication from the spirit of John C. Calhoun, who writes, not through a medium, but with his own hand, the words, "I'm with you still." Governor Tallmadge's comment on this short sentence, first on the *I'm*, and then on the whole, is worthy to rank with Mr. Puff's explanation of Lord Burleigh's shake of the head:—

"We have not only the most unequivocal testimony to the handwriting itself, but, lest any sceptic should suggest the possibility of an imitation or a counterfeit, this abbreviation, peculiar to himself, and known only to his most intimate friends, and which no imitator or counterfeiter could know, is introduced by way of putting such a suggestion to flight for ever!

"This sentence," continues the "Critic," "is perfectly characteristic of Calhoun. It contains his terseness of style and his condensation of thought. It is a text from which volumes might be written. It proves—

"1. The immortality of the soul;

"2. The power of spirits to revisit the earth;

"3. Their ability to communicate with relatives and friends;

"4. The identity of the spirit to all eternity.

How one's soul expands with these sublime conceptions! How resistless is this testimony of their truth! How surprising that men can doubt, when this flood of living light is poured upon them by spirits who, in the language of Webster, 'revel in the glory of the eternal light of God!'"

The logic which concludes that a writer using the abbreviation "I'm" must be Mr. Calhoun or his ghost, is on a par with that of the gentleman who discovered his grandfather by the infallible token of a hand passing down his face. We are not told what sort of a hand Mr. Calhoun wrote; but if it was not more legible than those of some other spirits, of which facsimiles are given in the same volume, it would be difficult to decide whether he used the abbreviated form or not.*

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* The same Governor Tallmadge has written an introduction and appendix to another "spiritual" book, called 'The Healing of the Nations.' Of the book itself, a farrago partly of commonplace and partly of nonsense, expressed in the bombastic language in which American eloquence delights, the following samples will probably be thought quite sufficient:—"When presumptuous man useth his individuality to try and substantiate the existence of a being which would re-create chaos by its very existence, it were far better that he had never been born than to thus live in vain. . . . Flesh-pots, or dead bodies in their stench, though they are outwardly useful unto creation—for there is nothing wasted—do not appear half so lovely, or are not half so acceptable, as the living, burning light within." Yet of this book Mr. Tallmadge says, "Many literary and scientific gentlemen have examined the original volume, and pronounce portions of it beyond human conception. The style is simple and faultless, and adapted to every capacity. The most astute critic cannot strike out a word in a single sentence, and substitute another which he can truly say will improve it in style or sentiment." In his own portion, Mr. Tallmadge gives us, among other things, a communication from Shakspeare, and another from the Evangelist St. John! The former, of which he says that "no spirit, in or out of the body, except the spirit of Shakspeare, could have written it," contains the following among other directions to a player, in which the

In contrast to these great men, we are favoured by Judge Edmonds with the following communication, spelt through rappings, from an illiterate spirit, who tells us that his name was John Jones, and that he "leived anywhere where they would keep him." The reader may determine for himself "which is the wiser here, Justice or Iniquity":—"You have got to hear my story fust. I am happy now, since I have larnt how for to wrap. You must pity my ignorance instead of laughing. I can tell you I am sorry I lived as I did; but no decent man would speak to me when I wanted to reform, and now I am not abel to converse as wel as a littel infant, because I have nobody to larn me how. Now do remember the poor; and remember that poverty makes them bad. You must not pas them by."

That such a work should have reached a tenth edition in the year after its first publication is of course a strong encouragement to the manufacture of other articles of the same kind. Writings from the other world seem now to have become part of the regular stock in trade of American literature, and may be

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reader no doubt will recognise the author of Hamlet:—

"To act requireth two things—a brain and an eye; the scene will do almost all the rest.

"The eye calleth up and *holdeth* [the italic marks are the spirit's own] the magic spell, which in the audience centers.

"The brain the gestures makes—the stand, the position; and grace doth take therefrom its own existence.

"Thou may'st stand majestically, thou may'st even speak well, and in every action proclaim the *will* and sentiment of that which thou art imitating; but death is there, if the eye's fierce light doth not illuminate the hating passion.

"The *eye*, the *eye*; without it man were blind, and play could ne'er be acting."

Shakspeare, like Bacon, has "somewhat progressed since he left the earth."

The following is something more than absurd, and raises other feelings besides those caused by its absurdity. It was communicated, "letter by letter, through the tippings of the table":—

"Lo an assembly of wise men from the East and from the West, and the North and the South, lawyers and doctors, judges and governors, and divines, are met to try the spirits. Beloved, ye do well. Ye are instructed from the Great Book of Books, even the Book of God, thus to proceed. 'Beloved, if all spirits were evil, or if all spirits were good, this trial would be useless. By their fruits ye shall know them. Beloved, can the leopard change his spots, or the Ethiopian his skin? When the spirit leaves the earthly form for a spiritual, the spirit is the same, but in a new temple. My little children, ye have the privilege to make that new mansion an abode of happiness or misery, &c.

"JOHN THE BELOVED."

This is only paralleled by the almanac-maker who figured in a recent trial as having exhibited in a crystal ball "Titania as she appeared in a chariot, and St. Luke as he appeared on several occasions," and both speaking English. If St. John, why not St. Luke? If Shakspeare, why not one of Shakspeare's creations?

expected as part of the contents of every catalogue of new publications. One of these precious documents is now lying before us, purporting to be the production of the spirit of Tom Paine, through the mediumship of a Mr. Wood. The editor, a Mr. Burbank, vouches for it as "a work of singular merit," the beginning of what was designed to be "a stupendous production," in thirty volumes of three hundred pages each. This design has, happily for readers, been abandoned; and the spirit of the notorious Tom has confined his communications for the present within the modest limits of a single pamphlet, which the editor pronounces to be certainly the work of Thomas Paine, on the ground of two convincing arguments: "the one, that the chirography is a *fac-simile* of Mr. P.'s; the other, that the style of composition is peculiarly his own—and that is acknowledged to be almost inimitable." The first of these arguments we must take for granted on the editor's word, as no specimen is given either of the original "chirography" or of its imitation; as regards the second, we are quite ready to admit that in the prominent features of the composition, "Tom the second reigns like Tom the first." For ignorance, coarseness, and blasphemy, the work is quite worthy of its reputed parent; but unhappily these qualities are anything but inimitable. Tom has not improved in writing English since he left the earth; witness his attempt to advertise the revelations of Andrew Jackson Davis, "of whose philosophy," he says, "allow me now to speak in *commendable terms*," meaning, we suppose, terms of commendation. Nor yet has he advanced in scientific knowledge; witness his account of the development of man, "as the highest physical ultimate of matter . . . having come up by regular stages of gradation from the monad" (surely either Tom Darwinizes or Darwin Tomizes) . . . "the fish running into the saurian, the saurian into the bird, the bird into the marsupial, the marsupial into the mammalial, the mammalial into the human";—from which we learn two things: first, philologically; that the proper name of the class is *mammalialia;* secondly, physiologically, that marsupials are not mammals. Nor yet has Tom advanced in Biblical learning; for he tells us that "according to Scripture" Noah's ark contained, among other animals, "two mammoths," "two whales," "two sea-serpents," and "two sharks." The main feature of his

theology consists in the assertion that God is not a person, but "an innate quality *of* and principle *in* matter." His remarks on Christian doctrines are too blasphemous to quote.

Such are a few specimens of the revelations proclaimed in America by "writing mediums." The manner in which these revelations are produced is thus lucidly explained by one of the inspiring spirits, to wit, the above Thomas Paine: "Aromal electricity is thrown into the system of the medium, and concentrated in the arm in quantities sufficiently large, and in currents sufficiently rapid, as to check the power of the *animal* electricity of the brain. Hence, so long as these currents are continued by us, accompanied by *passiveness* in the medium, *we* are able to use the arm of the medium, and leave his mind as free to think as ever." The explanation and the development of the system are doubtless due to our Transatlantic kinsmen; but we insist that the germ of the theory is of genuine British birth. The original idea is manifestly the property of Bayes in the 'Rehearsal,' who tells us that his best song was made by Tom Thimble's first wife after she was dead, and that he himself is "clara-voyant."

If one may not laugh at fooleries like these, it is difficult to imagine for what purpose a sense of the ludicrous was given to man. Yet, "even in laughter the heart is sorrowful," and Heraclitus, no less than Democritus, might moralise in his own vein over such a spectacle. That these so-called spiritual communications should be established as a regular and periodical phenomenon in the literature of a civilized people, as a fountain to send forth at the same place sweet water and bitter, the vehicle, now of religious instruction, and now of the wildest and most insane falsehood and blasphemy; that its pretensions in both characters alike should be eagerly proclaimed and indiscriminately received by a large population of impostors or dupes, seeking at all hazards for signs and wonders, be they from God or be they from Satan—such things, while we cannot but laugh at their folly, make us weep and blush for the weakness of our nature which makes such folly possible. The case, both in its ludicrous and in its painful aspect, has been rather understated than overstated. We have drawn our examples, in a great measure, from the better specimens of the literature and from the more respectable witnesses:

our worst instance belongs to a class in which worse follies remain behind.

What conclusion are we to draw from these phenomena as a whole? If our materials were of a more uniform character, whether for good or for evil, we should have less difficulty in forming an opinion about them. As it is, we are embarrassed by the multitude of our riches. The spirit theory has now assumed a completeness and rotundity which enables it to meet all objections and defy all discrimination. There are, as is now maintained by its defenders, Pagan and Pantheistic, as well as Christian spirits; foolish and lying, as well as wise and truthful spirits. Thus no amount of falsehood or folly in the communication can be urged as an objection; for these may naturally be expected from spirits of a cognate character. But here the sceptic interposes with a new difficulty: "By your own showing," he says, "I am justified in rejecting all such communications without further inquiry. For if the spirits tell me nothing but what I knew before or can find out for myself, their teaching is superfluous: if, on the other hand, they tell me things that I cannot discover for myself, I have no ground on which to believe them; for, by your own admission, it is at least an even chance whether the communicating spirit is one of the wise and truthful, or one of the silly and lying order. Indeed, by the latest evidence, the latter seem to be in a majority."

It is scarcely possible to go far into the multifarious contents of American "spiritualist" literature, without coming to the conclusion that, even admitting the possibility of a certain portion of truth at the foundation, an enormous mass of fraud and delusion has been employed in the superstructure. Some of the asserted facts are such as it seems hardly possible to attribute to anything but wilful imposture or mad fanaticism. Others might, perhaps, furnish materials for a new chapter in psychology, illustrating the influence, in certain abnormal states, of mind over matter, in relation, not merely to the phenomena of the senses, but also to the actions usually dependent upon the will. The communications made by "writing mediums" bear a remarkable resemblance to the power of mechanical writing exhibited by some of Mr. Braid's "hypnotised" patients;*

* See Carpenter's 'Human Physiology,' p. 860, 4th edit.

both actions being apparently severed from all connexion with the will of the agent, and from all consciousness of what is being written. This uniformity of mental state, under great varieties of bodily condition and external circumstances, seems to indicate the action of some common mental law, of which the bodily antecedents and concomitants are as yet but imperfectly known. The same law may, perhaps, be traced in table-turning, if, in accordance with Mr. Faraday's explanation, we refer the effect produced to a partially involuntary and unconscious exertion of muscular power.

But when we have deducted from these phenomena everything that can be attributed to fraud or self-delusion, and everything that can be traced to known or presumable natural laws, material or mental, may there not still remain a residue of well-authenticated facts which defy explanation on any natural grounds? We are far from denying that this may be the case; but to ascertain the existence, the amount, and the value of this residue, to sift the wheat of spiritualism—if wheat there be—from the chaff, of which there certainly is a great deal, requires a far more careful investigation and a far more discriminating judgment than is possessed by most of the writers who have hitherto come forward as the exponents of the supernatural hypothesis. Little help can be expected from the shark-like deglutition and ostrich-like digestion of such witnesses as Mr. Howitt and Governor Tallmadge. While admitting, in the language of Johnson, that some belief in apparitions of the dead may be supported by "the concurrent and unvaried testimony of all ages and of all nations," we see a marked difference between the venerable and general belief or superstition of past ages, and the got-up exhibitions of the present day; and this difference compels us to regard the latter as a distinct class of phenomena, of mushroom growth and upstart pretensions, whose claims to reception must be founded entirely on their own merits, and not on their very questionable descent from an ancient and respected ancestry. And without denying that they may possess some substantial merit which further inquiry may elicit, we recognise in their present assumptions too much of the characteristic brag and bluster of the country to which they belong, to accept the estimate of their worth on their own valuation.

We are free to confess that we entertain in secret a sneaking kindness for "that last lingering fiction of the brain, the churchyard ghost," and regard his gradual extinction with the same feelings with which we grieve over the approaching end of the last scion of an ancient and honoured family. But towards our modern hobgoblins, who perform their fantastic tricks under Mr. Home's tables, we find it difficult to entertain the same feeling. Our judgment concerning them more nearly approaches to that recorded in an old anecdote narrated by Bacon; not Dr. Dexter's Bacon in the spirit, but Queen Elizabeth's and King James's Bacon in the flesh.

"Sir Edward Dyer, a grave and wise gentleman, did much believe in Kelly the alchemist, that he did indeed the work, and made gold; insomuch that he went into Germany, where Kelly then was, to inform himself fully thereof. After his return, he dined with my Lord of Canterbury, where at that time was at the table Dr. Brown, the physician. They fell in talk of Kelly. Sir Edward Dyer, turning to the Archbishop, said, 'I do assure your Grace that that I shall tell you is truth: I am an eyewitness thereof; and if I had not seen it I should not have believed it. I saw Master Kelly put of the base metal into the crucible; and after it was set a little upon the fire, and a very small quantity of the medicine put in, and stirred with a stick of wood, it came forth in great proportion, perfect gold; to the touch, to the hammer, to the test.' My Lord Archbishop said, 'You had need take heed what you say, Sir Edward Dyer, for here is an infidel at the board.' Sir Edward Dyer said again, pleasantly, 'I would have looked for an infidel sooner in any place than at your Grace's table.' 'What say you, Dr. Brown?' saith the Archbishop. Dr. Brown answered, after his blunt and huddling manner, 'The gentleman hath spoken enough for me.' 'Why,' saith the Bishop; 'what hath he said?' 'Marry,' saith Dr. Brown, 'he said he would not have believed it except he had seen it, and no more will I.'" *

* It should be remembered that this article was written before the case *Lyon* v. *Home* was tried.—[Ed.]

FREETHINKING—ITS HISTORY AND TENDENCIES.

CONTENTS.

* The Deistical Writers of the 18th century, once so famous, are now almost unknown.
Course of Deism in England, France, and Germany.
The Characteristic of English Deism; its Coarseness and Virulence.
Stages of Deism.
Toland; his relation to Locke: Locke's philosophical Error, and its theological Consequences.
Collins's 'Discourse of Freethinking,' &c.
Woolston.
Tindal.
Morgan.
Annet.
Bolingbroke.
Parallel between the Unbelief of the last Century and that of the present.
The Test and Subscription Controversy.
Consequences of English Deism to the Church.
Conclusion.

FREETHINKING—ITS HISTORY AND TENDENCIES.*

TOLAND, Collins, Tindal, Woolston, Morgan, Chubb, Annet. What kind of recollection do these names call up in the minds of English readers of the present day? Are they, to the majority, anything more than a bare catalogue of names—"Alcandrumque Haliumque Noëmonaque Prytanimque"—known, perhaps, in a general way as Deistical writers, much as the above-mentioned Virgilian, or rather Homeric, worthies are known as soldiers; but, in other respects, not much more distinguished as regards personality and individual character? Yet these were men of mark in their day, the Essayists and Reviewers of the last century, attracting nearly as much attention, and receiving nearly as many criticisms, as their successors are doing at present. Nor were some of them without confident hope of the lasting effects which their works were destined to produce. Tindal prefaces his 'Christianity as Old as the Creation' with the declaration that he "thinks he has laid down such plain and evident rules as may enable men of the meanest capacity to distinguish between Religion and Superstition, and has represented the former in every part so beautiful, so amiable, and so strongly affecting, that they who in the least reflect must be highly in love with it." And, towards the conclusion of the work, he sums up his estimate of its argument in terms equally flattering: "For my part, I think, there's none who wish well to mankind, but must likewise wish this hypothesis to be true; and can there be a greater proof of its truth, than that it is, in all its parts, so exactly calculated for the good of mankind, that either to add to or to take from it will be to

* From the 'Quarterly Review,' July, 1864. 1. 'A Critical History of Free Thought in reference to the Christian Religion.' By Adam Storey Farrar, M.A. London, 1862. 2. 'Essays and Reviews—Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750.' By Mark Pattison, B.D. London, 1860.

their manifest prejudice?" Chubb, in the preface to his 'True Gospel,' asserts that he has "rendered the Gospel of Christ defendable upon rational principles." Annet tells his readers that his end is "to hold forth the acceptable Light of Truth, which makes men free, enables them to break the bands of creed-makers and imposers asunder, and to cast their cords from us; and to set at liberty captives bruised with their chains; to convince those that believe they see, or that see only through Faith's optics, that their blindness remaineth." * Woolston boasts that he will "cut out such a piece of work for our Boylean Lectures as shall hold them tug so long as the ministry of the letter and an hireling priesthood shall last." † And truly, if temporary popularity were any security for lasting reputation, Woolston had good grounds for his boast. His Discourses are said to have been sold to the extent of thirty thousand copies, and to have called forth in a short time as many as sixty replies. ‡ Swift's satirical lines testify to his popularity; while in other respects they might pass for a description of a Right Reverend critic of the present day.

"Here's Woolston's tracts, the twelfth edition;
'Tis read by every politician.
The country members, when in town,
To all their boroughs send them down;
You never met a thing so smart,
The courtiers have them all by heart.
Those maids of honour who can read
Are taught to use them for their creed.
The reverend author's good intention
Has been rewarded with a pension.
He does an honour to his gown
By bravely running priestcraft down:
He shows, as sure as God's in Gloucester,
That Moses was a grand impostor."

Other authors of the same school attained to a like celebrity. Against Collins's 'Discourse of Freethinking,' according to the boast of the author himself, no less than thirty-four works were published in England alone; § and the list of antagonist publi-

* 'The Resurrection of Jesus Considered,' p. 87.

† 'Fifth Discourse on the Miracles of Our Saviour,' p. 65.

‡ Lechler, 'Geschichte des englischen Deismus,' p. 294.

§ Thorschmid, 'Freydenker Bibliothek,' vol. i. p. 155. In the 'Acta Eruditorum Lipsiens.,' A. 1714, it is said that as many as twenty answers appeared in the same year with the Discourse itself.

cations enumerated by Thorschmid amounts in all to seventy-nine in various languages. Tindal's 'Christianity as Old as the Creation' gave occasion, according to the same diligent collector, to as many as a hundred and fifteen replies.

At this time, when we are again startled by a similar phenomenon—when we once more see writings, whose literary merits, to say the least, are by no means sufficient to account for the notice they have attracted and the apprehensions they have excited, pushed into an adventitious celebrity by the subject of which they treat and the circumstances under which they were written—our attention is naturally drawn to the parallel furnished by the last century; and we feel an interest in asking why it is that men so celebrated and so dreaded in their own generation should be so utterly forgotten in ours. And the interest is increased when we become aware of the existence of other parallels in other countries. The same state of things which existed in England in the early part of the eighteenth century was repeated in France in the latter part of the same century, and in Germany at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth. In France, the names of La Mettrie and De Prades, and D'Argens, and D'Holbach, and Damilaville, and St. Lambert, and Raynal, are almost as much forgotten as those of their English predecessors. In Germany, those of Tieftrunk and Henke, and Eckermann, and Paulus, and Röhr, and Wegscheider, represent men who once exercised a living influence on the theology of their day, but whose works are now little more than the decaying monuments of a dead and buried rationalism.

These, it may be objected, are neither the only nor the greatest names that can be cited as examples of freethinking in their respective countries; nor are they entitled to be considered as its chief representatives. Yet they are fair representatives, not indeed of the highest amount of ability or influence that has at any time been combined with freethinking tendencies, but of the class of writers whose reputation rests principally or solely upon those tendencies. Men like Hume and Gibbon, or even Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke, in England, like Voltaire and Rousseau in France, like Lessing and Wieland in Germany, may have written in the same spirit, and may have been as heterodox in their belief as their less distinguished countrymen; but they so little owe their literary reputation exclusively or

principally to their heterodoxy, that that reputation would now in all probability be as great or greater than it is, had their thoughts on religion never been given to the world. If we are to compare the freethinking of individuals with the teaching of the Church, in respect of its permanent influence on the minds of men, we must compare them, as Plato compares justice and injustice, in themselves, and not in their accidental accompaniments. We may perhaps add that by so doing we shall find a closer parallel to the writers who have excited the greatest religious panic among ourselves at the present day.*

These three schools of England, France, and Germany, however differing in the spirit and details of their teaching, have this feature in common—that they are all, to a great extent, of native growth in their several countries, and sprang up under, or were modified by, the influence, rightly or wrongly understood, of a native system of philosophy. In England, in the early part of the last century, both the assailants and the defenders of Christianity borrowed their weapons from the armoury of Locke. In France, the prevailing religious unbelief took much of its tone from the philosophy of Condillac; and the rationalism of Germany, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, allied itself, as regards its main principles, with the system of Kant. In every case, also, the theological deductions were rather inferred from than contained in the philosophical systems with which they were connected, and, in some cases, were neither intended nor admitted by the authors of those systems. Locke, to use the words of his friend Molyneux, took an early opportunity of "shaking off" Toland. Condillac, devoting himself chiefly to philosophical speculations, carefully avoided all application of his principles to questions of morals or religion; and, while he allowed no other source of knowledge than the experience of the senses, he was at the same time so far removed from the materialism of his later followers that his system has even been regarded as logically identical with the idealism of

* The apologist for the 'Essays and Reviews' in the 'Edinburgh Review' of April, 1861, compares the excitement caused by that work to such "religious panics" as that on the prospect of the admission of Dissenters to the Universities in 1834, that on the Education Scheme in 1839, and those caused by the Hampden and Gorham controversies, and by the Papal aggression. It would have been more just to compare it with the interest excited by the Deistical works of the last century, but such a comparison would have overthrown the Reviewer's argument.

Berkeley.* In the philosophy of Kant we may discern two opposite tendencies: the rationalism which his practical philosophy encourages is refuted by his speculative philosophy; and, while it must be admitted that the Kantian rationalists could find some support for their views in the later writings of their master, it must be admitted also that they are supported by one portion only of his philosophy, and that portion not the one on which his fame as a thinker principally rests.

The English and French movements were in this distinguished from the German,—that in the former, political interests and influences were largely mingled with the religious and the philosophical. In Germany, the rationalist theories were of the closet rather than of the world. They were the production of men who applied themselves calmly, and with little more than a speculative interest, to discuss as an abstract question the bearings of certain philosophical speculations on religious belief, —religion itself being little more than a branch of philosophy. In England and France, on the contrary, the philosophical speculation mingled with an existing political current, carried along in its motion and coloured by its hue. The English freethinking of the eighteenth century was in part the offspring of the English Revolution: the French infidelity was one of the movements which prepared the way for the French Revolution; and this difference may go some way towards explaining the difference of temper manifested in the respective controversies. Revolutions are not made with rosewater, nor do they impart a rosewater flavour to the events which follow them while the ocean is still heaving with the scarcely-subsided storm. The German philosopher might calmly discuss his thesis as a statement of abstract truth, which, if not immediately acknowledged, had only to bide its time. In England and in France the question was one involving or seeming to involve immediate action, dealing with persons and institutions, not merely with theorems and proofs. In passing from the controversies of the last century to those of the present, we may note a decided improvement in the temper of the disputants; but at the same time it may be questioned whether the gain is all on one side. Our taste may be less offended by rude language and injurious imputa-

* See Diderot, 'Lettre sur les Aveugles,' Œuvres (1821), tom. i. p. 321.

tions; yet it may be doubted whether all the coarse language which a recent writer has so severely censured in the English apologists of the last century * contained anything so revolting to the moral sense as the proposition which was calmly and philosophically advocated by Röhr at the close of his 'Letters on Rationalism,' and which has been revived in more than one quarter at the present time,—namely, that a clergyman is at liberty, while retaining his office in the Church, to accept the formularies of that Church in a new sense, and to teach them in that sense to his congregation.

The characteristic feature of English Deism in the last century was that it was not merely a promulgation of certain opinions on the subject of religion, but also an attack on a body of men, and on the church of which those men were ministers. The idea which the Deistical writers laboured most earnestly to impress on the mind of the English nation was, that priests are knaves and their congregations fools; that the shepherds fleeced the flock for their own benefit, and the sheep were simple enough to submit to the process. The design, it is true, was sometimes masked under the form of an attack on heathen or Popish priests, sometimes coupled with an ironical exception in favour of the orthodox ministers of the Establishment; but these transparent disguises were not calculated, and probably were not intended, to deceive any one as to their real purport. The words which Bishop Berkeley puts into the mouth of his Alciphron, exactly represent the general tone of the freethinkers of his age:—

"Take my word for it, priests of all religions are the same; wherever there are priests there will be priestcraft, and wherever there is priestcraft, there will be a persecuting spirit, which they never fail to exert to the utmost of their power against all those who have the courage to think for themselves, and will not submit to be

* Mr. Pattison allows one exception in the case of Shaftesbury, "to whom," he says, "as well after his death as in his lifetime, his privileges as a peer seem to have secured immunity from hangman's usage."—'Essays and Reviews,' p. 311. It may be doubted whether the peerage had anything to do with the matter. Shaftesbury's work was not directly theological, and his occasional allusions to religious doctrines were not, like the more directly Deistical publications, an open challenge to controversy. At any rate Bolingbroke's peerage did not save him from some pretty severe treatment at the hands of Warburton and Leland; and Shaftesbury himself fared little better under the criticism of Skelton.

hoodwinked and manacled by their reverend leaders. Those great masters of pedantry and jargon have coined several systems, which are all equally true, and of equal importance to the world. The contending sects are each alike fond of their own, and alike prone to discharge their fury upon all who dissent from them. Cruelty and ambition being the darling vices of priests and churchmen all the world over, they endeavour in all countries to get an ascendant over the rest of mankind; and the magistrate, having a joint interest with the priest in subduing, amusing, and scaring the people, too often lends a hand to the hierarchy, who never think their authority and possessions secure, so long as those who differ from them in opinion are allowed to partake even in the common rights belonging to their birth or species." *

This determined hostility to the clergy as a body was the distinguishing feature of the Deistical movement from first to last; and it is necessary to bear this circumstance in mind, if we would form a just estimate of the attitude taken by the party assailed. The Church of England had but recently recovered from two political attacks, threatening her very existence. She had actually been subverted for a time to Puritanism under the Commonwealth; she had been threatened with a second subversion by Popery under James II. When a new movement presented itself in a similar form, embodying not merely a discussion of doctrines, but an assault upon men and institutions, it was inevitable that a personal character should be imparted to the controversy; that the defenders of the Church should feel that they were contending, not merely against a speculative error which might be met by argument, but against a political assault which was endeavouring to stir up all the bad passions of men against them. A new Martin Marprelate seemed to have arisen, to make war, not only against prelacy, but against a clerical order of any kind; and, so far as past experience furnished any augury of the future, it might well be feared that if his hostility were suffered to reach its climax, the struggle would not be for victory, but for existence. That such a fear was not altogether groundless, was terribly shown at the close of the century in a neighbouring country; and the tree which bore fruit in France was sown in England.

The coarseness and virulence with which this attack was

* Dial. I. 3, Works, ed. Fraser, vol. ii. p. 28. [Ed.]

carried on, can be appreciated fully only by those who will take the trouble to search into the now happily forgotten publications of the period. The task is not a pleasant one: but we have lately heard so much censure of the apologetic writers for want of politeness towards their opponents, that it becomes a duty to inquire what manner of men these opponents really were. A few extracts from their writings will answer this question better than any description.

Toland, the leader of the band, was, after his fashion, a poet as well as a philosopher, and attacked the priests in verse as well as in prose. His earliest work was a poem entitled 'The Tribe of Levi,' the beginning of which is a tolerably fair specimen of his poetical powers and of his controversial temper.

> "Since plagues were ordered for a scourge of men,
> And Egypt was chastised with her ten,
> No greater plague did any state molest,
> Than the severe, the worst of plagues, a priest."

His theological system is summed up in some equally meritorious verses in a later work, the 'Letters to Serena':—

> "Natural religion was easy first and plain;
> Tales made it mystery, offerings made it gain;
> Sacrifices and shows were at length prepared,
> The priests ate roast-meat, and the people stared."

His prose is to the same effect. In his 'Christianity not Mysterious,' which, in point of language is one of the most moderately written of his works, he cannot forbear telling his readers that it was "through the craft and ambition of priests and philosophers" that mysteries were introduced into Christianity;* and if he does not extend the condemnation in full measure to the clergy of his own day, it is only because he charitably allows that they may be well-meaning dupes instead of designing knaves.† So again, when, in 1713, he came forward as the antagonist of Sacheverell, he was not content to deal with that hot-headed ecclesiastic on his own merits, but availed himself of the occasion to attack the clerical order in general; prefixing to his pamphlet the inflammatory title, 'An Appeal to Honest People against Wicked Priests,' denouncing

* See 'Christianity not Mysterious,' p. 168, ed. 1696.
† See Ibid., p. 127.

the clergy generally as the enemies of good government, and even justifying on this ground the persecution of Christianity by the Roman Emperors, because "the emulation and ambition of Christian priests had made the Christian religion seem incompatible with good policy." That this kind of language was not merely the expression of individual petulance, but was part of the ordinary and systematic warfare of this class of writers, will be sufficiently shown by the following passages from other authors of the same school.

Tindal, 'The Rights of the Christian Church Asserted,' 1707, p. 23 :—

"The tacking the priests' preferments to such opinions not only makes 'em in most nations, right or wrong, to espouse them, and to invent a thousand sophistical and knavish methods of defending 'em to the infinite prejudice of truth, but is the occasion that humanity is in a manner extinct among those Christians who by reason of such articles are divided into different sects; their priests burning with implacable hatred, and stirring up the same passions in all they can influence against the opposers of such opinions."

Ibid. p. 103 :—

"Here one's at a stand which to admire most, the mad insolence and daring impiety of the clergy, or the gross stupidity and wretched abjectness of the laity; one in thus imposing and t'other in being imposed upon."

Ibid. p. 235 :—

"This cursed hypothesis had perhaps never been thought on with relation to civils, had not the clergy (who have an inexhaustible magazine of oppressive doctrines) contrived it first in ecclesiasticals, to gratify their insupportable itch of tyrannizing over the laity and over one another."

Collins, 'Discourse of Freethinking,' 1713, pp. 88 (=109) :—

"Priests have no interest to lead me to true opinions, but only to the opinions they have listed themselves to profess, and for the most part into mistaken opinions. For it is manifest that all priests, except the orthodox, are hired to lead men into mistakes."

Ibid. pp. 91, 92 (=114) :—

"The great charge of supporting such numbers of men as are necessary to maintain impositions is a burden upon society. . . . .

The charge alone, therefore, of supporting such a number of ecclesiastics is a great evil to society, though it should be supposed the ecclesiastics themselves were employed in the most innocent manner imaginable, *viz.* in mere *eating and drinking.*"

Ibid. pp. 93 (=117):—

"Besides, they who have an interest to enlarge their sect and keep it united, know that nothing tends so much to its increase and union as the toleration of vice and wickedness to as great a degree as they can conveniently; for by that means they are sure to engage all the rogues and vicious (and by consequence the fools, who will ever be led by them) in their party. And therefore, wherever the power of the priest is at the height, they proceed so far in the encouragement of wickedness as to make all churches sanctuaries or places of protection."

Woolston, 'Fifth Discourse on the Miracles,' 1728, p. 70:—

"According to the foresaid articles of this my faith, I am so fully convinced, not only of the error of the ministry of the letter, but of the mischiefs and inconvenience of an hireling priesthood, that having set my shoulders to the work, I am resolved, by the help of God, to endeavour to give both a lift out of this world. This is fair and generous warning to our clergy to sit fast and look to their own safety, or they may find me a stronger man than they may be aware of. And tho' I don't expect long to survive the accomplishment of so great and glorious a work, yet I am delightfully ravished and transported with the forethought and contemplation of the happiness of mankind upon the extinction of ecclesiastical vermin out of God's house, when the world will return to its primogenial and paradisaical state of nature, religion, and liberty, in which we shall be all taught of God, and have no need of a foolish and contentious priest, hired to harangue us with his noise and nonsense."

Woolston, 'Defence of the Discourses on the Miracles,' 1720, p. 23:—

"And why should not the clergy of the Church of England be turned to grass, and be made to seek their fortune among the people, as well as preachers of other denominations? Where's the sense and reason of imposing parochial priests upon the people to take care of their souls, more than parochial lawyers to look to their estates, or parochial physicians to attend their bodies, or parochial tinkers to mend their kettles? In secular affairs every man chooses the artist and mechanic that he likes best; so much

more ought he in spirituals, inasmuch as the welfare of the soul is of greater importance than that of the body or estate. The church-lands would go a good, if not a full, step towards paying the nation's debts."

Morgan, 'The Moral Philosopher,' 1738, vol. i., p. 96:—

"In short, this clerical religion is a new thimble-and-button, or a powder-le-pimp, which may be this or that, everything or nothing, just as the jugglers please. And yet all this, in their different ways, if you can believe them, is divine Institution and immediate Revelation from God. All which can amount to no more than this, that the several passions and interests of every party, and of every man, are divinely instituted by immediate revelation; and this is the privilege of the *orthodox faith* and of being religious in the *clerical way*."

Ibid. p. 100:—

"The generality of the clergy of all denominations, from the very beginning, have been continually palming upon us false coin under the authority of God, and when they are convicted of it, they cry out, that this is but now and then, in a few particular instances, and only here and there a piece; and they think it hard, very hard, that they cannot have credit upon such small matters."

Ibid. p. 101:—

"In the meanwhile, how are our political State-Divines everywhere caressed and flattered; and how happy is it for them that they have an interest much superior to Truth and Reason, Religion or Conscience! And the ground of all this is certainly a clerical religion above reason and above all possibility of proof."

Chubb, 'The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted,' 1738, p. 170 (= p. 125, ed. 2, 1741):—

"The enlarging the revenues of the Church not only introduced a *useless*, but also a *superfluous* Clergy, or a set of Clergymen who, with respect to their offices in Christian societies, have answered very little or no good purpose to the Gospel of Christ or the souls of men, whatever plausible pretences may have been made in their favour. These superfluous Clergymen have been dignified and distinguished by pompous titles and vestments, which have served to introduce a groundless veneration and respect to their persons, whilst their principal business has been to possess great revenues, to live in pomp and grandeur, assuming and exercising dominion over their brethren, whom they have endeavoured to keep under

the power of ignorance and superstition, as it has been the ground and foundation of their wealth and sovereignty; whose power has been employed to the very great hurt and damage of Christian people, and has been highly injurious to the Gospel of Christ."

Ibid. p. 174 (= p. 127, ed. 2):—

"To this I may add that the possessing the Clergy with wealth and power, which was first introduced by men's great liberality in giving their goods both moveable and immoveable to the Church, this introduced not only a useless, a superfluous, and a supernumerary, but also an *injurious* ministry, or a ministry which were *directly* and *immediately* highly injurious to the Gospel of Christ and to the souls of men. I shall not here take notice of the numberless evils and mischiefs, and the miseries which have been brought upon multitudes of our species by their means, by their wicked, perfidious, and barbarous practices, and by their procurement; for were all these to be entered upon record (allowing me to use the same figure of speech which St. John has used before me), I suppose the world itself would not contain the books which might be written; but this is beside my present purpose. What I observe is, that the introducing of wealth and power into Christian societies, introduced with it a ministry which were directly and immediately *highly injurious* to the Gospel of Christ, and to the souls of men. For as the clergy were set upon increasing their wealth and power at all hazards, so they, in order to answer those purposes, have introduced *such doctrines*, and such a multitude of *superstitious practices*, and assumed to themselves *such power*, as took away the persuasive influence of the Gospel, and rendered it of none effect."

Annet, 'Judging for Ourselves; or, Freethinking the great Duty of Religion,' 1739, p. 8.

"If the *mysteries* of the *spiritual craftsmen* were exposed by reason, no man would buy their merchandize any more. Depend upon it, when you are hoodwinked with *mysteries supernatural*, there is *fraud* in the case; 'tis but another word for it; the meaning is the same. Whatever is imposed on men to believe, which will not bear the light of honest inquiry, is all craft and guile."

Ibid. p. 11:—

"The *Buyers* and *Sellers*, the *Bigots* and *Priests*, will unite again: the trade is likely to continue to the end of the world; for men being born ignorant, perverted by education, prepossessed with notions before they have sense or reason to judge of them, which some never have capacities to do, and others thro' cowardice or

idleness never make use of the capacities they have, there is no fear but the mystery-mongers will always find fools enough to buy their sophisticated wares."

Among many rude and some unjust things which disfigure the controversial writings of Warburton, there is one remark at least which most readers of the above extracts will allow to be, not, indeed, politely expressed, but most richly and thoroughly deserved; and that is the passage in his 'Dedication to the Freethinkers' in which he describes their "scurrilities, those stink-pots of your offensive war."

If from the language of the Freethinkers we turn to the matter of their teaching, we shall find something to remind us of some of the popular theories of the present day, and much more to warn us of the tendency of such theories when pursued to their natural results. The first step in the rationalism of that age was an attempt to eliminate from the doctrines of Christianity all that is above the comprehension of human reason: the second was an attempt to eliminate from the contents of Christianity all statements of facts which cannot be verified by each man's personal experience: the third was an attempt to get rid of Christianity altogether, as having no proper claim to respect or obedience. "No Dogmatic Christianity," may be taken as the watchword of the first stage: "No Historical Christianity," as that of the second: "No Christianity at all," as that of the third. The representative book of the first period was Toland's 'Christianity not Mysterious:' of the second, Chubb's 'True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted:' of the third, Bolingbroke's Essays and Fragments. The first represents revealed religion as brought down to the level of philosophical speculation, and to be tried by philosophical tests: the second subjects it to the judgment of the rough common sense of the many: the third represents it as tried and condemned by the verdict of the scorner and the profligate.

Toland, the disciple of Locke, and himself, in his own estimation, a philosopher of no mean order,* found a criterion of

* His estimate of his own merits may be judged from his epitaph, written by himself. Molyneux, no unfriendly witness, speaks of the "tincture of vanity" which appeared in the whole course of his conversation. Bishop Browne tells us that he "gave out he would be the head of a sect before he was thirty years of age."

religious truth in the principles, or what he supposed to be the principles, of his master. "The exact conformity of our ideas with their objects," was his ground of persuasion and measure of belief; the origin and nature of these ideas being explained according to the philosophy of Locke. Chubb, the journeyman glover, was the advocate of a Gospel to be judged in all things by the uneducated intelligence of working men. With him, no "historical account of matters of fact" can be any part of the true Gospel; for a Gospel preached to the poor must be plain and intelligible, and level to the lowest understanding. Bolingbroke, the brilliant and profligate man of the world, attempted to exhibit religion in a form adapted to sinners of rank and fashion, imposing no unpleasant restraints on gentlemanly vices, by precepts to be observed in this life or punishments to be dreaded in the next. Accordingly the purport of his system, so far as so inconsistent a writer can be said to have a system at all, appears to be to deny the possibility of any revelation distinct from the law of nature, and to interpret the law of nature itself in the manner most favourable to the pursuit of pleasure. At the same time, combining the politician with the epicurean, he finds it convenient to recognise so much of religious obligation as may be necessary to serve as an instrument of civil government, and to act as a check on the more unruly vices of the lower orders.

The relation of Toland to Locke is a question of far more than mere historical interest. It is a question affecting the character of English Theology during the greater part of the eighteenth century; it marks the point of departure at which the religious teaching of that century separates from that of the preceding age; it helps to explain the difference, which no student can fail to observe, between the one and the other; it suggests some useful considerations as to the best mode of meeting similar questions at other times. For though we have spoken of the philosophy of Locke as furnishing the weapons employed alike by the Deists and by their opponents, this remark is strictly applicable only to the later stages of the controversy. The earlier opponents of Toland, such as Stillingfleet, Norris, and Browne, were also direct antagonists of Locke, and combated the positions of his philosophy no less in themselves than in the conclusions which his disciple professed to deduce from them.

Afterwards, when the system of Locke became the reigning philosophy of the day, it numbered disciples among believers and unbelievers alike; and the later apologists were thereby enabled to contend with the freethinkers on their own ground and with their own weapons. In this, they did no more than justice to the personal piety and sincere Christian belief of Locke: they employed his philosophy for the purpose for which he would himself have wished it to be employed; and they adopted the most effectual means of obtaining an immediate triumph over their antagonists. But they broke off, perhaps unconsciously to themselves, from that grand old catholic theology which had been the glory of the English Church in the preceding centuries; and the point of their separation, apparently minute and indifferent in itself, was in fact the leaven which has leavened the whole course of English religious thought, for good or for evil, ever since.

Will our readers pardon the introduction of so much of metaphysics as may be necessary to explain this point? Small as the change may seem at the beginning, it is an instance of how great a matter a little fire kindleth. It relates to a question, one of the most important that man can ask,—that of the right use of reason in religious belief; and it is not wholly alien to some controversies which have been raised concerning the same question in our own day.

Locke wrote his great work without reference to theology, and probably without any distinct thought of its theological bearings. When challenged on account of the relation of his premises to Toland's conclusions, he expressly repudiated the connection, and declared his own sincere belief in those mysteries of the Christian Faith which Toland had assailed. No one who knows anything of Locke's character will doubt for an instant the sincerity of this disclaimer; but our question does not relate to Locke's personal belief, but to the admissions which may be unconsciously involved in some of the positions of his philosophy, and which, perhaps, had they been foreseen, might have led to a modification of those positions themselves, —a modification, we may add, which might easily have been made without injury, or even with benefit, to the integrity of the work as a system.

"Simple ideas, derived from sensation or reflection, are the

foundation of all our knowledge." This is the assumption which is common to Locke with Toland, and is acknowledged to be so by Locke himself. Is this assumption true in itself, and has Locke so handled it as to warrant in any way the consequences which Toland deduced from it?

That we think by means of simple ideas, is true in the same sense in which it is true that we breathe by means of oxygen and azote. The simple ideas, though they are the elements of which thought is composed, are elements elicited only by an artificial analysis of objects which naturally present themselves in a compound state. "I see a horse," said Antisthenes to Plato, "but I do not see horseness." "True," replied Plato; "for you possess the eye of sense which sees the one, but not the eye of intellect which sees the other."* In like manner, and with more reason, an adversary judging with the eye of sense alone, might urge against Locke, "I see a white horse, or a white sheet, or a white snowball; but whiteness, apart from the horse, or the sheet, or the snowball, I do not see." Whatever distinction may be made between our original and our acquired perceptions at a time before distinct consciousness begins, at the later stage, when sight has become a recognised fact of consciousness, and we are able to give an account of what we see, the objects presented to it are presented as complex ideas, not as simple ones. We do not see colour alone, but colour in connection with a certain extension and a certain shape, and generally with certain other accompaniments. When Locke asserted that complex ideas are made by the mind out of simple ones, and that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, he overlooked the fact that the most important of our sensitive perceptions consist of a plurality of ideas given in conjunction; and that the act of the mind is more often an analysis by which simple ideas are elicited from the compound, than a synthesis by which complex ideas are formed out of simple ones.

But this admission involves a further consequence. If our intuitive and spontaneous judgments are not formed by the mind out of previously existing simple ideas, but are given

* ['Simplicius in Categ. apud Brandis Scholia,' p. 66, b. 47. A similar story is told of Plato and Diogenes, by Laertius, vi. § 53.] See Menage's note on the place. [ED.]

already formed out of ideas in combination, it follows that our natural apprehension of a thing or object is not merely that of an aggregate of ideas, but of ideas in a particular combination with and relation to each other. And hence the logical conception of an object, as based on and reflecting the character of this intuitive apprehension, implies not merely the enumeration of certain ideas as constituents of the object, but likewise the apprehension of their co-existence in a particular manner as parts of a connected whole. To conceive an object as a whole we must know something more than that its definition may be expressed by certain words, each of which is separately intelligible and represents a known idea: we must also be able to combine those ideas into an unity of representation; we must apprehend not merely each idea separately, but also the manner in which they may possibly exist in combination with each other.

For example: I can define a triangle as a rectilinear figure of three sides. But I can also, as far as a mere enumeration of ideas is concerned, speak of a rectilinear figure of two sides, and call it by the name of a *biangle.* Now what is the reason that the one object is conceivable and the other inconceivable? It is not that the separate ideas in the one definition are less intelligible than in the other; for the idea of two is by itself quite as intelligible as that of three. It is because in the one case we are able, and in the other case unable, to represent to ourselves the several ideas as co-existing in that particular manner which we know to be necessary to constitute a figure. So again, I may speak of a being who sees without eyes and hears without ears; and the language in each of its separate terms is quite as intelligible as when I use the word *with* instead of *without;* yet the nature of such seeing and hearing is to me inconceivable, because the manner in which it takes place cannot be apprehended by me as resembling any manner of seeing or hearing with which I can be acquainted by my own experience. And as it is in the simplest instances of conception, so it is in those more complicated instances in which we explain a number of phenomena by reference to a general law. When, for example, we refer the motions of the planets to the law of gravitation, we do not thereby determine what gravitation is, and how it acts upon bodies; we only represent to ourselves the motion as taking place in a certain known manner—as being of the same

kind as that with which we are already familiar in the fall of the apple from the tree:—

> "That very law which moulds a tear,
> And bids it trickle from its source,
> That law preserves the earth a sphere,
> And guides the planets in their course."

Now the defect of Locke's philosophy in this respect is, that, by representing a complex idea merely as an accumulation of simple ones, and not as an organised whole composed in a certain manner, he leaves no room for a distinction between those groups of ideas whose mode of combination is conceivable or explicable from their likeness to other instances, and those which are inconceivable or inexplicable, as being unlike anything which our experience can present to us. Hence there is no room for a further distinction between the *inconceivable* or *mysterious*, and the *absurd* or *self-contradictory;* between ideas which may be supposed to co-exist in some manner unknown to us, and those which cannot co-exist, as mutually destroying each other—in brief, between those complex ideas of which we cannot conceive how they are possible, and those of which we can conceive how they are not possible. Regarded merely as heaps of ideas in juxtaposition, any combination is possible of which the parts do not destroy each other; but, within these limits of possibility, there may be some combinations of which the mode is conceivable, as resembling others; and there may be some of which we can only say that they may possibly co-exist in some manner unknown to us.

This defect is most apparent when the method of Locke comes to be applied to invisible things—to mental philosophy in the first instance, and through that to theology. The idea of an immaterial spirit, he tells us, is gained by "putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea," just as the idea of matter is gained by "putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea."* In thus appealing to our obscure apprehension of material substance, by way of illustrating that of spiritual substance, Locke realised the remark of his great

* Essay, ii., 23, 15.

rival Leibnitz—"Les hommes cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent pas ce qu'ils cherchent." He wandered into the region of existence in general, in search of the abstract and remote conception of a *spirit*, when the witness of his own consciousness was close at hand to supply him with the concrete and immediate conception of a *person*. Our consciousness presents to us, not merely the ideas of thinking, willing, and the like, but also the combination of these several mental states into one whole, as attributes of one and the same personal self. I am conscious, not of thinking merely, but of myself as thinking; not of perceiving merely, but of myself as perceiving; not of willing merely, but of myself as willing. And in this apprehension of myself as a conscious agent, is presented directly and intuitively that original idea of substance, which, had it not been given in some one act of consciousness, could never have been invented in relation to others.

In neglecting the conception of a Person, whose unity is given, to seek for that of a Spirit, whose unity has to be invented as a "supposed I know not what," Locke adopted the chief error of the scholastic psychology, and transmitted it, modified after his own manner, to his successors. The same conception of the soul, not as a power manifested in consciousness, but as a substance assumed out of it, accounts for nearly all the deficiencies which critics have noticed in Butler's Argument on a Future State;* and, long before Locke's time, the bewildered student, in old Marston's play, owed to the same mode of investigation most of the perplexities of which he so humorously complains.†

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* In justice to Butler, however, it should be observed that the defects in his argument arise from restrictions necessarily imposed upon him by the purpose of his work. The human consciousness is a thing *sui generis*, and therefore the positive evidence which it furnishes in behalf of the immortality of the soul has nothing to do with analogy. Arguments derived from a comparison of the soul with other objects must for the most part be, as Butler's are, of a merely negative character.

† "I was a scholar: seven useful springs
Did I deflower in quotations
Of crossed opinions 'bout the soul of man:
The more I learnt, the more I learnt to doubt.
Delight, my spaniel, slept, whilst I baused leaves,
Tossed o'er the dunces, pored on the old print
Of titled words; and still my spaniel slept.
And still I held converse with Zabarell,
Aquinas, Scotus, and the musty saw
Of antick Donate; still my spaniel slept.
Still on went I; first, *an sit anima*;

The false method thus applied to the apprehension of the nature of finite spirits was carried on by a natural transition into the domain of theology; and it is here that we find the connecting link which unites Locke's teaching, in effect if not in intention, with that of Toland:—

"It is infinity," says Locke, "which, joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c., makes that complex idea whereby we represent to ourselves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For though in his own essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and uncompounded, yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c., infinite and eternal; which are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God." *

The argument thus left Locke's hands in the form, "We know not the real essence of God, as we know not the real essence of a pebble or a fly." In the hands of Toland, by a slight transformation, it comes out with a positive side. We understand the attributes (or nominal essence) of God as clearly as we do those of all things else; and, therefore, "the Divine Being himself cannot with more reason be accounted mysterious in this respect than the most contemptible of his creatures." †

How completely this assertion reversed the catholic teaching of the Church in all ages might be shown by a series of quotations from theologians of various ages and languages, from the second century to the seventeenth. One such only our limits

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Then, an 't were mortal. O hold, hold; at that
They 're at brain buffets, fell by the ears amain
Pell-mell together; still my spaniel slept.
Then, whether 't were corporeal, local, fixt,
Ex traduce; but whether 't had free will
Or no, hot philosophers
Stood banding factions, all so strongly propt,
I staggered, knew not which was firmer part,
But thought, quoted, read, observed, and pryed,
Stuffed noting-books; and still my spaniel slept.
At length he waked and yawned; and by yon sky,
For aught I know, he knew as much as I.'
'What you Will,' Act ii. Sc. 1.

* Essay, ii. 23, 35.

† 'Christianity not Mysterious' (1696), pp. 88, 89.

will allow us to give, from the writings of a great English divine of the latter century; and we select it from many others because its language, from the similarity of subject, is peculiarly adapted to show the contrast to which we refer; and because it also by anticipation exactly points out the error which Locke planted and Toland watered. In a sermon on the text, "Without controversy great is the mystery of godliness," Bishop Sanderson says—

"Herein especially it is that this mystery doth so far transcend all other mysteries. Μέγα, ὁμολογουμένως μέγα: a great, marvellous great mystery. In the search whereof reason, finding itself at a loss, is forced to give it over in the plain field, and to cry out, *O altitudo!* as being unable to reach the unfathomed depth thereof. We believe and know, and that with fulness of assurance, that all these things are so as they are revealed in the Holy Scriptures, because the mouth of God, who is Truth itself, and cannot lie, hath spoken them; and our own reason upon this ground teacheth us to submit ourselves and it to *the obedience of faith*, for the τὸ ὅτι, that so it is. But then for the τὸ πῶς, Nicodemus his question, *How can these things be?* it is no more possible for our weak understandings to comprehend that, than it is for the eyes of bats or owls to look steadfastly upon the body of the sun, when he shineth forth in his greatest strength. The very angels, those holy and heavenly spirits, have a desire, saith St. Peter—it is but a desire, not any perfect ability—and that but παρακύψαι neither, to peep a little into those incomprehensible mysteries, and then cover their faces with their wings, and peep again, and cover again, as being not able to endure the fulness of that glorious lustre that shineth therein." *

Sanderson's distinction between the τὸ ὅτι, *that it is*, and the τὸ πῶς, *how it is*, indicates the exact point which Locke overlooked, and which Toland denied. When the older theologians declared the essence of God to be mysterious and incomprehensible, they were not thinking of Locke's Real Essence, of which they knew nothing, but of that logical essence which is comprised in attributes, and can be expressed in a definition, and which Locke calls the Nominal Essence. This is most distinctly stated in the language of Aquinas: "The name of God," he says, "does not express the Divine essence as it is, as the name of man expresses in its signification the essence of man as

* Sanderson's Works, vol. i., p. 233.

it is,—that is to say, by signifying the definition which declares the essence." * The ground of this distinction was the conviction that finite things cannot indicate the nature of the infinite God otherwise than by imperfect analogies. "The attributes of God," it was argued, "must be represented to our minds, so far as they can be represented at all, under the similitude of the corresponding attributes of man. Yet we cannot conceive them as existing in God in the same manner as they exist in man. In man they are many: in God they must be one. In man they are related to and limit each other: in God there can be no relation and no limitation. In man they exist only as capacities at times carried into action: in God, who is *purus actus*, there can be no distinction between faculty and operation. Hence the Divine attributes may properly be called mysterious; for, though we believe in their co-existence, we are unable to conceive the manner of their co-existence.

When we examine the controversy between Locke and Stillingfleet, and observe the frequent complaints of the latter against "the new way of ideas," we see that Stillingfleet's theological learning had enabled him to discover the true source of Locke's error; though his inferiority to his adversary in philosophical acumen and controversial dexterity prevented him from making sufficient use of his discovery. A very few years afterwards, Locke's great philosophical rival, Leibnitz, in an argument directed, not against the intellectual dogmatism of Toland, but against the intellectual scepticism of Bayle, points out the just medium between the two, in language exactly coinciding with that already quoted from Sanderson:

"Il en est de même des autres mystères, où les esprits modérés trouveront toujours une explication suffisante pour croire, et jamais autant qu'il en faut pour comprendre. Il nous suffit d'un certain *ce que c'est* (τί ἐστι), mais le *comment* (πῶς) nous passe, et ne nous est point nécessaire." †

The attitude, if not of antagonism, at least of indifference, to dogmatic theology, which was thus assumed indirectly, and perhaps unconsciously, in the philosophical positions of Locke's Essay, appears more plainly and directly in the latitudinarian

* 'Summa,' Pars i. Qu. xiii. Art. I.

† 'Théodicée; Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison,' § 56.

terms of Church Communion advocated in his 'Reasonableness of Christianity.' In this work, written, it is said, to promote the design entertained by William III. of a comprehension with the Dissenters, and published in 1695, the year before Toland's book, Locke contended that the only necessary article of Christian belief is comprised in the acknowledgment that Jesus is the Messiah; that all that is required beyond this consists entirely of practical duties, of repentance for sin, and obedience to the moral precepts of the Gospel. On these practical duties of Christianity, and on the new authority given by it to the truths of natural religion, Locke dwells earnestly and at length; but all points of doctrine, all distinctions between sound and unsound belief are, with the exception of his one fundamental article, either passed over without notice or expressly declared to be unessential. The teaching of the Epistles is separated from that of the Gospels. "It is not in the Epistles," he says, "that we are to learn what are the fundamental articles of faith;"* and again: "There be many truths in the Bible which a good Christian may be wholly ignorant of, and so not believe; which perhaps some lay great stress on and call fundamental articles, because they are the distinguishing points of their communion." And two years later, in his 'Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity,' Locke retorts the accusations of his antagonist Edwards, in a manner which virtually concedes the entire position contended for by Toland. "It is ridiculous," he says, "to urge that anything is necessary to be explicitly believed to make a man a Christian, because it is writ in the Epistles and in the Bible, unless he confess that there is no mystery, nothing not plain or intelligible to vulgar understandings in the Epistles or in the Bible."† The reasoning by which he supports this assertion is identical in substance with that which had just before been advanced by Toland; namely, that a proposition, to be believed, must be expressed in intelligible terms; and that if the terms are intelligible, the thing signified cannot be mysterious. In this case, however, it is possible that Locke may have been driven beyond his deliberate judgment by the heat of a controversy which offered many temptations to retaliation.

* Works, ed. 1823, vol. vii., p. 154. [Ed.] † Ibid. p. 238. [Ed.]

If we have dwelt somewhat at length on a dry and abstruse subject, we trust that its importance may be accepted as an excuse. The philosophy of Locke constitutes the diverging point at which the religious thought of the eighteenth century separates itself from that of the preceding ages; and to examine that thought at its source and in its purest condition is necessary, not only to a just judgment of the past, but to a right conduct as regards the present. The experiment of the last century is being repeated in our own day, upon the foundations of our own belief. We have a like independence of authority, a like distrust of, if not disbelief in, the supernatural, a like appeal to reason and free thought, a like hostility to definite creeds and formularies, a like desire to attain to practical comprehensiveness by the sacrifice of doctrinal distinctions. In the spirit, and almost in the language of Locke, we are told by distinguished writers of our own day, that in the early Church no subscription was required beyond "a profession of service under a new Master, and of entrance into a new life;" and again that, in points of doctrine, to regard the teaching of the Epistles as an essential part of Christian doctrine, is to "rank the authority of the words of Christ below that of Apostles and Evangelists;" and in so doing "to give up the best hope of reuniting Christendom in itself and of making Christianity a universal religion." Under these circumstances, it is no mere question of literary curiosity, but one of practical and vital interest, to ask what was the effect of Locke's influence on the generation which succeeded him, and how far the benefits arising from it were such as to warrant us in looking hopefully on a repetition of the same attempt.

The tendency, if not the actual result, of Locke's philosophy, as applied to religious belief, pointed, as we have seen, in two directions: first, to a distrust of, if not to an actual disbelief in, the mysterious and incomprehensible as a part of religious belief; secondly, to a depreciation of distinctive doctrines in general, as at least unessential, and to a dislike of them, as impediments to comprehensive communion. Both these tendencies found their gradual development in the religious thought of the succeeding generation. The open denial of mysteries, commenced by Toland, was carried on in a coarser strain by Collins, the personal friend and warm admirer of Locke, but a

man of a very different spirit. From the mysterious in doctrines the assault was extended to the supernatural in facts, in the attacks of Collins on the Prophecies, and of Woolston on the Miracles. And, finally, when the supernatural had thus been entirely eradicated from Christian belief, the authority of the teachers naturally fell with the evidences of their divine mission; and Christianity, in the hands of Tindal and Morgan, appears simply as a scheme of natural religion, to be accepted, so far as it is accepted at all, solely on the ground of its agreement with the conclusions of human reason, but having no special doctrines of its own distinct from those discoverable by the light of nature, and no special authority of its own, as a ground on which it can lay claim to belief.

Collins's earliest theological work, 'An Essay concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions the Evidence whereof depends upon Human Testimony' (1707), reads almost as if it were intended as a second part to Toland's unfinished 'Christianity not Mysterious,' though the name of Toland is not mentioned in the book. Like Toland, Collins follows Locke, in making all knowledge to consist in a perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas; and like Toland, he differs from Locke, in making such perception the sole condition of all assent, whether in matters of science, or of opinion, or of faith. Where this perception does not exist, he regards the mind as absolutely inert and void. "That which falls not within the compass of our ideas," he says, "is nothing to us." Like Toland also, Collins refers the belief in religious mysteries to the craft of the clergy; and, as if to leave no doubt of the application of his theory, he selects, as a special instance for animadversion, Bishop Gastrell's 'Considerations on the Trinity.' Finally, as if to mark the work still more clearly as a sequel to Toland, Collins concludes his essay with an attempt to carry out Toland's unfulfilled promise of "solving very easily" the difficulties connected with the idea of eternity; though his solution, in fact, consists in little more than a simple denial that such difficulties exist.

The once-celebrated 'Discourse of Freethinking,' by the same author, is principally taken up with abuse of priests and praise of freethinkers; but these congenial topics are now and then agreeably diversified by an oblique sneer at the mysteries of the

Christian faith. Thus he tells us, "The Bonzes of China have books written by the disciples of Fo-he, whom they call the God and Saviour of the world, who was born to teach the way of salvation, and to give satisfaction for all men's sins. The Talapoins of Siam have a book of Scripture, written by Sommonocodom, who, the Siamese say, was born of a virgin, and was the God expected by the universe." Of such scarcely disguised blasphemy as this, the most candid critic can hardly pronounce any other judgment than is given in a paper in the 'Guardian,' attributed, with some probability, to the gentle Bishop Berkeley: *—

"I cannot see any possible interpretation to give this work, but a design to subvert and ridicule the authority of Scripture. The peace and tranquillity of the nation, and regards even above these, are so much concerned in this matter that it is difficult to express sufficient sorrow for the offender, or indignation against him. But if ever man deserved to be denied the common benefits of air and water, it is the author of a Discourse of Freethinking." †

Eleven years later, when the controversy had extended itself from the doctrines to the evidences of Christianity, a third work of Collins, the 'Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,' and its sequel, the 'Scheme of Literal Prophecy considered,' attempted, under show of an interpretation of the Old Testament Prophecies, to undermine the foundations of Christianity by a method of insinuation similar to that which the author had previously employed against its distinctive doctrines. The whole proof of Christianity, Collins maintained, rests upon the Prophecies. If this proof is valid, Christianity is established; if it is invalid, Christianity has no just foundation, and is therefore false. He does not openly deny that the

* Works, ed. Fraser, vol. iii., p. 146. [ED.]

† A different judgment has been given by a recent critic in the case of 'Bentley against Collins.' "The dirt endeavoured to be thrown on Collins," says Mr. Pattison, "will cleave to the hand that throws it." We doubt whether any amount of dirt could be thrown which would not amalgamate sympathetically with the ingredients of Collins's own book. The 'Discourse of Freethinking' is one of those works which cannot be judged of by extracts: it must be read as a whole, and estimated according to the impression produced by its general tone and *animus*. Our own impression is that a more dishonest or a more scurrilous publication has seldom issued from the press. Mr. Pattison censures Bentley for treating Collins as "an Atheist fighting under the disguise of a Deist." If we may trust an anecdote recorded, on the authority of Bishop Berkeley, in Chandler's 'Life of Samuel Johnson, D.D.,' p. 57, Bentley may have had some reason for suspecting that this was really the case.

Prophecies have any reference to Christ; but asserts that they can only be so referred in a mystical and allegorical sense, which is not their literal and proper meaning, nor that in which they were originally understood by the Jews; among whom, as he asserts, the expectation of a Messiah did not arise till a short time before the coming of Christ. "His inference," says Mr. Farrar, "is stated as an argument in favour of the figurative or mystical interpretation of Scripture; but we can hardly doubt that his real object was an ironical one, to exhibit Christianity as resting on apostolic misinterpretations of Jewish prophecy, and thus to create the impression that it was a mere Jewish sect of men deceived by fanciful interpretations." *

In the argument of Collins it is easy to trace the influence of Locke's 'Reasonableness of Christianity,' and to see how the position originally advanced in support of latitudinarianism has degenerated, in the hands of a less scrupulous disciple, into a weapon for the service of unbelief. Collins, indeed, avowedly commences his argument from Locke's thesis. "The grand and fundamental article of Christianity," he says, "was that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messias of the Jews, predicted in the Old Testament. And how could that appear, and be proved but from the Old Testament?" † But if his premise is an echo of Locke, his conclusion reads like an anticipation of one of the writers in 'Essays and Reviews.' The interpretation of prophecy which Dr. Williams, with the aid of Bunsen, has rendered familiar to English readers of the present day, Collins, with the aid of Surenhusius, rendered almost equally familiar to English readers of nearly a century and a half ago. If the former writer says of the early fathers, that, "when, instead of using the letter as an

* 'Bampton Lectures,' p. 190. A censure of this kind from Mr. Farrar has more significance than from most theological writers. His Lectures exhibit in a remarkable manner how a firm and unhesitating belief on the part of the author in the great truths of the Christian faith may be combined with a spirit of the utmost gentleness and tenderness towards those whose religious errors he is compelled to notice and to deplore. Where Mr. Farrar censures, the reader may be sure that the censure is well deserved, and has been pronounced, after every allowance which the most liberal and kindly criticism can make, consistently with the interests of truth. We regret that the plan of our article will not permit us to notice these Lectures as fully as they deserve. They contain a fund of learning and valuable information on one of the most important departments of Church history, and afford a striking proof that a candid and honest study, in a religious spirit, of the history of free thought, is one of the best antidotes against freethinking.

† 'Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,' p. 12.

instrument of the spirit, they began to accept the letter in all its parts as their law, and twisted it into harmony with the details of Gospel history, they fell into inextricable contradictions;" * the latter undertakes, with still more confidence, to assure us that "the Prophecies cited from the Old Testament by the authors of the New do so plainly relate, in their obvious and primary sense, to other matters than those which they are produced to prove, that to pretend they prove, in that sense, what they are produced to prove, is to give up the cause of Christianity to Jews and other enemies thereof, who can so easily show, in so many undoubted instances, the Old and New Testament to have no manner of connection in that respect, but to be in an irreconcilable state." † If the former enumerates among the merits of his guide, philosopher, and friend, that "he can never listen to any one who pretends that the Maiden's Child of Isaiah vii. 16 was not to be born in the reign of Ahaz;" ‡ the latter is equally sure that "the words as they stand in Isaiah, from whom they are supposed to be taken, do, in their obvious and literal sense, relate to a young woman in the reign of Ahaz, King of Judah." § If the former states it as "beyond fair doubt" that Daniel's period of weeks ended in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes;" ‖ the latter assures us that "Dodwel, in a posthumous work, does (with the learned Sir John Marsham) refer even the famous prophecy in Daniel about the weeks to the times of Antiochus Epiphanes." ¶ If the former insists on the necessity of "distinguishing the man Daniel from our Book of Daniel;" ** the latter is equally convinced that "the famous Daniel mentioned by Ezekiel could not be the author of the Book of Daniel;" †† [if the former cites in evidence of his position "Macedonian words such as 'symphonia' and 'psalterion;' ‡‡ the latter in like manner alleges that "the book abounds with derivations from the Greek, which was a language unknown to the Jews in and for a long while after the Captivity." §§] If the former cannot shut his eyes to the fact that the Deliverer predicted by Micah as

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* 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 64 (2nd Edition).
† 'Grounds and Reasons,' &c., p. 48.
‡ 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 69.
§ 'Grounds and Reasons,' p. 41.
‖ 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 69.
¶ 'Grounds and Reasons,' p. 49.
** 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 76.
†† 'Scheme,' &c., p. 149.
[‡‡ 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 76.]
[§§ 'Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered,' p. 151.]

coming from Bethlehem "was to be a contemporary shield against the Assyrian;* the latter quotes the same prophecy with a similar remark, "which words are so plain as not to need the least comment to show them to be inapplicable to the peaceable times and to the person of Jesus."† If the former says of Baron Bunsen's arguments for applying Isaiah lii. and liii. to Jeremiah, "their weight (in the master's hand) is so great that if any single person should be selected, they prove Jeremiah should be the one;" ‡ the latter, with a like hesitating adhesion, says, "Part of the words of the text are literally applicable to Jeremiah, to whom Grotius applies the whole prophecy." § An argument is not necessarily the worse for being old; but at any rate it is well that readers should know that a good deal of what is paraded as a demonstration of modern German erudition is in substance a *réchauffé* of the forgotten criticisms of one of our old English Deists.

The method applied by Collins to the Prophecies of the Old Testament was carried on, with a still thinner disguise, by Woolston in relation to the Miracles of the New. Like his predecessor, he writes as a nominal Christian, and professes only to destroy the literal interpretation of the Gospel narrative that he may establish Christianity more securely on a spiritual interpretation. But the coarse and ribald blasphemy of the work betrays at almost every page the unbeliever and scorner. In this respect Woolston's work marks a new phase in the literature of Deism—a phase represented subsequently by Bolingbroke in England, and by the general tone of French infidelity in the latter part of the century. The earlier Deists carried on their attack under the cover of a reverence for primitive Christianity, and confined their personal scurrilities to the clergy, whom they professed to regard as corrupters of the faith. The ribaldry of Woolston was openly directed against the person and works of the Saviour Himself, as depicted in the Gospels. Though differing in its tone and in its positive object, the work on its negative or destructive side pursues a method identical with that carried out in the present century in the more elaborate criticism of Strauss; the aim of both assailants being to discover or invent

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* 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 68.
† 'Scheme,' &c., p. 201.
‡ 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 73.
§ 'Scheme,' &c., p. 220.

improbabilities and discrepancies in the Scripture narrative, which may hinder its reception as a true history.

The above-named writers laboured chiefly in a negative direction, striving to set aside the distinctive or specially revealed doctrines of Christianity, in themselves, or in the evidences on which they rest. Having done its utmost in this respect, it was natural that the same effort should be continued in a positive direction, by an attempt to sum up the results of the destructive criticism, and to exhibit the residuum that was left to constitute the actual contents of Christianity as an undogmatic religion. This was accordingly done in the works which form the two next steps in the progress of Deism—Tindal's 'Christianity as Old as the Creation,' and Morgan's 'Moral Philosopher.'

Tindal, who assumed to himself the title of a *Christian Deist*, was a man whose life, if we may trust contemporary testimony, was equally a scandal to Christianity and to any respectable form of Deism.* He had previously distinguished himself as the author of the 'Rights of the Christian Church Asserted.' The ostensible purpose of this work was to prove that there is no such thing as a spiritual power distinct from the temporal, and that the Church is nothing but the creature of the State: its actual purpose was to serve as the vehicle for a torrent of invective against the clergy, of which some specimens have been already quoted. Tindal's later and more famous work, 'Christianity as old as the Creation,' is remarkable, not merely on its own account, but also as having been probably the work which, more than any other of that day, gave rise to the 'Analogy' of Bishop Butler. No two works could be more opposed to each other, in their method as well as in their results. While Butler reasons inductively, endeavouring to illustrate the course of God's Providence in spiritual things from the actual features of the same Provi-

* The most definite statements on this point are to be found in a pamphlet published in 1735, entitled, 'The Religious, Rational, and Moral Conduct of Matthew Tindal, LL.D., late Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, by a Member of the same College.' The pamphlet is too scurrilous to be received as unexceptional evidence; though the author mentions some facts, such as the public reprimand of Tindal by the authorities of his College, which even a libeller would hardly have ventured to invent. But other witnesses corroborate the testimony. Swift, in 1708, in his Remarks on Tindal's 'Rights of the Christian Church,' speaks of his antagonist as "one wholly prostitute in life and principles;" and Skelton, in the 8th Dialogue of his 'Deism Revealed' (1749), speaks to the same effect.

dence as manifested in temporal things, Tindal, "nobly takes the high *priori* road," commencing with a conception of the Divine nature and attributes, and endeavouring to deduce from that conception what the course of God's Providence ought to be, and therefore what it actually is. "No religion," he argues, "can come from a Being of infinite wisdom and perfection but what is absolutely perfect. A religion absolutely perfect can admit of no alteration, and can be capable of no addition or diminution. If God has given mankind such a law, he must likewise have given them sufficient means of knowing it: he would otherwise have defeated his own intent in giving it; since a law, as far as it is unintelligible, ceases to be a law." * Natural religion being thus absolutely perfect, revealed religion, according to Tindal, cannot differ from natural in any portion of its contents, but only in the manner of its being communicated; and therefore Christianity can be nothing more than a republication of the law of nature.

The contents of this law of nature may be briefly summed up in the precept, "act according to your nature." "Whoever," says Tindal, "so regulates his natural appetites as will conduce most to the exercise of his reason, the health of his body, and the pleasure of his senses, taken and considered together (since herein his happiness consists), may be certain he can never offend his Maker, who, as he governs all things according to their natures, can't but expect his rational creatures should act according to their natures." † All positive precepts, distinct from this injunction to follow nature, Tindal regards as merely arbitrary, "as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure." ‡

Tindal did not live to publish the second part of his work, which was intended to show that all the truths of Christianity were nothing more than a republication of this law of nature; though his sneers at Christian doctrines, under the pretence of exposing heathen errors, sufficiently indicate the spirit in which his task would have been executed.§ The unfinished design was in some degree carried out by his successor Morgan, in the 'Moral Philosopher.' This writer, who, like Tindal, styles

* See 'Christianity as old as the Creation,' p. 3., ed. 1730.
† Ibid. p. 17. ‡ Ibid. p. 114.
§ Ibid. especially p. 87 *seqq.*

himself a *Christian Deist*, adopts Tindal's principle of the absolute perfection of natural religion, though he admits the need of a republication of it. The question, however, whether Christianity can be regarded as such a republication, is answered by simply excluding from Christianity all that is usually believed to be included in it. Both the Jewish religion, as contained in the Old Testament, and the Christian, as contained in the New, are tried by the criterion of the moral sense and rejected. His system, as Lechler has remarked, has more resemblance to Gnosticism than to Christianity. He regards Judaism and true Christianity as irreconcileably opposed to each other; and maintains that the first disciples corrupted and interpolated the books of the New Testament, in order to give Christianity a leaning towards Judaism.* The acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah, which Locke had declared to be the one fundamental article of the Christian faith, is regarded by Morgan as a Jewish Gospel, and the Christianity based upon it as "nothing else but a political faction among the Jews, some of them receiving Jesus as the Messiah, or Restorer of the Kingdom, and others rejecting him under that character."† In this perverse reasoning we may recognise at least the important admission, that the so-called Christianity of Deism is not the Christianity of the New Testament.

The greater part, however, of Morgan's work consists of a bitter onslaught on the Jewish religion, which he describes as "a wretched scheme of superstition, blindness, and slavery, contrary to all reason and common sense, set up under the specious popular pretence of a divine institution and revelation from God."‡ And in his work, as in that of Collins, it is instructive to observe how many of the conclusions which are now put forward as the discoveries of the criticism and learning of the present day, are the repetition of *a priori* guesses, flung out at random by an uncritical and by no means learned Deist of the last century. In Morgan we find Abraham's great act of faith explained on the ground that these Hebrews always looked upon human sacrifices, from the very beginning, as the highest and most acceptable acts of devotion and religion; and that Abraham "had

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* 'Moral Philosopher,' vol. i., pp. 440, 441.
† Ibid. vol. i., p. 354. ‡ Ibid. p. 71.

strongly wrought himself up into such a persuasion, that he concluded God in reality required it of him and expected it from him" *—much as, in a recent Essay, we are told that "the fierce ritual of Syria, with the awe of a Divine voice, bade Abraham slay his son." † In Morgan we find the notable discovery that Samuel is the author, or at least the compiler, of the Book of Genesis ‡—a discovery which Bishop Colenso has revived in our own day, and extended to other portions of the Pentateuch. In Morgan we find the narrative of the Exodus criticised in the spirit of the same fastidious prelate, and the later Jewish history reconstructed from the depths of the writer's moral consciousness, in a manner worthy of the ingenious author of the 'History of the Hebrew Monarchy.' § In Morgan we find the special instances of Divine Providence in the same history explained away on the ground that the Hebrew mind was accustomed to ascribe all remarkable events to the interposition of God—an explanation recently revived by Dr. Williams in his Sermons on 'Rational Godliness.' ‖ In the same writer we find also the hint, developed by Strauss, that portions of the New Testament may be regarded as the mythical deposit of Jewish Messianic ideas; ¶ and we find also the germ of that contrast between the Christianity of St. Paul and that of the other Apostles, which has been resuscitated in our own day as one of the products of the critical insight of the Tübingen school.**

The effect of such criticism as that of Tindal and Morgan was to eliminate from Christianity, not only all mystery and all dis-

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* 'Moral Philosopher,' vol. i., p. 132; iii. p. 96.

† 'Essays and Reviews,' p. 61.

‡ 'Moral Philosopher,' vol. ii., pp. 69, 70.

§ For instance, he tells us that the rejection of Saul was owing to an intrigue of Samuel, in revenge for Saul's having deposed him from the High Priesthood; that the command to destroy the cattle of the Amalekites was a plot laid by the Prophet, to make the army mutiny against the King; that the idolatry of Ahab was the result of a benevolent design to destroy the intolerance of the Prophets, and to establish a religion more friendly and beneficent to mankind; that Jezebel slew the Prophets with a view to establish liberty of conscience, as enjoined by the law of nature and nations. In his third volume, this historical criticism descends to libellous insinuations against those whom the Scriptures honour. He intimates that Abraham was ready to prostitute his wife, to secure a settlement in Egypt; that Joseph possibly "made up the matter" with Potiphar's wife; that Moses forged God's covenant with Abraham for political purposes; that Hannah committed adultery with one of the sons of Eli.

‖ 'Moral Philosopher,' vol. i., p. 256; iii., p. 95. Cf. 'Rational Godliness,' p. 295.

¶ 'Moral Philosopher,' vol. i., p. 440.

** Ibid. p. 359 *seqq.*

tinctive doctrine, but even all connection with the person and earthly life of Christ. In strange contradiction to the Creeds of the Church, it was virtually maintained that the Death, the Resurrection, the Ascension of Christ, are no portions of Christian belief.* For if Christianity is but a republication of natural religion, and contains nothing which cannot be verified by each man's moral consciousness, it is evident that facts dependent upon testimony, no less than doctrines above reason, are excluded from its creed. And accordingly we find Morgan asserting that he "cannot receive any historical facts as infallibly true;"† and in the same spirit his contemporary Chubb more explicitly declares, "The Gospel of Jesus Christ is not *an historical account of matters of fact.* As thus, Christ suffered, died, rose from the dead, ascended into heaven, &c. These are *historical facts*, the *credibility* of which arises from the strength of those evidences which are or can be offered in their favour; but then those facts are not the *Gospel of Jesus Christ*, neither in whole nor in part."‡ The same position is maintained a few years later, in 1744, in the work entitled, 'The Resurrection of Jesus considered, by a Moral Philosopher,'—a work which was for some time attributed to Morgan, but which was really the production of Peter Annet. This writer follows Morgan and Chubb in the rejection of 'Historical Christianity.' "My aim," he says, "is to convince the world that an Historical Faith is no part of true and pure religion, which is founded only on truth and purity; that it does not consist in the belief of any History, which, whether true or false, makes no man wiser nor better."§ Annet's writings were collected and published in 1766, under the title of 'A Collection of the Tracts of a certain Free Enquirer, noted by his sufferings for his Opinions.' On a separate title the author is designated as "P. A., Minister of the Gospel." The pamphlet called 'Social Bliss considered,' which forms part of this collection, is a sufficient proof that free inquiry, in the hands of this author, was as impatient of the restraints of morality and decency as of those of religion.

In Annet the Deism of England had reached its lowest point.

* [A similar view is taken by some of the German Rationalists, as by Röhr, and on different grounds by Schelling and Hegel. See 'Bampton Lectures,' ii., *note* 43, v.; *note* 22.]

† 'Moral Philosopher,' vol. i., p. 411.

‡ 'True Gospel,' p. 43=32, ed. 2.

§ 'Resurrection of Jesus considered,' p. 87.

His work does not, like those of most of the earlier Deists, profess a respect for Christianity as a whole, while attacking it in parts. It rather marks the commencement of a new phase in the progress of unbelief, which, having undermined the substance of the faith, finds it no longer necessary to profess allegiance to the shadow. "It indicates," as Mr. Farrar remarks, "the commencement of the open allegation of literary imposture as distinct from philosophical error, which subsequently marked the criticism of the French school of infidelity, and affected the English unbelievers of the latter half of the century.

The same spirit of revolt from all Christianity is also the predominant character, as far as so inconsistent a writer can be said to have a character at all, of the writings of Bolingbroke. Like his successor Gibbon, Bolingbroke generally makes his attack rather by way of sneer and insinuation than of direct accusation: he sometimes even condescends to speak respectfully and patronisingly of Christianity; but his real purpose is not the less discernible for being in some degree disguised. Bolingbroke's opinion of the Divine authority of Christianity may be gathered from his sneering comparison between it and Platonism:* his estimate of one portion at least of the Christian Scriptures may be seen in his language concerning St. Paul, whom he describes as having "carried with him, from the pharisaical schools, a great profusion of words and of involved unconnected discourse"—as being "often absurd, or profane, or trifling"—as teaching things "repugnant to common sense and to all the ideas of God's moral perfections."† Bolingbroke distinguishes, indeed, as Morgan had done, between the teaching of St. Paul and that of the other Apostles; but in a different manner and for a different purpose. According to Morgan, the Judaizing Apostles corrupted the true Gospel by their Messianic traditions; while St. Paul represents the Christian Deist who preached it in its purity and universality. According to Bolingbroke, the Gospel was intended by Christ for the Jews only;‡ and St. Paul was the first who saw the necessity of extending it to the Gentiles,§ while he was at the same time the great corrupter of its original simplicity. The true

* 'Bolingbroke's Works' vol. iv., p. 341. † Ibid. pp. 326, 331.

‡ [Something like this view is now held by F. W. Newman, in his 'Discourse against Hero-making in Religion,' 1864. See 'Westminster Review' for October, 1864.]

§ Works, vol. iv., pp. 305, 306.

Gospel he describes in general terms, after Tindal, as a republication of the law of nature; while at the same time he does not hesitate to set aside its doctrines and precepts in detail, whenever they impose an inconvenient restraint on the inclinations of men. Polygamy he regards as a "reasonable indulgence to mankind," and its prohibition as a "prohibition of that which nature permits in the fullest manner." Monogamy is only reasonable when accompanied by an unlimited facility of divorce, without which it is an "absurd, unnatural, and cruel imposition." The precept of our Lord in this matter is spoken of as sanctioning "a new interpretation of the law, founded on a grammatical criticism;" and the Christian law of marriage as "a new jurisprudence, the child of usurpation, of ignorance, and bigotry." * Marriages within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity (the degrees include even that of brother and sister) "are forbid by political institutions and for political reasons, but are left indifferent by the law of nature." † Future rewards and punishments, which he admits to be sanctions of the evangelical law, he maintains nevertheless to be a doctrine invented by men, and one which it is impossible to reconcile to the Divine attributes.‡ Even the immortality of the soul, though not absolutely denied, is treated as being at best an invention of men, and of very doubtful truth. "It was originally an hypothesis; and it may, therefore, be a vulgar error. It was taken upon trust by the people who first adopted it, and made prevalent by art and industry among the vulgar who never examine, till it came to be doubted, disputed, and denied by such as did examine. . . . . It was communicated from Egypt, the mother of good policy as well as superstition, to Greece." § Against the belief in particular providences, he urges that such providences are inconsistent with the government of the world by general laws; and he hints that this belief, and that of the efficacy of prayer, are an invention of priestcraft. "To keep up a belief of particular providences," he says, "serves to keep up a belief, not only of the efficacy of prayer and of the intercession of saints in heaven, as well as of the Church on earth, but of the several rites of external devotion; and to keep up a

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* Works, vol. v., pp. 160–171.
† Ibid. vol. v., p. 177.
‡ Ibid. vol. v., pp. 512–516.
§ Ibid. pp. 351–352.

belief that they are few, and that the providence of God, as it is exercised in this world, is therefore on the whole unjust, serves to keep up a belief of another world, wherein all that is amiss here shall be set right. The ministry of a clergy is thought necessary on both these accounts by all: and there are few, who see how difficult it is to make the two doctrines, which these reverend persons maintain, appear in any tolerable manner consistent." * On the whole, the tendency of Bolingbroke's scheme, the close and the consummation of the freethinking of his age, is not unfairly exhibited in the summary of Leland. "Man, according to his account of him, is merely a superior animal, whose views are confined to this present life, and who has no reasonable prospect of existing in any other state. God has given him appetites and passions; these appetites lead him to pleasure, which is their only object. He has reason indeed; but this reason is only to enable him to provide and contrive what is most conducive to his happiness; that is, what will yield him a *continued permanent series of the most agreeable sensations or pleasures*, which is the definition of happiness. And if no regard be had to futurity, he must govern himself by what he thinks most conducive to his interest, or his pleasure, in his present circumstances. The constitution of his nature is his only guide: God has given him no other, and concerns himself no farther about him, nor will ever call him to an account for his actions. In this constitution his flesh or body is his all: there is no distinct immaterial principle: nor has he any moral sense or feelings naturally implanted in his heart; and therefore to please the flesh, and pursue its interest, or gratify its appetites and inclinations, must be his principal end. Only he must take care so to gratify them, as not to expose himself to the penalties of human laws, which are the only sanctions of the law of nature for particular persons." †

Bolingbroke's works may be regarded as the last utterance of the philosophical Deism which attacked Christianity by appeals to reason and natural religion; and also as the partial commencement of a new phase of unbelief, which appealed to historical

* Works, vol. v., p. 419.

† 'View of the Principal Deistical Writers,' vol. ii., p. 44, ed. 1798. Letter 26 = vol. ii., p. 41, ed. 1757.

criticism and the testimony in behalf of facts. In both characters, they produced but little effect; for the old Deism was virtually refuted and worn out before their publication; and the new, in Bolingbroke's hands, was too slight and trifling to attract serious attention. But in the former aspect, at the close of half a century of infidel speculations, these writings have a significance for us which they had not in their own day. They exhibit the natural result of a current of unbelief of English origin, which ran its course and did its work in its native soil once; and may, under similar influences, run a similar course once again. They exhibit the natural tendency of the combined influences of Empiricism and Latitudinarianism, of a philosophy impatient of the supernatural, and a polity hostile to creeds and articles and formularies of faith. They show how the cry for a reasonable belief and a comprehensive communion, set on foot, with the best intentions, by men of persuasive genius and amiable character and sincere Christian belief, became a weapon in the hands of coarse ignorance and elegant profligacy, to destroy, first the doctrines and facts of Christianity, and then its precepts and moral restraints.

The history of English Deism, thus exhibited, is of itself sufficient to explain the fate which has attended the writings of its chief representatives. They were men pushed into adventitious celebrity for a time by the magnificence of their promises, and then consigned to deserved oblivion by the worthlessness of their performances. They acquired a transitory reputation under the specious pretext of reforming and purifying Christianity: they sank to their proper level when it was discovered that the true result of their principles was not to reform, but to destroy. Such will ever be the fate of that spirit of minute cavil and negative enquiry, which applies itself to overthrow the hope and the trust of ages, to substitute in its place, not a belief, but the criticism of a belief. Powerless alike as a source of good and as a defence against evil, powerless alike to satisfy the religious needs of the longing soul and to restrain the violence of unruly passions, it may stand for a while in the calm weather of a lethargic rationalism, "too proud to worship and too wise to feel;" but it falls prostrate as soon as the sense of spiritual want is awakened in the heart, and men begin to ask, with trembling, "What must I do to be saved?"

We have described with some detail, as our main subject, the progress of the unbelief of the last century, as regards its direct antagonism to the doctrines of the Church. But the parallel between that age and the present, and the lesson to be learned from that parallel, would be incomplete, did we not also bear in mind another feature of the movement, of which our limits will permit only a passing notice—namely, the indirect antagonism by which the same doctrines were assailed through the securities which constitute their external safeguards. The Church of England at that day, here again offering a remarkable parallel to her condition at the present time, had lost, by the secession of the Nonjurors, much of the zeal and learning, and yet more of the Catholic spirit, which still lingered round the close of the golden age of her theology; and the extravagance which disfigured this spirit in some of its later representatives fostered the reaction which political causes had introduced. And thus, side by side with the progress of Freethinking within and without the Church, there arose, as its natural accompaniment, a series of attempts to evade or abolish those Subscriptions and Declarations of Belief, which, so long as they exist, constitute a distinct self-condemnation on the part of those who remain in the ministry of the Church while rejecting her doctrines. These attempts may be regarded as commencing with the proposal of Tillotson, at the time of the Commission in 1689, to substitute, in the place of all former declarations and subscriptions required of the clergy, a mere promise to *submit* to the doctrine, discipline, and worship of the Church of England—a proposal which strongly reminds us of that ingenious casuistry of the present day which maintains that a man may "allow," as a law, articles which he would "be horror-struck" to have enacted. To this succeeded the pleas of Clarke and Sykes in behalf of Arian Subscription, and Hoadly's denial of all authority in the Church to legislate or interpret in religious matters; while, about the same time, the 'Independent Whig' propounded the notable discovery, which an Oxford Professor has not been ashamed to revive in the present day, that subscription to definite statements of doctrine is a hindrance to the attainment of truth.* The

*'The 'Independent Whig' was a periodical publication commenced in the year 1720, and principally devoted to the laudable purpose of abusing the clergy. Its authors were Thomas Gordon (the *Silenus* of the Dunciad), John

movement reached its culminating point half a century later, in the 'Confessional' of Archdeacon Blackburne, and the Feathers Tavern Petition. The language of Burke, when this last document was presented to the House of Commons in 1772, might almost have been uttered yesterday, so exactly does it describe the position of those who are now complaining of a similar grievance:—

"These gentlemen complain of hardships. No considerable number shows discontent; but, in order to give satisfaction to any number of respectable men, who come in so decent and constitutional a mode before us, let us examine a little what that hardship is. They want to be preferred clergymen in the Church of England, as by law established; but their consciences will not suffer them to conform to the doctrines and practices of that Church; that is, they want to be teachers in a church to which they do not belong; and it is an odd sort of hardship. They want to receive the emoluments appropriated for teaching one set of doctrines, whilst they are teaching another. . . . . The matter does not concern toleration, but establishment; and it is not the rights of private conscience that

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Trenchard [the younger John Trenchard, son of the Secretary], and Anthony Collins. Its contents are characterised by Mr. Pattison—certainly not an unfavourable judge—as "dull and worthless trash." Those who have read Professor Goldwin Smith's 'Plea for the Abolition of Tests in the University of Oxford,' may judge for themselves how far the learned Professor's argument and temper are anticipated in the following extract from this "dull and worthless trash":—

"I think I may therefore safely affirm that whatever body or society of men are most restrained by themselves or others from reasoning freely on every subject, and especially on the most important of all, are the least qualified to be the guides and directors of mankind. I will now examine how far this is the circumstance of the clergy in most countries. They are no sooner discharged from the nurse or the mother, but they are delivered over to spiritual pedagogues, who have seldom the capacity, and never the honesty, to venture at a *free thought* themselves, and must consequently be improper channels to convey any to their pupils. From hence they are sent to the Universities (very commonly upon charity), where they are hamstringed and manacled with early oaths and subscriptions, and obliged to swear to notions before they know what they are. Their business afterwards is not to find out what is truth, but to defend the received system, and to maintain those doctrines which are to maintain them. Not only their present revenues and subsistence, but all their expectations are annexed to certain opinions, established for the most part by Popes and Synods in corrupt and ignorant ages, and even then often carried by faction and bribery, in concert with the designs and intrigues of statesmen, but become sanctified by time, and now to be received without inquiry. . . . . As clergymen, so educated, cannot, for the reasons aforesaid, be fair and impartial judges themselves of what is truth, so their authority can give but little weight to such doctrines as they may think fit to teach to others. The first question asked of a suspected witness, in every court of judicature, is, whether he gets or loses by the success of the cause; and if either appears, he is constantly set aside, and not trusted with an oath." —'Independent Whig,' No. v., Feb. 17th, 1720; compare 'Plea for the Abolition of Tests,' p. 88 *seqq.*

are in question, but the propriety of the terms which are proposed by law as a title to public emoluments; so that the complaint is not that there is not toleration of diversity in opinion, but that diversity in opinion is not rewarded by bishoprics, rectories, and collegiate stalls."

In the present day, when the voice of religious doubt is again making itself heard in English literature and in English society, there are not wanting those who tell us that the best mode of dealing with such a state of things is to permit and encourage "free inquiry" among the ministers of the Church; to abandon those obligations which record the existence of definite religious doctrines as essential parts of the Catholic faith, and which bind the clergy to teach according to that faith; and to substitute in their place a sort of roving commission to a body of chartered libertines to seek for the truth as their consciences may dictate, unfettered by adhesion to the foregone conclusions of a traditionary belief. As yet, this advice is presented to us for the most part in its fairest and most attractive aspect, advocated by accomplished and estimable men, adorned with all the glorious hues and brilliant polish with which genius and refinement can invest it, recommended by the charm of good purposes and pure intentions. We say for the most part; for there are not wanting, even at this moment, threatenings of a rougher treatment and a more hostile temper; and in one instance, at least, the claims of free inquiry have been advocated in a spirit of rudeness and bitterness towards the clergy in general, which is, perhaps, the nearest approach which the manners of the present day will permit towards the coarse invectives of a Tindal or a Collins. But whether the means be blandishment or bullying, promises or threats, the end proposed is the same, —that, namely, which in the last century was ushered in by Collins under the plausible name of Free Thinking; and which, now that that name has acquired a somewhat evil reputation, is offered to us, with a very slight change of style, under the imposing titles of "free handling in a becoming spirit," and "honest doubt," which has "more faith than half the creeds."

It is, unhappily, only too true that religious unbelief is widely prevalent at the present time; but it is neither so novel nor so significant a phase of religious thought as its apologists would

have us believe. In much of what is now presented to us as the fruit of the superior knowledge and conscientiousness of the present day, we recognise an old acquaintance in a new dress: much of the teaching which boasts of its freedom from traditional methods of treatment is but the revival of an obsolete tradition, which became obsolete because it was worthless. The English Deism of the last century, like the English gentleman of the same period, has made the grand tour of Europe, and come home with the fruits of its travels. It has reinforced the homely bluntness of its native temper by the aid of the metaphysical profundities and ponderous learning of Germany, and the superficial philosophy and refined sentimentalism of France. Yet under a good deal of foreign lacquer and veneer, we may still recognise some of our own cast-off goods returned upon our hands; and discover that free thought, no less than orthodoxy, may have its foregone conclusions and its traditional methods of treatment.

We are now told that the right mode of dealing with this state of things is to endeavour to repeat under happier auspices the latitudinarian movement which marked the close of the seventeenth century; to throw away distinctive doctrines and exclusive formularies, and to welcome within the pale of the Church the roving spirit of doubt, provided it retains a nominal allegiance to some kind of Christianity. If this be the true remedy, latitudinarianism is indeed like the spear of Achilles, which can heal the wounds it has itself inflicted. The history of English Deism is the history of a latitudinarian movement which commenced under the recommendation of qualities not less estimable than than those by which it attracts us now. If brilliant intellectual endowments, a high personal character, a conciliatory and amiable temper, are the chief qualifications needed in a teacher of the truth, there is no name among our English worthies which has a better claim to be selected as the representative of these qualities than that of John Locke. And the fruits of the system which Locke and his fellow-latitudinarians inaugurated, is to be found in the history of the greater part of the eighteenth century, the age of rational religion and undogmatic Christianity; an age whose spirit, so far as it manifested itself in hostility to the Church, may be seen in the writers whose works we have been reviewing, and whose spirit within the Church may be described

in the language of one who reviewed, nearly at the end of the century, some of the latter phases of its influence.

"A just abhorrence," says Bishop Horsley, "of those virulent animosities which in all ages since external persecution ceased have prevailed among Christians, especially since the Reformation, among Protestants of the different denominations, upon the pretence, at least, of certain differences of opinion in points of nice and doubtful disputation, hath introduced and given general currency to a maxim which seemed to promise peace and unity by dismissing the cause, or rather the pretence, of dissension—namely, that the laity, the more illiterate especially, have little concern with the mysteries of revealed religion, provided they be attentive to its duties. Whence it hath seemed a safe and certain conclusion, that it is more the office of a Christian teacher to press the practice of religion upon the consciences of his hearers, than to inculcate and assert its doctrines.

"Again, a dread of the pernicious tendency of some extravagant opinions, which persons, more to be esteemed for the warmth of their piety than the soundness of their judgment, have grafted, in modern times, upon the doctrine of Justification by Faith . . . . . a dread of the pernicious tendency of these extravagant opinions, which seem to emancipate the believer from the authority of all moral law,—hath given general credit to another maxim, which I never hear without extreme concern from the lips of a divine, either from the pulpit or in familiar conversation—namely, that practical religion and morality are one and the same thing; that moral duties constitute the whole, or by for the better part of practical Christianity. . . . . The rules delivered may be observed to vary according to the temperament of the teacher. But the system chiefly in request with those who seem the most in earnest in this strain of preaching, is the strict, but impracticable, unsocial, sullen moral of the Stoics. Thus, under the influence of these two pernicious maxims, it too often happens that we lose sight of that which is our proper office, to publish the Word of Reconciliation, to propound the terms of Peace and Pardon to the penitent; and we make no other use of the high commission we bear, than to come abroad one day in the seven, dressed in solemn looks and in the external garb of holiness, to be the apes of Epictetus." *

The Church of that day, as has been truly observed by a recent writer, became practically if not openly Unitarian; because, in

* 'Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of St. David's, 1790,' pp. 5-8. The charges of S. Horsley, Bp. of St. Asaph. 8vo. Dundee, 1813, pp. 4, 5.

the religion then taught under the name of Christianity, there was no proper need for a Trinity; because the belief in the Trinity, dissociated from the related doctrines of the guilt of sin, atonement by the blood of Christ, and regeneration by the Holy Ghost, necessarily lost its importance, and hung round the faith of the age as an encumbrance and a superfluity.* To such a state we may expect to see the Church of England again reduced if she consent to listen again to the voice of the charmer, to be allured again by the promise of peace and unity, and to abandon the reaction, which the present century has happily witnessed, towards the Catholic teaching of her earlier and better days. The history of the last century, the least Catholic period of English Theology, lies before us for our example or our warning. If the philosophy of that century is a model of elevated and comprehensive thought, if its theology is a model of pure and devout belief, if its practical religion is a model of all that is excellent in Christian life, then let us listen reverently and obediently to the teaching of those who are labouring to re-establish among us the principles by which that century was formed. But if the history of which we have attempted the preceding slight survey teaches us an opposite lesson, it behoves us to remember that like effects may be expected to follow from like causes.

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* See Dr. Fairbairn's Appendix to the English Translation of 'Dorner on the Person of Christ,' p. 405.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY.

CONTENTS.

Difficulties of a Defensive Theology.
Relation of Philosophy to Theology.
Scepticism; its different Forms.
Dogmatic Philosophy: its Difficulties.
The Philosophy of Faith.
Contrast between the Philosophies of Saisset and Hamilton.
Saisset's Religious Philosophy; his Conception of the Deity and of the World; his Doctrine of Prayer.
The Primary Error of Saisset's Philosophy.
Conclusion.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY.*

THE writer who undertakes to defend the teaching of the Christian Church against the assaults of an unbelieving philosophy is liable to a special temptation to discharge his duty unfaithfully, and is in danger of a special accusation if he confine himself to the task of discharging it faithfully. He is, as it were, established by the grace of God in a goodly city which he builded not, and whose buildings it is his duty simply to defend, not to alter or enlarge, still less to pull down and rebuild. The foundation, other than which no man can lay, is laid already,—the city, whose builder is God, has been completed by his appointed workmen; it may not be added to nor diminished from. Its defender, be he never so successful in repelling the enemy from its walls, can at the utmost but leave it as it was before the assault was made; it is well if he leave it not with marks of the deadly conflict on its front. No portion of its sacred walls will bear his name as founder; no tower or bulwark will point out to future ages his share in the work. His most complete success will be to leave no trace behind of the battle he has fought; to consign to oblivion the assaults of his conquered enemies, and with them his own achievements as conqueror.

Hence arises the accusation as well as the temptation to which the Christian apologist is exposed—the accusation that his efforts have produced a merely negative result, the temptation to escape from the charge by aiming at something independent and positive. So long as he confines himself merely to the task of defending the teaching of the Church, the positive side of his belief will be found in that faith which the Church

* From the 'Contemporary Review,' May, 1866; a review of the following work. 'Essay on Religious Philosophy.' By M. Emile Saisset, Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Faculty of Letters of Paris. Translated, with Marginal Analysis, Notes, Critical Essay, and Philo-ophical Appendix. Two volumes. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1863.

has handed down from the beginning; his own work will have but a relative and accidental value, in connection with the temporary controversies by which that faith has been assailed.

There are two ways in which a philosophy may lead to negative results; but the effects of the two are diametrically opposite as regards religious belief. A philosophy which professes to be the handmaid of theology, and to be indebted for her highest truths to Divine revelation, not to human speculation, must necessarily assume a negative office in dealing with those truths which, by her own confession, are derived from and established by a higher authority. Her office is not to prove such truths, but to defend them; not to exhibit them as conclusions which reason is competent to establish, but to maintain them as positions which reason is not competent to overthrow. Thus viewed, her results, regarded simply and by themselves, must needs be negative; but they are negative in relation to a previously existing system of positive truths, and they point to belief in those truths as their ultimate though indirect purpose. Philosophy thus employed does not indeed build the fortress which she defends; but she has no need to do so, for the fortress is built already.

Far different is the position and effect of philosophy, when employed in independence of, or in opposition to, external authority. By her profession of independence, she binds herself, if she aspire to anything beyond mere scepticism, to the task of building up as well as of pulling down. She proclaims herself as the highest source of truth, and challenges an estimate of her pretensions solely on the absolute certainty and value of the truths which she is able to supply. If she confine herself to the task of refuting error, or what she deems to be error, her conclusions are not merely relatively but absolutely negative; they destroy an existing belief, but they offer nothing as a substitute in its place. If she aim, not merely at refuting the positions of others, but at establishing her own, she stakes the attainment of positive truth solely on her success in the latter endeavour: if this fail while the former succeeds, she is again absolutely negative in act and result, however positive in profession and intention.

The difference between an independent and a subordinate philosophy of religion extends itself also to the methods adopted

by each, and to the amount of evidence which each may be expected to furnish. The subordinate philosophy professes to deal with truths which, as they were not originally derived from human speculation, so they need not necessarily be entirely within the range of human comprehension to understand, or of human reasoning to establish. They may be—we do not say that they are, but the supposition is at least consistent with the pretensions of such a philosophy—adapted, in the mode of their revelation, to the capacities of the creature for whom they are designed; they may be represented in the way of mystery, or economy, or analogy, not exhibiting the truth in that aspect which is clearest and most perfect *per se*, but in that which is best suited to human apprehension, and which implies the existence of a higher and more absolute truth, of which it is the imperfect representative. Hence it is quite consistent with the pretensions of such a philosophy, both to admit the existence of difficulties which it is unable to explain and doubts which it is unable to solve, and also to supply the deficiencies of reason by an appeal to faith, showing us that there is cause to believe that these difficulties are not inherent in the things themselves, but arise from our imperfect power of apprehension; and bidding us look forward for their solution, not to the efforts of human philosophy in this life, but to that more perfect knowledge which shall be given us hereafter, when we shall know even as we are known.

Such a course is not, in like manner, open to a philosophy which professes to deal with truths, not as received from above, but as discovered by man for himself. It may have its difficulties also, but they are difficulties precisely analogous to those which occur in any other department of science, and may be fairly supposed to be due, not to any limitation of our faculties, but only to the imperfection of our present state of knowledge. A science which is founded by man may be reasonably believed to present no difficulties but such as are soluble by man: the genius which has been sufficient for the original discovery may well be supposed competent to any amount of further prosecution. The only faith to which such a philosophy may be expected to appeal is a faith in the future progress of the human race, an expectation, grounded on the past history of science, that what is difficult to us will become easy to our

successors. It is inconsistent with the pretensions of this philosophy to recognise such a thing as a permanently insoluble problem; or, at the utmost, it will admit such problems only as difficulties of words, not of things, arising, not from the limits of man's power of thought, but from the employment of terms which have no real significance.

Under these circumstances, it is not unnatural that the subordinate and less pretentious philosophy should be regarded with dislike and suspicion by its more ambitious rival, as attempting to clip the soaring wings of speculation, to place a barrier in the way of progress, and to rob philosophy beforehand of the triumphs which she expects to achieve. And the readiest way in which this feeling of dislike will find utterance is in the charge, already noticed, of merely negative results, or, if a more invidious term be sought for, of scepticism. We call this an invidious term, because it is one which inevitably insinuates far more than it expresses, and which, by the majority of readers, will be understood as conveying a far more odious charge than is probably intended by the person who employs it. There is a religious scepticism as well as a philosophical scepticism; and the two have not merely no natural connection with each other, but each may frequently be called into existence as the antagonist and antidote to the other. It may often be that the very despair which a man feels of finding the truths of which he is in need by philosophical speculation, may lead him to cling with a firmer belief to the doctrines of revelation: it may also be that his doubt or disbelief in the possibility of revelation may make him a more eager disciple of that philosophy which best promises to supply its place. Sometimes, indeed, as in the instance of David Hume, both kinds of scepticism are found united in one distinguished representative; and this union has contributed, no doubt, to fix and extend the invidious import of the word, by associating its two different senses together, and involving them in one indiscriminate condemnation. But in themselves, as we have said, the two kinds of scepticism are distinct from, and may be antagonistic to each other; and it is important, in relation to an accusation of this kind, so readily and often so hastily made, to understand clearly what is the proper meaning of the term, and what are the objects to which it is legitimately applicable.

Scepticism, in the proper use of the term, cannot be employed to denote the doubt or denial of any single doctrine or system of doctrines, whether in philosophy or in religion. The doctrine may be true, and the denial may involve a grievous error; but such an error is not properly scepticism. Scepticism is not a particular doubt, but a general method of doubting; it does not consist in questioning the truth of a given conclusion, but in questioning the possibility of attaining to a true conclusion at all. In this sense of the term, scepticism may be either universal or particular, according as the doubt extends to the possibility of arriving at truth in any matter whatsoever, or is limited to the possibility of attaining it in relation to some special object of inquiry.

In this point of view, there are two different kinds of doubt, which have, with different degrees of justice, been classed together under the common name of scepticism. The one is based on the assumption that the human mind is divided against itself, the testimony of one faculty contradicting that of another, —the reason, for example, being opposed to the senses, and the senses to the reason; or the same faculty in different exercises contradicting itself,—reasonings equally legitimate, for example, establishing opposite conclusions. The other proceeds on the assumption that the human mind, though at unity with itself, is at variance with some higher truth unattainable by it, things as they seem to us being different from things as they are in themselves. The inference from the former assumption is that no reliance can be placed on human consciousness within its own sphere of exercise, inasmuch as what it affirms on one occasion it denies on another. The inference from the latter is, that human consciousness, however trustworthy within its own sphere, is trustworthy as regards phenomena only, and is in error from the point of view of a higher intelligence, the nature of the phenomenon being different from that of the reality.

The first of these is absolute and unconditional scepticism, and can only be met on its own ground by denying its assumption. The faculties of the human mind, it is replied, do not contradict themselves or each other: they only appear to do so when we misunderstand their testimony. To correct the misunderstanding, we must distinguish that which they really tell us from that which they only seem to tell us. The senses

says the Pyrrhonist, contradict themselves: the eye sees the same tower at one distance as square, at another as round, at one distance as larger, at another as smaller: the palate, in different states of health, will taste the same thing at one time as sweet, at another time as bitter. These seeming contradictions, replies the antagonist, are not due to the testimony of the senses, but to erroneous inferences from that testimony. That which we really see is not the tower, but the rays of light in contact with the eye; and these, by the laws of vision, actually do present different sizes and shapes in different positions. What we perceive in taste is not a quality of the object, but an affection produced by it on the nerves of taste; and this affection is really different in different states of the organism. There is no contradiction; for it is necessary to contradiction that the testimony should be *de eodem*, and where the object is different, this condition is not fulfilled.

But it is evident that in this reply the second form of scepticism is partially employed as an antidote to the first. The senses are cleared from the charge of contradiction, on the plea that they inform us, not of the nature of things in themselves, but of the appearances which those things present to us. If the apparent contradictions which arise in other modes of consciousness are to be solved in the same manner, we arrive at the conclusion that the human mind, so far as these seeming contradictions meet it, may indeed be at unity with itself, but is at unity with regard to phenomena only, and cannot attain to realities.

There are two modes by which philosophy may seek to avoid this alternative. The first is by an assumption which, under various forms, has been the foundation of all dogmatic philosophy from the days of Plato down to the present time—the assumption, namely, that, though the senses and the lower faculties of man are cognisant only of phenomena, his reason, the highest faculty, is privileged to attain to a knowledge of the real and absolute nature of objects in themselves, and thus to establish a philosophy of realities as the supplement to and corrective of the philosophy of appearances. This is in effect the theory figuratively represented in Plato's allegory of the prisoners in the cave: the senses, and the empirical faculties in general, are condemned, like those prisoners, to see shadows and to mistake them for substances; but beyond the region of sen-

sible phenomena there is an upper world of real existences, which can be discerned by the eye of the soul, released from the bondage of sense and brought face to face with the true objects of reason. To effect this release is the purpose of philosophy, by which the powers of the reason are trained and strengthened for the contemplation of pure and absolute truth.

Such a method will completely establish its own validity, if it can succeed in showing that the distinction which it supposes to exist between the senses and the reason is confirmed by the actual features of each; that the exercise of reason is not impeded by any discrepancies or apparent contradictions similar to those which beset the exercise of sense; that we have not the same ground for supposing a difference between things as they are and things as they seem to our thought, that we have for supposing a distinction between things as they are and things as they seem to our senses. If this can be proved, the dogmatic philosophy, if not completely secured from assault, has at least established a reasonable claim to acceptance in preference to any other system.

But on the other hand, if any such apparent contradictions remain unsolved, it is obvious that this philosophy may lead by natural consequence to a scepticism deeper and more radical than any other. The assumption, that our reason is privileged to behold its objects in their real and absolute nature, naturally leads to the conclusion that such contradictions, if they exist at all, exist in the very nature and essence of the objects contemplated, and are not due to any limitation or imperfection in our mode of contemplating them. The plea on which the senses are cleared from the charge of self-contradiction becomes unavailable in behalf of the reason; for the senses acknowledge a distinction between their phenomena and the things themselves; the reason abjures such a distinction, and declares that its conceptions express the absolute reality of things. By virtue of this declaration, it is limited to a choice between two alternatives: it must either show that its own conceptions involve no inconsistency or contradiction, or it must admit that inconsistency and contradiction are inherent in the absolute nature of things.

There is a class of thinkers who shrink from both these

alternatives. On the one hand, they despair of being able to clear the conceptions of the reason from every appearance of contradiction, or of proving that such contradictions are in appearance only; and on the other hand, they are unwilling to admit that there is a contradiction in the very nature of things, and delusion in the belief that they exist. Unable to find a refuge from scepticism in knowledge and in reason, they endeavour to find it in ignorance and in faith. We do not *know*, they say, what is the absolute nature of things, but we *believe* that there is an absolute nature above and beyond the range of our knowledge. The apparent contradictions, which beset the exercise of our reason when it strives to attain to the absolute, may not be capable of solution in this world; yet we believe that they are apparent only and not real; and we are justified in that belief on several grounds. For, first, it is borne out by the analogy of our lower faculties, which are in harmony with themselves and with each other when their testimony is limited to the phenomena of which they are directly cognisant; and which only appear to fall into contradictions when they are assumed to be cognisant of the absolute nature of things. Secondly, it is supported by the testimony of the reason itself, which is involved in these contradictions, not on all occasions, but only when it attempts to rise to a knowledge of the absolute. Thirdly, if our conceptions are partial and relative, it is reasonable to believe that the defects of those conceptions are partial and relative also, and would disappear were our knowledge complete and absolute. Fourthly, these seeming contradictions present a feature which distinguishes them from those real contradictions which are incompatible with belief. The latter are one-sided, and necessitate a belief in the opposite direction; the former are two-sided, and appear to press equally in opposite directions, from both of which together we find it practically impossible to exclude belief. For, to take an example of the unilateral kind, I find a contradiction in the conception of a circular square, and I cannot believe in its possible existence; but then, on the other hand, I am compelled to believe that every existing square is not circular. Whereas, to take an example of the bilateral kind, I find a seeming contradiction in the conception of an unlimited duration of time, but I find also a seeming contradiction in the

opposite conception of an absolutely first or last moment of time: yet I find it impossible to believe that neither of these can be true, and I find it equally impossible to believe that both can be true. To the existence of this distinction my consciousness bears direct witness; and by virtue of it, I find myself compelled to regard the second instance of contradiction, even if I am unable to solve it, as not equally real with the first.

We have thus, continue these philosophers, a range of belief which is beyond the range of knowledge. We cannot, in the above example of time, *solve* the difficulty; we cannot *prove* that one of the supposed contradictions is real and the other unreal; and, consequently, we cannot *know* which of the opposite hypotheses is true, and which false. Yet we are compelled to *believe* that one or the other must be true; and we may have grounds for believing in the one rather than the other, notwithstanding the apparent contradiction involved in both. For these contradictions at the utmost do but balance each other, and thus leave the scales equally poised, and fit to receive any other weight that may determine which shall preponderate.

Such is a brief outline of two methods, both of which are designed, whether successfully or not, as antidotes to scepticism, and which may be respectively designated as the Dogmatic and the Limitative methods, the method of Reason and the method of Faith. Each has an attraction for a different class of minds: each has a reproach which it is ready to urge against the other.

The attraction of the dogmatic method is that it professes a higher estimate of human reason, and promises the possession of a wider field of knowledge: the attraction of the limitative method is that it promises a narrower domain indeed, but with more secure possession, and less need to defend the title by constant litigation. The reproach which each brings against the other is that of doing secret service to the common enemy of both—Scepticism.

How this reproach is urged against the advocate of reason, we have seen already. His method proceeds upon two assumptions; first, that a knowledge of the absolute nature of things is attainable by man; and secondly, that reason in its proper exercise is the instrument by which it is to be attained. So long, there-

fore, as the philosophy of the absolute appears involved in insoluble contradictions, so long his method favours a doubly sceptical position; first, that the nature of things is contradictory in itself, and secondly, that the reason, in its legitimate exercise, leads to contradictions. His most obvious reply is, that a solution of these contradictions may be found some day if it is not found yet. His antagonist answers, that at any rate philosophy has hitherto made no progress towards solving them.

But if the dogmatist cannot entirely repel the charge, he can at least retort it. In depriving man of a knowledge of the absolute, he says, you deprive him at the same time of all power of testing the truth of his conceptions. If my conception of an object does not correspond to the absolute nature of that object, it is not a true conception; and if the absolute nature of the object is unknown, we have no means of determining whether our conception corresponds to it or not. Hence your belief in the existence of an absolute being, beyond the range of your knowledge, is at best but a blind belief in a something, you know not what. If you do not go to the length of saying with Kant, that our conceptions do not correspond to things as they are, you must at least admit that you do not know that they correspond; and hence, even if by some fortunate accident you are in possession of the truth, you have no means of knowing that it is the truth.

What answer the advocate of faith can make to this charge will perhaps appear in the sequel. But the value both of the attack and the defence may perhaps be more clearly seen in a special instance than in general remarks. Let us proceed, then, to the examination of the instance by which these remarks were originally suggested, the philosophies of M. Saisset and of Sir William Hamilton, as brought into conflict with each other in the 'Essai de Philosophie Religieuse' of the former.*

M. Saisset is one of those philosophers described at the beginning of our remarks, whom the temptation of constructing an independent and positive system of religious truth has led beyond the humbler but perhaps safer task of refuting error.

* This is the work of which the English translation is named at the head of our article. The additional title, 'Modern Pantheism,' is only applicable to the first portion of the Essay.

On the negative side, as the antagonist of Pantheism, it would be difficult to name any recent philosopher whose writings have done better service to the cause of true religion and sound philosophy. Modern Pantheism, in its foundation and in its superstructure, in Spinoza and in Hegel, is subjected to an examination and a refutation alike searching and complete. His opening statement of the "inevitable dilemma" of all Pantheism, the denial of the personality of God or of the personality of man, — in other words, of Providence or of morality; *—his proof that Pantheism, although it owes its principal attraction to the far-famed power of its logic, is essentially and fundamentally illogical; †—his exposition of the strange farrago of contradictions involved in Spinoza's representation of God as "extended yet incorporeal; thinking, yet without understanding; free and active, yet without will" ‡ —his final conclusion, "that Spinoza, setting out from the abstract and barren principle of substance, and developing this principle by a completely artificial method of purely geometrical deduction, ends at last by effacing the idea of God and degrading that of the soul, that is to say, by the overthrow of all religion and of all morality;" §—his reduction of modern German philosophy to its "last word, *man divinized;* God placed not at the commencement, but at the end of things;" ‖ his parallel between the German and the Alexandrian philosophies,—"the same principle, the search after absolute science; the same method, purely rational speculation; the same results, the identity of contradictories, and man made one with God," ¶ all these are presented, in the earlier or destructive portion of M. Saisset's work, with a clearness and acuteness which leave nothing to be desired, and only make us the more regret that the author's penetrating insight into the defects of various philosophical theologies should have failed him in his own attempt to erect a positive system in their place.

M. Saisset's Meditations, and Sir William Hamilton's theory of the Conditioned, may both be regarded as the result of a recoil, in different directions, from the open or disguised Pantheism of the German philosophy of the Absolute. But they

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* English Translation, vol. i., p. 7. † Ibid. p. 9. ‡ Ibid. p. 113.
§ Ibid. p. 157. ‖ Ibid. vol. ii., pp. 31-2. ¶ Ibid. p. 35.

differ in this important respect, that while Hamilton's system is avowedly put forward as auxiliary and subordinate to the authoritative teaching of Revelation, that of Saisset is openly announced as a substitute for it. The difference between the two philosophers cannot be better exhibited than in their own words. Hamilton says:—

"Above all, however, I am confirmed in my belief by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy and those of revealed truth. . . . . This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy; that, in fact, if the divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity to reveal, do not wilfully identify the doctrine of God's word with some arrogant extreme of human speculation, philosophy will be found the most useful auxiliary of theology." *

M. Saisset, on the other hand, tells us in his Preface that he was led to undertake his work by the challenge of those preachers who proclaimed that there was no middle course "between Pantheism and the Catholic Faith,"—that he wished to know "if it was really impossible to believe in God, and yet to remain a philosopher."† The further question, whether philosophy, when reconciled with natural religion, is also in accord with revealed religion, if not excluded, is at least not contemplated as a portion of the argument.

It would be unfair to lay stress on verbal differences of this kind, if they went no further. But in fact, the thoughts which underlie these two forms of expression pervade the two systems throughout, and are the key to the fundamental difference between them in method and purpose. M. Saisset recoils from Pantheism, but he recoils no less from an opposite extreme, which he denominates Scepticism; and under the head of sceptics he classes not merely those who deny the trustworthiness of reason within her own sphere, but others who, like Hamilton, mainly differ from him as to the extent of that

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* 'Discussions,' pp. 625-6. 2nd ed.

† His translator renders, "the [Roman] Catholic faith;" but there is nothing in the original to warrant this restriction. And the author's remarks on the doctrine of the Incarnation, at the end of his criticism of Malebranche, suggest a very different interpretation. This passage, however, can only be estimated in the original, the most significant part being omitted in the translation. At all events, the author's position is unmistakeably indicated in his later fragment on Pascal.—'Le Scepticisme,' 8vo. Paris, 1865, pp. 341-7.

sphere. In a later, we regret to add, a posthumous work, devoted to the examination of this second extreme, M. Saisset expressly maintains the sufficiency of philosophy to supply a religion for philosophers;* and the same claim is throughout implied, if not so categorically stated, in the present Essay. Philosophy is thus, by the very terms of such a claim, compelled to occupy the same ground with revelation, and to develope a system of religious belief, if not antagonistic to, at least independent of, all authoritative teaching from a higher source. The contents of this system may he collected without much difficulty, as they lie scattered through M. Saisset's Meditations.

The essence of religion, he tells us, is to conceive God as anterior and superior to the world; as the first principle, the perfect model, and last end of existence here below.† Had the author said *believe* instead of *conceive*, this proposition would have been identical with that maintained by the so-called sceptic whom M. Saisset sets himself to oppose. But to *conceive* God as anterior to the world, we must conceive Him as existing in some manner before the world was; we must give, as Hegel professed to give in his 'Logic,' "an exhibition of God as He is in His absolute being, before the creation of nature and of finite spirit."‡ Does M. Saisset, the unflinching antagonist of the Hegelian Pantheism, profess to do this? Far from it: he confesses, in language as emphatic as that of Hamilton himself, that the essence of the absolute and infinite is incomprehensible—nay, inconceivable. We know that the Absolute exists; the *why* and the *how* of that existence we know not.‖ But this is precisely Hamilton's own explanation of what he means by belief in the incomprehensible as an

* "Et pourquoi la philosophie ne suffirait-elle pas à de telles âmes? La philosophie leur donne une religion, puisqu'elle leur inspire la foi en Dieu. Elle leur donne une morale, puisqu'elle leur enseigne le devoir. Elle leur donne même une certaine piété, puisqu'elle leur inspire la foi en la Providence, par suite, la résignation; non pas une résignation passive et forcée, mais une résignation volontaire et douce, celle qui dit, dans la douleur même, '*Fiat voluntas tua.*' Enfin elle leur donne l'espérance. Socrate n'est pas sûr de l'autre vie; mais il ne regrette pas d'avoir agi comme s'il y en avait une, et il l'espère de la bonté des dieux. Ainsi le philosophe ne manque ni de religion, ni de piété. Il croit en Dieu. Il l'adore et le contemple avec ravissement dans la beauté de ses œuvres. Il prie, il espère."—'Le Scepticisme,' pp. 313–14. † 'Essay,' vol. ii, p. 184.

‡ Hegel, 'Logik,' p. 33, edit. 1841; 'Werke,' Bd. iii., p. 33.

‖ 'Essay,' vol. ii., p. 64.

original conviction. "A conviction is incomprehensible when there is merely given us in consciousness *that its object is* (ὅτι ἔστι); and when we are unable to comprehend through a higher notion or belief *why or how it is* (διότι ἔστι)."* Thus far the two philosophers are entirely agreed; but thus far M. Saisset's theory has not given us any positive knowledge of God as existing anterior to the world.

To gain this knowledge, we must look, it seems, to what follows. "When," says M. Saisset, "from the inconceivability of the essence of God, it is concluded that we know nothing at all about God; when, instead of comprising in precise limits the science of things divine, that science is set aside altogether, I can go no further, and I enter my protest in the name of common sense. The heavens declare the glory of God; this is the voice of common sense, and science in the depths of its analysis finds this principle, that the imperfect being has its reason in the perfect Being, and consequently that there must be in the perfect Being something that may be communicated to the imperfect being, and be to it a natural revelation of its principle."† True, thoroughly true, in itself, but in no way contradictory of Hamilton, who has in substance said the same thing:—"Though man be not identical with the Deity, still is he 'created in the image of God.' It is, indeed, only through an analogy of the human with the Divine nature, that we are percipient and recipient of Divinity."‡ Nor can it be said that the analogy or community of nature between God and man is closer and more intimate in the theory of the French philosopher than in that of his antagonist. His own language couples this analogy with a difference as great as possible,—an infinite difference—a difference not of degree, but of kind. "Between the intellects that we possess and the complete intellect," he says, "there is the infinite. Our thought, and every imperfect thought, is a power in the way of development; this is its essence and its necessary law. Divine thought is a thought fully developed, which by its essence is anterior to all development. Finite thought implies effort; infinite thought excludes it. Finite thought is displayed under the form of

* Reid's Works, p. 754. † 'Essay,' vol. ii. p. 65.
‡ 'Discussions,' p. 20, note, 2nd ed.

time; infinite thought subsists and is maintained under the form of eternity. It knows none of the conditions of an imperfect intelligence; nothing of limit, or time, or space, or succession, consequently nothing of memory, or reasoning, or induction, or any of those human intermediaries between an infinite truth and a finite thought; nothing of those laborious operations which are the torment and confusion of our reason. It is but the pure essence of thought, thought adequate to being, intuition having consciousness of itself, thought taking hold of being, and taking hold of itself. On one side, an indefinite virtuality, tending towards action without being able to reach it; on the other, the absolute, infinite act, excluding all virtuality, all effort, all measure, all degree, all interval between itself and its end. The difference is not of degree, but of nature and essence; it is the difference between time and eternity, between the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute."* It would be difficult to express in stronger language than this from the mouth of the great advocate of the sufficiency of reason in religious knowledge, the doctrine which in this country has been decried as a degradation and renunciation of reason; namely, that the intellectual attributes of God, though analogous to those of man, cannot be regarded as identical with them.

The real difference between M. Saisset and the so-called sceptics whom he is opposing, is one which at first sight looks like a mere difference of words, but which in its result becomes an important difference of things. The representation of the Divine intelligence exhibited in the above eloquent language, would be called by the disciples of Sir W. Hamilton a negative or relative notion of the infinite, suggested by its opposite the finite, as all contradictions suggest one another. It is of course easy, they would say, to enumerate one by one the various imperfections of intelligence of which we are conscious in the actions of our own minds; and as these imperfections necessarily suggest their opposite perfections, we know perfectly well the meaning of the several terms in which we describe the Divine intelligence as differing from the human. But we have not thereby gained a conception of that intelligence as a whole;

* 'Essay,' vol. ii., pp. 51-2.

we have not been able to form a representation in our minds of the manner in which these several perfections act in combination with each other so as to form one infinite consciousness, as we can of the manner in which our imperfect modes of intelligence act together so as to form one finite consciousness: we lack the intuition of the object, which is necessary to enable us to reduce to unity the thoughts corresponding to the several words denoting it. From a notion thus incomplete and negative we cannot deduce scientific consequences: our inferences are at best conjectures, not certainties, and are not entitled to hold their place against positive statements of revelation, should they in any case come into collision with them. M. Saisset, on the other hand, following his master, Cousin, regards the association in thought of the infinite with the finite, not as the mere suggestion of one contradictory by the other, but as a positive intuition of both: he calls the notion thus obtained by the name of the true absolute, as distinguished from the false absolute of Schelling and Hegel; and from this conception of the true absolute he proceeds to deduce, as a logical consequence, a scientific theory of the Divine action in creation and in providence.

Of his "real absolute," which is in fact Hamilton's relative, he says,—

"Certainly, to conceive the Perfect and Absolute Being is the proper function of reason; and there is not a thought of the mind, an emotion of the heart, an impulse of the imagination, not even a perception of the senses, which does not contain this notion. But what is its real character? Far from being an abstract idea representing an indeterminate object, it is of all ideas the most determinate and the most concrete. I cannot contemplate being and life under their changeable and imperfect forms; I cannot see some gleams of intelligence shine around me and in me; I cannot catch some impressions of strength, of beauty, of justice, of joy, of happiness, without conceiving, beyond the beings of visible nature, a First Existence, where plenitude of intelligence, perfect beauty, and the possession of almighty power, compose in their harmonious unity the eternity of a perfect life. Collect these partial acts of a sole and identical intellectual function, these divided members of an idea always present in the depths of thought, and you have the idea of the Prefect Being. And this is not an abstract idea, nor an idea which represents an indeterminate object; it is emphatically

the concrete idea, since it represents the most real being, not potential, but actual being, the plenitude of perfection, the accomplishment of all the forms of being and of all the attributes of life. Here is the real Absolute, here is true perfection, but a determinate living perfection." *

The question, whether the Being thus described can properly be called the Absolute, may be postponed until we have examined some of the consequences which M. Saisset deduces from his principle. God, as the Perfect Being, is unchangeable: hence He cannot act at one time, and not act, or act differently, at another. He cannot therefore begin to create the world at any given moment of time:—

"God is eternally all that He is. If He is the Creator, He creates eternally; if He creates the world, it is not from chance or from caprice, but for reasons worthy of Himself; and these reasons are eternal. Nothing new, nothing fortuitous, can arise in the counsels of eternity. If the world be a work where wisdom and love concur with Almighty power, all *that* is eternal; and the creative act is equally so." †

Hence the author concludes that the world, as the effect of an eternal creative act, is, not indeed coeternal with God, for eternity is distinct from all time, but infinite in time as well as in space, without boundary, without beginning and without end. Without such an infinity, the world cannot be "the image of God, the expression of His all-perfect being." ‡

This conclusion is startling; but it is not the only one which seems to follow from the above principle. If God cannot act in time as the Creator of the world, can He act in time in the formation of a new species? Has the human race existed from everlasting, or was it developed by natural laws from some primitive germ which itself had no beginning? Or, to come to questions more directly religious, Can God act in time as the Sustainer and Governor of the world? Can He act in time with reference to the moral and religious needs of his creatures? Is providence possible? Is grace possible? Is answer to prayer possible? Is special revelation possible? Are miracles possible? Some of these questions are asked by the author himself: of the sufficiency of his answer let the reader judge:—

* 'Essay,' vol. ii., p. 110. † Ibid. p. 124. ‡ Ibid. pp. 126-7.

"Does not prayer, like revelation, grace, a miracle, suppose a particular local temporary intervention of the Divinity in terrestrial matters and the things of time? God is immutable, eternal, immense; there is no succession in Him; all that He does He does by a single act, which embraces all times and spaces and beings. If, then, I conceive God as acting in such a place or time by such a particular act, I assimilate God to a secondary cause; I submit Him to the conditions of space and time; I degrade Him, I make of Him an idol or a Jupiter." *

But he continues:—

"There are two degrees in prayer,—the first has no value, but as a means to reach the second. He who stops at the first step of prayer knows not its greatness or its value. At its outset, prayer is born of want. Like its parent, it is egotistical and self-interested, it asks a favour. It is the prayer of the imagination, the prayer of the child, and there is always something childish in the most manly being. It asks a miracle, nothing less, but it asks it ignorantly; for the idea of a miracle supposes the laws of nature, and the soul which prays on the spur of an imperious necessity knows not whether nature has any laws. It only knows one thing, that it wants a certain assistance, and it asks it of the Omnipotent Will. But the religious soul does not stop there. It knows that the events of the world are not given over to caprice or chance; that the hairs of our head are all numbered; that everything in the universe is ruled by universal eternal laws, full of wisdom, of foresight, of mercy, and love. Thus disappear selfish wishes and indiscreet claims. The soul, raised above itself, above its restless wishes and its transitory ills, cries out, My Father, thy will be done." †

Miracles, then, are abandoned; special revelation is abandoned; and prayer remains, not as a petition for the things of which we have need, but as an expression of pious resignation to the will of God. We must not ask if this is the teaching of Scripture,—that would be to appeal to an alien tribunal,—but we ask, Does it satisfy the instincts of man's heart when he prays? Does it bring him into communion with God as a person with a person? Does it not rather substitute for the Divine Personality an inexorable fate or immutable law? Does it not deprive God of the chief attribute of personality, free will? Does it not limit his omnipotence, by denying to Him

* 'Essay,' vol. ii., p. 187. † Ibid. pp. 189-90.

the power of acting in time? Nobler by far we grant it to be than the grovelling materialism which denies the possibility of miracles by deifying the empirical laws of nature; but is it really different in its practical result? Is it really a philosophy of religion, or is it not rather a philosophy which supersedes religion?

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος, the radical error, which has defaced an otherwise noble work with these untenable conclusions, is to be found in the author's assumption that he has attained to "the real Absolute." The assumption is unfortunate in its language, no less than in its consequences. If God, by the necessity of his nature, is eternally determined to create, God is not the Absolute: He is not a being existing by Himself, having no necessary relation to any other being: He has a necessary relation to the world; He cannot exist except in relation to it. And by advancing the consequences deduced from this principle as the necessary conclusions of a philosophy of the real Absolute, the author leaves no room for belief in the possibility of a higher reality which is above philosophy; he leaves no room for the possible reconciliation of his philosophy with the teaching of Scripture or with the religious instincts of man. His opponent, the so-called sceptic, may believe in miracles, in special providence, in the efficacy of prayer, as well as in the unchangeableness of God; admitting at the same time that he cannot reconcile the two beliefs with each other; but regarding both as partial manifestations of a higher and unknown reality; and believing that they are not irreconcileable in themselves, but only by reason of our ignorance; that we might reconcile them if we knew wholly what we know in part. But the philosopher of the absolute is precluded from this belief. He may not know all things; but that which he does know is absolutely, immutably, rigidly certain as far as it goes: it is not the shadow of a higher truth, but the truth itself: whatever else remains to be known must be separate from or subordinate to this. Philosophy is not auxiliary to revelation; it is not even independent of it: it necessarily becomes antagonistic to it. There is not, as the author tries to establish, one true religion for the philosophical reason, and another equally true for the devout feelings: the two are contradictory of each other; and in whatever degree the one is accepted as true,

in the same degree the other must be rejected as false. The religion of the philosopher is based on an intuition of absolute truth: whatever does not agree with this is, so far, absolutely untrue.

It is not without regret that we have undertaken this task of pointing out the faults in a work full of high principle and noble purpose. But errors are never so dangerous as when they are associated with principles and purposes such as those of M. Saisset. It belongs to the highest order of minds to conceive such a system: it is the highest order of minds who are in danger of being led astray by it. It seems nobler to soar than to stoop, yet wisdom may be nearer when we stoop than when we soar. The ambition which has given birth to so many various and unsuccessful attempts to scale the height of the Absolute may be, not to despair of philosophy, "the last infirmity of noble minds;" but it is an infirmity nevertheless.

But our purpose is not so much to criticise an individual work, as to call attention to the method of which that work is the representative, as contrasted with that which it condemns on the charge of scepticism. This method agrees with its antagonist in repudiating the arrogant claims of pantheistic omniscience: it agrees with it also in admitting that the essence, the absolute nature, of God is incomprehensible and inconceivable by finite beings; that none but God Himself can know what He is in Himself. Yet, starting from this confession of ignorance, it proceeds, nevertheless, to reason, with all the certainty of perfect knowledge, concerning God's mode of action in creation and in providence: the eternity of his creative act; his complete isolation from the things of time; the utter impossibility of his interposition in the world by miracle or by special providence. And what is the result of such reasoning, but that very division of humanity against itself which is the root and essence of scepticism? The reason marches triumphantly onward, proclaiming itself in possession of absolute truth, and deducing with inexorable logic the necessary consequences of that truth; but behind its march rise up in protest the crushed instincts of human nature, trampled down for the moment, but not destroyed; unable, it may be, to refute, but still more unable to believe. The God whom you preach to us, they say, a God fixed and im-

moveable, who cannot act in time, who cannot be influenced by prayer; a God, the image and expression of whose nature is not the free action of human will, but the fixed laws of an unyielding universe in inexhaustible evolution,—such a God may be a necessary hypothesis in your philosophy; but He is not our God; He is not the God with whom his creatures can have communion, will with will, person with person; He is not the object of our prayer and our adoration; He is not our Father in heaven. The highest triumph of philosophical reasonings such as these can only be that which the great modern sceptic himself announced as the criterion of sceptical arguments; "they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction."

If, on the other hand, we admit, with the advocates of the opposite method, that our knowledge of God is not absolute, but relative; if we found our philosophy on the saying of Bacon, "Deus percutit intellectum, propter medium inæquale, radio refracto;" if, developing the same simile, we acknowledge that those various personal attributes, whose perfection is suggested to us by contrast to our own imperfection, are apprehended in various relations, as the separate colours of the refracted ray, not in a single intuition, in a unity of representation, as the colourless light where all are blended with one—under such an admission there is room, in the midst of our apparent discrepancies and confusions, for a belief in the existence of a higher reality, where all is clear and all in unison. Eternity and continuous duration—immutability and creation in time—perfect action, yet unexhausted power to act—everlasting purpose and accessibility to prayer—general law and special providence—complete foreknowledge coexisting with human freedom,—we cannot combine these several elements together into a consistent whole, yet we can believe that they are capable of combination. We cannot conceive how they coexist, yet we can believe that, in some manner unknown to us, they do coexist,—

> "They are but broken lights of Thee,
> And Thou, O Lord, art more than they."

If this be scepticism, it is a scepticism which strangely resembles the definition given, by a distinguished modern

philosopher, of Belief:—"The true difference between knowledge and belief amounts to this, that knowledge receives its objects from intuition: belief does not; it is not to see, and yet to believe."*

* Fries, 'Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung,' p. 74.

ON UTILITY AS A GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

CONTENTS.

Difference between Scientific Demonstration and Practical Reasonings.

Purpose of Moral Philosophy.

Moral Obligation—is it real, or delusive?

Only two answers possible to the question, *Why ought I?*

Various forms of the Utilitarian Theory.

Bentham's Theory—Its inconsistencies; denies the existence of any Moral Obligation; subverts itself.

Mill's Theory: his error regarding the Moral Sense; his Theory of Association fails to account for Moral Obligation; his Denial of Free-will; inconsistencies of Determinism; confounds *Person* and *Thing*; false Physical Analogies.

Conclusion.

ON UTILITY AS A GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION.*

"IT is manifest" says Aristotle, "that practical wisdom is not science, for it has to do with an ultimate fact; for that which we do is of this kind." † In other words: while the conclusions of scientific demonstration are universal propositions: as, for example, that *all* triangles have their angles equal to two right angles, the conclusions of practical reasonings are singular—that *this* individual man ought or ought not to do this individual act, and on grounds assigned by the reasoning. Every moral agent is an individual person; every act which he performs is an individual act, and the ultimate purpose of moral philosophy is to determine the reason why certain individual acts ought, and certain other acts ought not, to be done by one as an individual agent; why the one are *right* and the other *wrong*. To give an answer to this question, is to assign a ground of moral obligation. The fact of a moral obligation real or apparent, is taken for granted: that there are certain acts which the conscience (whatever that faculty may mean, and however it may come into existence) does as a matter of fact approve and bid us do, and certain others which the same conscience does as a matter of fact condemn and bid us not do, is assumed as acknowledged by the general feeling and language of all mankind. To examine the nature, origin, and authority of this distinction—to say what it means: how it arose, and why I am bound to act upon it, if I am bound at all, is to state the source and ground of this obligation, assuming it to exist as a reality. Or, on the other hand, supposing it to have no real, but only an apparent existence, supposing the universal conviction of mankind to be a universal delusion, and the so-called moral obligation to be something else assuming this character, we are then stimu-

* A lecture delivered in Magdalen College, Oxford, May 2nd, 1866.
† 'Eth. Nic.' vi. 8, 8.

lated or inclined (I suppose I must not in that case say we are *bound*) to inquire what this something is, and how it came to assume the above character. To answer these questions, on the one side or the other, is the purpose, or one of the purposes of moral philosophy, and on the manner in which this purpose is carried out will ultimately depend its own character, as a true science or a specious imposture.* I have put as an alternative supposition, the possibility that moral obligation may be a delusion. But some may be disposed to ask, can such a supposition be really made without an insult to the moral nature of man? Has it ever been made, except by wicked men desirous to find an excuse for their own wickedness by denying the authority of the law which they transgress? and do even such men really in the bottom of their hearts believe in the falsehood which they attempt to impose on themselves and others? The sequel of my remarks will show that not only theories indirectly, perhaps in some cases unconsciously, tending to a denial of moral obligation in any proper sense of the term, but even doctrines having this consequence as their direct and acknowledged result have been gravely and earnestly maintained by men whose characters and motives are above all suspicion, with a sincere belief in the truth of their own teaching, and a deep conviction of its importance, and of its tendency to promote the highest interests of mankind. And, however paradoxical may be their position, and however untenable the arguments by which it is supported, it needs but a glance at some of the most influential and esteemed works of the present day to show that this paradox may assume in many minds the appearance of a truth, almost of a truism; that the inconclusive reasonings have at any rate been sufficient to pass themselves off as valid on intellects of no ordinary acuteness.

The general conviction of mankind as to the existence of such a thing as moral obligation is testified to by the existence, in all languages, of terms denoting duty, distinct from those denoting pleasure or profit; the proverb "honesty is the best policy," if it is anything more than the bare truism that policy is policy, testifies to the natural conviction of men that the *idea* of honesty

* On this purpose of moral philosophy, see Inaugural Lecture, 'Psychology the Test of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy,' p. 4 [*supra*, p. 129].

is one thing and the *idea* of policy is another. So long as the words *I ought* are understood by the mass of mankind as meaning something different from *I desire*, so long the men who thus understand them bear testimony against the theory which would resolve the idea of duty into that of pleasure. The conviction may perhaps be a mistaken one—eminent philosophers have told us that it is so—but it is a natural conviction of mankind, and as such, it is entitled to hold its place until the philosophers who repudiate it have clearly shown that it is a delusion, and, how according to the laws of the human mind, its existence as a delusion is to be accounted for.

Starting then from the point previously stated, that all moral actions are individual actions done by individual agents, the fact, real or supposed, of moral obligation is assumed in the proposition *I ought;* and the ground of that obligation, if there is any, will be ascertained when we have found the answer to the question, *Why ought I?* To that question, only two answers can really be given.* I, as an individual agent, am called upon to do an individual act, either because it is my duty to do so, or because it is my interest to do so. The word *interest*, I here use in its most general sense, to denote any acceptable consequence whatever proceeding from the act, whether in the way of pleasure, profit, esteem, or any other desirable result. All such results may ultimately be reduced to the one head of pleasure; and the two answers to the above question may be distinguished as that of the Imperative theory, which finds the motive for action in something existing previously by way of authority, and the Utilitarian theory, which finds it in something following after by way of consequence.

It is the latter of these theories which it is the principal object of the present lecture to examine; and the result of the examination will, I believe, be to show that the Utilitarian theory, instead of exhibiting a ground of moral obligation, is in fact a denial of the existence of any moral obligation at all. But before proceeding to this examination, it will be necessary to say a few words on the form in which the theory itself is stated; that being by no means the form which it has always

* See 'Psychology the Test of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy,' *supra*, p. 134, *sqq.* [ED.]

assumed in the writings of his advocates. The doctrine that an act is to be done because of its consequences, has been very variously stated in various systems, and may be sometimes deduced, by itself or as an alternative, from theories in which it is not directly advocated. For example, there is the theory of Benevolence, which in the form in which it is maintained by Cumberland, viz., that the obligation to benevolence is to be found in the happiness which it produces to the individual himself, is manifestly reducible to the Utilitarian principle,* while in the form in which it is stated by Shaftesbury, it may be reduced either to the Utilitarian or to the Imperative theory, according as the inducement to act upon our benevolent feelings is placed in the pleasure accompanying the action, or in the approbation of the moral sense.† There is the theory of Sympathy, as maintained by Adam Smith, who tells us that we are so constituted as to feel pleasure or pain at an act which gives pleasure or pain to others, and that, from reflection on these feelings arise the ideas of right and wrong. Here, again, that which induces us to act is the pleasure attached to the action; and the rectitude of the act is ultimately reduced to its capacity of giving pleasure—a theory which, though the pleasure is refined by being made sympathetic instead of personal, is yet, in principle, identical with the ultimate form of the Utilitarian theory. The "Greatest-Happiness principle" may be reduced—indeed it is expressly reduced by its author—to the same basis. Why am I, as an individual agent, required to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number? As we have said before, only two answers can be given to this question: either,

* "Agnoscimus interim obligationis indicium quoddam legibus naturæ esse intrinsecum, et plane essentiale. Illud autem est a præmiis, seu auctâ felicitate quæ a naturali actuum suorum influxu benevolum comitatur, sequiturque virum eas leges summo studio observantem; et e pœnis, seu miseriæ gradibus quas velint nolint in sese accersunt, qui dictatis rectæ rationis vel non parent, vel repugnant." Cumberland, 'De Legibus Naturæ,' i. 12.

† Shaftesbury, in his language, appears as an opponent of the Utilitarian theory, maintaining that excessive regard for one's own good is prejudicial to virtue and piety ('Characteristics,' vol. ii. p. 58). But in the wide sense of the theory, as advocated by Bentham and Mill, it embraces the pleasures annexed to the disinterested affections which Shaftesbury acknowledges as inducements ('Characteristics,' vol. ii., pp. 101, 102). On the other hand, the moral sense in Shaftesbury's system is not developed as it might be to the support of the opposite theory; being a sense rather of the pleasantness or beauty of virtuous acts, than of their conformity to a law. Yet the other view is not wholly neglected. See 'Characteristics,' vol. ii., p. 42.

"because it is my duty to do so;" or "because it is my interest to do so." The former, as implying a duty prior to utility is naturally repudiated by the Utilitarian school;* and the only possible alternative is to maintain, as Bentham expressly does maintain, that pleasure and pain constitute the good and evil of actions, and that the individual man is the only proper judge of what, with reference to himself, is pleasure and pain.†

Thus stated the Utilitarian doctrine is almost a verbatim repetition of the saying of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things, as that saying is interpreted by Plato and Aristotle,‡ to signify, that each individual man is the judge for himself of truth and falsehood, according as things seem to him to be. And this is in fact the true character of the theory when pushed to its final results—a character which is distinctly implied in the above confession, and which all the subsequent efforts of the author are unable really to change. In vain does the moralist tell any man that he makes an erroneous estimate of the magnitude of pleasures; in vain does he lay before him considerations designed to correct the error,§ and assure him that the true "balance of pleasures" will be found on the side which he recommends. The answer to all his arguments is obvious, and it is conclusive. By your own admission, every man is the best judge of his own happiness, that is to say, of his own pleasure.‖ You may try to alter my judgment if you will; but so long as it is my judgment, I must act upon it, and my so acting, on your own principles, is *right acting*. So long as I am not convinced by your arguments, to act upon your advice will be to act, not upon the dictates of reason, but upon those of authority; and why is the authority of a philosopher, merely as authority, to be held of more account than that of a king, or a priest, or a lawyer?

There is indeed one concession made by Bentham, which his admirers may regard as an answer to the above objection; but

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* "Unless it can be shown that a particular action or course of action is for a man's interest, the attempt to prove to him that it is his duty will be but a waste of words." Bentham, 'Deontology,' vol. i., p. 12.

† See 'Deontology,' vol. i., pp. 29, 59. Cf. 'Principles of Morals and Legislation,' chap. x. § 2. x. (Works, vol. i., p. 48.)

‡ Plato 'Cratylus,' p. 386; 'Theætetus,' p. 152; Arist. 'Metaph.' x. (K) 6, 1.

§ 'Deontology,' vol. i., p. 29.

‖ 'Deontology,' vol. ii., pp. 121, 298.

it is an answer which can only be admitted at the cost of overthrowing the whole Utilitarian theory. Not all pleasant acts, he tells us, are virtuous, but only those which involve a certain amount of self-denial—the sacrifice of a present to a future enjoyment.* This admission comes upon his readers like a thunderbolt. They had previously been told that every action is right or wrong in proportion to its tendency to contribute to or diminish the amount of public happiness;† that public happiness is but the aggregate of the happiness of the individuals composing the public;‡ and that happiness or unhappiness are determined by pleasure and pain,§ pleasure being the only good, and pain the only evil.‖ They are now told that pleasure is only good when accompanied by self-denial—*i.e.*, that good is only good when mingled with evil. Yet this glaring parodox is necessary to avoid reducing the whole system to an absurdity. According to the criteria previously laid down, eating and drinking have an undeniable claim to be ranked among virtuous acts. They are pleasant—that everybody allows—and within the bounds of moderation, they are not alloyed by any counterbalancing pains. They are also unquestionably useful; directly to the individual in supporting his life, and indirectly to the various persons—butchers, bakers, wine merchants, brewers, and so forth—who make a profit by supplying the necessary materials. On the Utilitarian principle, they undoubtedly ought to be virtues; but to admit them as such would be to expose the absurdity of the whole theory. They must, therefore, be denied to be virtues; and why? Because they involve no self-denial—*i.e.*, on Bentham's hypothesis, no evil. This ingenious mode of saving a theory finds an appropriate parallel in a well-known case in physics. For a long time it was believed that the reason why water rose in a common pump was because nature abhors a vacuum. In the course of time, however, it was discovered that the water would rise to the height of thirty-two feet and no more. For a short period the happy idea was started, that nature might abhor a vacuum up to the height of thirty-two feet only.¶ In like manner, after laying

* 'Deontology,' vol. i., p. 146; ii., p. 4. † 'Deontology,' vol. i. p. 24.
‡ 'Principles of Morals and Legislation,' ch. i. iv.
§ 'Deontology,' vol. i., pp. 17, 29.
‖ 'Principles of Morals and Legislation,' ch. x., § 2, x.
¶ Cf. Saisset, 'Le Scepticisme,' p. 262.

down, as a general principle, that pleasure is the only good, and that moral science is but an arithmetical calculation of the balance of pleasures and pains,* the Utilitarian moralist suddenly discovers that pleasure can account for virtue, so far as it is accompanied by self-denial, and no farther. Yet this is, in effect, to say that the virtuous element lies in the denial and not in the pleasure. The greatest-happiness principle, thus modified, has little more chance of being ultimately accepted as the foundation of morals than the abhorrence of a vacuum in physics.

This instance, however, may perhaps be regarded merely as an inconsistency on the part of the advocate of Utilitarianism, in carrying out his own principles. But, on more general grounds, it may be shown that the Utilitarian doctrine necessarily, and by virtue of its fundamental principle, involves a denial of the existence of any moral obligation whatever. This, indeed, is candidly confessed by Bentham himself, though some of his disciples have not imitated their master's candour. "The word *ought*," says Bentham, "if its use be admissible at all, *ought* to be banished from the vocabulary of morals." † This unfortunate word is further denounced ‡ in the severest language as "an authoritative imposture," "the talisman of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance." A theory of morals with the word *ought* banished from its vocabulary, reminds us of the tragedy of 'Hamlet' with the part of Hamlet left out. The words *ought* and *ought not* are the very words by which men in general express their natural conviction of the existence of a moral obligation at all; and to forbid the use of the word is to declare that the conviction is a delusion, and that no such obligation exists. The philosopher who takes up this position does not construct a theory of morals based on interest, but simply constructs a theory of interest, and leaves morals alone. Duty is interest and nothing more; let it therefore be called by its right name, and we arrive at the conclusion that interest is interest—an unquestionable conclusion, but one which contributes nothing towards a theory of morals, and which only assumes the appearance of doing so by retaining the very words the use of which it declares, on its principles, to be inadmissible.

The weakness of the Utilitarian theory becomes manifest as

* 'Deontology,' vol. ii., p. 19. † Ibid. vol. i., p. 32. ‡ Ibid. p. 31.

soon as we ask a question which Bentham himself regards as destructive of every system but his own, but which really destroys his own and leaves others standing—the question, *Why* is it as you say? * So long as it confines itself to the general statement that utility—that is, a balance of pleasures—is virtue, it is difficult to bring it to a crucial test; but as soon as it descends to the application of this general assertion, it is compelled to make distinctions, and to allow that there are some acts, such as eating and drinking, which are both useful and pleasant, but are not virtuous. But then at once arises the question, Why are some pleasant acts virtuous and others not? What is the *differentia* of virtue which subdivides the genus pleasant into these two classes? This, the essence of virtue, must be something different from pleasure. Or we may put the question in another way, perhaps still more decisive: Why are different pleasant things all pleasant? They are so by means of different qualities adapted to different parts of our constitution. A beautiful landscape or figure is pleasant because of certain qualities discerned by and acceptable to the sight; a musical concert is pleasant because of certain qualities discerned by and acceptable to the hearing; an agreeable dish is pleasant because of certain qualities discerned by and acceptable to the taste. None of these can change places with the other; the eye cannot judge of sounds, nor the ear of sights, nor the palate of either. If, then, virtuous acts are pleasant, they must in like manner be pleasant by reason of some quality which they possess, which is discerned and approved by some faculty of our nature. There must be a moral sense, to which moral objects are pleasant, as there are physical senses to which material objects are pleasant. In other words, granting that the same act is both virtuous and pleasant, it is not virtuous because it is pleasant, but pleasant because it is virtuous. If it were virtuous because it is pleasant, all pleasant acts, those of seeing, hearing, tasting, &c., would be equally virtuous. If it is pleasant because it is virtuous, we allow, as the common sense of all mankind does allow, that there are different kinds of pleasure, proceeding from different causes, one of which causes is virtue.†

* 'Deontology,' vol. i. p. 12.

† Cf. Whewell's 'Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England,' pp. 210, 216.

But again, we may ask, if every pleasure is a good, and every pain an evil, and if there is no distinction of a moral kind between different pleasures and pains, or different goods and evils, why is it that the feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation is limited to that particular class of pleasures and pains which are connected with the acts of a responsible agent? If one man stabs another with a knife, or breaks his head with a cudgel, the act, no doubt, is painful to the sufferer and culpable in the agent; but is it culpable solely because it is painful? An equal or a greater amount of pain might be inflicted by a fragment of rock or the branch of a tree falling on a man. Why do we not regard such an event as equally culpable with the other? If we say that the one is a voluntary, the other an involuntary, occurrence, we concede at once that the test of good and evil is to be found, not in the pain, which both have in common, but in the volition, by which one is distinguished from the other. If vice and pain are evil in the same sense of the term—nay, if, as Bentham tells us, vice is only an evil because of the pain which it occasions, we have a perfect right to talk of the immorality of a toothache or a broken leg. If we have not this right, it is because morality or immorality are dependent on other causes than pleasure and pain.

The Utilitarian theory of morality, which, as buried in the expositions of Jeremy Bentham, might find perhaps fit audience, but almost certainly few, has recently been popularised and adapted to general readers in a well-known essay by a distinguished living writer. The principles of Mr. Mill's essay are identical with those of his master, Bentham, and the arguments which may be urged against the one are equally applicable to the other; but the exposition is clearer and more consistent, and is for the most part free from the coarse and glaring misrepresentations of opposite systems, and from the intolerable self-assumption of arrogant dogmatism which distinguish the writings of the master and of some of his disciples. There is, however, one misrepresentation in Mr. Mill's essay so curiously the reverse of the truth, that it is difficult to imagine how any person with the slightest acquaintance with the literature of his subject could possibly have fallen into it. In criticising the theory of a moral sense, he says (and the statement in substance

is repeated in his later remarks): "Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty, and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete."* Now, how stand the facts of the case? Aristotle, who under the name of *νοῦς πρακτικὸς* distinctly recognises a moral sense, and even speaks of it as a *sense*, describes its office in the words, *καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.*† Here we are expressly told that the moral faculty, be it called *sense* or *intelligence*, for Aristotle uses both terms, is an apprehension, not of general and abstract principles, but of concrete and individual facts. Shaftesbury,‡ the writer who first introduced the term *moral sense* into the English language, speaks in the same way: "The case," he says, "is the same in the mental or moral subjects as in the ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense. The shapes, motions, colours, and proportions of the latter being presented to the eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity, according to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in *behaviour* and *actions*, when presented to our understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the subjects."§ Hutcheson follows Shaftesbury, defining the moral sense as "a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation from *actions observed* antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them."‖ Butler, in like manner, makes particular actions, and not general principles, the objects of the moral faculty. "God," he says, "hath given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and approve

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* J. S. Mill's 'Utilitarianism,' p. 3.

† Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 11.

‡ On Shaftesbury's use of the term *moral sense*, see Whewell, 'History of Moral Philosophy in England,' p. 92.

§ 'Characteristics,' vol. ii., p. 28.

‖ 'Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue,' p. 129, ed. 1738.

some as virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert;" and again, "Our *sense* or discernment of *actions* as morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill desert." * Warburton speaks of the moral sense in a manner which clearly implies, not a knowledge of general principles, but a perception of concrete facts; for he likens it to the natural instincts of animals, and describes it as that "whereby we conceive and feel a pleasure in right and a distaste and aversion to wrong, prior to all reflection on their nature or their consequences." † It would be curious to inquire on what principles a list could be drawn up of "all the interpreters of the moral faculty entitled to the name of thinkers," from which the above names should be omitted.

The only important addition which Mr. Mill has made to the Utilitarian theory as stated by Bentham, consists in an attempt to explain how, on the supposition that acts are only virtuous in so far as they lead to pleasure, the idea could ever have arisen in men's minds of a duty obligatory in itself without reference to its consequences. This inconvenient fact Mr. Mill attempts to explain away by his favourite theory of association. "Virtue," he says, "is not the only thing originally a means, and which, if it were not a means to anything else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for itself, and that, too, with the utmost intensity. What, for example, shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off." ‡

Of the theory of association thus stated, we may observe, first, that the point which it proves is not that which, for the purposes of the argument, it ought to prove; and, secondly, that the

* 'Analogy,' part i., chap. 6, and 'Dissertation,' ii.; 'On the Nature of Virtue' (pp. 124, 321, ed. Fitzgerald).

† 'Divine Legation,' book i. sect. 4.

‡ 'Utilitarianism,' p. 55.

latter point, if proved, would be, not a vindication of utility as a source of moral obligation, but simply a denial of the existence of any moral obligation at all. The point really proved is, that virtue (whatever that word in such a system may mean), being really only desirable as a means to pleasure (happiness and pleasure, we are expressly told, are convertible terms), comes in the end, under the law of association, to appear desirable for its own sake. The point which ought to be proved is, that desirability, whether as means or as end, can under this law of association, be so transformed as to assume the appearance of duty. Let us grant, as proved by this argument, that virtue, like money, may come, by the law of association, to be desired for its own sake; the argument does not explain how we come to have the idea of a moral obligation to practise virtue, which we certainly have not to hoard money. The miser desires to hoard his gold for its own sake; the virtuous man desires to do virtuous acts for their own sake. But the miser is not conscious of a moral obligation to hoard gold, nor are other men conscious of a moral approbation of his hoarding. This consciousness, the characteristic feature of duty as distinct from pleasure, the association theory does not explain. But the argument labours under a further disadvantage, in that it not only gives no explanation of the meaning of its principal term, but is expressly so constructed as not to admit of any explanation being given. What is meant by *virtue?* Virtue, on this theory, is that which gives us a certain kind of pleasure, not a kind differing in moral quality, for this would be to assume an independent morality, but a pleasure higher and more intense, in the opinion of those who are acquainted with it, than other pleasures.* Virtuous pleasure, then, simply means the most pleasant pleasure; and pleasure means that which is desired; and the statement that virtue is desirable for its own sake, amounts in this system to nothing more than that which is most desirable is desirable.

But, in the second place, the above argument, even if it were unobjectionable in other respects, would not prove that utility is a source of moral obligation, but merely that there is no such thing as moral obligation at all. Let it be granted (though the metamorphosis is more wonderful than any in Ovid) that that

* 'Utilitarianism,' p. 12.

which in itself is merely *pleasant* may be, by the law of association, so transformed as to assume the appearance of that which is *obligatory* or *right*. What does this prove, except that the law of association may create in our minds a delusive appearance which has no foundation in the nature of things? Pleasure is the only real good; the law of association creates the appearance of a moral good distinct from pleasure. What then? Why, the law of association is a deceiver, and makes us to think things to be different which are really the same. If so, let us, in the name of truth and honesty, expose the fallacy of this association, and boldly proclaim that duty as duty—*i.e.*, as something different from pleasure—is a figment of the imagination—a mockery, a delusion, and a snare.

There is indeed one hypothesis under which this is the only legitimate conclusion, and that hypothesis is one of which Mr. Mill, in other works, if not in the present essay, is well known to be the advocate. I mean that there is no such thing as Free-will. If this premise be conceded, no amount of special pleading will enable us to escape the inevitable conclusion that there is no such thing as morality. If human actions, like all other events in the world, follow uniformly and certainly from antecedent phenomena under the general law of physical cause and effect, there may be pleasure and pain no doubt in abundance; but other good or evil there can be none. The man that wounds me with intent to murder, the tree that injures me by its fall, both, no doubt, inflict pain; and both inflict it in precisely the same way, as links in the same chain of antecedent and consequent. Ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι.* Duty and Free-will mutually imply each other. If I ought to do a thing, it must be in my power to do or not to do. As well say that gunpowder is morally blameworthy for exploding when brought in contact with fire; as well say that a stone is morally blameworthy for sinking when thrown into the water, as say that human actions can be the objects of moral praise or blame, for taking place when the antecedents are present which cause them to take place as certainly as the powder is caused to explode or the stone to sink.

In answer to this objection, we are told that there is "a double

* Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. 1, 24.

meaning of the word necessity, which in this application signifies only invariability, but in its common employment compulsion."* Why, the very philosophy which thus defends itself has banished compulsion out of the world, to make way for invariable succession. No causation whatever, on this theory, implies anything more than regular and uniform sequence. A stone *does* always sink in the water, we do not say whether it *must;* a man *does* always act the same way when the same motives are present, we do not say that he *must.* But whether there be equally in both compulsion, or equally in both no compulsion, so long as both come under the same law, the man is no more morally responsible than the stone.†

But we are told that our character is one of the antecedents of our acts, and that "our character is in part amenable to our will; that we may, by employing the proper means, improve our character." ‡ Verily, as in the memorable case of St. Denis, this would be perfectly credible could we only see how to make the first step. My will is necessarily determined by my character, and yet my character is amenable to my will. My character is bad, and, as I am expressly told, "necessitates me to do wrong." Yet I, who am thus necessitated to do wrong, am told that I may take the proper means to improve my character; but the taking of such means is the first step towards right, and how can I take such a step while my character necessitates me to do wrong? If I am a free agent, I see how I may set to work to improve my character; but if my character necessitates me to do wrong, then must my character be already improved before I can take the first step towards improving it.

No doubt, an Utilitarian morality—that is to say, the denial of any morality at all—is the necessary consequence of a determinist theory of the will—that is, of the denial of any will at all. And it is the strongest condemnation of this theory (for it may be treated as one theory in logical connection) that it annihilates the first and fundamental distinction of consciousness, that on which all other facts of consciousness, and all superstructures reared upon those facts, ultimately depend—the distinction

* Mill's 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 492, note.
† See on this question Alexander's 'Mill and Carlyle,' p. 6.
‡ Mill's 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy,' p. 516.

between self and not-self, between free and determined agency—in one word, between *person* and *thing*. Moral good and evil are attributes, not of things, but of persons; * my actions can only be called good or evil in a moral point of view because they are done by me, a personal agent, with power, if I will, not to do them. If I am a thing, a mere phenomenon of the universe, determined by the same laws, with the same necessity, as other phenomena, my actions can have no more moral character than the material phenomena around me, my fellow-slaves under the immoveable rigidity of law. This attempt to identify moral action with material occurrence has ever been the vice of unscrupulous system-making. There was a time when men believed, according to the philosophy of Heraclitus, that the material world was the scene, not of law and unchanging order, but of ebb and flow, of perpetual change, of shifting states of the moment, where nothing is, but all things become. Forthwith a Protagoras appears to complete the theory of Heraclitus: to maintain that man too is a part of this fluctuating world, a phenomenon among phenomena; that his moral actions partake of this universal instability, assuming different forms in different places, subject to no rule but individual caprice. The character of physical science changes; we hear no more of the shifting phenomena, but of the fixed unchanging law, of the invariable sequence of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent. Forthwith the same pestilent sophistry crops up again to annihilate our moral consciousness by crude theories drawn from physical analogies and physical methods. Still interpreting the moral world after the pattern of the material, our philosophers assure us that the law of cause and effect reigns supreme in the universe, over mind as well as matter—if, indeed, mind be anything but a subtle kind of matter. And the manner in which the error of the sophists of old was met by Socrates may teach us how the cognate error may be met by us. He looked within, to the witness of his own consciousness, and found in his moral nature and constitution a witness to the existence of immutable principles and permanent truths. And we, if we look to the same testimony, may find there a direct assurance of our moral responsibility and personal freedom—an assurance more trust-

* Cf. Kant, Kritik d. praktischen Vernunft, p. 180, ed. Rosenkranz.

worthy than all the physical analogies in the world; for it is the assurance of a fact, and not of a theory—the fact of a sense of right and wrong in the act done, of a sense of freedom in the doer. The particular laws of nature may be the discoveries of modern times or the yet undiscovered embryos of a future birth; the existence of a distinction between persons and things is a fact coeval with the creation and co-extensive with the spread of the human race, the innate conviction of man in every stage of rudeness or culture, from the savage who feels that the stone which wounds him is not the object of his vengeance like the man who injures him, to the philosopher enunciating the grand axiom of duty and liberty combined, "thou oughtest, therefore thou canst."* Personality can only exist if free-will exists; the consciousness which is the very root and essence of personality is only possible through free-will: we may almost say, in the words of St. Augustine, "Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt."† In the twofold conviction of necessity and freedom—necessity in the physical, freedom in the moral world—we recognise the innate and inextinguishable conviction implanted in the minds and consciences of the human race by Him who gave to man a physical and a moral existence, a body subject to the laws of matter, a soul conscious of its superiority to matter, and who by connecting inseparably in our unsophisticated convictions the consciousness of moral obligation with that of freedom, manifests Himself as the First Great Cause, the Personal Cause, in whom the empire of mind over matter is supreme and absolute; who created man in his own image when he imparted to us in our limited sphere, and within our mortal bodies, a share in his own spiritual and personal being;

> Who gave us, in this dark estate
> To see the Good from Ill;
> And, binding Nature fast in Fate,
> Left free the Human Will.‡

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* Kant, Religion innerhalb d. Grenzen d. blossen Vernunft, I. 4, allgemeine Anmerkung, p. 213, ed. Hartenstein. 'Kritik d. praktischen Vernunft,' I. Th. 1. B., 1. Hptst., § 6, Anmerk. p. 130, ed. Hartenstein; *ibid.* § 8, p. 139; *ibid.* II. Theil, Methodenlehre d. reinen praktischen Vernunft, p. 284; Kritik d. rein. Vernunft, Methodenlehre, II. Hauptst. II. Abschr. Von dem Ideal d. höchsten Guts, p. 603, ed. Hartenstein. [ED.]

† De Civ. Dei, xiv. 6.

‡ Pope's 'Universal Prayer,' stanza 3. [ED.]

ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY.

CONTENTS.

Professor Fraser's edition of Berkeley's collected works.

Berkeley an advocate of Common Sense; greatly misunderstood by Philosophers and non-Philosophers.

The real Berkeley no Visionary or Sceptic.

In what sense he denied the existence of *Matter*.

Common Problem of Berkeley and the Scotch School: The Fact of Consciousness; Inferences from it.

Relation of Berkeley to Descartes, Malebranche [and Locke]. . . .

ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY.*

WE rejoice at the appearance, for the first time, of a complete and annotated edition of Bishop Berkeley's works. We rejoice at it as removing one, at least, of the reproaches to which British literature is justly liable for its neglect of the writings of its greatest thinkers. It is now more than thirty years ago that Sir William Hamilton, in an article † on Arthur Collier's then forgotten 'Clavis Universalis'—itself a most remarkable instance of undesigned coincidence with Berkeley's philosophy—observed that "even of English philosophers of the very highest note (strange to say), there are now actually lying, unknown to their editors, biographers, and fellow-metaphysicians, published treatises of the highest interest and importance; as of Cudworth, Berkeley, Collier, &c." We rejoice that, as regards Berkeley at least, this discreditable accusation can no longer be urged, and we trust that this publication of a complete collection of his writings may be the precursor of a similar revival of the neglected works of other philosophers, some of which are not less valuable than rare. An undertaking of this kind seems especially suited to the presses of our universities, which, possessed of advantages which enable them in some instances to dispense with the pecuniary considerations which must necessarily influence individual publishers, are thereby enabled, and may fairly be expected, to take an active part in enterprises of which the expected fruits are rather of a literary than of a commercial kind.

If it be true that none but a poet can translate a poet, it is

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* This paper was written for the 'Quarterly Review,' and was occasioned by the publication of the 'Works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne, including many of his writings hitherto unpublished. . . . . Edited by Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 4 vols. 8vo. Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1871.' The author's sudden death prevented him from completing and revising it. [ED.]

† Hamilton's 'Discussions,' ed. 2, p. 188. [ED.]

no less true that the editor of a philosopher should himself be a philosopher, and a philosopher who has a hearty sympathy with his author. But idealism is a form of philosophy which has never greatly flourished on English soil, and the tendencies of the present age especially are by no means favourable to its growth. Under these circumstances, we think Berkeley has been fortunate in his editor. Professor Fraser's previous writings manifest philosophical talent of a very high order, and of a kind especially suited to his present task. Originally a pupil of Sir W. Hamilton, and his successor in the chair of logic and metaphysics at Edinburgh, Mr. Fraser has, latterly, at least, shown himself a disciple of the idealism of Berkeley, rather than of the natural realism of Reid, with which the name of his distinguished predecessor is so intimately associated.

[Compare Fraser's 'Berkeley' with Hamilton's 'Reid.']

The two systems, indeed, may be regarded, though the author of the latter would hardly have acknowledged the affinity, as in truth sister streams, springing from the same source, and flowing, though by different channels, to the same ocean. The aim of both alike was to lay a sure foundation for human knowledge in principles secure from the assaults of scepticism; the method of both alike was to appeal to the common consciousness of mankind as a witness to the existence of certain primary and ineradicable convictions on which all others depend, and to disencumber these convictions from the rash hypotheses and unwarranted deductions with which they had been associated and obscured in previous systems of philosophy. Both, in short, though with very different results, were united in appealing from the theories of metaphysicians to the common sense of men.

It may surprise those who have imbibed the popular prejudice against Berkeley as a paradoxical visionary, to hear him described as an advocate of common sense. But in truth, as his editor has observed, Berkeley has suffered more perhaps than any other great modern philosopher from misunderstanding. It was not merely that, according to the well-known line of Dr. Brown (often erroneously cited as Pope's),

> And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin; *

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* Brown's 'Essay on Satire,' part ii., line 224. [Ed.]

it was not merely that wits, like Byron, thought it fair to expose the seeming inconsistency—

> When Bishop Berkeley said there was no matter,
> And prov'd it—'twas no matter what he said:
> They say his system 'tis in vain to batter,
> Too subtle for the airiest human head.
> And yet who can believe it? I would shatter
> Gladly all matters down to stone or lead,
> Or adamant, to find the world a spirit,
> And wear my head, denying that I wear it; *

it was not merely that practical men, like Johnson,† regarded it as a sufficient refutation of the whole system to stamp on the ground and say "that's matter;" but even professed philosophers, men of kindred taste and pursuits, were equally mistaken as regards the real character of a doctrine which nevertheless they most freely criticised. Hume claimed Berkeley as a fellow-sceptic on the ground that his reasonings "admitted of no answer, and produced no conviction." ‡ Reid, who at one time, as he himself tells us, had embraced the whole of Berkeley's system, and who gives, on the whole, a tolerably accurate account of the Bishop's "sentiments of the nature of ideas," yet brings against the author the formidable accusation that "by depriving us of the material world, he deprived us, at the same time, of family, friends, country, and every human creature, of every object of affection or concern except ourselves." § Beattie charged him with maintaining that to be false which every man must necessarily believe every moment of his life to be true, and that to be true which no man since the foundation of the world was capable of believing for a single moment. ‖

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* Byron's 'Don Juan,' canto xi., stanza i. [ED.]

† "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, 'I refute it *thus*.'" Boswell's 'Life of Johnson,' ed. J. W. Croker. 8vo. 1831. Vol. i., p. 484. [ED.]

‡ Hume, 'Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding,' § 12. Works, vol. iv., p. 176, note. [ED.]

§ 'Intellectual Powers,' Essay vi., chap. 5.

‖ "The substance, or at least the foundation, of Berkeley's argument against the existence of matter, may be found in Locke's Essay, and in the 'Principia' of Descartes. And if this be conclusive, it proves that to be false which every man must necessarily believe every moment of his life to be

Even Kant, who addressed himself to the same problem, and whose system has much affinity to that of Berkeley, could so far misunderstand the speculations of his fellow-philosopher as to say that "the idealism of Berkeley was mystical and visionary." *

In striking contrast to all these fancy portraits, the real Berkeley was so far from being a visionary, that he based his whole philosophical system chiefly—indeed we might, perhaps, say too exclusively—on the facts of experience; and is so far from being a sceptic, that he received those facts as the sure foundation of real and undeniable knowledge. Instead of maintaining with Pyrrho and Sextus, that the senses present to us, not that which is, but only that which seems to be, Berkeley emphatically proclaims the contrary: "I do not argue," he says, "against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands, do exist, really exist, I make not the least question."† And upon this very position he bases a refutation of scepticism which, from his point of view, is complete: "Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many *sensations* in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as notes or images referred to *things* or *archetypes* existing without the mind, then we are involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in *rerum natura*." ‡

How far this hypothesis is really a safeguard against scep-

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true, and that to be true which no man since the foundation of the world was ever capable of believing for a single moment." Beattie, 'Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,' part ii., chap. ii. 1, p. 241, ed. 1773. [Ed.]

* Kant, 'Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik,' § 13. [Ed.]

† 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' § 35.

‡ Ibid. § 87.

ticism, is a question which we are not yet in a position to examine, but it is at least certain that its author believed it to be such, and that he proposed it, not with the view of shaking men's belief in the veracity of their senses or of any other of their faculties, but of confirming that belief, and making it a sure foundation for any superstructure of knowledge which might be built upon it. And this superstructure was designed to include, not merely a knowledge of the existence of myself as conscious, and of the ideas of which I am conscious; but also of an external world distinct from myself, only he insists upon putting his own interpretation on the word *external*. By an *external object*, in the language of Berkeley, is not meant an object existing by itself in space irrespectively of its being perceived by any mind, human or divine, but an object not produced by my own will, and therefore not dependent upon myself for its existence, though still, as its very nature implies, dependent upon some other mind. "Ideas," he says, "imprinted on the senses are real things: or do really exist; this we do not deny; but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them; or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind:* since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived; and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed *external*, with regard to their origin, in that they are not generated from within the mind itself, but imprinted by a spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be without the mind in another sense, namely, when they exist in some other mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind." †

It thus appears that the *matter* whose existence Berkeley denied is not anything which can be directly perceived by the senses, but something inferred to exist in order to account for the sensible phenomena; namely, an insensible substratum in which the sensible qualities, which alone are capable of being

* This, as Professor Fraser remarks, and as the context shows, must be understood of archetypes without, or unperceived by any mind human or divine. Berkeley elsewhere admits the existence of ideal archetypes in the Divine mind.

† 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' § 90.

perceived, are supposed to inhere, and to be supported by it. *Matter* in this sense is identical with that which Locke defines under the name of *substance.* "The idea," he says, "to which we give the general name *substance,* being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substante,* without something to support them; we call that support *substantia;* which according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, *standing under* or *upholding.*" * Instead of supposing these sensible attributes to exist as qualities of a substance of which nothing is known, Berkeley asserts them to exist as we perceive them to exist: namely in relation to a mind which is conscious of them. As existing in the mind, they are called *ideas* (in Berkeley's phraseology *idea* and *object of sense* are synonymous;†) but as actual objects of sense, and imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature, they may truly be called *real,* ‡ and even *material,* provided the latter term is not so understood as to attribute to them an independent existence apart from their relation to any perceiving mind. §

It was this denial of the existence of matter or substance in Locke's sense of the term, which brought Berkeley into immediate collision with the Scottish representatives of the philosophy of 'Common Sense.' "I perceive," urged Reid, "in a billiard ball, figure, colour, and motion; but the ball is not figure, nor is it colour, nor motion, nor all these taken together; it is something which has figure and colour and motion. This is a dictate of nature, and the belief of all mankind." ‖ These words show exactly the point at which Reid's philosophy appears in direct antagonism to Berkeley's; both in reality commencing with the same problem, and aiming at the same object in its solution. The problem common to both was to explain the possibility of an intercourse between mind and matter, or rather, to state it in its simplest and most immediate terms, between myself as a conscious being, and the objects, distinct from myself, of which I am conscious. Stated in the latter way, the problem

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* 'Essay,' book II., chap. xxiii., § 2.

† See 'Theory of Vision Vindicated,' § 11.

‡ 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' § 33

§ 'Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous,' *ad finem.*

‖ 'Intellectual Powers,' Essay II., chap. xix.

is translated into the terms of a somewhat later phraseology, but at the same time it is divested of the arbitrary assumptions which are involved in its earlier statement, and to which are due by far the greater portion of the obscurity and confusion which have been manifested in its treatment.

Every act or state of consciousness, be it sensation, thought, emotion, volition, or what you please, is necessarily manifested in the form of an individual state of my own being. That other men have states of consciousness similar to mine; that there is a substance called mind in myself and in other men, by virtue of which we are capable of this consciousness, and that there is another substance called matter which furnishes objects of which we are conscious—these are inferences, legitimate or illegitimate, from the fact of consciousness, but they are no part of the fact itself. The primary fact is simply a state of my own existence. I see an object, I think a thought, I feel an emotion—in one word, I am conscious of something—and this consciousness is necessarily composed of two factors: *I* who am conscious, and *something* of which I am conscious.

Such is the fact of consciousness simply and in itself. But beyond this, we find different states of consciousness associated with certain further convictions, which, though no part of the fact itself, are nevertheless inevitably formed by way of inference from it. There are some objects of consciousness which we find ourselves compelled to regard merely as states of our own being, having no existence beyond the fact of their being apprehended, and ceasing to exist when the apprehension is over. I am conscious, for example, of a state of anger or fear. No man dreams of asking what becomes of the anger or fear when it is felt no longer, or in what manner it exists, apart from its presence in consciousness. It exists only as it is felt; it is felt only as it exists; it represents nothing beyond itself; it truly exists as it is truly felt, and no question arises as to the veracity of consciousness in declaring its existence. But, on the contrary, when I see a mountain or a tree, my conviction does not stop here. I am compelled to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the object which I see is something more than a state of my own being, that it has an existence apart from its being perceived by me; that it continues to exist when I see it no longer; that it is a permanent thing, and not a mere temporary mode of

consciousness. On the occasion of a perception of this kind, I infer the presence of something distinct from myself; I believe in an intercourse of some kind between *ego* and *non ego*.

But this conviction, however common or even inevitable, is still not an immediate fact of consciousness, but an inference from such a fact. Hence it is not, like the facts of consciousness themselves, primary, inexplicable and yet unquestionable, but admits of doubt and calls for vindication and explanation. My own existence is immediately given in consciousness, for my consciousness is itself a state of my existence. Here neither doubt nor analysis is possible. *Cogito, ergo sum*, "I am conscious, and as conscious I exist," was rightly proclaimed by Descartes as the first and most unquestionable of truths: he only erred in choosing an ambiguous mode of expression, which his adversaries erroneously interpreted as denoting an inference, and not an intuition. But the further conviction, that the object which I perceive in certain modes of consciousness is a real being distinct from myself, is neither so immediate nor so certain, but, on the contrary, may give rise to two successive questions:—First, Are we sure that an external world exists at all? and, secondly, supposing such a world to exist, how can we become conscious of its existence?

The philosophers by whom Berkeley was principally influenced (to say nothing of earlier speculators) assumed the first of these questions, and applied themselves to the discussion of the second. Descartes, who may be regarded as the father of modern mental philosophy, assumed as the basis of his theory the existence of two distinct substances—Matter, whose principal attribute was Extension; and Mind, whose principal attribute was Consciousness.* But between these two how is any communication possible? Extension—the occupation of space—has nothing in common with mind. Consciousness—a mental affection—has nothing in common with matter. Here, as it seemed, was a *dignus vindice nodus* sufficient to justify the introduction of a *Deus ex machina*. Accordingly, Descartes suggested, and his followers elaborated, the Theory of Divine Assistance and Occasional Causes, according to which the

* Descartes 'Principia Philosophiæ,' I., 51-53; Reid's Works, ed. Hamilton, p. 273. [ED.]

mental phenomena of sensation are not produced by any direct action of body upon mind, but by the immediate agency of God, who produces certain sensations in the conscious mind, upon the occasion of certain corresponding movements in the bodily organism. The material world thus exists, and is capable of affecting the cognate matter of the human body. The corresponding affection of the mind can only be produced by the action of another mind.

From Descartes to Malebranche was but a single step; and that step consisted in simplifying the theory by substituting the actual ideas in the mind of the Deity in the place of corresponding ideas produced by Divine action in the human mind. The whole sensible world is ever present to the mind of God in those archetypal ideas according to which it was created. Finite spirits also exist only in God, on whom they are dependent, who is, in fact, to all spiritual beings what space is to material things. Existing in God we behold the ideas of God, so far as He sees fit to reveal them to us, and thus we become acquainted with His work in the intelligible world, which is the pattern of the sensible.* Hence, instead of supposing that each man apprehends a separate world of ideas produced in his mind by divine action, Malebranche maintains that the divine ideas are presented to all men as the direct objects of their perception; and hence that a thousand men can see the same individual object—namely, the intelligible extension which is perceived in God.†

It is obvious that this theory, no less than Berkeley's, does in effect dispense with the material world altogether. Such a world is not even needed as the mere occasional cause of our perceptions, for these are produced simply by the presence of the Divine ideas, and would equally be produced if the material counterparts of those ideas were annihilated; and accordingly Malebranche expressly admits that for the existence of a material world we have no warrant at all except the authority of Scripture,‡ which tells us that in the beginning God created

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* 'Entretiens sur la Métaphysique,' II., § 1 sqq.; VIII. §§ 4, 7, 12; 'De la Recherche de la Vérité,' Livre III^ème^, seconde partie, chap. IV. and VI. [Ed.]

† 'Réponse au Livre des vraies et des fausses idées, de M. Arnauld,' chap. xiii.

‡ 'Entretiens sur la Métaphysique,' VI., §§ 5, 8; 'Éclaircissements sur la Recherche de la Vérité,' vi. and x. [Ed.]

the heavens and the earth. Sir William Hamilton has pointed out another and a more cogent reason, also theological, which prevented Malebranche, as it had prevented some of the schoolmen before him, from pursuing the principles of Idealism to their logical conclusion—namely, that the denial of the existence of a material world is incompatible with a belief in the doctrine of transubstantiation.* Berkeley and his contemporary, Collier, as Protestants, were not affected by this latter scruple.

The close resemblance between this theory and that of Berkeley will be evident from the extract which we have already given from the latter philosopher. Like Malebranche, Berkeley maintains that the ideas which we perceive are imprinted on our minds by the Author of Nature, to whom they are ever present; and in denying the existence of a material world corresponding to these ideas he merely discarded an assumption which, as far as philosophy was concerned, his predecessor had already dispensed with. He even occasionally approaches so closely to the language of Malebranche as to speak of sensible things having a permanent existence in the mind of the Deity when they are not perceived by finite minds.† Yet Berkeley is so far from professing himself a disciple of Malebranche that he says: "There are no principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine."‡ The opposition was not quite so fundamental as Berkeley supposed; but, in order to estimate fairly the position of the two philosophers towards each other, it will be necessary to consider briefly the relation of both to the third of the great thinkers by whom Berkeley was principally influenced—namely, Locke * * * *

[This paper breaks off abruptly with the above words. Some of the topics on which the author probably intended to enlarge

* 'Reid's Works,' pp. 285, 358, 967; 'Discussions,' ed. 2, p. 198.

† "To me it is evident . . . . that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, *there must be some other mind wherein they exist.* As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it." 'Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous,' p. 304, ed. Fraser. Cf. 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' §§ 33, 90.

‡ 'Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous,' p. 307, ed. Fraser.

are indicated by a few pencil notes in the original manuscript; they run as follows:

Locke's Examination of Malebranche.

Locke's Relation to Berkeley.

Common Problem of Berkeley and Reid.

Locke's Erroneous View of SPIRIT *instead of* EGO, *shared by Reid, but not by Berkeley.*

Reid read Berkeley through Hume, but Hume and Berkeley really antagonistic.

Berkeley maintains Free Will, which can only consistently be maintained by an intuitive consciousness of self. See 'Prolegomena Logica,' pp. 150, 347. *Relation of Berkeley and Kant.*

Relativity of Knowledge not possible on Berkeley's hypothesis, but admissible on that of Natural Realism.

Real Error of Berkeley's Idealism.

ED.]

PHRONTISTERION.

SCENES FROM AN UNFINISHED DRAMA

ENTITLED

PHRONTISTERION;*

OR,

OXFORD IN THE 19TH CENTURY.

Καὶ οἱ μὲν λῃσταὶ αὐτοὺς πορισταὶς καλοῦσι νῦν· διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ' ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθῆσαι.—*Arist. Rhet.* III., 2.

Lucio. Thou concludest like the sanctimonious pirate, that went to sea with the ten commandments, but scraped one out of the table.

2 *Gent.* Thou shalt not steal?

Lucio. Ay, that he razed.

1 *Gent.* Why, 'twas a commandment to command the captain and all the rest from their functions; they put forth to steal.

Measure for Measure, I., 2.

DRAMATIS PERSONÆ.

STREPSIADES-COTTONARCHICALICOCRATICUS. *The Model Manchester Man.*

PHEIDIPPIDES-JOHNNY. *The Model Minister, a compound, as his name implies, of parsimony and chivalry; a great public benefactor, but prefers doing it at other people's expense.*

SECRETARY TO THE COMMISSION.

COMMISSIONER-SOCRATES. *The Model Instructor of Youth.*

CHORUS OF CLOUDY PROFESSORS.

JUST DISCOURSE. *A Bigot.*

UNJUST DISCOURSE. *A Liberal.*

SCENE I.

COTTONARCHICALICOCRATICUS *in bed, soliloquizing.*
JOHNNY *in truckle-bed, asleep.*

COT. Confound those heaven-sent Whigs! There was a time
Some twenty years ago, when cautious John
Upset his coach, and nearly lost his place for't.
Ay, those were glorious times. Reforms and riots,

* This "inimitable imitation" (*see* De Morgan, 'Budget of Paradoxes,' p. 358,) was occasioned by the Commission appointed to inquire into the State, Discipline, Studies and Revenues of the University and Colleges of Oxford, 1850. The Report was printed in 1852. [ED.]

Burning of ricks and Bristols. Honest Demus
For once was master, and my Lord was fain
To climb his box on Tom the Tinker's shoulders,
And drive a rattling pace for't. But once mounted,
He halts and hesitates, talks of Finality,
And drives so slow and steady, that his wheels
Scarce make a Revolution in a life-time.
Boy there, my bills! let's see what we've in store.
"Proposed by Richard Cobden, to distribute
The whole of Britain in electoral districts
Of equal numbers."—Why electoral districts?
That men of movement, those who live in towns,
May swamp the country bumpkins, and promote
The march of intellect and sale of cotton.
Then from the Peace Society, demanding
Protection for all cannibals and pirates,
Provided that their skins are black or tawny,
Fraternity with all Malays and Kaffirs,
And lasting infamy to him that wears
The base and bloodstained livery of a soldier.
JOHNNY (*in his sleep*). The Estimates.
COT. Sir Joseph Banks was right; *
Ten thousand Lobsters bite me from the ticking.—
Plague take the matchmaker who brought together
The fine Whig Lady, Aristocracy,
And honest Homespun from the cotton-mill.
A well-assorted couple!—Madam, full
Of old historic memories, and prating
Of Sidney, Russell, William the Deliverer,
And Brunswick Line, and Protestant Succession;
And plain, rough Hubby, thinking Monarchy
A rather costly article, and spouting
Of Household Suffrage, Ballot, and Retrenchment,
The fine old English Gentleman cut down
To a good travelling Gent, and martial scarlet
Doffed for the drab and broadbrim.—Well, we married.
In time my Lady longed, as women will

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* The whimsical theory of this *savant* as to the identity of fleas and lobsters will be familiar to the readers of Peter Pindar.

In interesting states, and when I hinted
Plain Manchester for pudding, she grew squeamish,
And fancied nothing but a Cabinet.
It wouldn't do to cross her; so she had it.
At last our John was born. Mamma's relations
Petted and coaxed him. "Some day we shall see
Our darling Johnny drive his coachy-poachy
With four blood Greys in front." Says I, "My lad,
I'd rather see you riding Dick our cob,
Or arm-in-arm with worthy Quaker Broadbrim
And Joey Skinflint." Not a whit would he.
The great Whig Families (ay, that's the doctrine,
He sucked it with his mother's milk, and bit it
Letter by letter in his gingerbread)
Are heaven-sent ministers to rule the country.
I'll rouse him yet. Ho! Johnny, Johnnikin!
Brutus, thou sleep'st; thou art no longer Brutus.
JOHNNY (*still sleeping*).
Join the adjacent district to the borough,
And give two members—
COT. That's his boroughmongering!
'Tis strange, the greatest jobbers in creation
Are these same purity-Whigs. He dreams of jobbing;
And if you whisper in his ear "Reform,"
He snores, and starts, and turns, and snores again,
Letting *I dare not* wait upon *I would*,
Like the poor cat i' th' adage. What will rouse him?
[*Meditating.*
I have it now! the Universities.
Long as those monkish rookeries exist
They'll be a drag upon us go a-head men;
At least with Church Establishment. Abroad
They manage those things differently: the Burschen
Fight at the barricades; and Herr Professor
Will sketch you twenty Paper-Constitutions
Shall only cost the foolscap. No subscribing
To Articles, no tests of Church Communion;
But good Free Trade, religious and political,
Progress and Agitation. But at Oxford
There's nought but bigotry and priestcraft. Tell them

Of Institutions free to all religions,
Where Jew, Turk, Infidel and Heretic
May sit like brothers, studying modern science:
They say the experiment's too dangerous
For old, time-honoured bulwarks of the Church,
And bid us try Stinkomalee. The bigots!
I'll tame their pride and open all their ports.
I'll have a Meeting, nay, a Synagogue.
The pompous Pharisee shall walk their streets
With broad phylacteries and Rabbi, Rabbi.
Why not? as well as stand with bated breath
And lifted cap, saluting Heads and Proctors——
Johnny, wake up, boy.

JOHN. What's the matter, governor?

COT. Johnny, my precious, do you love Papa?

JOHN. Ay, when Mamma will let me.

COT. Never mind her.
(*Aside.*) She's troublesome at times, spends lots of money,
Gives herself airs, is fond of patronizing
Her high-bred kinsmen, asks them to my house,
Finds them in bed and board, and all the while
I know the puppies laugh behind my back.
But still 'tis something to be hand and glove
With men who wear clean shirts and know good manners:
I can't afford to quarrel. (*Aloud.*) No, my boy,
Mamma won't meddle here; 'tis no great matter:
Only to rap a few proud parsons' knuckles.

JOHN. That all! I'm ready. Bishops? Deans and Chapters?

COT. No, not just yet. "Commission to examine
The discipline, state, studies, and revenues
Of Oxford and of Cambridge."

JOHNNY (*Musing*). The revenues.
How strange, I never thought of that before.
They're influential bodies. Can I venture?
So short a notice. Shall I? Courage, Johnny!
(*Aloud*) 'Tis done. Five minutes time is all I ask
To manage any patriotic task.

SCENE II.

Front of the Room in Downing Street.

JOHNNY *enters and knocks.* THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION *opens.*

SEC. For whom thus rudely pleads our loud-tongued gate
That he may enter?
JOHN. 'Tis the Premier, John.
SEC. Why did you knock so loud? You nearly spoiled
The neatest, cleverest problem in Statistics.
Our Chief Commissioner was solving it
Just when you rapped.
JOHN. What was it? pray do tell me.
SEC. Our Chief Commissioner was calculating
How many College Fellowships would keep
The new Professors of the Board of Science.
JOHN. A very knotty point. How did he solve it?
SEC. Oh, in the cleverest way. He took himself,
A hypothetical case, of course, and sent
For all his last year's bills, summed up and reckoned,
"Add twice as much for Frau Professorinn,
Three times for olive-branches yet unborn,
A margin left for sundries, and another
For rainy days and failures of the scheme,
Eight hundred pounds will just suffice per annum."
JOHN. Odds Dos and Dodges! What a ready reckoner!
But who's to pay the piper?
SEC. That he settled
By a still cleverer plan. He made a schedule,
Picked out four Colleges, Magdalen and Corpus,
Merton and All Souls; then he calculated:
"Six Fellowships of Corpus, six of Merton,
Twice six of Magdalen, four times six of All Souls,
Will make provision for fourteen Professors."
JOHN. By Hermes, god of thieves, a shrewd device!
And after that, can we admire our Founders?
Mere wasteful Donors, ignorant of Economy,
Private, Political, and t'other kind
Which Newman used to join with φενακισμός.
I never heard of money raised so well.

I long to be his pupil. Open quickly!
Laverna! What a calculating face!
SEC. That is the Chief himself.
JOHN. And who those ladies?
SEC. Physical Sciences. The first's Pneumatics.
JOHN. What can she do?
SEC. She teaches men of science
Clever contrivances to raise the wind.
The next is Mensuration. She's to measure
Incomes of Fellowships.
JOHN. Which? the Professors'?
SEC. No, all the rest. Look at her map. That's All Souls.
JOHN. How thin and shrunk it looks.
SEC. 'Tis just cut down.
From forty Fellowships remain sixteen,
Deducting four and twenty for Professors.
JOHN. Hermes! that beats Vidocq.—Commissioner!
COMMISSIONER. Who calls so loud?
JOHN. I, John the Minister;
Teach me, I beg, your mode of raising money.
'Twill help our budget wondrously. That Wood
Is a mere stick at figures, and Joe Skinflint
Bothers us with his items and his tottles
Out of our very places. Can't you teach me
A good Exchequer trick? you'll find me apt,
A ready pupil. Will you be my tutor?
COM. Tutor! benighted wretch! didst thou say Tutor?
Who talks of Tutors now? The coin's not current.
Professors, man, Professors are the thing.
They'll mould and model English education
On the best German plan: 'tis quite delightful
To see how German Students learn of them.
No bigotry, no narrow-minded feeling,
Nothing sectarian. In their very songs
They praise the Pope, who leads a jolly life,
And wish to be the Sultan.
JOHN. Can I see them,
These wonderful Professors?
COM. I'll invoke them.
Listen, august Professors, ye who teach

Physics with Oken, and proclaim to man
In the beginning how the heavens and earth
Rose from the eternal Nothing. Ye who scan
The Universe of Being, and reveal
How Werden, eldest born of Seyn and Nichts,
Gave birth to Daseyn, whence in long succession
The world of Thought and Substance. Ye who fathom
The hidden myths of Scripture and the essence
Of Worship, Function of Psychology,—
I summon you, appear.

Enter CHORUS OF PROFESSORS.

STROPHE *or* TWIST.

Professors we,
From over the sea,
From the land where Professors in plenty be;
And we thrive and flourish, as well we may,
In the land that produced one Kant with a K
And many Cants with a C.
Where Hegel taught, to his profit and fame,
That something and nothing were one and the same;
The absolute difference never a jot being
'Twixt having and not having, being and not being,
But wisely declined to extend his notion
To the finite relations of thalers and groschen.
Where, reared by Oken's plastic hands,
The Eternal Nothing of Nature stands;
And Theology sits on her throne of pride,
As Arithmetic personified;
And the hodmandod crawls, in its shell confined,
A symbol exalted of slumbering mind.
Bacon, be dumb,
Newton, be mum;
The worth of induction's a snap of the thumb.
With a bug, bug, bug, and a hum, hum, hum,*
Hither the true Philosophers come.

COM. All hail, revered Professors. Didst thou note
The eloquence and wisdom of their strain?

* These emphatic monosyllables, like the κόγξ ὄμπαξ of the Mysteries, are supposed to have an esoteric meaning, known only to the initiated.

JOHN. Faith, how I wish I had them in the House
To talk down opposition. Do you think
They would take office?
COM. Hark, they sing again.

ANTISTROPHE *or* COUNTER-TWIST.

Theologians we,
Deep thinkers and free,
From the land of the new Divinity;
Where Critics hunt for the sense sublime,
Hidden in texts of the olden time,
Which none but the sage can see.
Where Strauss shall teach you how Martyrs died
For a moral idea personified,
A myth and a symbol, which vulgar sense
Received for historic evidence.
Where Bauer can prove that true Theology
Is special and general Anthropology,
And the essence of worship is only to find
The realized God in the human mind.
Where Feuerbach shows how Religion began
From the deified feelings and wants of man,
And the Deity owned by the mind reflective,
Is Human Consciousness made objective.
Presbyters, bend,
Bishops, attend;
The Bible's a myth from beginning to end.
With a bug, bug, bug, and a hum, hum, hum,
Hither the true Theologians come.

JOHN. And is this really the new German light,
The true philosophy of everything?
COM. No, not of everything: you've only heard
The Exoteric Teaching, freely showered
Upon the vulgar ear. If thou wilt be
Our patron and disciple, thou shalt know
The Inner Doctrine. Thou shalt hear a strain
Such as Eleusis never heard of old
Amid the initiate: such as Egypt's priests
Ne'er sang at Sais' shrine, what time they worshipp'd
Isis, the symbol of the Unconditioned:

Such as ne'er rose when Æon Demiurgus
Was hymned in Gnostic Ecstasy; nor when
Spinoza, the Acosmist, preached his God
The One and All, the Universal Substance.

HYMN TO THE INFINITE, BY THE FULL CHORUS.

The voice of yore,
Which the breezes bore
Wailing aloud from Paxo's shore,
Is changed to a gladder and livelier strain,
For great God Pan is alive again,
He lives and he reigns once more.
With deep intuition and mystic rite
We worship the Absolute-Infinite,
The Universe-Ego, the Plenary-Void,
The Subject-Object identified,
The great Nothing-Something, the Being-Thought,
That mouldeth the mass of Chaotic Nought,
Whose beginning unended and end unbegun
Is the One that is All and the All that is One.
Hail Light with Darkness joined!
Thou Potent Impotence!
Thou Quantitative Point
Of all Indifference!
Great Non-Existence, passing into Being,
Thou two-fold Pole of the Electric One,
Thou Lawless Law, thou Seer all Unseeing,
Thou Process, ever doing, never done!
Thou Positive Negation!
Negative Affirmation!
Thou great Totality of every thing
That never is, but ever doth become,
Thee do we sing,
The Pantheists' King,
With ceaseless bug, bug, bug, and endless hum, hum, hum.

COM. There was a strain, whose tones of dulcet grandeur
Might rouse Inertness from her bed of down,

Might check the eager blood of Youth, when glows
The heyday of the passions, might bring down
The pride of pompous Dons, and charm the ear
Of Academic millions, make Debauch
Cast off the sickening fumes of midnight's revel,
And Carelessness grow convert to Attention.
Sublime Professors! Did you understand it?

JOHN. Not quite, I own. But can we have all this
Only for eight and forty fellowships?

COM. All this, and more.

JOHN. One little scruple pricks me.
The Colleges, I've heard reformers say,
Were private institutions, quite distinct
From the great public University.
Now, if one feature of your reformation
Is to restore the University
As independent, how will you defend
The endowing it from College property?

COM. By one good reason. It will give the Crown
Twelve thousand pounds a-year of patronage
Raised out of College lands.

JOHN. I'm satisfied.

COM. I'll make the thing still clearer. All your scruples
If you have any scruples left, will vanish,
Let it but please you hear our two Discourses.
The one's a Tory, of the good old school,
Honest, but ignorant, bigoted, pig-headed,
A staunch Protectionist, a Church-and-State-man,
Marring the certainties of Social Science
With crude, old-fashioned dreams of Providence.
The other, a Stump-Orator from Manchester,
Quick-tongued and brazen-faced, a hustings-spouter,
A demagogue, an out-and-out Free Trader,
Goes with the Spirit of the Age, and knows
All branches of Political Economy.
We'll call them, if you please, the Just and Unjust,
Mere *noms de guerre*, of course, for justice, really,
Is what the law commands, and what the law
Commands is what the people's wants require.
This time, I back the Unjust, and will bet

My reputation as a sound reformer
Against the best Professorship when founded,
He beats his rival in the argument.
Then listen, while our disputants define
The nature, end, and laws of *mine* and *thine*.

SCENE III.

Enter JUST DISCOURSE *and* UNJUST DISCOURSE.

U. D. Where be they, the dreaming dotards, bigots of the olden time,
Purblind patrons of abuses, champions of corruption's slime,
Pudding-headed, narrow-minded, noddynoodledoodlenincompoops, who doubt our right of dealing as we please with college income?

J. D. Where be they, the shameless spoilers, violating private right,
Riding roughshod over justice, crushing equity with might,
Turning from its proper channels wealth our fathers' bounty left,
Sullying reform with rapine, public ends with private theft?

U. D. Theft, my friend? the gods have pity on your weak and watery brain!
How can they who own the total steal a portion? pray explain.
Men in nature's state are equal: property conferred by laws,
From the sanction of the people all its rights and safeguards draws.
You but hold it at their pleasure, you must yield it at their summons:
And the pleasure of the people, seek it in the House of Commons.

J. D. Have you then no higher standards, fixed ere human laws began
By the voice of man's Creator, by the moral sense of man?
Rules may alter, codes may perish, customs change, but these abide,
Truths no practice can abolish, no enactment override.
Vain the fine-drawn web of sophisms, vain the brazen mail of lies;
Means condemned by God and Conscience, no expedience justifies.

U. D. Moral Sense! a mere delusion: prejudice of education
Amiable in individuals, childish weakness in a nation.
Pious scruples, tender conscience, doubtless suit a private station;
Public interest's the rule for all enlightened legislation.
So in debts; one's private duty pleads, perhaps, for liquidation:
In a free enlightened people, who shall blame repudiation?
J. D. Yet bethink thee that the spirit whence those princely bounties flowed
To the ties of private feeling all its force and being owed.
Severed from the bonds of kindred, taught his lonely heart to school
By his Father's chastening kindness or his Church's sterner rule,
Oft to spots by memory cherished, where his earliest love began,
In his age's desolation, fondly turned the childless man.
Then the quickening drops of kindness through the drooping soul were felt
From the home his youth that nurtured, from the church where first he knelt.
Then the long-neglected feelings claimed once more their moving part,
And the pent-up tide of bounty forced its passage through the heart.
U. D. Stuff and nonsense! why should feeling public spirit clog and cumber,
When the greatest happiness is wanted for the greatest number?
Private ties, you can't disprove it if you argue to eternity,
Hamper in their narrow fetters Cosmopolitan Fraternity.
Close Foundations, limited to one particular locality,
Might as well be left to foster open vice and immorality:
I should feel far more compunction, laying hands to spoil and pillage
On the brothel of an empire than the college of a village.
J. D. Shameless Robber!
U. D. Owl-eyed Bigot!
J. D. Hear'st thou, Heaven, and sleeps thy thunder?
Right Divine proclaimed for rapine, Laws invoked to sanction plunder!

Take a warning in thy triumph. Godless power is frail to trust;
Sure the millstone of His vengeance; late it grinds, but grinds to dust.
Search the tale of fallen nations. Justice banished, rights forgot.
History's record tells the sequel. Seek her place, and she is not.
U. D. Worn-out notions, musty fancies, redolent of Church and King,
Guardian-Angels, George-and-Dragons, that old-fashioned sort of thing.
Master spirits, leading statesmen, all to circumstances bow:
Public Conscience, State Religion, even Gladstone scouts them now.
Tut, man, look to facts and figures: truce to all this idle bustle:
Bluff King Hal is praised in Christchurch; plundered Woburn breeds a Russell.
Look at France's half-fledged eaglet, gazing with undazzled eye
On the sunbeams of his glory, and the Orleans property.
Look at Prussia's champion-heroes, men in freedom's tale immortal,
Chalking "national possession" on their tyrant's palace portal.
Look at England's Church Commission, holy work, by Bishops blest,
Half your Chapters burked already; Blandford's bill will do the rest.
If you bandy rights and duties, great reforms will ne'er begin.
Give the cards a thorough shuffle: cut again; first knave to win.
J. D. 'Tis in vain, I see, to argue. Modern light must have its way.
Public morals sapped and rotted, knaves must even win the day.
Fare thee well. Should after-ages bring to pass the scene foretold,
When our future is a memory, and our days are days of old;
When New Zealand's travelled native from some ruined arch looks down
On old Thames's silent current, London's desolated town:
On the banks no groaning warehouse, on the stream no flag unfurled,
Where the second Carthage traded long ago with half a world;

Then if History's bitter lesson wake the patriot's anxious care,
Thus the warning voice may mingle in the accents of his prayer.
Thou that hold'st the fate of nations in the scales of Justice weighed,
Not alone 'gainst foreign armies; 'gainst ourselves we ask thy aid.
Never may my country's counsels traffic's sordid spirit feel,
Selling birthrights, cheapening pottage, trading with a nation's weal.
Never may a craven pilot at our vessel's helm preside,
Swayed by mob-tongued agitation, taking demagogues for guide,
Truckling to the voice of faction, listening for the loudest cry,
Gauging pressures, measuring noises, what to grant and what deny.
Never may the scoundrel maxims * of a money-making band
Pawn the charter of our freedom, blight the sinews of our land.
Thou whose gifts are might and wisdom, purge from mists my country's eyes;
Teach her in the hour of trial where alone her safety lies;
Bid her scorn the shout of faction, bid her spurn the lust of pelf,
Trusting still through good and evil in her God and in herself.
And if ever public feeling, led by selfish tongues astray,
Gloat o'er traffic's heaped-up riches, smile when Church and State decay,
Though our blindness ask our curses, still do Thou vouchsafe to bless,
Spare us England's tradesmen-senate, spare her cotton-spun success.

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* "A penny saved is a penny got:
Firm to this scoundrel maxim keepeth he,
Ne of its rigour will he bate a jot,
Till it has quenched his fire, and banished his pot."
Castle of Indolence.

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